"Promotion by purchase better than promotion by "merit"? " Topic

Well no. You've cut lots of campaigns because they did not affect"Europe". That is rubbish.

The issue is if the British could be succesfull without Welly.
So who they fight and it's greater contribution to the war against Napoleon is immaterial. Though I must admit in my last list I DID add Wellingtons succesfull campaign in aswell. So the issue needs to consider ALL British army actions. I excluded operations conducted by only the Navy, or events only involving Emigre m/French Royalists UNLESS British troops were actually there. Trying to jerrymander the conditions to exclude as many successful campaigns as you can does not help with any meaningful analysis.

In 1792-1815 without Wellington
They won the majority of their battles. 149/192 that I could count.
They won the majority of their conflicts…. and even when they lost these they had still won battles.

Clearly "they only did well with Wellington" is highly misleading if not outright wrong. Would you also say "the French only did well with Napoleon"?

Nope-sorry.

The issue is that without Wellington in Europe (which I probably should have set the parameters) and being part of the Napoleonic wars the British didn't do very well.

That's fact if you look where the British were unsuccessful.

And, again, if you win battles but lose a campaign, as in southern Italy in 1806, it's a loss.

The problem is gentlemen, you overlook the reason why purchase introduced.

It came in the wake of the English Commonwealth between 1649-1660 which effectively degenerated into a military government running the country under martial law.

Following the Restoration in 1660 the army was naturally distrusted. This was exacerbated by the action of James II that resulted in the Glorious Revolution of 1688 who employed foreign mercenary officers.

Purchase ensured that officers came from a branch of society that had a stake in the country. Poor foreigners living on their wits and experience would not have the link to the state. The religious requirement to be a member of the Anglican (Episcopalian) Church further strengthened that link.

Now promotion was also allowed by merit and above the rank of Colonel commissions could not be purchased. In addition, if you could get a junior commission, it was possible to be promoted to fill casualties. That gave a poor officer an asset that could be sold and provide them with a capital sum.

As the goalposts are apparently flexible ….
If you win campaigns but lose the war, it's a loss.
Britain, Austria, Prussia, Russia, ,Sweden, Spain, Portugal et al…..Win
France….Loss
Not a bad endorsement for "purchase" over "merit"?

The only problem is that it wasn't one war. There were seven coalitions against France which equates to wars with either treaties or agreements that ended each war.

France won the first five…in other words they defeated five coalitions against them, and Great Britain was a member of each one.

That's why the period, at least from 1803-1815 is called 'The Napoleonic Wars'-note the use of the plural.

You win the first five but lose the last one …. Loss

Try clutching at something more substantial?

There were seven coalitions of which Britain was a member precisely because France was unable to defeat Britain and prevent the formation of new coalitions. This was the case whether Britain was fighting France essentially alone or with all of Europe alongside her.

Britain was able in each case to mobilise proxies to do the land fighting in a new coalition, and herself remained an undefeated combatant even after the inept proxies were defeated. From Britain's perspective, there was a Revolutionary War from 1792 to 1802, one Napoleonic war from 1803 to 1814, and another very brief Napoleonic war in 1815.

So: did the purchase system enable the consistent string of tactical successes that ensured British armies were able to stay in the fight and defeat French ones (and French proxies) all over the world? Remember, this is not about the outcome of politically ill-chosen campaigns, or the bungling of militarily incompetent allies (which is all of them, by the way. Napoleon was toppled because he lost the 1812 campaign. The Russians didn't win it; he lost it. The allies lost every campaign they fought against France, until 1813 after the armistice, at which point they mobilised enormous numbers, and won. The exception to this is the Anglo-Portuguese campaign in the Peninsula, which liberated it).

This question is about whether the merit system produced better officers at a tactical level than did the purchase system.

Anyone who has worked in a modern office will have noticed that the reason people are promoted is always ascribed to merit (in the same way, corporate success is always ascribed to things like "teamwork" or "innovation" even if you're someone like Microsoft). Professing this is not, however, the same as the organisation actually being a meritocracy, because it all depends on how you are defining merit. People are promoted for being cronies, for being on-message, for being a member of a trendy minority, or for being good at their job; these are all clearly merits, otherwise nobody would be promoted for exhibiting them. They may be also passed over for promotion simply for not doing so.

