"If the Gribeauval System of Artilley, (fighting the bug)" Topic
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Zhmodikov | 01 Jul 2018 11:22 p.m. PST |
Brechtel198 wrote:
Well-educated artillery officers in the Russian service is somewhat debatable.
Most Russian artillery company commanders, who fought in 1805-1814, graduated from either the Artillery Cadet Corps or the Land Cadet Corps in 1780s-1790s. The Russian military schools suffered from poor instructors, among other issues.
Who were those poor instructors? Ivan Gogel, a lecturer in the 2nd Cadet Corps (former Artillery Cadet Corps), a member of the Artillery Committee, the author of several articles on artillery tactics published in 1809-1811 in the Artillery Journal, one of the authors of the 1816 two-volume book on artillery? Johann Vitzthum von Eckstädt, also a lecturer in the 2nd Cadet Corps, the author of several articles on artillery equipment, and one of Gogel's co-authors in writing the 1816 book? Why did a Russian heavy artillery company have 333 personnel-I'm assuming that's all ranks. French foot artillery companies had about 100 plus the train company-and that was for eight pieces.
Because the Russian artillery company included its train. There were no separate train companies under separate commanders, as in the French army. I believe an experienced, capable artillery captain should be able to command an artillery company in any army.
Your conclusion can be considered from another side: the French company commanders were not educated and experienced enough to be able to command a large company consisting of many men, horses, guns, and vehicles, they were able to commanded only 100 men and 6 to 8 guns. |
4th Cuirassier | 02 Jul 2018 4:47 a.m. PST |
Ah, another discussion on who had the second-best artillery system of the era! Congreve presumably knocks the whole lot into a cocked hat otherwise why did everyone then adopt it… |
Brechtel198 | 02 Jul 2018 5:50 a.m. PST |
The Congreve rocket system was truly innovative. And as with any new technical development, there were teething problems. And there were also successes. The French and the Danes experimented with them under Davout at Hamburg in 1813-1814. The Austrians developed their own rockets as well as rocket units, and they were employed in 1815. However, they did not replace tube artillery and still haven't today. |
Brechtel198 | 02 Jul 2018 7:00 a.m. PST |
they were able to commanded only 100 men and 6 to 8 guns. French artillery company commanders also commanded the attached train company, which doubled the size of the unit. Train company commanders were lieutenants so that they would be subordinate in rank to the artillery company commanders to which they were assigned. So, the gun company commander had over 200 men under his command. Vehicles in French artillery companies were numerous, and the count depended on what type of artillery company. Different numbers of caissons were assigned to gun companies depending on the caliber of the field pieces. There were two caissons per each 4-pounder, three for 6- and 8-pounders, and five per 12-pounder and howitzer. A French horse artillery company would then have six field pieces, either 6- or 8-pounders, 22 caissons, a field forge, and three supply wagons. A French 6- or 8-pounder foot artillery company would have 8 field pieces, 28 caissons, a field forge, and three supply wagons. A French foot artillery company of 6- or 8-pounders would have four additional caissons used for infantry ammunition for a total of 32. A French foot artillery company of 12-pounders would have 40 caissons, a field forge, and three supply wagons.
Gun teams varied per gun company. All horse artillery pieces were pulled by six-horse teams and the gunners were individually mounted.
6- and 8-pounders were pulled by four horse teams, and 12-pounders by six horse teams.
These organizations were commanded by captains. The addition of four field pieces and ancillary vehicles does not to my mind make up a senior field grade command. It's merely a reinforced company.
