"Britain's Struggle To Build Effective Tanks During..." Topic

Gotta remember that a tank has other uses than fighting other tanks.

Are you excluding the Sd.Ah.116 trailers?

No, but my impression is that German tank transporter assests were few and far between. Compared to my great uncle's experience where the Scammels were an integral part of the recovery process.

Donlowry wrote -
"Gotta remember that a tank has other uses than fighting other tanks."

Unquestionably true, Don. But not at the cost of functionally sacrificing all anti-armor capability, as was the case with the 75mm Sherman by 1944 – a policy and planning failure on the part of an arrogant US stateside bureaucracy paid for by a large number of dead Allied tankers.

Interesting commentary in "Brains and Bullets" (pp 176-178) regarding the evolution of the relationship between tankers and the Sherman tank in the ETO:

The smokescreen put out by the authorities mean that most men were unaware of the weaknesses of the Sherman before their first battle. Their opinions quickly altered. Just a few miles from Trooper Brooks, the 4th/7th Royal Dragoon Guards soon came to accept the Sherman's limitations:

" 'We had a nasty shock although we did not realize it for a week or two after D-Day, because we were still too full of confident enthusiasm to be easily deterred; but it was not long before we realized that our tanks were outmatched by both the enemy tanks and anti-tank guns, and that in a straight fight at anything over point-blank range, we were backing a loser every time. The armour of the Shermans rarely resisted any armour-piercing shot, except at extreme range, and when pierced usually burst into flames almost spontaneously, adding burns to the other ways in which members of the crew might become casualties.

The 75mm gun …<snip>… had no powers of penetration to deal with Tigers or head-on Panthers. The 17-pounder of the Sherman Firefly was indeed a match for the German guns in penetrative power, and we treasured the five that 'A' Squadron had like the most precious stones, but even here the tank was at a disadvantage, as its armour was so inferior to that of its opponent.'

The realization of Sherman vulnerability is reflected in the way tank and crew casualties changed over time. For US armoured divisions, the first week in combat saw four crewmen killed or wounded for each tank that was destroyed. Crew casualties dropped sharply after the first few weeks then bounced along, gradually declining until, by the fifteenth week in combat, only one crewman was lost for each tanks destroyed. This was a remarkable survival rate given the Sherman's tendency to burst into flames.

Some of the drop in crew casualties came from modifications like fixing track plates or railway sleepers to the hull, or from improved escape drills and better casualty handling. But most change came from crews being more likely to abandon their vehicle once they suspected that it was outmatched. Many crews would abandon their Sherman as soon as it was engaged, or even before it had come under fire. Veteran tankers have told how their immediate action on contact with an 88 was to fire all their weapons as fast as possible in any direction while reversing quickly into cover, then dismount and get away from the vehicle before it was hit.

…<snip…

The same aura surrounded the Tiger tank, which was almost twice the size of a Sherman and armed with another variant of the 88mm gun. One Normandy veteran recalled 'a grumble to our front that sounded like a half-track to me, but some fool shouted "Tiger" and our tanks just ed off behind the hill, leaving the company to face it alone'. Variations on this story were repeated right across north-west Europe."

B

Veteran tankers have told how their immediate action on contact with an 88 was to fire all their weapons as fast as possible in any direction while reversing quickly into cover, then dismount and get away from the vehicle before it was hit.

Tosh. Take GOODWOOD where over 700 British tanks advanced into the sights of 50+ Pak 88s of their left flank. Some 300 Shermans drove right past these guns and came up against the villages of Bras, Soliers, Ifs and Bourgebus. If the claim were true then there should be many dozens of undamaged tanks littering the battlefield. Where can we read accounts of this happening?

One Normandy veteran recalled 'a grumble to our front that sounded like a half-track to me, but some fool shouted "Tiger" and our tanks just Bleeped texted off behind the hill, leaving the company to face it alone'

Lets have a War Diary extract where we can see the Shermans all running for cover when the word 'Tiger' is mentioned.

