"French Attack Column" Topic
103 Posts
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Le Breton | 10 Nov 2017 10:07 a.m. PST |
"what would work best would be a heavy skirmish line augmented by artillery and supported by battalion columns and cavalry formed to counter-attack locally whatever came near" That is how would summarize late period Russian actual practise – it is perfect description of the positions at Borodino, for example. Also used in the advance, examples Jakobovo, Gorodeczna, Maloyaroslavets. Also, with some alterations, Suvarov's usual method. ============ "We can see the same procedure at Austerlitz, Jena, etc. I think it is the typical use of attack columns." The use of rather complicated conversions was pretty common among the French in 1805/1806, as the general Roguet describes. Lannes' men at Austerlitz had the choreogrpahy of a ballet corps. But they had had years to drill in the camps at the English channel before the autumn of 1805. How much was this complexity used before and after that period, even by the French? I, too, am not an expert. So I really don't know. |
Gunfreak | 10 Nov 2017 10:48 a.m. PST |
By the way, taking into consideration the whole action described in that quote, we can conclude that skirmishers did not replace lines in order to defeat the enemy lines by firepower. Skirmishers fire did not replace the volleys fired by formed infantry lines (or not in all circumstances). I think skirmishers' role is overestimate. In my opinion skirmishers cancel each other out. Unless one side has a huge advantage in skill and or numbers (like the French in 1805-1807, then each sides skirmishers just did their thing. Skirmishing was low intensity things. Hitting other skirmishers as a skirmisher isn't easy. Both sides are hiding, popping up, even with modern rifles it's not very easy hitting running people. At Auerstadt French skirmishers did in fact do great harm to the Prussians. They got very close to the formed Prussian battalion which didn't have any answer. Morand's 1st division also had a big skirmish formation made up of the elites companies of the depot battalion. This formation of some 450 men actually outflanked the prussians and shot at their rear and Flank. They probably didn't cause huge casualties. But any battalion getting hit by pot shots in their back is going to get nervous. |
McLaddie | 10 Nov 2017 1:05 p.m. PST |
Rachel: The Roguet example you give doesn't summarize how columns were used. It gives one example, a good one, but just one variation. What isn't mentioned is that the Austrians 'broke' when the French advanced after their rapid volleys, though contact was never made…as usual. And that method wasn't used exclusively at Jena or Austerlitz. For instance, the Colonel of the Hohenlohe regiment reported at the end of the battle that French skirmishers engaged them for a long time, supported by columns which they 'held off' with volley fire until flanked. At Austerlitz, Lannes troops remained in column for most of the fighting, particularly when so much enemy cavalry was around. One division of Soult's corps remained in column while St. Hilaire's division fought in line. Gunfreak: Skirmishers only 'canceled each other out' if both sides agreed to that which seldom happened. It was an arms-race of sorts. Pelet, in describing skirmishing in his narrative of Bussaco said just that. At Auserstadt, the Prussians did answer with both their own skirmishers and advancing fire…in fact one regimental officer described cutting down French skirmishers and then advancing over their bodies. The Prussians were so concerned about just that ouflanking by French Tirailleurs that they posted their Fusiliers and jagers on their flank in wooded areas… just the wrong flank as it turned out… and they were engaged when the battle was over. That isn't to say that the French deployed more and better skilled/experienced skirmishers, but the Prussians didn't simply stand around with no answer…just not 'good enough.' I think it is very hard to identify "one way" columns were used and it is evident they were used several ways, some of which have been described. The use of skirmishers is one of the more flexible and varied deployments by all nations. For instance, the Austrians and Prussians were deploying their third ranks of line troops as skirmishers on a regular basis in 1793-1795. How well they did is another question, but they did it. Archduke Charles complains about in in 1796 and Scharnhorst uses the practice to argue for more skirmishers. |
attilathepun47 | 10 Nov 2017 1:58 p.m. PST |
Regarding the important role of skirmishers to cover the advance of an attack in column, it is important to note that not all skirmishers were "created equal." The French skirmishers seem to have been generally regarded as the best in Europe, both in training and leadership--except for the British and their German and Portuguese allies. The British might have been far less successful in the Peninsular War if the French had routinely been able to drive off the British skirmish lines. Then French commanders would have learned just where Wellington had concealed his formed troops, and the French skirmishers could have begun wearing down their morale. That seldom happened, and frequently it was the reverse; French skirmishers driven back so that it was the attacking columns that were harassed by skirmish fire, all the more effective for the significant proportion of riflemen among the British light troops. |