Again, what were the size of Russian gun crews? As they had 200 gunners and bombardiers per company, that made for very large gun crews, over ten per piece. |
Brechtel198 | 02 Jul 2018 7:14 a.m. PST |
Both Langeron and Wilson, foreign officers who either served in the Russian army or were attached to it on campaign, remarked on the poor education of the Russian officers, Wilson in particular remarked on artillery officer education. The Russian Officer Corps in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars 1792-1815, the author, Alexander Mikaberidze comments on page xxvii that 'Despite the increasing number of cadet corps and other institutions, the quality of graduates remained poor' And the comment on the same page that 'The quality of the instructors was also low. Many officers could barely read and write when they entered the army. Military subjects were taught briefly and erratically.' Further, on the same page, the text continues that 'In 1812, the majority of Russian officers (1061 out of 2074 men) could only read and write…Only 61 officers (2.9%) studied military sciences and seven (0.3%) were taught tactics. Many officers, especially those in the artillery, were familiar with mathematics. Twenty-three percent showed competence in arithmetic, 10.6% in geometry, 6.5% in algebra, and 3.5% in trigonometry.' Being merely 'familiar' with mathematics does not competent artillery officers make. The Russian military education system should be compared with that of France, Great Britain, and Austria, all of which possessed excellent artillery schools, superior to what the Russians possessed. |
Zhmodikov | 02 Jul 2018 10:55 a.m. PST |
Brechtel198 wrote:
French artillery company commanders also commanded the attached train company, which doubled the size of the unit. Train company commanders were lieutenants so that they would be subordinate in rank to the artillery company commanders to which they were assigned. So, the gun company commander had over 200 men under his command.
The Russian artillery company was much larger than the French one. Again, what were the size of Russian gun crews? As they had 200 gunners and bombardiers per company, that made for very large gun crews, over ten per piece.
In the Russian artillery the auxiliary personnel held the same status as the members of the gun crews. The size of the gun crew was 8 men in light artillery companies and 9 men in heavy ones. Both Langeron and Wilson, foreign officers who either served in the Russian army or were attached to it on campaign, remarked on the poor education of the Russian officers, Wilson in particular remarked on artillery officer education.
Langeron obviously wrote about the infantry and cavalry officers: he was an infantry officer, and he wrote in 1796 that the most common way for a young nobleman to become an officer was to join a regiment as a NCO. In 1796, there were no artillery regiments in the Russian army. To become an artillery officer, any candidate should pass exams at the Artillery Commission, later – at the Artillery Committee. By the way, Langeron wrote that at Austerlitz the Russian artillery proved itself superior to the French artillery:
Dans cette malheureuse journée, l'artillerie russe se distingua par sa bravoure et son adresse dans le tir, et se montra supérieure à l'artillerie française, qui était loin d'être alors au point de perfection où elle était avant la Révolution. Tous les anciens officiers d'artillerie avaient émigré, avaient été tués ou avancés, et on ne pouvait en former de nouveaux. Nouvelle revue rétrospective. Deuxième semestre (Janvier-Juin 1895). Paris, 1895, p. 312-313. My translation:
In that unhappy day, the Russian artillery distinguished itself with their bravery and their skill in firing, and proved itself superior over the French artillery, which was far below the state of perfection in which it was before the revolution. All old artillery officers either emigrated, either were killed, or were promoted, and they had been unable to form new ones. Wilson did not serve in the Russian army and was only slightly acquainted with it. The Russian Officer Corps in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars 1792-1815, the author, Alexander Mikaberidze comments on page xxvii that 'Despite the increasing number of cadet corps and other institutions, the quality of graduates remained poor' And the comment on the same page that 'The quality of the instructors was also low. Many officers could barely read and write when they entered the army. Military subjects were taught briefly and erratically.' Further, on the same page, the text continues that 'In 1812, the majority of Russian officers (1061 out of 2074 men) could only read and write…Only 61 officers (2.9%) studied military sciences and seven (0.3%) were taught tactics. Many officers, especially those in the artillery, were familiar with mathematics. Twenty-three percent showed competence in arithmetic, 10.6% in geometry, 6.5% in algebra, and 3.5% in trigonometry.' Being merely 'familiar' with mathematics does not competent artillery officers make. The Russian military education system should be compared with that of France, Great Britain, and Austria, all of which possessed excellent artillery schools, superior to what the Russians possessed.