2nd Fife & Forfar Yeomanry August 6 1944:

. Two Tiger tanks succeeded in getting through and knocking out 2 tanks out of a troop in C Sqn. These Tigers were just beginning to cause casualties to the infantry when Sgt. Scott of C Sqn. with his troop arrived and succeeded in getting his tanks into position and destroying one of the tanks and damaging the other to such an extent that it withdrew.

Aug 7th
Meanwhile a number of Tiger tanks had established themselves on the high ground on our eastern flank at Le Haut Periere( M.R. 7233) and were able to engage A Sqn. from the rear at a range of about 2500 yds. These Tigers quickly caused A Sqn. 5 tank casualties.
Major Gilmore then went forward with a troop of B Sqn.to try and engage these tanks and succeeded in knocking out one of them

It seems running away and hiding was not the normal reaction after all.

The realization of Sherman vulnerability is reflected in the way tank and crew casualties changed over time. For US armoured divisions, the first week in combat saw four crewmen killed or wounded for each tank that was destroyed. Crew casualties dropped sharply after the first few weeks then bounced along, gradually declining until, by the fifteenth week in combat, only one crewman was lost for each tanks destroyed. This was a remarkable survival rate given the Sherman's tendency to burst into flames.

I have most of the reports on tank crew casualties for Normandy and I have never heard such a claim or seen any data that backs this claim. 4 dead per penetrated Sherman the norm? If it were so then crew losses would have been massive-and they were not. Does the author give a link to any data that supports his claim?
It should also be noted that around half of all tank crew KIA fall victim after they exit the tank. That is the AP shot that on paper kills 1 man per penetrated tank really only accounts for 1 man in every two penetrated tanks.

"4 dead per penetrated Sherman the norm? If it were so then crew losses would have been massive-and they were not."

mkenny – You might wish to re-read the author's text more closely; his exact words were "four crewmen killed or wounded". With respect to your other opinions and objections, you would be best served to take them up directly with the author.

B

You might wish to re-read the author's text more closely; his exact words were "four crewmen killed or wounded". With respect to your other opinions and objections, you would be best served to take them up directly with the author.

No I will take it up with you as you posted it. I have never seen a casualty study that get 4 casualties per tank. Never once even seen it hinted at or mentioned as a possibility. All the reports arrive at c.2 casualties per tank on average. KIA/WIA is a 50:50 split with up to 60% of the KIA being killed after they bale out of the stricken tank.
So I ask again what source does your author give for the 4 casualties per tank?
Does he give any sources for his crew casualty figures?
Are any reports mentioned by name?
At Villers Bocage on 13/6/44 at least 5 Cromwells, 2 Firefly and 2 Stuart tanks were fully-crewed and hit at close range by Tiger shells. From those 9 tanks a total of 10 crew were killed.

Sorry, mkenny; can't help you. You will have to contact the author for an answer to your questions.

B

OK I understand. You can not source your claims. I knew the numbers were fiction and thus am not surprised.
I always have a source for my posts and will provide references when challenged.

With all due respect, mkenny, I'm not sure that you do actually understand. I quoted a passage from a book. I don't have any wish to shock you or upset any delicate sensibilities, but quoting from a book does not in any way constitute making any sort of claim on my part; it is in fact the author of the book who has made the claim. Therefore, it is the author of the book you must seek out if you wish to dispute what he has written.

It's lovely that you religiously reference all your sources. That must come as a great pleasure and relief to your many loyal readers.

B

IIRC, somewhere I read/heard 1.3 crew members were KIA'd per AFV when KO'd. Or … Can't remember if that 1.3 is KIA'd or WIA'd ?

Of course if you are in that crew … 1.3 may be 1.3 too many …

It's lovely that you religiously reference all your source.

It has its advantages-main one being I am never exposed as a bluffer. If I post it I stand 100% behind it. If challenged I reference it.

I quoted a passage from a book. I don't have any wish to shock you or upset any delicate sensibilities, but quoting from a book does not in any way constitute making any sort of claim on my part … it is the author of the book you must seek out if you wish to dispute what he has written.

OK. So then, you make no assertion that what the author wrote was anything more than non-sense?

