"M4 Sherman Tank - Crew tell how shocking it was " Topic

Well I wish you would use those books to tell us where you found that killer fact that US tankers couldn't hit a barn door!

For a start that is not Speer's quote

So what book did you get the Speer quote from and what is the context?

By the way does this:

Also, according to reports from the 26.Panzer-Division, the terrain-crossing ability on level ground (in the Po valley) is completely superior to our Panzers.

mean that the troops that said it were………….liars?

Panthers also had poor welding on the joints and the inferior armour plate can be seen to have completely shattered in several wrecks. Late war German welding was found to be sub-standard by Allied Technical examiners with too much packing in joints because quality took second place to getting tanks out the factory doors.
All this can be traced back to a tank rushed into service before the bugs were ironed out.

So what book did you get the Speer quote from and what is the context?

Do try and pay attention. I didn't quote it, Mark did. I was tempted to say go look it up for yourself as that seems to be your standard response, but I will oblige you. As I said I don't have my books with me, but I am pretty sure it comes from Jentz' Panzertruppen Vol.2. It will be in the chapter on the defence of Italy.

As I said I don't have my books with me, but I am pretty sure it comes from Jentz' Panzertruppen Vol.2. It will be in the chapter on the defence of Italy.

Jentz, Panzertruppen 2 page 150-151 as a matter of fact. I did an OCR of it several years ago and posted it on a number of forums. In fact the version posted here is identical in every respect to my copy which I just cut and paste when needed.

Panthers also had poor welding on the joints and the inferior armour plate can be seen to have completely shattered in several wrecks. Late war German welding was found to be sub-standard by Allied Technical examiners with too much packing in joints because quality took second place to getting tanks out the factory doors.
All this can be traced back to a tank rushed into service before the bugs were ironed out.

And up pops another red herring so you can actually avoid having to provide the evidence you have been asked for. The welds were poor, because the armour plate was made with high carbon steel at that late stage of the war as the Germans had run out of the alloys needed to make high quality armour plate. That was also the reason the armour tended to shatter with repeated hits, it was too brittle. Nothing to do with the Panther being rushed into service, everything to do with the lack of access to natural resources.
I suggest you go back to those books you have been acquiring over the last 50 years and read them properly!

Do try and pay attention. I didn't quote it, Mark did.

And the reason I asked you instead of Mark for a quote I already knew about is because I made one mistake in my post. I meant to ask you:

So what book did you get the Bayerlein quote from and what is the context?

mean that the troops that said it were………….liars?

Actually come to think about if it was 26th PD, from memory they spent most of ‘44 without a Panther battalion, so their report might have referred to Panzer IV's. If you have Panzertruppen you could check it.

I suggest you go back to those books you have been acquiring over the last 50 years and read them properly!

I did they are B.I.O.S. Final Report No 614 Item No 18 Welding Design & Fabrication Of German Tank Hulls and Turrets
and
Watertown Arsenal Experimental Report 710/750 Metallurgical Examination Of Armor And Welded Joints From The Side Of A German PzKw (Panther) Tank

Very interesting information of the poor quality of both armour and welding on German tanks

The welds were poor, because the armour plate was made with high carbon steel at that late stage of the war as the Germans had run out of the alloys needed to make high quality armour plate

Incorrect. The welding was bad because the joints were poorly cut and the interlocking plates had large gaps. The welders did not do a good enough job of filling these gaps because quality control was never allowed to get in the way of getting complete tanks out of the factory gate. Poor workmanship was the cause of the welding failures.

So what book did you get the Bayerlein quote from and what is the context?

Again do try and pay attention and actually read my posts properly. Here is my post.
"I think it was Zaloga in Armoured Thunderbolt that quotes Fritz Bayerlin saying of the Panther "An ideal vehicle for tank battles and infantry support."
And as I have said I don't have my books with me at the moment so can't check the context, but will do so when I get the chance.

Oh naughty, naughty I knew I had seen this quote online before, it is lifted straight off the Wiki Panther page!

While the PzKpfw IV could still be used to advantage, the PzKpfw V [Panther] proved ill adapted to the terrain. The Sherman because of its maneuverability and height was good … [the Panther was] poorly suited for hedgerow terrain because of its width. Long gun barrel and width of tank reduce maneuverability in village and forest fighting. It is very front-heavy and therefore quickly wears out the front final drives, made of low-grade steel. High silhouette. Very sensitive power-train requiring well-trained drivers. Weak side armor; tank top vulnerable to fighter-bombers. Fuel lines of porous material that allow gasoline fumes to escape into the tank interior causing a grave fire hazard. Absence of vision slits makes defense against close attack impossible.