McLaddie | 10 Nov 2017 4:18 p.m. PST |
More than one British light infantry officer stated that the 95th were the best,then the French, followed by the British Light Regiments. But even that depended on the period. St Cyr noted that in 1793-4, the mass skirmisher tactics surprised the Allies, but by 1795-6, any advantages with such tactics had been countered and lost. It was the decades' long experience that honed the French capabilities and if Davout's 1811 Instructions are any indication, outside of the Legere and Voltigeurs, the line infantry had to be trained to skirmish/support the lights all over again in Davout's corps, which was the best. Russian Generals noted a decease in French skirmish effectiveness in 1813, where they tended to bunch up and fail to take cover. Like most things, in any army during any period, there were excellent troops and not so excellent forces. |
1968billsfan | 11 Nov 2017 4:04 a.m. PST |
A couple of thoughts to add to the pot, invoked by some of the postings above: [1] A column approaching a line would have its head covered by skirmishers. For many rule sets, skirmishers would screen the formed troops behind them from being shot by muskets (how true it his is another matter of discussion). Might this allow an attacking column to get through a bit of the beaten zone without getting hurt? Perhaps close enough to where the "shadowning efffect" reduces the number of muskets that can bear on them? . [2] People seem to have the view that once the head of the column (say the first rank) was shot up, then the entire column would stall. Why is this an absolute truth? We have all seen the movies where the valiant stoic following ranks step over the fallen, and prodded by the tough sergeants, plod onward. The column would have 6- 9 ranks but would only take one or two volleys- and the long range one would hit few people. Might they keep going? Oh, and the defenders are now standing there with empty guns or struggling to reload, while angry people with loaded guns are coming to kill them. . [3] A post above complained that looking at the shadowing effects of a defending line musketeers in cramped shoulder-to-shoulder formation was silly and that it was trying to fit modern practices to the old battle systems. Actually, is QUITE the opposite!! Modern infantry has free, unobstructed 180 to 270 degree arc of fire because they are dispersed. So yes, such modern can fire way down their line of battle but NO, in the older period they can not. Also, the old smoothbore was limited to 100 yards or less, but the modern rife shoots 200 to 300 yards with reasonable area accuracy by the typical soldier and the main killing is done by crew machine guns which effectively go out further than vision (or at least 300-500 yards). Maybe it is also necessary to mention that a modern machine gun can be at one point about 2 yards in diameter and fire 500 rounds in a minute. You can not cram that many muskets into that same space. . [4] Here is a question for the "column attacks were never of any use" proponents. Were there ANY attacks made by closing on an enemy line? Please take ALL the arguments made against an attack in column,,,,, and apply them to an attack by an advancing line on a stationary line. Didn't think of that? In a line-onto-line attack, EVERY defending musket can now fire at its most effective range. The attackers have presented themselves in the most beautiful way as targets. The attacking line must now move quite slowly or (and) become disrupted as a line because the terrain is not even. The choice is go in as a series of disjointed segments (with loss of flanks and command control) or go very slowly. ….. Oh, and everyone is open to being hit- the back ranks are not sort-of being screened by the front ranks. ….. Oh, and the NCO's (the guys who wack the wavering ones or the ones pretending to be hit) are now spread out TWO or THREE times as far apart from the troops. As well, all the morale and control boosting things (the colours, the colonel, any musicians) are further away. Hmmmm . [5] Real terrain is not completely flat and featureless. The following will give an attacker who can chose a limited front from his attack (a.k.a uses a column) and advantage. (a) a outward curve in the defender's line- defending muskets away from the center of the attack are pointing away from the attacker (b) a clump of bushes or trees or walls- these will hide the view of the attacker and make it more difficult to shoot him (c)a clump of bushes or trees or walls to the side of the attacker's approach- This will make it harder for files to the outside of the attacker's impact zone to fire effectively (d) a covered way- this might be a hollow that allows a close approach (partly or completely out of view) or a hill/obstruction/building that juts UP and accomplishes the same thing. These