"Their Wehrmacht Was Better Than Our Army" Topic

Andy, please elaborate on "I feel the deck is stacked". No, NOT being snarky wondering exactly what you meant.

And if we are measuring effectiveness then machine gun or not artillery caused, depending on the source, from 3-4 times the casualties that ALL small arms caused in Northwest Europe 44-45.

The US problem was not that they did not have effective MGs, there is nothing inherently wrong with the .30 cal, but that they decided on the BAR instead of equipping each squad with a real machine gun. Further I think you will be hard pressed to find anyone who will argue the .50 cal was an "inferior" weapon.

As to defining the period, we are talking about Mr Hastings article and it is he who has chosen to talk primarily about Northwest Europe 44-45.

Interesting discussion at least.

Normandy is late war.
The german army was seriously worn by this time.
Many of the units were second or third line. Some weren't even german really.
The allies completely dominated the skies.
Huge resources were expended by the allies. They had carpet bombing for a few ops and of course the landings themselves had serious naval direct fire support.
Jerry reserves and supplies trying to move up were plagued by air attacks and partisans.

Further to that (and hopefully showing that the front lines here aren't "fixed") is that there is no evidence that I know of to prove that one side or the other was more effective in combat at section, platoon or company level. There is no evidence I know of to show that the reason for German effectiveness at the divisional level was that German soldiers were on average 1.1:1 times as effective as their Allied counterparts and this aggregated up through the organizations. So it is possible that the "better small arms & fieldcraft" stuff had a pretty negligible effect. It is also possible that it entirely explains the effect. It is even possible that it more than explains it, and better Allied procedures at the battalion / regimental / brigade-level dampened the effects somewhat. I don't think any of us know.

The effect might be entirely from having more experienced divisional commanders and staffs, for example.

Thank you Andy. I think then your argument is with Mr Hastings. As I said he chose a comparison with US and British troops 44-45 Northwest Europe.

Further his logic train, to me, jumps the track at times. He is arguing against the stereotype of the German soldier as portrayed in propaganda and popular media yet tries to bolster his argument by talking about material superiority in ground force equipment the Germans enjoyed. Easy to chalk up the "superiority" to material advantages. Further much easier to deflect the discussion to the merits of various hardware then what is his central thesis about the quality and proficiency of the German army especially at its height.

The only 'fair fight' was with the French. They failed to capture The British Army, were defeated by The RAF and could not mount an invasion. If you set out to destroy an Entente and only manage to get half of it then you yes you have failed-failed big time.

If you want a fair fight … you don't go to war. E.g Attacking at 1 to 1 odds is not recommended. IIRC we were basically taught 3 to 1 and 5 to 1 if dug in/fortified. And we all know AFV to AFV the UK and France had many MBTs that were "superior" to many of the German designs. Employed at that time. The Germans knew how to use their AFVs "better"/properly, etc. for modern mobile combined arms warfare. They took everybody to school at that time. Many were still fighting the last war …

They had an army pinned against the coast and completely failed to destroy it. They might have been giving lessons but at the same time were being taught them.

Yes, but that may have not been only to refit/maint., etc. But some[Goring]thought the Luftwaffe [and some even with the Kriegsmarine] would finish off those allied forces on, in and around the beachhead. But some say it could have been a "political" decision by Hitler ? Let the UK escape and they may have decided that they have had enough and would not try again to take on the Germans ? At least in Western Europe.

Hitler was famous for "gambling" on such things. E.g. the Blitz, the Battle of Britain. Knocking the UK air assets out of the war. As again Goring said he could do it. As it was took the UK and it's allies[USA, etc.] almost 3 years to mount an invasion of France., i.e. Normandy, June' 44.

I've heard a number of other opinions as well why Hitler didn't killed/capture everyone at Dunkirk. I don't think it was for lack of trying with the Luftwaffe and even the Kriegsmarine …

Bottom line, the UK, French, etc. left/abandoned all their equipment in France, etc. Plus thousands of troops holding the beachhead so thousands could escape.

As far as learning a lesson. In the early day of the war, e.g. '39-'43(?) the Germans modified their tactics, techniques, etc. and even improved/modified their equipment. E.g. after running into the T34, they designed the Pz. V to take on that type of MBT. Even taking the concept of sloped front armor, etc. for better protection.