I have no reason to think armies are any different, and hence I wonder whether giving people an equity stake in the army of the day might in fact have been a better way to extract high performance from officers.

As 138Squadron RAF said, the purpose of the purchase system in the British Army was not to produce the 'best' officers, at least as far as war-fighting went, but to produce a politically 'safe' army. Britain's wars were 'optional' rather then existential, the Navy protected the homeland, and depended on professional ability modified by connections.

Given that, it is perhaps remarkable how successful the British Army managed to be, although many of the most dire fashionable gentlemen officers sold out if their regiment was posted to some dangerous!

France won the first five…in other words they defeated five coalitions against them, and Great Britain was a member of each one.

That's why the period, at least from 1803-1815 is called 'The Napoleonic Wars'-note the use of the plural.

I'm English and not very good at Baseball analogies, but isn't that rather like saying "We did really well in the opening round of the playoffs, but we still lost the World Series."

There were seven coalitions of which Britain was a member precisely because France was unable to defeat Britain…

And it should be noted that Britain was unable to defeat France, especially on her own. And the raising of coalition after coalition was able to be done because of Britain supplying the coalition countries, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, with enough money and arms to be able to take the field. Especially in 1813-1814 none of those three countries could have fielded enough troops to fight without British subsidies.

Never mind Baseball – how about a football (soccer for the ex-colonials) analogy? In the FIFA World Cup Finals (note the use of the plural) how you play in the Group and Knockout stages is very important, but the guys who win the Final (coincidentally the seventh game) get their name on the trophy.

I think that it is at least arguable that if you win battles but lose a campaign- it's a loss. Though I guess that would mean that the French/Napoleon lost the 1812, 1813, 1814 and 1815 campaigns- which would be a pretty impressive record of consistent strategic defeat.

Even the record of inter-campaign recovery by the French in these years then just looks like someone bravely staggering up out of the pool of blood a bit weaker and more disheveled than the last time- but ending up in an ever more humiliating succession of proper hidings- until the final beating into ignominious submission. And we think the British celebrate failure…..

The late French are by far my favourite army, and I've just ordered a beautiful Dragoon helmet for my wargames room. Gosh I feel miserable now.

BTW- re the OP- I don't think it's quite right to say that the British adopted the purchase system because of the social stability it was thought to promote- although I think it did do that and so it may well have been a factor in keeping it for longer than most.
The purchase of commissions was becoming a popular feature of army management across Europe during the C17th. England and Scotland- with their tiny pre-ECW standing forces- obviously had very few commissions to sell, the exigencies of the ECW then meant free commissions were handed out by the King wholesale, and purchase was banned under the Commonwealth, but I think it was accepted as the way things should be done in civilised states.
It was effectively just re-adopted by Charles II and his successors, as one of the measures in the post Cromwellian return to 'normality'.

It should be noted that in 1813 there were two campaigns in Germany-the spring campaign and the campaign after the armistice. The French won the first one which prompted the Austrians to come in on the side of the allies.

Yep. After 1800 at least, and perhaps before – I'm a bit hazy about the early period – the French never lost a campaign except against the British, who defeated them in Egypt, Portugal, Spain, and Mauritius.

The French won in 1805, 1806, 1807, 1808, and 1809. They lost in 1812 (the Russians didn't win – they lost just as bad, but the French left Russia), and won in 1813 until the Austrians and then the Swedes came in against them.

Only with huge numerical advantage was it possible for continental armies to beat the French. Even then, they made heavy weather of it.

The exception was the British, and as there seems no reason to consider the enlisted men to have been any different, the explanation for consistent tactical and campaign success must arise from the leadership, whether junior or senior.

It's fairly clear from the composition of the Marshalate that military merit wasn't the only nor necessarily even the main factor in making marshal. One thinks of Bernadotte and Grouchy. Yet whatever it was seems to have worked better than what the continental armies relied on but not as well as what the British army relied on.

It's fairly clear from the composition of the Marshalate that military merit wasn't the only nor necessarily even the main factor in making marshal. One thinks of Bernadotte and Grouchy. Yet whatever it was seems to have worked better than what the continental armies relied on but not as well as what the British army relied on.

It is abundantly clear that the Marshalate was an entirely political body.

Not only in the people who became Marshals, but also in the people who didn't join the ranks – Berthier's number two, I forget his name, should have been chief of staff on the Armée du Nord in 1815. Or Gouvion-Saint-Cyr, who became embittered because less talented subordinates who were more political gained promotion in his stead.