Again, this is written about the officer corps as a whole. Concerning the artillery officers, of 682 officers of the Guard artillery and line field artillery 471 (69.1 per cent) were graduates of various cadet corps, and 326 of them (69.2 per cent) were graduates of the Artillery Cadet Corps. Krylov V. M., Kadetskiye Korpusa i Rossiyskiye Kadety (Cadet Corps and Russian Cadets). St.Petersburg, 1998. See at the bottom of this page: adjudant.ru/cadet/063.htm How many French artillery company commanders had got special education? |
Brechtel198 | 02 Jul 2018 11:07 a.m. PST |
Christopher Duffy Russia's Military Way to the West on page s 144-145 states: Finally in 1800 Paul renamed the establishment the First Cadet Corps, and reconstituted the engineer academy as a corresponding Second Cadet Corps. Military education as a whole lay in the hands of Grand Prince Constantine, who appointed German instructors who could be relied upon to inculcate high standards of drill and bearing. Everything else was neglected, and the products of the corps arrived at their regiments as fourteen- or fifteen-year-old ignormauses.' Whether or not the Russian artillery officers were graduates of the various cadet corps, their education was not on a par with that of French artillery officers, even after the mess of the French Revolution. Napoleon's realignment of the military education system restored the excellent of education that had been the hallmark of the French artillery arm since 1765 and Gribeauval's reforms. Wilson's and Langeron's comments on Russian education of officers is from direct observation, so to discount it is ahistorical and only shows national bias. And where and in which action did the Russian artillery arm prove itself superior to that of the French or of a greater skill level? Russian auxiliary personnel in their artillery batteries were not artillerymen, and that includeds train troops. I'm not disputing that Russian artillery batteries were larger than the French. That isn't the point. I have not seen any logical reason why they should be commanded by senior field grade officers. Majors perhaps, but not colonels and lieutenant colonels. That clearly demonstrates a low level of expertise and command ability on the part of Russian company grade officers. It also demonstrates a lack of trust on the part of the Russian senior leadership. Why were Russian gun crews so large? Frederick Artz, The Development of Technical Education in France, 1500-1850, vii: 'The French, in the three and a half centures between about 1500 and 1850, developed all, or nearly all, the basic forms of modern technical education. And in the course of time, from Russia across western Europe and the United States to Japan, all countries modeled their technical schools on those of France. So, in the gradual transfer of technical training from an apprenticeship system where one learned a calling on the job to one where one learned much of his technical profession in a school, France played the dominant role.' |
Brechtel198 | 02 Jul 2018 2:37 p.m. PST |
…Langeron wrote that at Austerlitz the Russian artillery proved itself superior to the French artillery… Is that why the Russians lost 130 guns at Austerlitz and they were routed?
Langeron himself didn't do too well, going up against Davout who fought off the allies in a delaying/economy of force mission against three-to-one odds, Langeron being only one of the Russian division commanders in that sector. Langeron is probably commenting on the large battery of 36 guns assembled there by Kienmaier which helped the shattered allied units, Langeron's included, who were trying to escape the disaster. The massed artillery of the French IV and Imperial Guard fired on the fugitives as they were running away. Allied artillery losses were 180 guns, 130 of them Russian. The only thing that Langeron was expressing was sour grapes.