And yet, you state, without suggesting an easily disclaimed source, that:

The Sherman was, in essence, not a tank in the conventionally understood sense but more akin to an armored exploitation vehicle – painfully vulnerable to all up to date anti-tank weapons, slower than a tank destroyer, armed with a main gun optimized for engaging non-armor targets.

Since you so easily dismiss your own sources from any reliance upon actual facts, what have you, in your "delicate sensibilities", relied upon for such a firmly stated conclusion?

Rather than relying on authors who justify my pre-conceived prejudices, I prefer to look to primary sources when I can, or to authors who quote their primary sources when those sources are not available to me.

There are in fact very few studies that examine direct tank vs tank engagements; which only constitute a minority of engagements involving tanks. One of the few that has been examined in published books is the United States Army's Ballistic Research Lab (BRL) study in 1946, which has been cited in several books by Stephen Zaloga (notably Armored Champion, published in 2015).

To expand not on Zaloga (and why you should take the matter up with him, which btw I have), the BRL study looked at a series of engagements fought by the US 3rd Armored Division and 4th Armored Division in 1944 -- real information, from real battles. Not the imaginings or rants of some author. The study was done to give the US Army an accurate picture of how its armored UNITS actually fought; and the data was used to help design future tanks and doctrine.

The study recorded a total of 30 armor vs armor engagements fought between M4 Shermans and the Mk V Panther.

Contrary to all popular notions of Sherman tank inferiority, these two Divisions in fact recorded a 3.6-1 kill ratio in their favor. Rather than the oft-repeated myth that it took five Panthers to kill a Sherman, the study of actual combat results show that the ratio was instead 3.6 Panthers were lost for every Sherman they killed.

The BRL study in fact shows exactly why the Sherman performed better. The gun penetration versus armor calculation are in fact just a small part of the entire engagement cycle.

A tank vs tank battle does not begin and end with an anti-tank round trying to penetrate the armor of the front of an enemy tank. The tank first has to find the enemy tanks, and then hit the enemy tanks. The former requires diligent reconnaissance, situational awareness, and better tactical mobility. The latter requires good positioning (which is also dependent on tactical mobility) and accurate, fast-firing guns. The Sherman proved to be the better tank in these regards by an enormous margin compared to the Panther.

To further expand on the material from the BRL study, the Shermans were on the tactical defensive in 20 out of 30 examined engagements. Even though it was the Americans who were on the offensive, the mobility of the Sherman tank allowed it to quickly seize key ground before Panthers, forcing the Germans to counter-attack against prepared Sherman tanks in ambush positions. Shermans notched a 5-1 kill rate in their favor on the defensive.

On the attack, the Shermans should have suffered the same kind of losses in reverse, since it's the Panthers who would have been in ambush positions. And when the Panthers spotted and fired first, they were able to notch up better than a 5-1 kill ratio in their favor against the Shermans. But the Panthers only fired first once in all the engagements studied.

The Shermans still fired first most of the time even when they were attacking, and in these instances the 5-1 advantage again swung back to the US Army!

There were at least two major battles in which Shermans found themselves significantly outnumbered by Panthers (by a factor of 3:1) and still won anyway. Even without air support. There was no verifiable engagement wherein significantly outnumbered Panthers (3:1 odds or more) defeated Shermans.

British War Office studies also separately reached the conclusion that who fired first was among the most critical predictors of success in tank-vs-tank combat. Armor and gun penetration were somewhere far down the list of importance, after numerical superiority.

Quite aside from the "top 3" of gun-armor-speed, Shermans were simply faster on the draw in terms of spotting, hand-off from TC to gunner, gunner traverse and acquisition of the target, and firing; and their tactical mobility meant they were in the advantageous ambush position much more often than not. And Shermans could concentrate faster, being both more maneuverable AND more available, so more frequently out-numbering Panthers, which they were able to use to their advantage.

The tactical mobility advantage is a bit hard to explain. If one looks at the stats, Panther should be better. It has a better HP/ton ratio, and better flotation by any measure, than a Sherman. This is particularly true when comparing to an M4 or M4A1 Sherman, somewhat less so when comparing to an M4A3 and again less so when comparing to an M4A3 HVSS Sherman. But still true. Yet Shermans consistently out-maneuvered Panthers on ETO battlefields. How can we explain this?

