"Militias in the AWI" Topic

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Interesting article concerning militias in the AWI by noted historian, Thomas Fleming. Here's a quote:

"At Bennington and Kings Mountain, the militia, again led by experienced officers, scored victories without the help of Continentals. When Washington marched to Yorktown, he left New Jersey completely in the hands of the militia. The conclusion seems inescapable: the militia could not have won the war alone but the war probably could not have been won without them."

Hmmmmmmm……………..

I think that is essentially true. I think the commanders of the Revolutionary army later in the war tended to use militia as a sort of forlorn hope, placing their faith in the Continentals.
I think militia were a bit of an unknown quantity, they could do as well as regulars at times, but could equally be rather…unreliable, especially if pressed, which made them difficult to use. The Regular Continentals seem to have been more predictable, especially as the war progressed.

"The conclusion seems inescapable: the militia could not have won the war alone but the war probably could not have been won without them"

Lol. If they weren't essential then why bother to raise them?

Dan

The most important thing about this discussion will of course be, how do I rate each unit in a wargame?

There is nothing new or profound in that statement.

Nope. Especially given Congress' resistance to raising a standing army of any size. Not that they could even pay for the one they had.

If the term "militia" was changed to "irregulars", and thereby still maintaining the distinction from the regular Continental Army, so many of these "revelations" would become pretty self-evident.

Militia is a very broad term with very varied quality. We have a penchant for wanting to classify this especially in wargaming. So as usual, it depends… lol

As to militia being essential, absolutely!

"The conclusion seems inescapable: the militia could not have won the war alone but the war probably could not have been won without them"

In other news, water is wet.

Made sense to leave NJ "in the hands of the militia." The center of gravity had shifted 400 miles to the south.

Worth bearing in mind that quite a lot of New Jersey militiamen had been drafted into Continental units during the middle years of the war – for example, all four of Maxwell's regiments at Monmouth had been "bulked out" with militia drafts – and hence were relatively experienced (if not actually keen).

See the previous discussion on Saratoga.
One of the posters there argues that militia did nothing but run away. I disagree.

Since he is fond of quoting historians, I thought I would do the same.

Seems pretty clear cut to me.

NJ was still an important hinterland for the British garrison in New York, which Clinton continued to regard as the key to the position in America. Hence his quick departure northwards after the capture of Charleston.

The problem is discussing "the militia." There were effectively several. New England militia was nothing to mess with, and the southern back country produced excellent irregulars--sadly, for both armies. Militia from slave plantation areas is notoriously tricky--too many people they don't dare arm, and too many they don't dare send away or lose. But the middle colonies experienced the joys of modern-style "diversity." What with ethnic and political factions, you got a smattering of decent small units, and an overall militia probably not worth the firearms they stole.

For a historical battle, they are what they are. For a campaign--
Pretty good militia on the frontier, but only for irregular warfare. First rate militia in New England, but they still don't have the drill or discipline to match regulars. Tidewater south--not much, but you'd get some decent cavalry scouts. Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York--roll dice to see whether they show up. Then roll again to see whether they make any difference.

Washington said the militia eat your rations, consume your weapons and ammunition "and leave you at last at a critical moment." But look where he mostly fought.

Fleming, a historian of whom I think highly, is wrong in stating that there were no Continentals at Bennington. That has been demonstrated in the recent Saratoga thread.

As for the militia:

‘No militia will ever acquire the habits necessary to resist a regular force. Even those nearest the seat of war are only valuable as light troops to be scattered in the woods and plague rather that do serious injury to the enemy. The firmness requisite for the real business of fighting is only to be attained by a constant course of discipline and service.'-George Washington.

‘there was always that incalculable factor, the American militia, a factor which could never be counted on by its friends, but equally could never be ignored by its enemies.'-A British military historian.