hinder fire and also unsettle the defenders. (e) ANY variation in elevation or irregular slope in the ground- This hurts the defender in various ways. Most soldiers were taught to "level" not "aim" before firing. If the enemy was "up" or "down" in elevation relative to the firer, you missed. If the defender was on a slight slope (it is hard to notice this- ever use a level to set up a mortar?), they might be firing above or below the attacker. (f) Artillery. Artillery (of the period) had limited good "killing zones". It was limited because it operated best where there was a level area that could be swept by the fairly straight line path and bounce of the cannonball and cannister. With a smaller column, luck, and observation you could chose to stay out of those zones. . Why the tedious level of detail (and there are more that could be brought up) ? The attack in column allows you to play all of these to your advantage by reducing the effectiveness of defending fire at the location where YOU chose to attack, and it allows you to reduce the number of defenders who can even shoot at you. Repeating a key question: why would an attack by a line be better? |
Whirlwind | 11 Nov 2017 9:00 a.m. PST |
1 – Only partially and if the defenders were opening up at long range, which they were mostly trying not to do. 2 – It isn't an absolute truth. But I don't know if any cases where that happened (And it is very clear that this mostly didn't happen). Furthermore, depending on the type of fire being used, there might be no let up at all. Even if there was, there would be another devastating volley coming in 20 seconds. 3 – No, I think you misunderstood, for 2 reasons. Mainly, you are giving the attacking battalion commander a latitude he didn't generally have – he had to keep in formation with his brigade's regulating battalion. That type of action would violate the brigade's integrity. That said, there are occasional snatches of this kind of thing being tried (Rolica and Vimiero on both sides) with very mixed success. On the defensive side, battalions could and did refuse flanks, or detach companies, against this kind of thing. It still feels as if you are trying to put a modern interpretation on this. 4 – Are there any "column attacks were never of any use" proponents? In certain circumstances, all armies used attacks in column formations. 5 – This is all really modern thinking. But even excepting that, all it amounts to is saying that terrain could sometimes hinder the defence – but it was just as likely to disrupt the attack. A column needs less space than a line, but it still needs plenty of space. And that was why generals spent a lot of time considering the ground. 6 – It isn't, generally. But if it does resolve into a firefight the attacking line is likely to deal roughly equal damage to that it inflicts. A follow-up assault is therefore more likely to succeed. Whereas if an attack in column fails, then the defending line isn't likely to have suffered that much. However, the comment previously made needs re-iterating – attacking generals didn't want the thing to descend into a firefight in the first place. |
Gunfreak | 11 Nov 2017 9:24 a.m. PST |
At Auserstadt, the Prussians did answer with both their own skirmishers and advancing fire…in fact one regimental officer described cutting down French skirmishers and then advancing over their bodies. The Prussians were so concerned about just that ouflanking by French Tirailleurs that they posted their Fusiliers and jagers on their flank in wooded areas… just the wrong flank as it turned out… and they were engaged when the battle was over. Which Sources do you have on Auerstadt? I have only two books that deal with the battle, one is based almost wholly on French sources and the other is just a collection of french AAR. |
McLaddie | 11 Nov 2017 10:43 a.m. PST |
Which Sources do you have on Auerstadt? Gunfreak: Unfortunately, I am visiting family and don't have access to my library, computer or book shelf. Bressonet is one book that has several examples, but there are a number of German sources such as Jany. I will be back home on the 14th and can give you chapter and verse then. The French are very good at narrating the activities of their skirmishers, not so much of the Prussians… Just as the British are good at describing their actions, but vague in describing the French. For instance, during the Prussian approach to Auerstadt at the beginning of the battle, French skirmishers were chased away by Prussian skirmishers. The Fusilier battalions and Jagers were situated in the woods on the right flank of the Prussian front and actually were forced out at the end of the battle. |
Whirlwind | 11 Nov 2017 10:56 a.m. PST |
Gunfreak, this one has some interesting bits on it: PDF link |
attilathepun47 | 11 Nov 2017 12:59 p.m. PST |
@Whirlwind, I think you did a good job of replying to 1068billsfan in a polite and temperate manner. I think a lot of his ideas reflects the dangers of too much theoretical analysis based more on the experience of playing wargames than on wide reading of historical accounts. Rules must reflect what really happened as best we can determine after more than 200 years--often not an easy task at all. |