Oh naughty, naughty I knew I had seen this quote online before, it is lifted straight off the Wiki Panther page!

check page 82 of Panzer Lehr Division 1944-45

link

I want the source of the source of the Bayerlein quote. Where did Zaloga say the original quote can be found. I want to check it.

Incorrect. The welding was bad because the joints were poorly cut and the interlocking plates had large gaps.

But the reason the plates were poorly cut was the poor quality of the steel which was difficult to machine and weld, but the pressures which the factories were under to churn them out must have had an effect. It still had nothing to do with the Panther being rushed I to service.

Please try and read what I have written so I don't have to keep typing the same thing!
"And as I have said I don't have my books with me at the moment so can't check the context, but will do so when I get the chance."

It still had nothing to do with the Panther being rushed I to service.

Why not read your preferred Wiki page?

To achieve the goal of higher production rates, numerous simplifications were made to the design and its manufacture. This process was aggressively pushed forward, sometimes against the wishes of designers and army officers, by the Chief Director of Armament and War Production, Karl-Otto Saur (who worked under, and later succeeded, Reichminister Speer). Consequently, the final drive was changed to a double spur system.[ Although much simpler to produce, the double spur gears had inherently higher internal impact and stress loads, making them prone to failure under the high torque requirements of the heavy Panther tank. Because of the significant numbers of breakdowns, the Wehrmacht was forced to move the Panther D and Tiger I tanks by rail, throughout 1943.

As a result of the rush to get the Panther into service it had a very weak final drive. A fatal design flaw. If it were an Allied tank this fault would mean it would be rejected as a design. The Germans ignored the problems and so had a tank that broke down in the 100s and the troops lose their confidence and in some situations abandon the whole vehicle just because of this problem

As a result of the rush to get the Panther into service it had a very weak final drive. A fatal design flaw.

And that is relevant to weld quality how?
The design trade offs in moving the Panther to series production are well documented in Jentz' Panther book, Zaloga covers it too in the Osprey IIRC and Guderian devotes a considerable amount of space to his "problem child" in Panzer Leader. The alternate final drive cost more and took more man hours to produce and a decision was made to go with the cheaper one. With a well trained driver it was good for 1,500 km, which was fine when they had the time and fuel to train drivers properly, but a real problem when they didn't. Incidentally 1,500 km was the life span that the Russians built the T34 for and many consider that a genius move!

If it were an Allied tank this fault would mean it would be rejected as a design.

Really? Tell that to the British tankers who had to endure some truly awful designs early war as evidenced by the numbers of tanks lost to breakdowns in France and the desert.

Really? Tell that to the British tankers who had to endure some truly awful designs early war as evidenced by the numbers of tanks lost to breakdowns in France and the desert

France 1940 was not France 1944. The panther entered service in mid 1943 so a more apt comparison would be with Allied tanks from that date. I would really like to see someone try and make a case that Allied tanks had low readiness rates v an opposing German Unit. Plenty of designs for up-gunned and/or up-armoured Sherman replacements were trialed
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but none reached the battlefield because they were deemed mechanically unreliable or impracticable.

The panther entered service in mid 1943 so a more apt comparison would be with Allied tanks from that date.

You would hope they would be more reliable as they had 2 years to perfect the design. But the first reliable British tank was the Cromwell and that didn't go I to service until 1944, despite the design being started in 1941! 3 years to produce a tank is a rather leisurely pace in war time and we were fortunate to have US tanks to equip most of the armoured divisions or we would have gone into NWE with a single armoured division equipped with Cromwell's and a few battalions of Churchills. The alternative would have been to take the unreliable Centaur to war.

Fred C wrote – "Actually come to think about if it was 26th PD, from memory they spent most of ‘44 without a Panther battalion, so their report might have referred to Panzer IV's. If you have Panzertruppen you could check it."

According to Jentz, as of Jan 1944, 26th PD was equipped with a mix of Mk III 50mm L60 and 75mm L24 + Mk IV 75mm long and 75mm L24 + Stugs. At some point later in 1944, the division received a number (41?) of Stugs which IIRC replaced some of the older tanks. None of these tanks had engines rated more than 300hp and the Mk III's had a ground pressure =/> 14 lbs/sq in. Note – at one point or another during 1944, some Mk Vs from 4th Pzr Rgt were attached to 26PD.