Morgan to Greene on the militia after Cowpens:

‘If they fight, you will beat Cornwallis; if not, he will beat you, and perhaps cut your regulars to pieces, which will be losing all our hopes…I think it would be advisable to select [former Continentals] from among the militia and put them in the ranks with the regulars…put the riflemen on the flanks, under enterprising officers who are acquainted with that kind of fighting, and put the militia in the center with some picked troops in the rear with orders to shoot down the first man that runs.'

‘The Myth of the Militia…The Revolutionary War created its own military traditions, perpetuated in myth, are, and even serious history. The most pervasive of these was that all free-born Americans would spontaneously rise to arms to meet and crush any foreign invasion-a belief well expressed in [paintings] of militia rushing to meet the British…In cold fact, there was no large scale rally during the Revolution, but the myth endured.'-John Elting.

‘They come in you cannot tell how; go out you cannot see when; act you cannot tell where; consume your provisions; exhaust your stores; and leave you at last in a critical moment.'-George Washington.

‘Men just dragged from the tender scenes of domestic life; unaccustomed to the din of arms; totally unacquainted with every kind of military skill, which being followed by a want of confidence in themselves, when opposed to troops regularly trained, disciplined, and appointed, superior in knowledge, and superior in arms, makes them timid, and ready to fly from their own shadows.'-George Washington.

The North Carolina militia…abandoned us…Many were missing, as it always the case with militia after a battle; but they generally are to be found safe at their own firesides.'-Henry Lee after Guilford Courthouse, March 1781.

‘I would not have had a swamp in the view of the militia on any consideration; they would have made for it, and nothing could have detained them from it. As to covering my wings, I knew my adversary, and was perfectly sure I should have nothing but downright fighting. As to retreat, it was the very thing I wished to cut off all hope of. I would have thanked Tarleton had he surrounded me with his cavalry. It would have been better than placing my own men in the rear to shoot down those who broke from the ranks. When men are forced to fight, they will sell their lives dearly…Had I crossed the river, one half of the militia would immediately have abandoned me.'-Daniel Morgan after Cowpens.

Fleming, a historian of whom I think highly, is wrong in stating that there were no Continentals at Bennington. That has been demonstrated in the recent Saratoga thread.

Maybe. But he's correct about this. You can cherry pick all the quotes you want to.
Fleming is right.

Nope.

Warner's Continental Regiment was present at Bennington as has been shown. Fleming is wrong in this case, and so are you-repeatedly.

By the way, which quotations are 'cherry-picked'?

They definitely show Washington's opinions, and Morgan's message to Green is right on the money.

So, perhaps you could elaborate on your statement?

This is your original statement:

"Overall, the militia were a liability, not an advantage, despite too many people making excuses for them too many times. They also failed in the War of 1812."

And that's just wrong.

As are you.

Fleming is a top notch historian. You're not.

In fact, judging by your AWI uniform book that has over 200 errors in it, I would trust Fleming over you any day.

You should spend more time fixing all the errors you made in that book

Just some friendly advice.

Not that they could even pay for the one they had.

This is a key element that usually gets forgotten in this discussion. The AWI was a war of a few major battles and a great many skirmishes. Those skirmishes quite often determined how much territory and its resources would be available to help maintain the rebellion, and how much British resources would be tied up in occupying duties rather than being used in the field army. Much of that skirmishing was done by the militia, and much of it was successful.

The colonial governments and the colonial economies were not set up to maintain large standing armies needed to secure territory and fight the British. At times there weren't sufficient resources to maintain the small standing forces they had. Militia let the colonies wage war on the cheap. It allowed them to secure territory and populations whose resources could then be used both for the militia and for the standing forces.

Equally important was the number of British troops tied down by the rebel militia activity. At Camden Cornwallis fought with only a fraction of the total British strength in the south. Most of his forces were in garrisons scattered throughout South Carolina and Georgia.

‘If they fight, you will beat Cornwallis; if not, he will beat you, and perhaps cut your regulars to pieces, which will be losing all our hopes…I think it would be advisable to select [former Continentals] from among the militia and put them in the ranks with the regulars

The version that I have usually seen refers to "old soldiers" and not necessarily former Continentals. Greene did not follow this bit of advice.