Ruchel | 11 Nov 2017 1:13 p.m. PST |
1968billsfan: Well, maybe St. Hilaire could answer your question. At Austerlitz his division attacked in line and defeated the allied lines mainly by firepower. If he had attacked using attack columns frontally, his division would have been defeated. And I think it is not the only one historical example at Austerlitz and Jena/Auerstadt, and other Napoleonic battles. I agree with McLaddie on the different uses that attack columns could offer, but that is another point. I think that using attack columns directly and frontally against fresh lines of good troops was not a successful method. Likely those columns would be severely defeated. Perhaps you can consider it as a desperate procedure, especially if you have only poorly trained troops at your disposal, unable to move and fight in line. But, if the aim was to attack and defeat enemy lines directly and without delay (and with some chance of success), professional troops used to move fast in attack columns and then deploy (in line) in order to engage the enemy and defeat it by firepower. Obviously, if the enemy lines were wavering or disintegrating previously, then it was not necessary to deploy. The columns continued their movement directly towards the enemy in order to force it to fall back. Evidently, attack columns could succeed in assaults against the lines' flanks, and, again, it is not necessary to deploy them (in line). But charging in column frontally against well-protected (in their flanks) lines of good troops is doomed to failure. Also, the attack columns could remain stationary (waiting) until artillery and skirmishers had severely weakened the enemy lines. Then, they could attack directly. The change into lines was not necessary in this case. But this kind of attack takes a long time and demands a correct combined arms procedure. Also, it is more suitable for poorly trained troops which can only move and fight in dense formations. Sadly, we can see many games, using many popular Napoleonic wargame rules, in which the players, from the beginning of the game, launch a myriad of attack columns directly and frontally against lines and break them easily. Yes, it is very practical and decisive, but it is not Napoleonic. But, again, it is just my humble opinion. I am not an expert on these tactical matters. Regarding Jena/Auerstadt, I think that new historiographical approaches are necessary, and new studies and books about that campaign too, using all sources and resources available, not only French ones. We must give up those biased studies and historiographical myths. |
von Winterfeldt | 11 Nov 2017 1:52 p.m. PST |
Reminder, the French did not exclusivly use attack columns, the also attacked in lines or in a combination of line and column. |
Gunfreak | 11 Nov 2017 3:12 p.m. PST |
It's safter to attack with firepower. Unless you are very close. Firefight caused slow attrition of soldiers. This gave you tactical options. If you start a firefight. After some time you might notice the enemy is wavering. A few minutes more and they might run. For a few dozen killed and wounded you've sent the enemy running. If the enemy doesn't flee you have other options. 1. you have reserve battalions mabye standing in column. The can try and outflank the enemy. 2. Mabye ask for artillery support, bringing up a half battery to blast canister at the enemy might get them moving. 3. If things aren't going your way. It's far easier to disengage 100 yards from the enemy then 30 yards from the enemy. This is just some of the tactical options you have. If you try and charge in. You are limiting your options. Either it works or you'll suffer a lot of casualties. At Austerlitz Davout's 1st division (attached to a different corps) advanced mostly in line with columns behind in support. Even when attacked by cavalry. They simply chased them away with fire. Not bothering to change to square. At Eylau, Davout's divisions advanced in columns with room to deploy into line for each battalion. |
4th Cuirassier | 11 Nov 2017 4:09 p.m. PST |
@ gunfreak Your point 3 is really interesting. Does any ruleset stipulate that units should behave differently according to how close the enemy is? |
1968billsfan | 11 Nov 2017 4:45 p.m. PST |
Well, still no answers as to why the dumb people back then would not use terrain for their advantage. Still no answers as to why a line attack, where every attacker was under short range fire, would be better than an attack where fewer shots would be taken. |
1968billsfan | 11 Nov 2017 4:47 p.m. PST |
3 – No, I think you misunderstood, for 2 reasons. Mainly, you are giving the attacking battalion commander a latitude he didn't generally have – he had to keep in formation with his brigade's regulating battalion. That type of action would violate the brigade's integrity. That said, there are occasional snatches of this kind of thing being tried (Rolica and Vimiero on both sides) with very mixed success. Gee, I never knew that battalion attacks were against the law. I missed that. |
1968billsfan | 11 Nov 2017 4:54 p.m. PST |