I see two contributing factors, but I can not find any useful data to support conclusions over which was more important. First is that German tank crews were progressively less skilled as the war moved into it's final stages. This was particularly true of Panther tank crews, as the old hands were more often left in their existing mounts (Pz IVs), or moved up to Tiger formations. Panther formations were more often new drafts or units built (or re-built) around a few core veterans. In those cases the veterans more often took the roles of TC or gunner.

Second is that the Panther's breakdown-prone final drive may have led drivers (and TCs) to be more timid in their use of the tanks impressive performance. It does little good to have a tank that can roar across a field and climb up a small rise faster than your opponent if you are unwilling to take that path due to concerns about grinding out your gears.

Finally, much of the gunpower vs armor assessments are jilted because they assume guns being fired on the front armor as the norm. It does not in fact appear to be the norm, but rather the minority case. Reports of hits on both the Soviet Army T-34s and US Sherman tanks show that the majority of hits were to the side and rear; even when the tank could be penetrated from the front.

It's rather simple, really. AT gunners and tank crews were taught to seek an advantageous position before engaging enemy armor. That meant holding fire until you had a side or rear shot. Even the Germans tended to practice this effective tactic.

The Panther in fact was an abysmal tank in this regard as all the armor is in the front – which is why there are examples of Panthers knocked out by 14.5mm anti-tank rifles to the side

It was actually rare for the opponent to have no choice but to shoot at the front of the tank. This is the probable explanation to the anecdote about British tankers "scampering away" at the mention of a Tiger. It is unlikely that they were running to hide, and more likely they were maneuvering for an advantageous position from which to engage if a Tiger was in fact coming.

In reality most tanks that survive combat are never hit by AT weapons to begin with – the enemy either never saw them or missed. And most tanks that were lost to AT weapons were hit from the side or rear, by an opponent they never saw before being knocked out.

Given this, it's rather clear that assuming front armor thickness and gun penetration are the prime determinant of battlefield success is flawed. But it is the staple of wargamers everwhere.

The Panther, the Tiger, and the Tiger II were simply all horribly overrated machines; especially in the face of the 1944 US Armored Division. Even in equal numbers, or having superior numbers, the Panthers, Tigers, and Tiger IIs lost. Consistently.

Even their "successes" – such as Villers-Bocage – have been tilted in the rush to proclaim the Tiger as an wundermachine. Tiger fans proclaim that Villers-Bocage was a battle wherein a lone Tiger destroyed 20 Allied tanks. Well, yes, but … that was one engagement in a sequence of engagements that made up a battle in which the 101st SS Heavy Tank battalion had 9 Tigers destroyed and 21 taken out of action by damage.

And that's not anecdotes, not somebody said or some author wrote. That's what you find if you actually look into the real engagements.

And now someone will point out an error in my counting. And I will not say "oh, well, take it up with him, that other guy, it's his numbers". Rather I will say "OK, that's interesting, let's look at that … thanks for helping me find and understand the real data".

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

Hi Mark -
Thanks for your input, but I'll settle for the commentaries of the end-users who actually had the sort of "hands on" experience that would permit a clear and objective appraisal of the issue – Isaac White, Maurice Rose, the various and sundry armored division fighting personnel, both commissioned and enlisted, who shared their personal battle experience, not to mention BuOrd's official history. They uniformly judged the Sherman tank of 1944 to be an inferior weapon platform in the tank-versus-tank arena. Do you think these two highly respected fighting frontline generals who had just lead their armored divisions across northwest Europe were lying? or stupid? or gullible? I actually stand in awe of the ability of some people to so willfully and consistently ignore this kind of factual contemporary testimony.

"OK. So then, you make no assertion that what the author wrote was anything more than non-sense?"
Don't play word games; it really doesn't become you. The text of "Brains and Bullets", 288 pages in length, has been by all accounts extremely well received as an important work on the subject of battlefield psychology. Is your argument that in just two of those 288 pages of text the author fell victim to a fit of insanity, or chose to concoct vicious lies about his own countrymen for some devious and unknown reasons? I'm interested to know what you think on that point. Let me know.