Morgan understood when deploying his troops at Cowpens that he did not have enough Continentals to form a sufficiently strong main line of defense. He also knew that he had individual militia units that had accumulated combat experience and/or otherwise could probably be relied upon to fight up to Continental standards. By carefully selecting militia units Morgan was able to significantly increase the numeric strength of his third line without weakening its qualify. Greene did not follow this advice at GCH. Greene chose to rely solely on Continentals for his third line.

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In fact, judging by your AWI uniform book that has over 200 errors in it, I would trust Fleming over you any day.
You should spend more time fixing all the errors you made in that book

Please list them by error and page number. If you don't want to list them here, then my home email is Boulart198@yahoo.com.

And for all of your posturing, insults, and argument, Fleming is still incorrect in the quotation in the OP.

And, overall, your opinions are irrelevant. You are, however, entitled to your own opinions, but not to your own facts.

Your knowledge of what an ad hominem logical fallacy is needs some refreshing. Basically, if you can't argue the point, you attack the poster personally. You have a very bad habit of exercising this error in logic to your own hurt.

Excellent point BILL N:

"This is a key element that usually gets forgotten in this discussion. The AWI was a war of a few major battles and a great many skirmishes. Those skirmishes quite often determined how much territory and its resources would be available to help maintain the rebellion, and how much British resources would be tied up in occupying duties rather than being used in the field army. Much of that skirmishing was done by the militia, and much of it was successful."

As game presenters, these types of encounters are often overlooked/ignored. As a result, and "as game presenters" there's probably too much of a skew to the set-piece battles that receive constant tabletop replay.

Maybe it's just me, but Tarleton is overrated by history. He was only 27 in 1781, and had just been a cornet a few years prior. Kind of a big leap, and he really didn't have a lot of experience prior (cause he was just a very young man). But another way, he was just a few years older than Washington was when he surrendered at Necessity.

Militia played a limited role in the big engagements. I think their value was contributing to the friction of war on the Crown – countless skirmishes, denial of Royal Authority in most areas, etc.

27 was not very young by the standards of the time. Wolfe was a lieutenant colonel at 23 and 32 when he died at Quebec. Arthur Wellesley (Duke of Wellington) was a colonel at 27. Youth does not necessarily equate with experience in the 18th C, be careful not to view this through 21st C eyes.

Alexander had conquered Babylon when he was 25.

Tarleton had not commanded a unit as long as Wolfe nor served as 2ic as he did at louisbourg either. Wolfe was regarded as one of the better young officers for some time.

So you are comparing Alexander to Tarleton? Really?

Hell no. Just that both were 27 at one time. The Age is not a factor.

SM makes a great point. In the last third of the war many militia units benefited from having veteran ex-Continentals among their number. Former Continental sergeants now militia officers, former Continental privates now militia sergeants.

I always have a few figures in my militia units wearing a Continental jacket to represent this.

Militia was important to fill the ranks but I cannot see winning the war with only Militia.

Russel Weigley's "The American Way If War" is an interesting look at the Militia throughout American history.
From the beginning of the Republic, there was debate about the merits of a standing Army.
Look at the Civil War. The Regular Army was virtually shoved aside, while the States recruited State regiments. Lots of political graft there in officer appointments. And of course we all know how the regiments withered away while new ones were raised, rather than sending drafts to reinforce veteran cadres. More new regiments equaled more opportunity to politically appoint new officers, especially Colonels.
When the Militia was codified in the National Guard, it became even more so. See Spanish American War and the Great War.
It wasn't until World War 2 that the standing army regained control.

I think it's fair to say that men like James Wolfe and Ban Tarleton were obtained command despite their youth (and encountered jealousy because of that).

The purchase of commissions and patronage meant that young men could achieve command over older and more experienced men, but also allowed for the promotion of men deemed to have ability, like Wolfe and Tarleton. Augustus, Lord Howe was another. As was GW. Being well connected did not hurt.