[1] A column approaching a line would have its head covered by skirmishers. For many rule sets, skirmishers would screen the formed troops behind them from being shot by muskets (how true it his is another matter of discussion). Might this allow an attacking column to get through a bit of the beaten zone without getting hurt? Perhaps close enough to where the "shadowning efffect" reduces the number of muskets that can bear on them? "1 – Only partially and if the defenders were opening up at long range, which they were mostly trying not to do." Heh? A bunch of skirmishers in front of the defenders would certainly keep the defending line busy and restrict their fire at a far away group of attackers. They would be a visual screen (killing people and making smoke- every call in wooly peter?) and take attention away and hide the attackers. Have you forgotten the success of the early "scarm of skirmishers and columns" used in the revolution wars? Just because other methods were largely used later, does not mean that the affect of those advantages suddenly passed out of existence ! |
1968billsfan | 11 Nov 2017 5:07 p.m. PST |
. " [2] People seem to have the view that once the head of the column (say the first rank) was shot up, then the entire column would stall. Why is this an absolute truth? We have all seen the movies where the valiant stoic following ranks step over the fallen, and prodded by the tough sergeants, plod onward. The column would have 6- 9 ranks but would only take one or two volleys- and the long range one would hit few people. Might they keep going? Oh, and the defenders are now standing there with empty guns or struggling to reload, while angry people with loaded guns are coming to kill them." "2 – It isn't an absolute truth. But I don't know if any cases where that happened (And it is very clear that this mostly didn't happen). Furthermore, depending on the type of fire being used, there might be no let up at all. Even if there was, there would be another devastating volley coming in 20 seconds." Well, lets think about the reply. "It is not an absolute truth" contradicts " it is very clear that this ,,, didn't happen." IF it didn't happen, then it is a near absolute truth. ??? The logic is faulty. Now explain why a line attacking a line would be a better deal? |
McLaddie | 11 Nov 2017 5:12 p.m. PST |
If you start a firefight. After some time you might notice the enemy is wavering. A few minutes more and they might run. For a few dozen killed and wounded you've sent the enemy running. It takes very disciplined troops to start a prolonged firefight [several volleys which always devolve to 'battle fire' [individual fire] and still be able stop the fire and mount an advance. That is one of several reasons for the 1-3 volleys and bayonet attack. |
1968billsfan | 11 Nov 2017 5:15 p.m. PST |
"5 – This is all really modern thinking. But even excepting that, all it amounts to is saying that terrain could sometimes hinder the defence – but it was just as likely to disrupt the attack. A column needs less space than a line, but it still needs plenty of space. And that was why generals spent a lot of time considering the ground." I am surprised. Were people back then so stupid that they would NOT try to get their butts shot off? What you are denying is that an attacking column COULD select it's approach march. Moving "second" does give the advantage of avoiding what is bad for you and selecting what is bad for the opponent. Yes, generals DID consider the ground. The defending general was almost never able to select the perfect defensive position. The attacking general COULD see and find the weaknesses in the defense and exploit them. Those that ignored these were weeded out or killed by their stupidity. |
1968billsfan | 11 Nov 2017 5:16 p.m. PST |
So….. a firefight is the only way to defeat the enemy. And in a firefight, we should ignore any tactical advantages. |
McLaddie | 11 Nov 2017 5:20 p.m. PST |
Hallmark does a decent job of describing the battle, though a lot of the work is based on others' secondary works. His descriptions bear little resemblance to a number of modern accounts of the battle. Keep in mind that throughout the battle of Jena, the Prussians and Saxons were outnumbered 2:1 or more at every point in the battle. |
McLaddie | 11 Nov 2017 8:58 p.m. PST |
So…a firefight is the only way to defeat the enemy. And in a firefight, we should ignore any tactical advantages. Most military men didn't believe that by the Napoleonic Wars. It was a primary way of stopping an enemy's advance and killing men, but none of them saw a prolonged firefight as anything but attrition, which left both sides depleted. A charge was decisive. That is what ultimately drove the enemy away and left you the ground. Both sides saw the extended firefight at Albuera as idiocy, British officers horrified by it. |
Gunfreak | 12 Nov 2017 12:45 a.m. PST |