The invasion of Poland was a joint Soviet-German operation.
The invasion of France was-in terms of losses per day of action-not far away from losses in Russia.

So … ? Sounds like a good strategy. Attack on two fronts at the same time.

If the French Campaign had continued German losses would have been crippling. That is why the Germans agreed to a stop line and Vichy. It was not them being magnanimous but rather a desire to avoid losses.

Agree but again a good strategic decision.

As far as defeating some nations in weeks. E.g. Denmark, Holland, Luxemburg, Greece, etc., … Even Belgium only lasted @ 6 weeks …

Of course I could be wrong on all this … I was not there … so …

On the subject of the US improving so quickly after Torch and beyond has to do, among other things with the fact that they closely followed up their officer corps and had a well-oiled system to gather data, analyze it and distill useful information. For example the original TD manual emphasized aggression, which resulted in TD's charging at enemy tanks. Once they noted this the manual was revised and this was done many times. Officers and NCO's would often be briefed and trained in various updates. This allowed the US army to very quickly get better.

It also helps that the US involvement in Western Europe matches pretty much the curve troops go through as they get combat experience and ends right before fatigue and the loss of effectiveness among veteran troops sets in.

There was no miracle, the Americans simply worked hard on keeping their officers, NCO's and soldiers well trained and educated and adjusted in time when necessary.

I would observe that even if the evidence shows a 1.1:1 or 1.5:1 superiority in outcomes between Germans ans Allied troops, it doesn't necessarily mean that one is superior to the other.

To understand that one need to understand error bars and or standard deviations values. The difference may well be statistically insignificant. Arguably, history shows it was.

Google "Dupuy QJM validation". There is a great deal of material to be found regarding the numerous validation studies, both in-house and third-party, to which Dupuy's QJM analytics and methodology have been subjected.

Well worth reading.

B

Yes HJ in Normandy were just little kids. Anyone could beat these small 12 year-old boys

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Normandy is late war.
The german army was seriously worn by this time.
Many of the units were second or third line. Some weren't even german really.
The allies completely dominated the skies.
Huge resources were expended by the allies. They had carpet bombing for a few ops and of course the landings themselves had serious naval direct fire support.
Jerry reserves and supplies trying to move up were plagued by air attacks and partisans.

The concentration of German forces in Normandy was greater than anywhere else in WW2.
The panzer-per-mile density there was 4-5 times more than the most concentrated battlefield in Russia.
The Germans were on an internal arc and could move troops from one front to another in an hour or so.
12th SS & Pz Lehr were by far the most powerful Panzer Divisions in the German Army in June 1944.
There were more 'Class 1' German Panzer Divisions in Normandy than there were on the entire Eastern Front.

The excuses for defeat are simply that-excuses.

"The Germans were on an internal arc and could move troops from one front to another in an hour or so."

Really? How interesting.

B

The Germans were on an internal arc and could move troops from one front to another in an hour or so.

That is some pretty impressive logistics. It was many miles between Normandy and the Italian and Eastern fronts. I was under the impression it took several weeks to shift troops between fronts.

Hastings with his journalistic stlye tended to write in broad strokes which can be nit picked by specialists. But his real fault was that he ran counter to the Triumphalism which Ambrose had brought to popular history.

But Hasting's general point that the Germans with limited resources (something like 38% of their army was deployed in the West) put up a tenacious and professional defense in Normandy against almost the full might of the US and UK armed forces. Its certainly a far more valid point than Ambrose contention that the US Army was simply an unstoppable war machine (with a little UK help and a bit of Russian distraction).

Causalities can be manipulated hence the disputes. Often to get big pro-allied numbers, KIAs, MIAs, POWs and wounded are added together. But of course some of the MIAs are really part of the KIAs and POWs likewise many of the wounded are also POWs so you get lots of double accounting. Zettlering tries to be consistent and methodical but given the state of German records may have somewhat under counted. But keep in mind that the allies counted lots of Todt types and auxiliaries as POWs running up the count.

When armies collapse they suffer high causalities but to measure combat effectiveness you need to look at causalities before collapse. In other words before the smaller army was simply attritted down and broke. This is where Dupuy's methodical analytic method shines and shows the quality of the German's tenacious defense. (Which you can compare to the Western allies with much better force rations in 1940 – I'm amused that in triumphalism mania even 1940 is now an allied victory because the Germans (through error) did not fully defeat the UK expeditionary force).

