"Summerfield's Prussian Napoleonic Landwehr" Topic

Dear Phil
The French Army were still closing up at 1pm. The battle was delayed because the Fench Army was not there.

You are forgetting the Prussian Corps in the Rhineland from your figures. The 8,000 deserters are double counted. Now that comes to mind whether they are deserters.

Another problem with the figures is sometimes exclude the Gunners, Pioneers and Engineers. It is very inconsistent how the numbers are arrived at by many authors. They are using numbers to prove a point.

Remember IV Corps was not at Ligny. If we start with 120,000 in 4 corps as you suggest. Losses 24,000 Ligny + 8,000 (missing – actually counted on the losses already) + III Corps at 18000 gives 70,000 marching to Waterloo.

A Brigade of Infantry was about 4,000 men so that is the missing parts of I and II Corps. This is 5 Brigades. If you add back 8000 as aready counted this is 7 Brigades which is correct. Not counted have been 3 brigades each of I and II Corps plus 9 Brigade of III Corps. These 7 Corps arrived before dark on the 18th and actively participated in the pursuit the next day.

Yes I should start with the correct rather than estimated numbers.
Stephen

Dear Phil,

I'm sure you are fully aware of the composition of the VI corps. Which was 8 regiments of Landwehr and 4 of line. 4 regiments of the landwehr were Silesian (pronounced Shlay-ze-an, according to my wife's father who is from there). As Stephen stated earlier these men were some of the best landwehr troops. The other landwehr regiments were Neumark and Pomeranian.

I would surmise that there was less attrition due to straggling and desertion than some of the other landwehr units due to the composition of the corps. The Silesian landwehr were also attributed to pushing some Young Guard units out of Plancenoit. It also had a large cavalry reserve, albeit largely landwehr units.

I also find it interesting that this corps was sent to Waterloo instead of the I or II as it was also farthest away and had to literally march through both of those formations. However the I and II corps were most likely still trying to reorganize and round up stragglers from the previous day. If I recall correctly, Hofschroer mentioned this.

Dear Tom
Bulow's IV Corps had not been engaged at Ligny. Much of that is the problems of the orders that Bulow recieved from Gneisnau which was his junior in seniority. Blucher had gone to bed on the 14th and the orders were polite instructions.

The I-III Corps was scattered and lost in the retreat from Ligny. Two of the Corps had lost (mislaid) their reserve ammunition. Infantry and artillery without ammuition are useless. These were not rediscovered until the morning of the next day. None of these Corps were in a fit state to march immediately. Only IV Corps with the most experienced commender was ready to re-inforce Wellington with I and II Corps following.

Also remember that I Corps had been constantly engaged since 14 June and had performed an efficient rearguard withdrawal to the main army depite being seriously outnumbered.
Stephen

Thanks Stephen.

Yes I recall now that the reserve ammunition had been mislaid during the retreat from Ligny, now that you mention it. That would have been a real problem. Reorganizing an entire corps aftger a large battle and night retreat would have been monumental as well.

The Landwehr performed very well at Plancenoit, which we have trouble recreating on the wargame table.
You really should get out to a game now and again.

Cheers,
Thomas

Dear Oliver
The evidence and comments upon the trustworthy of officers of different religions really come from outside the Napoleonic Period. Both before and after. The Westphalian Landwehr were officered by those who had served in the Westphalian, French and Berg armies under Napoleon because they could not get employment in the Prussian Army. Now I have ascribed the mistrust on religious grounds. It could have been that they had served in a foreign army. I do not know. The comments upon the Westphalians came from writing a book on the Westphalian Guard.

Also these comments are from the mid-Victorian period when such predudice was common. I do not know.

I believe Friedrich II's possible mistrust of Silesians just came from the fact that they had been Austrian subjects until 1742.

The problems with catholics in Prussia during the 19th century was caused by the rise of utramnontanism, after the Napoleonic wars.

The Landwehr performed very well at Plancenoit

Why do you say that? They outnumbered the French 3 to 1, and had more artillery, yet still hadn't taken moved west out of Plancenoit by the time Wellington's troops had advanced so far south that they were level with it.

The latter we know from the fact that friendly fire from Plancenoit was falling on the Brussels road, which it wouldn't have been if the French had broken.

Dear Phil
To attack a defended position, the rule of thumb is a requirement of 3:1 superiority. Please look at the map where Pancenoit is. The impression that you have has come from Siborne and the pressure upon him to change the history by Wellington.
Stephen

Dear Oliver
Thank you for your comments. There are plenty of issues with the raise of nationalism and religious strife to understand whether my comments were real or due to later predudice.
Stephen

I am very interested in your new book Waterloo Logistics.
I can buy it from Ken Trotman from your link above.
But it is relatively expensive.
I see that from that page, there is the option to download a PDF.
Why would I buy the book if I can get a PDF for free?
Is the PDF a full version?
I would like to support you and Ken Trotman books.

Dear Digby
There is an extract from the book and not the full book. It is to show the reader what he is going to get and no more. A PDF is not available of the full book. The price of £25.00 GBP is now at the bottom end of the hardback books and it is on high quality coated paper.
Stephen