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4th Cuirassier | 03 Jul 2018 2:50 a.m. PST |
@ Brechtel The Congreve rocket system was truly innovative. I was referring to the Congreve block trail carriage design, as adopted by the rest of the world, eventually. It makes arguments about Liechtenstein versus Gribeauval versus An XI otiose, because even the best of them was still inferior to Congreve. It's just that it took the French 50 years to get their heads around it (some things don't change). |
Brechtel198 | 03 Jul 2018 3:26 a.m. PST |
The block trail gun carriage was the best of the period. However, that new design was developed until the 1790s and was not fielded until Portugal and Spain and not all of the British ordnance had it. The French adopted it ca 1827 as they greatly admired it when they came into contact with it. That being said, as late as 1800 Adye was still admiring the Gribeauval System because of its production standards and that it was a system. The British artillery arm was not in the same category as a system. And the British admired the French artillery arm and also recognized that the French horse artillery was the best in Europe. After the Niagara campaign of 1814, the British were very complimentary of the US artillery battalion that was part of the American division they faced in three hard-fought battles. They actually asked the American artillerymen if they were French and had French artillery officers. And the US had adopted a modified Gribeauval System in 1809. Where did you come up with 50 years? The French first came into contact with the new British gun carriages, limbers, and caissons about 1808 and they adopted those ca 1827 with the Valee System. |
4th Cuirassier | 03 Jul 2018 5:56 a.m. PST |
1790 – 1827 is about 50 years. In the sense that 40 is about 50 :-) If I am not mistaken, however, the Congreve system allowed the use of one trail and one wheel size for all guns and limbers – which seems like a significant improvement over anything else. |
Brechtel198 | 03 Jul 2018 8:04 a.m. PST |
Looking into British Napoleonic Field artillery by CE Franklin on page 53 the years stated for its introduction was 1793. Apparently they weren't being issued to the brigades of foot artillery. Inn 1794 'some' 6-pounders and 5.5-inch howitzers were given 'new pattern gun carriages. The policy enunciated in 1804 was: 'Carriages of 'other construction will be furnished as soon as they can be prepared. As soon as cavalry brigades arrive an equal number of similar pieces not so equipped with their carriages and appointments to be returned to Woolwich in lieu of those supplied from thence.'' Apparently 9-pounders did not receive the new gun carriages until 1808. The new limbers were 'in general service as early as 1794.' Dickson noted in 1811 that the difficult terrain in Iberia was hard on the block trail gun carriages. See pages 53-54 of the above stated reference. So, fielding the new vehicles was done over a period of fifteen years and to get them produced in any quantity caused the establishment of the Royal Carriage Department at Woolwich in 1803. And since the French probably didn't come into contact with them until 1808, that's a period of only 19 years until the French adopted the block trail and ancillary vehicles. As a footnote, there is a different viewpoint on who actually developed the block trail gun carriage. General Desguliers is sometimes given credit for it, but I'm of the opinion that it was indeed Congreve. |
138SquadronRAF | 03 Jul 2018 8:48 a.m. PST |
Actually there is a lot of politics that affected the British military. They system of splitting off the artillery under the Board of Ordnance, which originally dated to the Tudor period, together with the system 'purchasing commissions' for officers. These were measures specifically designed to weaken the army and prevent any form of military coup. The memories of the Civil War and English Republic made a deep impression on the ruling classes. One further reason the French Revolution set back the cause of democracy in Britain by 50 year. |
Major Snort | 03 Jul 2018 9:16 a.m. PST |
Some block carriages were used as least as early as 1801 against the French. General Lawson's report on the artillery in the Egyptian campaign appears in Duncan's History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery. On p119 Lawson says: "Four light 6-pounder upon block-trail carriages, with two royal howitzers, were also equipped (as nearly as the means would admit) for Horse Artillery service [note that these were Foot Artillery]…These block-trail carriages, from their lightness, short draft, and quick turning, passed over the inundations, dyk-es and desert with great ease, while the framed carriages with more horses were attended with difficulty and delay, and once in the desert, were obliged to be left behind". Although the same did not apply to all theatres, it would appear that the block trail carriage was used exclusively in the Peninsular (with the exception of a minority of pieces in 1808). This is disputed by one frequent poster here, but I have never seen any firm evidence put forward to support the claim that the block trail wasn't in common usage until late in that campaign. I prefer to