On balance German methods and weapons were a bit better. The MG42 based squad was a better idea than the BAR/M1 or Enfield/Bren squad. Panthers/PzIVs better than M4/Cromwells. Pzfaust/shreck better than bazooka/PIAT. Pak40 better than 5.7/6pder. The allies had far more though of their weapons and had won the other two aspects of modern warfare (air/sea). Some of this came from easier to produce designs but most came from just having a much bigger industrial base, more allies and not being bombed.

Yes the Germans had a higher concentration in Normandy than the Eastern front per mile but that was because they were able to bottle up the allies (though had to stay in naval gunfire range to do so). But as the battle became attritional, the Germans got worn down and then as the front broke open the full material superiority of the allies (and much greater mobility) made it a rout. But from which unlike the French/UK in '40, the Germans recovered.

TomT

Causalities can be manipulated hence the disputes. Often to get big pro-allied numbers, KIAs, MIAs, POWs and wounded are added together. But of course some of the MIAs are really part of the KIAs and POWs likewise many of the wounded are also POWs so you get lots of double accounting. Zettlering tries to be consistent and methodical but given the state of German records may have somewhat under counted. But keep in mind that the allies counted lots of Todt types and auxiliaries as POWs running up the count.

The exclusion of POW/MIA totals is the standard way skewing the figures in favour of the Germans.

When armies collapse they suffer high causalities but to measure combat effectiveness you need to look at causalities before collapse. In other words before the smaller army was simply attritted down and broke. This is where Dupuy's methodical analytic method shines and shows the quality of the German's tenacious defense.

So the Germans could have bagged the BEF but an 'error' prevented it?
What you are saying is that if your army is totally defeated and sent running for its life then you should ignore the rout and only measure performance up to the moment they turned and fled?

made it a rout. But from which unlike the French/UK in '40, the Germans recovered.

Recovered?
I thought surrender came just 8 months later?
The claim the UK never recovered from Dunkirk is absurd.

Yes, the UK and French recovered. You saw this later in North Africa, Sicily then Italy. And of course at Normandy and beyond.

That is why the Germans agreed to a stop line and Vichy. It was not them being magnanimous but rather a desire to avoid losses.

I think that is too simplistic. There were a number of good reasons why Hitler wanted a French rump state in 1940.
(1) There was nothing in what was left that he wanted. No natural resources. Occupying the rest of France just gives you more territory to police and a longer coastline to defend.
(2) He had the bits he wanted. Namely Alsace Lorraine, the channel coast to harass the British from, an Atlantic sea port for U boats to operate from and of course Paris, the jewel in the French crown, which had eluded the Prussians in 1870 and the Germans in 1914.
(3) Taking the rest of France would have pushed the French fleet into allied hands. Keeping a French state prevented that from happening.
(4) If the French state ceased to exist Britain could have taken over French colonies, keeping a French state in being kept that from happening and enabled French ships to continue to bring cargo to France from those colonies unmolested by the British. Hitler made sure the French had to pay reparations which meant Germany had access to that wealth.
Operation Torch effectively ended all those advantages and the Germans therefore moved swiftly to occupy the rest of France.

"Recovered? I thought surrender came just 8 months later?"

Correct. Absolutely nothing of any military consequence occurred between August 1944 and May 1945. Market Garden, the defence of Walcheren Island, the Reichswald, Huertgen Forest, the Lorraine campaign; the Battle of the Bulge, Lake Balaton, the siege of Budapest, Seelowe Heights and the culminating siege of Berlin were simply figments of Joseph Goebbels' propaganda imagination.

Good lord.

B

The pre-D-Day planning assumed that it would take about a year to reach the Rhine and that ultimate victory would be around July 1945. They were being too pessimistic. The speed of the German collapse took everyone by surprise. I guess you could say all the Allies had to do was 'Kick in the door and the whole rotten structure came crashing down'.

I've always been impressed by your ability to ignore what you just wrote and completely change the subject without a whiff of intellectual conscience.

B

Sorry by recover I meant that they failed to reconstitue a defense line after the intial shock of the German breakout. I was speaking of the defense of France not WWII in its entirty. course.