It takes very disciplined troops to start a prolonged firefight [several volleys which always devolve to 'battle fire' [individual fire] and still be able stop the fire and mount an advance. That is one of several reasons for the 1-3 volleys and bayonet attack. When did i say anything about firing and advancing? If the enemy runs from your fire. There isn't any "advance". You simply tell your soldiers to stop firing. Which might take some time. And then you take up the enemies position. Of course this is all down to the quality of the command and NCOs. The soldiers might not even be aware the enemy has retreated. If the enemy doesn't run. Then again. As i said use support battalions, or artillery. I never said they should fire a long time and then start to advance. The myth a "none linear" and "less shooting" During the Napoleonic war dies hard. It was just as much shooting and linear combat during the Napoleonic wars. The column just gave a big advantage in moment and tactical options. Shooting your enemy was still the go to way of getting rid of him. It was safer, caused less casualties if far enough away. You fixed the enemy holding his attention giving you several tactical options. Napoleon him self said, it's with firepower you win not with the bayonet. |
1968billsfan | 12 Nov 2017 3:32 a.m. PST |
I wonder if people would be happier if we called a division column used in attack as a "doubled line" or sometimes a "tripled line". I'm afraid that many people have the vision in their head that a "column" is something that is 12 men wide and 120 men deep. Rather then 3 men deep with a 3 man deep replacement right behind. |
Stoppage | 12 Nov 2017 5:05 a.m. PST |
@1968 Would the leading platoons' casualties be replaced by the succeeding ones? If the battalion needed to deploy then the succeeding platoons would have been depleted and be 'out-of-order'. Perhaps if it got to the point that the succeeding platoons' order were affected (by feeding replacements forward) then that would prevent deployment and fix the column to fight in place. |
Whirlwind | 12 Nov 2017 7:35 a.m. PST |
Gee, I never knew that battalion attacks were against the law. I missed that. Who said they were? But individual battalion attacks not taking part in the context of a brigade attack were quite rare. Heh? A bunch of skirmishers in front of the defenders would certainly keep the defending line busy and restrict their fire at a far away group of attackers. They would be a visual screen (killing people and making smoke- every call in wooly peter?) and take attention away and hide the attackers. Have you forgotten the success of the early "scarm of skirmishers and columns" used in the revolution wars? Just because other methods were largely used later, does not mean that the affect of those advantages suddenly passed out of existence ! Yes – they would restrict fire at a far away group of attackers . Firing at far away attackers was not generally what defenders were trying to do. At more usual ranges, then the skirmishers had to file away to the flanks to allow the column to advance. Your idea of using smoke is entirely modern – I can't recall a single attempt or discussion of it during the period to exploit a smokescreen generated by skirmishers to screen an attack. It would tend to increase attackers' disorder, which commanders did try and avoid. Massed use of skirmishers and supporting columns remained an effective tactic throughout the period in the right circumstances. W – It isn't an absolute truth. But I don't know if any cases where that happened (And it is very clear that this mostly didn't happen). Furthermore, depending on the type of fire being used, there might be no let up at all. Even if there was, there would be another devastating volley coming in 20 seconds." BF – Well, lets think about the reply. "It is not an absolute truth" contradicts " it is very clear that this ,,, didn't happen." IF it didn't happen, then it is a near absolute truth. ??? The logic is faulty. It isn't faulty logic. There is no known logical impediment to a unit maintaining its cohesion and marching over masses of its own dead, shot dead a second ago. What there is is no evidence that leadership in the Napoleonic – or any – era was actually capable of achieving this. Maybe once our understanding of battle psychology is more complete then it will become a logical absolute. Now explain why a line attacking a line would be a better deal? You will have to find someone else for this, since I don't particularly believe that attacking in a line was generally better. I am surprised. Were people back then so stupid that they would NOT try to get their butts shot off? What you are denying is that an attacking column COULD select it's approach march. Moving "second" does give the advantage of avoiding what is bad for you and selecting what is bad for the opponent. Yes, generals DID consider the ground. The defending general was almost never able to select the perfect defensive position. The attacking general COULD see and find the weaknesses in the defense and exploit them. Those that ignored these were weeded out or killed by their stupidity. Yes, it could. But it had to do it in the context of its formation attack – it wasn't free to choose between lots of different approaches. A defending line occupied a frontage of 100-150m or so. An attacking column needs a minimum of 30-50m empty frontage. That means it needs to find a covered route which is between 20-50% of the defenders' total frontage. If it has to be against the flank, it is even worse odds. And all of this has to be within 100m of the defenders' line. I am afraid all of this really is modern, dispersed fighting thinking. So….. a firefight is the only way to defeat the enemy. And in a firefight, we should ignore any tactical advantages. Not really…there were lots of advantages to attacking in column, that is why all armies did it. But there were some disadvantages too, hence it wasn't a silver bullet. But there is no need to introduce contemporary concepts to see either; unless your purpose is to critique Napoleonic methods of course. |