It's true though that In an age when boys of 14 could be commissioned Ensign or Cornet and serve with their regiments in battle, the threshold of manhood was crossed earlier, even if experience and maturity of judgement would have to come later. Natural selection played its part.

Wesley/ Wellington obtained command of the 33rd when he was 25, although he was fortunate in having a more experienced 2i/c, John Sherbrooke ( an old man of 30) who helped pull the chestnuts out of the fire when the 33rd first went into action in Holland. Wellington, as well as having natural talent, was also uncharacteristically diligent, which was fortunate since through seniority he also served as acting brigadier for a period.

A generation after the AWI, the Army at that time had become notorious for the number of juvenile Lieutenant Colonels who cheerfully blundered about, saved by natural leadership and a sense of aristocratic entitlement- as well as a dollop of good luck. Henry Paget of the 80th (later Lord Uxbridge) was one. In later life Wellington was happy to admit "Why, I learnt what one ought not to do, and that is always something."

Nevinsrip or Brecthel198: what constitutes a Continental Regiment? Thank You

Are you looking for a legal definition or a practical one?

Continentals were members of a standing army. They were either recruited under the authority of the Continental Congress or were recruited and organized by the states and adopted by the Continental Congress. The cost of maintaining them was ultimately supposed to be born by the Continental Congress. They were answerable to the chain of command set up by the Continental Congress.

Confusing the matter is that you have Continental regiments which were brought up to strength by the addition of militia troops. You also have state regiments which were standing units raised by the states and were only answerable to and maintained by the Continental Congress when lent for Continental service. You also have ad hoc militia units which were raised from the larger body of militia for terms of up to 180 days and which may or may not have been maintained at the cost of the Continental Congress. If you still think you've got it many of the Continental units were actually maintained by the states' cost during the war because the Continental Congress lacked the resources to meet their obligations.

Practically Continental units were units designated as Continentals, such as the 1st Continental (rifle) regiment in 1775-6, or the 1st Maryland Continental regiment, or the 1st Continental Light Dragoons or Lee's Additional Continental regiment.

None of which addresses the issue of the relative quality of the units designated "Continental". Or "militia" for that matter.
Since this is allegedly a "wargaming" site, that's kind of important.

When assembling a historical scenario for my home rules, I tend to rate a unit by how they performed on the day. Again, that is based on whether that information is available.

Calling a unit "Continental" is no guarantee that I can rate it as equivalent to a British or a Hessian line unit.

Winston, that's a very practical viewpoint, and part of what makes wargaming the AWI so intriguing. Some may want simple, complete answers, but obviously those can't always be forthcoming.

Take a look at the Continental units combat records. It may take a little time, but it can be done.

A good start is The Continental Army by Robert Wright.

The Continental Army was founded on 14 June 1775. State units that had been formed that year were taken into the Continental Army and regiments formed after were formed as Continentals.

By the time of von Steuben unit training had become uniform, but even before that, such as during the battles of Saratoga, especially Freeman's Farm and Bemis Heights, the Continental regiments performed excellently against the British and Germans and bore the brunt of the heavy fighting.

None of which addresses the issue of the relative quality of the units designated "Continental". Or "militia" for that matter.

Which is the point some of us have been driving at. The quality of Continental forces as a whole was rising especially in the 1775 to 1778 period, not only from Steuben's training at Valley Forge but also from the rising levels of experience of Continental units, officers and troops. Even late in the war though the Continental tag wasn't a guarantee that the unit was of high quality. Buford's regiment at Waxhaws and the 2nd Maryland at GCH were both Continentals.

The other half of the story is the same could be said for the militia. As the conflict wore on there were increasing numbers of militia men who had previous experience. SOME militia units were even performing at or near the levels of good Continental units. That does not negate the fact that job #1 of all militia serving away from home was to get back alive. Plus many of the units while capable of serving well under some situations were not sufficiently good to serve as ersatz Continentals unsupported by regulars, and other militia units were just bad.