This sort of addresses Germany's actions after France, it had no choice.YouTube link
A very interesting video! Thanks for posting the link.
The video makes a well-reasoned point that WW2 was really a war about oil. I would add that even if some of the participants didn't recognize it as their motive or state it as their explicit war goal, WW2 was a war that ebbed and flowed and resolved based on oil.
The case is made that Germany, by early 1941, could see that it would run out of oil in the fall of 1941 if it didn't either end the British blockade (preventing imports of oil), or grab the Soviet oil fields. And looking at German operations, it seems that indeed the Germans reached a crisis state in about October of 1941.
I think perhaps the video makes a bit too much out of some admittedly interesting quotes. Yes Hitler may well have described the importance of oil and the ignorance of his generals on the matters of national strategy, but he also described the importance of lots of other stuff, and ragged on anyone who suggested otherwise. Doesn't reveal that he really understood how important oil was.
All in all an interesting theme. How can we reconcile a nation that lead the world in tank warfare with an army where 80% of the divisions are foot-bound, with horse-drawn artillery and supplies? Why didn't Germany build more tanks? Because there wasn't enough oil.
But …
This sort of addresses Germany's actions after France, it had no choice.
There are always choices. There may not always be GOOD choices, but there are always choices.
After France, Germany had several ways they could have proceeded. When I look at strategic choice-making, I like to keep strategic factors in mind (rather than just the timeline of events or decisions in the OTL).
Germany was at a peak of military power after France. And if one had been astute, one could have seen this as a peak (ie: not only well above what it had been before, but also well above what it would be in the not-too-distant future).
This was due to a few factors. Better than before due to tactical and operational skills, which had been refined in several very successful campaigns and were built on a relatively unique doctrinal base. Germany was succeeding in practicing war craft that worked, and opponents had not yet come to their own war craft to counter. Not yet.
But not going to remain better for long, because opponents might well be expected to find counters to German war craft, but perhaps more importantly because the German war craft relied upon resources that were in short supply, and that supply was getting tighter as time went on, and potential major opponents did not suffer limitations to the same extent.
Those resources included oil (discussed above), but also several important metals, and even food. The harvest of France and the Benelux was going to be a disaster in 1940. Norway perhaps too. If Germany wanted to build any sort of economical empire from its conquests, there were many dozens of millions of new mouths for the German agricultural base to feed.
The fact that Britain was still in the war made it difficult for Germany to play time as an advantage. The new German empire had more people and more industry, but not enough access to raw materials.
So the choices, as I see them, went in a few possible directions:
1) Reduce conflict with UK. There were half a dozen ways this could have been pursued. Churchill in office made it hard to envision success, but very public displays of peace overtures might well have made it hard to Churchill to resist (or hard to stay in power).
2) Find somewhere else to grab a useful resource base. This was one of the main reasons Barbarossa took place as soon as it did. Germany was at or near their peak, while the Soviets (if the Germans had any realistic assessment of the Soviets) were close to a self-imposed nadir, but finally on the rise again.
3) Reduce their demands for resources. Give up populations and activities. Not too likely in a scenario (or personality) with defined goals of aggrandizement.
4) Do a little bit of several. Maybe limit hostilities (rather than actually reducing), and reduce some demand for resources, while making a grab for further resources.
5) Spout preposterous political theories and self-serving populist propaganda which ensured the British would stick with their fight, and still launch against the Soviets without a focus on what you need to gain in order to win, and then see if you can bring the US (the largest but also most inaccessible source of resources) in against you to supply your other adversaries as well as to become an adversary.
So they chose 5. Not because they didn't have choices, but because that's what they chose.
-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)