BTW – You might find this document of interest:
THE QUEST FOR OPERATIONAL MANEUVER IN THE NORMANDY CAMPAIGN
It deals in a very comprehensive way with much of what we are "discussing" here. The PDF link can be found in the thread just posted.

B

Folks, I am really enjoying this strand, and learning much from it – even as a Cold War tank guy.
But… please let's keep it civil.
EC

Isaac White, Maurice Rose, the various and sundry armored division fighting personnel, both commissioned and enlisted, who shared their personal battle experience

But which 'Battle Experience in the memo (often misrepresented as a 'Report' by those with an anti-Sherman agenda) do we believe?
The men in the 'our sights were crap' section where they bemoan the superior German sights whilst they could never hit anything over 500 yds because 'our' sights were so poor or the 'our gun were crap' section where crews give example of multiple extreme long range hits on German tanks but they fail to penetrate. They both can not be correct. I also tried to count how many times a Tiger was engaged in this memo but gave up half way through because it would appear Tigers were the standard German tank and every crewman remembers engaging dozens of the beasts.

This example is a lesson to all those who delight in tales of Shermans hitting Tigers and the shells are not seen to have any effect:

Duel in the Mist 3 by Haasler, Vosters, and Weber; a small engagement on 22 December 1944 involving a tank of Task Force Lovelady and a tank of Kampfgruppe Peiper in the Belgian town of Parfondruy:

US veteran Charles R. Corbin recalls:
Quote:
…I went upstairs in a house on a hill behind us to observe better. There under our nose was a large German tank in some trees. After telling Plummer and Edmark we got artillery on it and flushed it out where one of Company D's tanks had a clear shot at it, and shoot it he did, but three balls of fire bounced off of it and it backed away never moving its turret. It had to be a Mark VI Tiger. It made us all wonder and I know the tank gunner was shaknig his head, feeling helpless, as it backed up the railroad on our left flank. I had seen our 75s bounce off Mark V tanks before, the last time near Roetgen where they wiped out several of our tanks…

The tank was indeed a Tiger Ausf.B, number 133 of 1./s.SS-Pz.Abt.501. TC SS-Oberscharführer Werner Wendt relates his side of the engagement:

Quote:
…I started again in the direction of Stavelot trying to give my best. About fifty meters in front of the edge of the town my driver suddenly swung around our tank. The interphone isn't working, I don't know what happened. The driver drove back at full speed, passing the command post in the direction of Petit Spai. About 100 meters in front of the bridge we drive into the ditch. Only now can I see the reason for the sudden turn-around of the driver. We have received a hit into the turret ring. The shell had bounced downwards into the hull, torn off the hatch of the radio-operator, and killed the radio-operator…Fragments had destroyed the steering gear and the gearbox, oil was leaking. As the driving mechanism and gear shift was conducted by oil pressure the failing oil pressure caused the tank to run out of control. The Tiger was totally immobilized.

The Tiger was later blown up when the Germans fled. [URL=https://imageshack.com/i/poXQc8nsj]

[/URL]

The text of "Brains and Bullets", 288 pages in length, has been by all accounts extremely well received as an important work on the subject of battlefield psychology. Is your argument that in just two of those 288 pages of text the author fell victim to a fit of insanity, or chose to concoct vicious lies about his own countrymen for some devious and unknown reasons? I'm interested to know what you think on that point. Let me know.

Just because it is a book does snot make it the infallible final word on the subject. Authors can and do get it wrong. The proper way to deal with a challenge is to cite the authors references. Does he provide a reference?

Something one notices in accounts of the Eighth Army experience in the western desert is that they thought their tanks were being shot up at great range by better-armed German tanks. The reality was that a lot of the time, they were actually being shot up not by enemy tanks that they could see but, at somewhat closer range, by dug-in anti-tank guns that they had not seen.