trust the words of Sir Alexander Dickson, who answered several questions for an article in the British Indian Military Repository in 1823. In this article, far from claiming that the block carriages were prone to breakage, he states quite the opposite: "The equipment of field Artillery during the whole Peninsular war, was with block trailed carriages, and four wheeled ammunition limber waggons… The block trailed carriages were found much superior to the cheek trailed or bracket carriages, in strength and durability, in facility of limbering and unlimbering, and in pointing whilst in action; they also admitted of more close turning in manoeuvres and on the march…the carriages fully demonstrated the solidity and excellence of their construction, by standing both the shocks of execrable roads and of frequent heavy firing without scarcely ever wanting repairs". In the same article, Dickson considered the French equipment to be clumsy: "The French carriages are heavy in limbering, and of inconvenient movement; they are difficult to limber and unlimber, so much so as in action to occasion great use of the prolonge, which I am sure was the cause of their losing many guns". |
Zhmodikov | 03 Jul 2018 9:55 a.m. PST |
Brechtel198 wrote:
Christopher Duffy Russia's Military Way to the West on page s 144-145 states: Finally in 1800 Paul renamed the establishment the First Cadet Corps, and reconstituted the engineer academy as a corresponding Second Cadet Corps. Military education as a whole lay in the hands of Grand Prince Constantine, who appointed German instructors who could be relied upon to inculcate high standards of drill and bearing. Everything else was neglected, and the products of the corps arrived at their regiments as fourteen- or fifteen-year-old ignormauses.'
Secondary literature, wrong conclusions based on critical remarks on the so-called "Tactical Class" established by Paul in St.Petersburg. This class had no relation to the cadet corps, it was supposed to be a high school for the officers and even for the generals. I have mentioned two main lecturers in the 2nd Cadet Corps: Ivan Gogel and Johann Vitzthum von Eckstädt. And as I have said, most Russian artillery company commanders, who fought in 1805-1812, had got their military education before 1800. Whether or not the Russian artillery officers were graduates of the various cadet corps, their education was not on a par with that of French artillery officers, even after the mess of the French Revolution. Napoleon's realignment of the military education system restored the excellent of education that had been the hallmark of the French artillery arm since 1765 and Gribeauval's reforms.
How many French artillery officers had got any special education? The following quote is taken from a book titled Military Character of the Different European Armies Engaged in the Late War: with a Parallel of the Policy, Power, and Means of the Ancient Romans and Modern French. Translated from the French. 2nd edition, London, 1804, p. 20:
The French artillery preserves nothing but the name of what it formerly was. Their officers are ignorant, unexpert, and inferior to all others.
Further, p.42:
The Revolution has destroyed the science of artillery and engineering in France: there remains but a small number of officers, that have been instructed: the rest are men, that have newly risen, and have nothing but the routine or common round of duty of their profession; the number of French artillery-men has been considerably diminished by their generals having exposing them, beyond measure. The present officers may be compared to empirics, who employ receipts, without knowing the properties of the ingredients that compose them.
This is a contemporary source. Reference to the original book: Caractère militaire des armées européennes dans la guerre actuelle; avec une parallelle de la politique, de la puissance, et des moyens des Romains et des françois. Londres, 1802, p. 18 and 36 correspondingly. So, we have already two sources saying that the quality of the French artillery officers declined after the Revolution. Brechtel198 wrote:
Wilson's and Langeron's comments on Russian education of officers is from direct observation, so to discount it is ahistorical and only shows national bias.
As I have said, Langeron obviously wrote about the infantry and cavalry officers, not about artillery officers. He had no experience with the Russian artillery by 1796. In 1813 Langeron wrote about Veselitsky, the commander of artillery of Langeron's corps, that he was an excellent officer, his artillery was always in excellent state. Langeron A. de, Mémoires de Langeron, général d'infanterie dans l'armée Russe. Campagnes de 1812, 1813, 1814. Paris, 1902, p. 221 (Veselitsky spelt as Weszelizki). Veselitsky was born in 1774, graduated from the Artillery Cadet Corps in 1790, in 1813 after the battle of Bautzen he was promoted major-general. link Wilson was unable to speak Russian, he gathered information from the Russians who spoke French or English, as his friend Mikhail Vorontsov. I'm not disputing that Russian artillery batteries were larger than the French. That isn't the point. I have not seen any logical reason why they should be commanded by senior field grade officers.