While on the subject of comparative hill-climbing ability, here is an excerpt from a US Army report of Jan 1945 – "The first operation was on a 28pct dirt slope that was frozen solid and partially covered in ice. The Panther tank negotiated this slope in both directions with ease and there was virtually no track slippage, even during steering. Medium Tank M4 equipped with the chevron steel grouser tracks T54E1, and with the rubber block track T51 equipped with a standard grouser on every block were unable to climb the slope. A heavy tank T26E3 equipped with a modified T81 track was also unable to climb the slope. This modified T81 track varies from the standard track in that it has high grousers for additional traction."

It is true that German heavy RHA produced in the last half of 1944 was found to vary considerably in quality, depending upon factory of manufacture. Brittleness was the most common defect, due (IMO) to a dire shortage of critical alloys and short-cuts undertaken in the manufacturing process (heat-treating, rolling, etc) to maximize production output and conserve energy.

Jentz's book, "Germany's Panther Tank – The Quest for Combat Supremacy" and M & G Green's "Panther – Germany's Quest for Combat Dominance" give good overviews of the design and development of the Panther tank.

B

But the first reliable British tank was the Cromwell and that didn't go I to service until 1944, despite the design being started in 1941! 3 years to produce a tank is a rather leisurely pace in war time and we were fortunate to have US tanks to equip most of the armoured divisions or we would have gone into NWE with a single armoured division equipped with Cromwell's and a few battalions of Churchills. The alternative would have been to take the unreliable Centaur to war.

The Centaur/Cavalier/Cromwell are all the same tank. Engines were the difference,
7th AD was entirely Cromwell and the recce Regiments of 11th AD, Guards AD and Polish AD all used Cromwells.
Some Centaurs did got to war in Normandy

I've heard the loss ratio of M4's vs. Tigers was as high as 11:1. But considering that Shermans probably outnumbered Tigers by a greater ratio the math was still decidedly in favor of the Sherman.

I'll bring up again Stalin's much quoted and cliched observation that "quantity has a quality all its own," but I'm sure that's small consolation to the brave Sherman crews who died fighting under this war-winning strategy.

I'm missing something in this nice friendly discussion. What exactly do the shortcomings of German armor plate and welding have to do with the original question? Please enlighten me. Thanks!

What exactly do the shortcomings of German armor plate and welding have to do with the original question? Please enlighten me.

About as much as the Youtube link in the OP has to do with the real story of the M4.

This is the internet. Clicks are the prize. The more heated the debate the more viewers.

mkenny +1

Ok. So I'll get sucked in. I'm not even going to bother trying to quote chapter and verse but IIRC tactical maneuverability depends largely on three factors. Steering, hp to weigh and ground pressure aka flotation.

The M4 had good hp ratio compared to some German tanks, hence the comments from German tankers in Italy make sense. But it had worse flotation than the Panther. I believe they added track extenders called duckbills in NW Europe to overcome this. So the US tanker comments from that Theater about Panzers crossing soft fields make sense. Gotta take eye witness comments in context.

Also believe the steering on German tanks allowed tighter turns than US tanks. A factor in Western European towns.

What I find most interesting is that when the Germans with their lightly armed and armored panzers ran rings around the Franch tanks with better guns and armor in 1940 they were hailed as supermen. Move to 1944 where US tanks with weaker armor and smaller guns ran the Germans out of France and the verdict is we had crappy tanks. Double standard? Cheers!

I posted one quote, one statement taken directly from a participant at the time, and managed to generate 2 pages of argumentation.

I think that's a record for me.

Not that it was what I intended, mind you. But still I am impressed by how many posts were stimulated by efforts to react to, imbue meaning into, and contradict a single piece of historical content.

The one point I would like to make, that was in fact my intention in posting the passage, is that "been there, did that" perspectives are useful, valid inputs, but any one "been there, did that" perspective is just one perspective. Take a US general who was there and says "Shermans were inferior to all the German stuff", and match it up to a German general who was there and says "Shermans were better than all our stuff" -- you don't have to respond by saying "He was there -- are you calling him a liar!?!" Neither one is lying. They are providing their testimony, their perspective. Any two witnesses to an event will describe it differently. Doesn't mean one is right or one is wrong. Only means they saw things differently.

And more importantly, it doesn't mean that those who try to analyze and understand what actually happened should be criticized for not accepting any one account (even if it is your personal favorite account) as the revealed gospel.

I've heard the loss ratio of M4's vs. Tigers was as high as 11:1. But considering that Shermans probably outnumbered Tigers by a greater ratio the math was still decidedly in favor of the Sherman.