I suspect something similar was going on in Normandy. Actual tank on tank battles were comparatively rare, but anti-tank versus tank ambushes less so. In such encounters the PAK typically gets the all-important first shot, and it is that rather than the type of PAK that determines the outcome.

If the PAK in question is a PAK 40, 43 or 44 it is going to defeat the frontal armour of any Allied tank it can see at any likely range, including frontally. If it's a PAK 38 or 97/38 its AP performance will require it to seek the advantageous firing position, and if it does, then again it's still going to defeat the armour it actually shoots at, i.e. side or rear.

If an Allied anti-tank gun did the same thing it would find the Tiger's protection to be much the same all the way round.

Mark's stats are interesting. I suspect circumstances conspired to make Allied tank crews think they had a much worse chance than they actually did. Episodes like Villers Bocage where 75mm QF guns made no impression on a Tiger at point-blank range cannot have helped.

"Just because it is a book does snot make it the infallible final word on the subject. Authors can and do get it wrong. The proper way to deal with a challenge is to cite the authors references. Does he provide a reference?"

I find all this artful dodgery fascinating -
> It's just a book, so it's not infallible.
> Authors can and do get it wrong
….. except for one's own preferred sources.

For the third and last time (because we all have busy lives, don't we) contact the author and ask him for his references. Possibility number one is that the author is just a total blowhard/liar who made it all up; possibility number two is that he may actually know something that you don't.

B

4th Cuirassier -
There is no question that anti-tank guns played a role in the Normandy fighting, as they did on every WW2 front, or that the Germans were enthusiastic practitioners of the "Pak Front". But if tank versus tank battles were rare in the bocage where the American fought, such engagements were quite common, almost ubiquitous, on the Caen front. The doctoral thesis whose PDF link I posted last night will convincingly bear this out. It is profusely referenced and draws upon a rich array of both US and UK operational research material.

I also suggest that you snag a copy of General Isaac White's (cdr US 2nd Armored Division) report ("A Report on United States vs, German Armor") prepared at the behest of Eisenhower in March 1945. It is available from Amazon under the title "United States vs German Equipment" by Isaac D White. Read the report and draw your own conclusions.

You can also find on the web a copy of the 21 March 1945 letter sent to Eisenhower by General Maurice Rose (cdr US 3rd Armored Division) before his death –

link

- which echoes the opinions of General White's report. Read the letter and draw your own conclusions.

Then ask why Bradley begged the British to supply him with Fireflies during the Normandy fighting (interesting tidbit of information here – whatever the causes, Bradley actually had more tank losses than the UK/Commonwealth forces). Ask also why Eisenhower himself again approached the British for Fireflies during the Bulge fighting. My personal opinion is that US interest in Fireflies was a direct measure of the intensity of tank versus tank fighting faced by the US forces. "The United States Army in World War II, The Technical Services, The Ordnance Department: On Beachhead and Battlefront" -

link

- describes well the view of the Ordnance Department regarding the suitability of the Sherman tank as of late 1944 and early 1945. It's worth reading.

The other side of this "discussion" likes to waft all this inconvenient evidence away by means of various sorts of rhetorical devices (example – ignore White's 100+ page report; it is not an "official" report) or conveniently just ignores it.

- – -

Just for the record – here is my summary opinion of the Sherman tank:

> a great tank in 1942 with sufficient AT capability to satisfactorily discharge the full spectrum of battlefield functions.

> a reliable and serviceable tank for 1943: still excellent for exploitation and infantry support purposes, but starting to fall behind in AT capability.

> a still reliable but now obsolescent tank by 1944: still very good for infantry support duties and exploitation, but technically now badly outclassed in the AT role.

….. There it is.

B

It's rather simple, really. AT gunners and tank crews were taught to seek an advantageous position before engaging enemy armor. That meant holding fire until you had a side or rear shot.

but anti-tank versus tank ambushes less so. In such encounters the PAK typically gets the all-important first shot, and it is that rather than the type of PAK that determines the outcome.

Indeed and that holds generally true even today … As you may only get one shot at it before you receive return fire.

And AT weapons being generally smaller than an MBT/AFV are easier to hide.

