"Expressed in its ultimate terms, the struggle for the Mediterranean during the past fifty years has been a contest for its mastery waged by two non-Mediterranean powers. The Germany of today continues the struggle of Wilhelm II which was frustrated in the years 1914 to 1918. The Mediterranean powers themselves, whether wittingly or not, have functioned to serve the ends of one or the other. The Triple Alliance was smashed by the Great War, but essentially, because of certain commitments which continued in force, the Triple Entente remained, even though it was no longer referred to by that name. Italy, France, Spain, and Russia—in this order these countries had become the pivots of Britain's Mediterranean strategy. But within the last ten years the equilibrium that Britain had built up in the Mediterranean began to get out of balance and fall apart. Russia, Italy, Spain, and France—this was the order in which these countries withdrew from that equilibrium.
Immediately after the Great War Britain showed a hostility toward Russia that amounted to a rejection of Russian friendship. France, pursuing a realistic policy, entered into a partnership with Russia for purposes of defense, but the Tory Government of England pursued a course aimed at breaking up this partnership. It was not until Germany invaded Czecho-Slovakia in March, 1989, that Britain's statesmen realized they had made a mistake. England then set to work feverishly to undo what it had done and to try to bring Russia into a triple partnership with herself and France. The fiasco that resulted is known to everyone. The Russian abandonment of Britain and France created anew the old Russian threat at the Dardanelles, in the Balkans, at Suez, and toward the East.
The British Government's secret acquiescence in Italy's invasion of Ethiopia, which was revealed by the Hoare-Laval agreement and by the half-hearted sanctions so riddled with loopholes, weakened the British system of defense in the Red Sea. The most serious effect of British complacency toward Italy, however, was the encouragement it gave to the Fascist government. Had Italy been effectively stopped in Ethiopia, as she might have been, it is hardly likely that she would soon have embarked on a new venture in Spain. Nor would she have got very far toward becoming a partner of Germany, for Italy was at that time exceedingly jealous of Germany and had not yet joined the partnership…"
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