Because they were large, much larger than French artillery companies. Majors perhaps, but not colonels and lieutenant colonels. That clearly demonstrates a low level of expertise and command ability on the part of Russian company grade officers. It also demonstrates a lack of trust on the part of the Russian senior leadership.
I am sorry, I can't understand how does the fact that a large company is commanded by a lieutenant-colonel or colonel clearly demonstrate low level of expertise and command ability of the lower grade officers. This fact demonstrates that there were too many colonels and lieutenant-colonels in the Russian artillery, and nothing more. I think it was rather good that the artillery company commanders were colonels and lieutenant-colonels: they had more more authority to reject any demands of infantry or cavalry regimental commanders. And where and in which action did the Russian artillery arm prove itself superior to that of the French or of a greater skill level?
I have never said that the Russian artillery arm was superior to that of the French. Langeron says from direct observation at Austerlitz. Is that why the Russians lost 130 guns at Austerlitz and they were routed?
The Russians lost 130 guns at Austerlitz and were defeated not because the French artillery arm was far superior to that of the Russians. There were more important causes. Langeron is probably commenting on the large battery of 36 guns assembled there by Kienmaier which helped the shattered allied units, Langeron's included, who were trying to escape the disaster.
Langeron mentions Yermolov with his horse artillery company and Jacob von Sievers with 24 heavy guns. The only thing that Langeron was expressing was sour grapes.
I see, Langeron's 1796 article is good enough to you, because you think that it supports your opinion that the Russian artillery officers were not well educated, though Langeron did not mention the artillery officers at all in his article, he obviously wrote about the infantry and cavalry officers, but Langeron's account of Austerlitz written soon after the battle is a bad source for you, because it contradicts you opinion that the French artillery was far superior to the Russian artillery. Nice approach to the primary sources. |
4th Cuirassier | 06 Jul 2018 2:13 a.m. PST |
@ brechtel Apparently 9-pounders did not receive the new gun carriages until 1808. The new limbers were 'in general service as early as 1794.' With all due respect, Kevin, this is a bit like arguing that jet fighters can be omitted from a discussion of who had the best fighter of WW2 because there weren't many jet fighters and they took a while to arrive. While that may be true, jet aircraft made piston-engined fighters obsolete and obviously so. It was then just a matter of how long everyone took to absorb this and re-equip. I can't help thinking that all this stuff about Gribeauval versus Liechtenstein versus An XI is bit like arguing over whether the Thunderbolt was better than the FW190 was better than the Mustang while avoiding mention of the Me262 and Gloster Meteor. In each case, instances of the future were right there to be seen; as soon as proponents of obsolete devices such as the Thunderbolt or the bracket trail got a look at the future they dumped the past and went with block trails and turbojets. |
Brechtel198 | 06 Jul 2018 3:41 a.m. PST |
No, it isn't. If artillery of the period is being discussed, then the elements in the development of artillery are important, especially the differences between systems and the innovations that came with those systems. Finally, the definition of what an artillery system is/was is important to the discussion. And the discussion includes the British innovations in design of gun carriages, limbers, and caissons. Interestingly, the bracket trail carriage was still used by the British for certain calibers throughout the period. As for War II aircraft, what has to be discussed are the different and progressive versions of each and who superceded what. The jet fighter made little impact in the outcome of the war and the piston engine fighter was still being used after. The US employed both the Mustang and Corsair in Korea, and the Skyraider in Vietnam. All aspects should be taken into consideration whether you agree or not. |
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