Then ask why Bradley begged the British to supply him with Fireflies during the Normandy fighting (interesting tidbit of information here – whatever the causes, Bradley actually had more tank losses than the UK/Commonwealth forces). Ask also why Eisenhower himself again approached the British for Fireflies during the Bulge fighting. My personal opinion is that US interest in Fireflies was a direct measure of the intensity of tank versus tank fighting faced by the US forces.

This sort of thing always plays into my opinion. That the US was really behind the power curve for a number of reasons in tank on tank battles. Some good reasons some not so good.

If the US should have been able to deploy a heavier more "deadly" MBTs like the M25 or the M26 sooner. And yes, again, there are a number of reasons that did/could have influenced that. IMO it would have saved more US Tankers lives.

Even if tank on tank engagements were not always the norm. But you don't want to go to a gunfight with a knife. As the saying goes. Better to have more firepower than you may need than not have it when the situation arises …

Remember that Leo Murray's book is about the psychology of warfare.
It doesn't really matter whether the Sherman was a super tank or not. In that context.
It also doesn't matter if 3.9 or 1.3 casualties occur on average for each Sherman hit.
If there were some crews who immediately abandoned a tank when it came under 88 fire then that's a real psychological effect due to their beliefs.

This is also mentioned in Don Featherstones tank battles in miniature as being fairly common practice in the desert.
If you came under fire from an 88 and couldn't engage it then it was fairly common to bail because the expectation was the next round would hit and destroy the tank.
Maybe Featherstone got that wrong as well.
That'd be a bit odd though.
As I recall, he was there in the desert.

I interviewed some British tankers. Amongst them was one TC who mentioned his driver got a bit nervous about Tigers. He said it jokingly so I don't know how much exaggeration was involved. He said if his driver heard "the wrong thing" over the radio you were likely to find your tank reversing out a static position and into turret down before you knew it.
This is the opinion of crews who were really there.

My opinion is the Sherman was adequate by 1944. Any tank at all was way better than none and shipping heavier tanks would have been a problem.
There again, I didn't have to sit in one and watch shell after shell bounce off a tiger or panther.
As described by crew I have interviewed this was a pretty daunting experience.

But what do they know, huh?

The French destroyed Panzer Brigade 112 at Dompaire on 13 September 1944 with 75mm Shermans and M-10 tank destroyers. Yes Panzer Brigade 112 was poorly trained with green troops and hardly the model of a combined arms force but with at least half their force Panthers the 112th should have seen French rounds bounce harmlessly off their armor. The Americans repeated this feat on 19 September against Panzer Brigade 113 at Arracourt with 75mm Shermans and M-18 tank destroyers facing the Panther again. The Germans had a two to one advantage yet the Americans knocked out 43 panzers, mostly Panthers, at a cost of 3 M-18s and 5 M-4s. On 20 September is was the turn of Panzer Brigade 111 in the barrel and they faired no better. While it is true all 3 Panzer Brigades had mostly green troops each was formed around a cadre of experienced NCOs and officers.

From 25-29 September the Germans attempted to renew the offensive in the Arracourt area designed to destroy the American spearheads. During that period the Germans committed 262 tanks and assault guns. By the end 86 had been destroyed and only 62 were operational. The Americans, during the same period, lost 41 M-4 and 7 M5 light tanks. The German forces in these engagements, while certainly worn down, were not all green troops like the 3 Panzer Brigades.

Funny what those inadequate, totally outclassed M-4s could accomplish in the hands of experienced crews.

Part of our problem as gamers might be that there is often no room to maneuver for a flank shot, the table isn't big enough! So we are left with having to deal with the opponent's frontal armor.

I made it a point to have some maneuver room on the table. Otherwise you see, e.g. what GW 40K generally shows in most of the pics of it's (war)games(?). Tanks and Infantry lined up like it was the Napoleonics, AWI, ACW, etc. !