A reasonable consideration.

There are several ratios that might be examined. Loss rate of one vs. the other may indeed be interesting, but as you state the inference drawn from that ratio should be viewed within the added light of the ratio of numbers deployed.

Tiger units took 100% losses in many compaigns. None of the Tigers sent to Normandie survived to cross the Seine at the end of the campaign. Not one.

So also all the Tigers sent to Tunisia were lost. Not one survived.

There are several campaigns on the Eastern front where the surviving crews of Tiger units returned with no tanks.

I'd be interested to see how many of the Tigers deployed in the Ardennes / Battle of the Bulge actually managed to survive the campaign. I believe some did, but I haven't seen a count of how many.

Sherman units, on the other hand, were almost always at reasonable combat strength in tanks after major campaigns.

Now part of the reason was the supply flow. But even in Normandie, the number of Tigers ultimately deployed was significantly larger than the number of Tigers initially deployed (ie: there was a flow of Tigers).

Another part of the reason was that the Allies were advancing. As others have noted, many of the big cats, whether Tigers, Panthers, whatever, were lost because they could not be recovered as the Germans retreated. So of course, that hardly counts, right? Except, well, what's the measure of success of a tank if not that it helps your army win and advance?

But on the other side, we can say that there are/were many factors that contribute to one side advancing and the other retreating. So let's not blithely assert that the reason the allies were winning was because they had Shermans. Which is appropriate. Just as it is appropriate to suggest that the reason the Germans won against the French in 1940 was not that they had Pz 38ts and Pz IIIs vs. Char Bs and S-35s. And the reason the Germans won against the Russians in 1941 was that they had Pz IIIs and Pz IVs against T-28s and KV-1s, and the reason the Russians won against the Germans in 1944 was that they had T-34s against Panthers and Tigers.

See, there is in fact a pattern here. The side that has the more mobile tank force seems to be the winning side. The pattern repeats. It's not a matter so much of tactical mobility (zooming around the battlefield) as it is operational mobility (concentrating force and applying it at the place and time of your choosing).

When German armored formations were called on to move anything more more than 20km or so, they started looking for railheads and train schedules. The Allies quite regularly redirected armored forces 100km or more in one or two days, just by consulting a map and assigning road routes (and sometimes not even worrying about roads).

I'm sure that's small consolation to the brave Sherman crews who died fighting under this war-winning strategy.

While I agree that any perspective derived by sitting in comfort in a chair reading books or online documents gives small comfort to those who fought and suffered through the fire and blood, I also find some objection to the oft-stated conclusion that Sherman crew paid some comparatively heavy price.

So far, at least, I have found NO evidence that the choice of the Sherman tank as the main allied combat tank in 1943/44/45 lead to disproportionate allied casualties.

Winning is better than losing. Shermans won. They won VERY consistently. The allied casualty rates were less, not more, because of the Sherman.

Fewer Americans became casualties in battles where Shermans were present, than in battles where Shermans were not present. This is because the cold truth was that, despite whatever we may think about Panthers or Tigers, the probability of an individual US tank crewman becoming a casualty in ETO was substantially less than the probability of an individual US infantryman becoming a casualty, and there were a lot more infantry than tankers, and every time tanks showed up infantry casualties went down.

There was nothing callous in the calculation. Tanks saved lives. More tanks saved more lives. Sure, it was a dangerous job. Every job at the pointy end of the spear was dangerous. But having an advantage in tanks, a significant advantage in tanks, was clearly a way to get more fighting and winning done for a lower price in lives.

And BTW the same is true for artillery -- more guns, better artillery doctrine and capability also meant fewer infantry casualties. And the same is true for close air support. And for engineering equipment, and medical services. etc etc. There's nothing magic about it, and it shouldn't be controversial among those who actually study the war.

Yet somehow, many carry this impression that those poor Sherman tankers were sacrificed at the alter of bureaucratic intransigence. This is the perspective that baffles me. Where is it in the data? Where are all the dead Sherman crewmen? Sure, I'd rather be in a Tiger than a Sherman -- ON THE BATTLEFIELD. But in the war? Tiger crews were losers, and Sherman crews were winners, and building Tigers was a losing plan, while building Shermans was a winning plan.

BTW given that American logistics were many multiples more difficult than German logistics I think it is pretty clear that building Tigers would have been even MORE of a losing plan for the Americans than for the Germans. But given the petroleum imbalance it might be reasonably debatable whether building Shermans would have been a winning plan for the Germans.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)