The UK was able to recover due to the presence of the channel which the Germans for all their ground combat tactical/grand tactical skill could not cross becasuce of the already mentioned Allied superiortiy in Air/Naval component of total war. But as we are discussing ground combat competence this type of recovery is quite different.

The UK returned to ground combat in France four years latter after the Germans had committed the bulk of their forces to a campaign in Russia and the US had committed the bulk of its forces to combat in France. This is rather different than the German recovery and reconstituting a defensive line in the Fall of 44 (and eventually retaking the offense) which they did without the channel barrier (in fairness they did have the Siegfried line) while still fighting with most of their resources in Russia and no new major ally to provide the massive additional forces.

TomT

The UK returned to ground combat in France four years latter after the Germans had committed the bulk of their forces to a campaign in Russia and the US had committed the bulk of its forces to combat in France.

And there was I thinking that Britain (and Canada) invaded France at the same time as the U.S., and not afterwards. I suppose that that's one version of history.

"And there was I thinking that Britain (and Canada) invaded France at the same time as the U.S."

In the interest of forum decorum, I shall suppress the flickering snicker within me. BTW, don't forget the Poles!!!

;-)

B

The primary academic source Hasting relies upon is Dupuy's "A Genius For War" in which Dupuy puts a series of engagements through his model and gives various weighting to different factors. From this he concludes that the Germans were more effective than the Allies – not just the Western Allies – ALL allies.

Dupuy did not have access to any statistics from the Eastern Front. Dupuy did not include any Battles of WWII prior to September 1943. Dupuys model does not scientifically weight the factor Dupuy identifies as relevant (long range logistical capacity for example). Dupuy created a model whereby the ratio of calculating the "cost per kill" – the number of friendlies lost per enemy soldier killed is conducted. And that isn't based upon any on the ground research, just his own impression about what weight should be given to each individual factor.

It was basically a refinement (and not a subtle one, in my view) of the body count philosophy used by Westmoreland to prove that the US was winning in Vietnam in 1968. This whole process was following in the discredited footsteps of SLA Marshall. You can model anything you like – but that doesn't make it real.

I don't think you can compare it to the Vietnam experience. Vietnam wasn't a total war so casualties are relatively less important and while the US were winning the body count they were losing on the political will to continue the fight. Under those circumstances superior application of force at the sharp end doesn't help.

With all due respect, William Ulsterman, I suggest that you labor under a rather imperfect appreciation of Dupuy's work. Dupuy's development of the QJM/TNDA model was a direct reaction to what he viewed as the inadequacies of the Vietnam era "quantitative" hardware-based modeling methodologies then in vogue within the defense community. The web offers a very great deal of useful data on the evolution and development of the QJM/TNDA model as well as its repeated validations (both in-house and third-party) and its predictive successes; the QJM/TNDA is probably one of the most extensively reviewed and validated models in existence today. DARPA seems to consider it a valuable analytic tool.

"A Genius for War" is only one of 25-30 books penned by Dupuy (a career US Army officer BTW). I have a copy of Dupuy's original 1979 1st edition of "Numbers, Predictions & War", which introduced his QJM approach. Going through Appendix B, HERO QJM Database as of May 1977, the following Eastern Front engagements were listed:

21-25 Jun 1941 – Rovno (Ukraine)
12-18 Jan 1943 – Leningrad
04-12 Jul 1943 – Oboyan-Kursk
03-05 Aug 1943 – Kharkov-Belgorod
09-16 Aug 1945 – Mutangiang (Manchuria)

He did in fact have some Eastern Front material in hand. Keep in mind as well that the list dates from forty years ago, during the height of the Cold War. Soviet archives were only opened to western scholarship in the early 90s and IIRC a number of other Eastern Front engagements have since been evaluated.

Apart from that, I still have a list of historical monographs offered by HERO that accompanied the a/m book. Among the titles:

> Soviet Mechanized Corps Operations in World War II.
> The Attack of the German XLVII and II SS Panzer Corps at Kursk in July 1943.
> Soviet Air Defense Organizations and Operations in World War II.
> The Breakthrough of the Soviet XV Rifle Corps near Lvov in 1944.
> The Soviet Attack at Pogorelye Gorodishchye in 1942

I have no desire to start a big argument or debate; I'm simply suggesting that you might want to explore the topic more deeply before forming an opinion. Some of Dupuy's conclusions have gored certain sacred oxes, which has resulted in a backlash (as in certain precincts of the US Army).