They lost in 1812 (the Russians didn't win – they lost just as bad, but the French left Russia), and won in 1813 until the Austrians and then the Swedes came in against them.

That's hard to argue; yes, the Russian losses where very high, but they did fulfill their campaign objectives i they did not to join the Continental System and were to drive the invader from Holy Mother Russia. The French fairly obviously achieve none of their campaign objectives in the Great Patriot War of 1812.

The French won in 1805, 1806, 1807, 1808, and 1809. They lost in 1812 (the Russians didn't win – they lost just as bad, but the French left Russia), and won in 1813 until the Austrians and then the Swedes came in against them.

Only with huge numerical advantage was it possible for continental armies to beat the French. Even then, they made heavy weather of it.

If you are going to include "1808" as a separate campaign (I am assuming that you mean Napoleon's autumn invasion) then I think you have to include a Spanish campaign victory for summer 1808. Conversely, if one doesn't give this credit to the Spanish, then there seems no reason to give the French the credit either.

It should be noted that in 1813 there were two campaigns in Germany-the spring campaign and the campaign after the armistice. The French won the first one which prompted the Austrians to come in on the side of the allies.

Now if the Austrians were being pragmatic would not the logical thing to do would be to join the winning side? After all Austria could be rewarded a victorious Napoleon.

Presumably Austria expected to gain more from beating the French than from siding with them.

It is abundantly clear that the Marshalate was an entirely political body.

Berthier, Soult, Lannes, Davout, Mortier, Grouchy, Suchet, and many others of the marshalate were not politicians. All of the marshals were soldiers, and it is definitely true that some were promoted to marshal in order to bring the different armies together into one French army under Napoleon.

And there were four that were created as Senatorial Marshals.

That does not make them a political body. In point of fact, some like Victor were never particularly friendly towards Napoleon.

Bailly de Monthion is the assistant chief of staff in 1815 and I agree that he should have been made a marshal as well as chief of staff and major general. Vandamme should also have been made a marshal in 1815. Some of the best French generals were not given that grade for whatever reason.

Now if the Austrians were being pragmatic would not the logical thing to do would be to join the winning side?

What the Austrians should have done, if they were being honorable in any way, was to stay with their alliance with France. However, Francis never did display any personal honor.

Well maybe there were two campaigns in Germany in 1813, or one campaign with a break part way- with both armies remaining in position on a war footing both awaiting resupply and reinforcement- that's neither here nor there. We can say it's two, although the fact the 'first' had to end in an agreed six week armistice hardly qualifies it as a victorious campaign- whatever the outcome of its component battles (see earlier posts…).

As far as the strategic struggle for Germany in 1813 goes- the French/Napoleon did suffer almost total defeat by the end of that year. Aside from Hamburg and some smaller cities- the French were expelled from Germany by the allies.

As a result of the battles of Lutzen and Bautzen, the allies were driven back to the Oder. Blucher's Army of Silesia was located in the vicinity of Breslau. Bernadotte's Army of the North was centered on Berlin to the north.

Breslau is on the Oder, Berlin on the Spree, not too far from the Oder. Both are east of Leipzig-the first southeast and the second northeast. In April 1813 the armies were west of the Elbe.

@4th Cuirassier,

Whilst browsing the internet I found this link and thought of your OP. Perhaps you really are onto something!

After many years teaching successfully in the classroom, I was promoted to the senior management team with a higher salary, fewer lessons but hours of meetings, administration &c. After sticking it for two terms, I went to the headmaster and asked to return to my previous role – a decision I never regretted. I then avoided management until I retired.

There is, indeed, something odd about 'promoting' people by removing them from the very thing at which they were successful…

A more cynical man than me might think this chap was desperate to write (yet another) scare-mongering article about Brexit, and somehow managed to shoe-horn a mention of the Peter Principle into his tirade.

From Whirlwind's link: "Since when did a manager ever get sacked for anything?"

Well, I'm in a job where if I'm honest I don't actually do a lot, but I'm personally accountable (sackable) for a lot if it all goes up; to the point where I would need to find a completely new career.

For this to work, I have to have subordinates who can be relied upon to do things exactly how I want them done, and if they won't, I have to fire them before their omissions get me fired.

I am a sort of a Sir Harry Burrard figure.