"Allied vs German strength - Western Front 1918" Topic

Was looking through an old book from my library, "The War with Germany – A Statistical Summary" by Leonard P Ayres, which contained a very interesting chart of the relative strengths of Germany vs the Allies on the Western Front in 1918. It offers a very strong and perhaps under-appreciated argument as to why Germany was forced to armistice.

Read as: Germany --- Allies --- Ratio (German vs Allies)

Apr 1918 --- 1,569,000 --- 1,245,000 --- 1.26:1.00
May 1918 --- 1,600,000 --- 1,343,000 --- 1.19:1.00
Jun 1918 --- 1,639,000 --- 1,496,000 --- 1.10:1.00
Jul 1918 --- 1,412,000 --- 1,556,000 --- 0.91:1.00
Aug 1918 --- 1,395,000 --- 1,672,000 --- 0.81:1.00
Sep 1918 --- 1,339,000 --- 1,682,000 --- 0.80:1.00
Oct 1918 --- 1,223,000 --- 1,594,000 --- 0.77:1.00
Nov 1918 ----- 866,000 --- 1,485,000 --- 0.58:1.00

In other words, whereas Germany had held a 5 to 4 advantage in numbers in April 1918, in seven months its situation had been more than reversed to a 3 to 5 position of inferiority by November 1918.

Sobering numbers.

B

hmm and what event occurred during that period of time…

Sobering for the Germans perhaps. I'd guess the allies were breaking out the champagne.

Still ….. from a peak strength in Jun 1918, the German army on the Western Front lost very nearly half (47 pct) of its fighting strength in just five months.

That is remarkable to me and goes a long way toward explaining the panic at General Staff HQ. Ludendorff did not lose his nerve; he was watching his army evaporate before his eyes.

B

The combined effect of the attrition suffered during the "victories" of the Kaiserschlacht combined with the losses from the Allied counter-offensives had a devastating impact on the German army. And it was not just men that were lost, artillery and machine guns were lost in enourmous numbers as well, the Allies captured well over 6000 pieces of artillery between the summer and the armistice. Germany was long past the point were it could absorb such losses and bounce back it was either seek a negotiated end to the war or have the allies dictate the peace in Berlin after an additional year of bloodshed, this time on German soil.

I don't think that is was Germany loosing strength as much as it was the American's entered the trenches in strength.

More likely the fact that they lost 30% of their army in one month (according to the above data). Not many armies bounce back from that after 4 years of continuous war.

Allied strength peaked in September, so the arrival of US forces was undoubtedly helpful, but didn't magically kill off 700,000 German soldiers.

As noted above, the losses suffered during the Kaiserschlacht, and summer/autumn offensives were shattering. So much for the 'stab in the back' story.

One factor people often forget about troop numbers and casualty figures is that they rarely mention which percentage of troops are frontline units and which are secondary or even only suited for logistics and other menial jobs.

To give a WWII example

On the 20th of June 1941 the Germans had 136 Divisions suitable for all offensive operations, 8 needed a little rest and refitting but were otherwise also suitable. 19 Divisions were suitable for limited offensive operations while 22 for suited for defense and 24 for limited defense.

By March 30th, they were down to 8 divisions suitable for offensive operations, 3 required rest and repair before being fully operational while 47 divisons were available for limited offensive operations. A staggering 73 and 29 divisions were only suitable for defensive or limited defensive operations, while 49 divisions had ceased to exist.

In October the German army would be in a similar condition with most of their units too depleted to launch a counter-attack or struggle to keep a defensive line. We can also assume that casualty rates would be highest among the frontline troops as the very best of the army is said to have been used up in the offensives and what remained were second-line troops.

So the ration doesn't say that much, you can be outnumbered but still have qualitatively far better trained and motivated troops than the enemy, or your percentage of fighting troops is higher than that of an enemy whose force has a huge logistics train but fewer combat troops.

The loss of German strength, both in terms of quality and quantity, had a huge impact. It became virtually impossible for German divisions to be rotated out of the line. Anecdotal accounts speak of the incessant strain, without almost no relief. The numbers only tell part of the story.

Robert

Remember that in addition to battlefield casualties the combatants of 1918 were hit with the Spanish Flu.