FWIW.

B

With all due respect Blutarski, how can Dupuy's analysis credibly include Battles such as Rovno, Leningrad, Kursk and Kharkov when he has no access to any data from the Soviet Union and still be presented as balanced?

The whole point of my argument is that Hasting is relying upon Dupuy, who has created a model based upon his own weighting of factors which are considered important from his own perspective, through which he has run a tiny proportion of total WWII actions. SLA Marshall did the same thing, only he did it badly.

And now the eastern front battles you are pointing out to rebut my point are ones that Dupuy did not have access to any data from the Soviets.

You might see QJM/TNDA as a new Camelot, but I don't.

My response is that it is only a model and models are not the be all and end all of history, if that were so then predicting any future event would be easy.

WU – I was simply raising some points where documentation in my possession runs counter to your apparent understanding of things. You are under no obligation whatsoever to pursue the matter if you choose not to do so.

Just curious – what exactly does your reference to "a new Camelot" mean to imply?

B

To get back to the original question … Better or not … they lost in the long run. And like on ESPN, if you take a quick look at the Big Game overall on the after game reports :

"Well Eric the USSR killed about 70-75% of the Nazis on the Eastern Front …"

"But Hubie don't forget the US production rates as well as Generals' Foods, Motors and Electric !"

The whole point of my argument is that Hasting is relying upon Dupuy, who has created a model based upon his own weighting of factors which are considered important from his own perspective, through which he has run a tiny proportion of total WWII actions.

That is the standard way of developing a model. You then test those weighting's by feeding real world data into the model and see if it produces results that agree with the real life outcome. If it doesn't you go back and adjust your weightings. That is how any model of real life situations are developed – weather forecasting, traffic flow, spread of disease etc. How much real life data you have to put through a model to validate it varies with the complexity of the model, but you certainly don't need to put all the available data to get a model that works and you can also work with incomplete data, although you need more of it.

SLA Marshall did the same thing, only he did it badly.

Despite the valid criticisms of SLAM's methods his conclusions seem to tie in with the other observations regarding participation rates in combat in WW2 and no one has come up with anything different. In response to his writings many modern armies changed their training regimes for soldiers to get higher rates in combat and higher participation rates are reported in modern wars from Vietnam onwards, although one could argue at the expense of higher rates of psychological trauma. However as has been pointed out on this thread turning your army into an efficient killing machine does not guaranteee you win the war as was the experience in Vietnam despite the impressive body counts reported.

My response is that it is only a model and models are not the be all and end all of history, if that were so then predicting any future event would be easy.

That is a bit like saying Einstein's general theory of relativity is "just a theory" and ignoring all the maths that went into developing and it its validation in predicting real world observations. My reply would be that history is not the be all and end all of history. The opinions of those who went through it and report on it will be shaped by their own experiences and preconceptions and what they think is important may not be important at all. Same applies to those who study it. Each historian brings his or her own baggage to the table.

Well Eric the USSR killed about 70-75% of the Nazis on the Eastern Front …"

"But Hubie don't forget the US production rates as well as Generals' Foods, Motors and Electric !"

And of course no one ever mentions the British and Commonwealth effort, the Chinese etc. Sigh!

Or the Pacific Theater which, area wise, dwarfed the European one :)

And of course no one ever mentions the British and Commonwealth effort, the Chinese etc. Sigh!

Well Fred I was only mentioning a few of the comments in what would have been on ESPN if such a conversation actually occurred there.

Which if anyone ever watched ESPN and I very, very rarely do … It's a pretty good bet that few if any on ESPN would know anything about WWII, or other than sports history, etc., etc.

As someone on another site said "I don't know why the Germans are held up as an example of military excellence, they haven't won a war since 1871!"

An attempt at humour I know, however, you can have the ‘best' armed forces in the world, but if you have the worst leaders picking the wrong fights ……

The problem is defining better. And you also have to define the context (ie scale)

Was one German soldier better than one US GI? Or are you going by squad, platoon, division, army? Or the whole German Armed Forces? Well Germany certainly loses at that level, their navy and air force was crushed by ours.