So yes, we use maneuver or try to hit the enemies flanks, etc. And in turn the AFVs' weaker armor. For modern or even future warfare hitting the flanks should be a standard. But you can even see it in Ancient War, e.g. Marathon, Cannae, etc., etc. Not always for the same reasons per se. Regardless Enfilade, Oblique, Flanking, etc. maneuver & fire should be the normal tactics, techniques, and procedures.

But again, like we see in e.g. GW 40K games "Line Up, shoot, run into the middle and hit the other guy over the head with a ranged weapon, etc. !"

Legion: How big is your table and what scale minis do you use?

6 ft x 4 & 1/2 ft and 6mm minis … Along with that, pretty much we only played games, no bigger than a Bn TF on both sides generally.

So @ 2-4 Companies and some support assets per side, basically.

On the subject of gaming WW2 and the issue of flanks -

"Back in the day" I had a 6'8" x 15' gaming table in my basement. I was playing a lot of WRG Armour & Infantry 1925-1950 in 6mm micro-armor scale. With that in mind, I reproduced an area of central France (taken from a WW1 1:50,000 topo map in the appropriate one meter per millimeter ground scale. Topographical elevation contours were all cut from 4x8 sheets of 1/2-inch foam insulation, endless number of treed were planted to represent the many forests and wooded areas. All roads, rivers and streams were represented as per the map. The small towns, villages and farmsteads were laid out on a as closely as possible by use of small wooden blocks cut to suit. It would not have won any awards at a modeling competition, but what resulted was a 2km x 4.5km slice of "real world" terrain. Certain "real world" terrain rules were also incorporated:

> All major roads were considered to be flanked on both sides by drainage ditches that were considered to be impassable for 2-wheel drives vehicles, poor going for fully tracked vehicles, while everything in between treated them as linear obstacles (risk of bogging).

> All major streams were considered to be steep-banked and therefore uncrossable except via bridge or designated ford.

> Artillery bombardment of a town or village resulted in any vehicle passing down any interiot street having to test for a linear obstacle (where "bogging" = road blocked due to debris.

> Any element in woods, within 50m of a stream or waterway or immediately adjacent to any construction was considered to be in cover.

It entirely changed the gaming experience. We usually played a US battalion versus a reinforced German company on half the table (2000m or so frontage). There was way too much frontage for a company to cover on a "wall to wall" basis, but the real world terrain coupled with the above-mentioned terrain rules restricted the number of practical axes of attack. All of a sudden, the defense came to focus upon tactically important chokepoints, possession of elevated point where an F.O. could have the best view of the avenues of approach. Mortars became really useful and important weapons that could freeze an advancing infantry unit or raise havoc with an soft transport column that might choose to unwisely down a approach road.

On the other side of the coin, covered approaches (we used gentleman's honor hidden movement and hidden defensive positions), probing for soft spots in the defense, etc, became important tools for the attacker. Since the defender could not be everywhere or see everywhere, flank attacks became really effective when they were were able to force or filter their way through.

We had some really strange and interesting games -

> In one game, I had bought a battalion of 4.2-inch mortars to barrage my way across what I thought was my opponent's MLR – something I had done successfully in some previous games. On this occasion, I had my mortar battalion blast the crap out of the long hedge row where I supposed my opponent had his troops dug-in. He ceremoniously threw numerous dice testing for hits, suppression, neutralization and kills (all subsequently discovered to have been spurious theatrics conducted for my benefit). I advanced my company of infantry right into the hedge row without taking any fire. As soon as I emerged on the far side, his line of defending troops, entrenched in the open field 75m behind the hedgerow, plus flanking fire from a pair of dug-in tripod mounted MG42 GMPGs just pinned me to the ground. When his pre-registered mortars came down, it was game over por moi.

> On another occasion I was able to totally disrupt the advance of a company reinforced by a platoon of Shermans across a bridge into a town with one 75mm AT gun hidden in a great flanking position behind a building next to the bridge plus two sniper team and a squad of infantry.

> On another occasion I saw a company of SU-152s drive unescorted down into a small stream valley, get ambushed and absolutely toasted by a platoon of Panzerfaust-carrying infantry and a couple of Panzerschreck teams hiding in ambush in the (presumed) undergrowth lining the far side of the stream.

FWIW.

B