Man to Man? I kinda think a US paratrooper was better than an Ost Battalion soldier. Absurd? Yes. My point exactly. Without a definition of better and a context it's a meaningless comparison. If you mean could a group of German soldiers win a battle (ie be better) against a similar sized group of Americans  (context) my answer would be no.

 In 3 years of War vs the US there were few German Victories. Kasserine perhaps. Anzio? Doubtful. Bulge? Only at the beginning when they had a crushing numerical advantage vs. thinly stretched Americans. When the odds evened up the Germans lost.

As to the argument that they held out for so long against such great numbers does that show they were "better" or just had forces like Tiger Tanks and terrain like the English Channel and Italian Mountains that favored defense? So if the Germans were better than the US where is the list of German Victories in 43, 44, 45?  Compare vs US Victories. QED. Cheers!

The problem is there is never a truly fair fight in ww2 above mabye battalion or company level.
Either one side as air superiority or the other.

It's much easier to "game up" play with numbers in say the Napoleonic wars. Why did Napoleon win in 1805-1807? Corps de armee system, faster matching, extremely motivated soldiers and good leaders (Including Napoleon him self)
When these factors either get reversed or at least become equal among the nations. The French prefrom worse.

There is no giant tactical/strategic diffence in the napoleonic period.

However when you keep mixing air superiority into the mix every thing gets screwed up.

This whole "who is best Germany or the allies" would be much easier to decide if planes didn't exist.

The problem is there is never a truly fair fight in ww2

As I said, good combat leaders don't prefer to "fight fair". I.e. as in 3 to 1 odds at a minimum plus combat multiplies.

Yes, and hence it's extremely difficult to ascertain who is best.

This is not really a question of who laid down the winning hand or ultimately walked away with the entire pot; it is really about how well, win or lose, one played one's cards.

B

it is really about how well, win or lose, one played one's cards.

Very much so … E.g. In 1940 many of the UK and French AFVs were "superior" to many of the Germans'. I.e. The majority of the German Panzers were Mk.Is & IIs.

I disagree. There is no "second place" in war. No judges awarding style points. At the end of the day it is all about winning or losing. :)

Agreed … bottom line … you are #1 or defeated/dead …

I disagree. There is no "second place" in war. No judges awarding style points. At the end of the day it is all about winning or losing.

I think if I was a soldier I would be concerned about my personal chance of survival, so if my army wasn't doing what it could to improve combat efficiency so we kill more of theirs than they do of ours I would be very annoyed. If the other guy is doing it better you need to find out why and do it too.
But the bottom line, despite all the naysayers on this thread for the works of Dupuy and S L A Marshall, post war German operations and Auftragstaktik were extensively studied and adopted by NATO armies. SLAM's work lead to a revaluation of how soldiers were trained for combat. The irony, of course, is that despite improved participation rates and tactics the US still lost in Vietnam, which goes to show that the better army doesn't always win the war.

I think if I was a soldier I would be concerned about my personal chance of survival, so if my army wasn't doing what it could to improve combat efficiency so we kill more of theirs than they do of ours

Yep … Regardless of the criticism of "body count" … On a tactical level, at a PL or Co Cdr. Kill more of the "enemy" than he kills of you is why as a Grunt or Tanker, you are there.

As I was taught and so often repeat, killing in an effective and efficient manner … "ruthlessly" if need be … Killing as many of the enemy as often as possible is how you generally "win" on a tactical level. Of course with the caveat that you don't violate an GCs, etc.

Add using combat multipliers, e.g. Gunships, FA, CAS, etc. "properly" … You remove as many of the enemy and their equipment from the battle as quickly as you can.

Destroy the enemies' assets of all types to make it very difficult for them to carry on/fight, etc. Destroy their will to wage war.

Of course with the modern paradigm of asymmetrical warfare. This is easier said than done in most situations. For a number of reason as we have discussed many times before.

But again, as a Ldr/Cdr I want to bring all my troops back home. I don't really care about how many of the enemy has to be eliminated to make that happen. But it seems to me on a tactical level. That as long as we kill, capture and destroy enemy personal & equipment frequently and in large numbers you are doing what you were put on the battlefield for.

I know some in the past maybe upset with that kind of realistic and pragmatic mind set. So be it. But AFAIK generally that is the way conflicts are waged and "won" … Once the die is cast to prosecute a war.