Glenn Pearce | 12 Nov 2017 9:24 a.m. PST |
Hello HappyHiker! My short answer to both of your questions is no. A longer and hopefully better answer is as follows. Yes column attacks were often used by the French, but they also used lines and occasionally a mixed order which is a combination of a line with columns on both flanks. They would also attack in square. So they were not locked into a single type of attack. Attacks were also often preceded by artillery bombardments and with skirmishers ahead of the formed infantry. I don't think a moving attack column is being pushed along. The formation is probably moving in step and has a rhythm to it. When the front stops voluntarily or involuntarily the entire column stops. Obviously if it's abruptly there will be some stumbling, etc., but the forward momentum has probably stopped. I don't think very many if anybody is being pushed forward. The cohesion of the unit has now probably been suspended and the officers must regain control. That could include some pushing. Once control has been regained the column will probably do one of two things, try to continue forward or deploy into a line. I believe warfare is more psychological than physical. Dead men don't run away. So measuring success or failure by counting casualties is probably a false dichotomy. Units don't break simply because they have obtained X number of casualties. In general units started to fall apart from men running from the rear more often than from the front. That's why the steadier troops were often placed in the rear. When possible other units or cavalry were also placed behind them to stop men from running away. So even looking at when, where, and how the casualties were caused is only looking at part of the problem. Although morale is perhaps better than counting casualties, it is probably more about what helped to get the unit to the field of battle. Once the action actually begins I think other factors become more important, such as training, experience, resolve, perseverance, resilience, etc. Some modern Napoleonic rule systems lump a few of these under cohesion. When you add this to the external pressures such as under fire, attacking or defending, terrain, brigade/Division integrity, etc. you will probably get a more realistic approach to Napoleonic warfare. Even before the Napoleonic wars began some of the military scholars debated the values of lines and columns and how they interact. I don't recall reading any conclusive evidence that one was found to be better than the other. As is slowly coming to light here in this discussion as well there are simply too many variables in play to establish a clear choice in every situation. This inability to define any real difference between the effectiveness of a line or column as a better formation, reinforced the concept of a certain neutrality in formations in some modern Napoleonic rules as well. Some rules simply push formation changes down to a level below that of the players. Also the rise of single unit brigade games indicates that a lot of players see little value in battalion formations. For some of us these changes are just too drastic as a lot of players were brought up under systems where changing formations were the foundation of Napoleonic warfare, and counting casualties was the only way to measure success. While others have embraced the modern concepts of not stressing about formations and use cohesion as being the critical factor, and are experiencing a new freedom that allows them to concentrate on other more important factors, such as when, where and how to attack or defend, etc. Best regards, Glenn |
von Winterfeldt | 12 Nov 2017 9:24 a.m. PST |
We shouldn't ignore the usual tactical order of two battle lines, either in column, line – or mixed. Usally attacking columns were formed in line distance to each other, so they could deploy. The benefit of coumns – was that the second line, in case also of columns could pass through the intervalls in case first line of columns is stopped or needs support. In case a line is attacking, this is not possible. By all this discussion one shouldn't forget that also the defender would be two battle lines deep. So in case the first line is broken, so what? The second line would still stand there and could inflict severe damage and counter attack. Fire fight, yes, usually long and not that conclusive, in case a defender is successfull in provoking an attacker to stop and engage in a fire fight, the first step of a successfull defence is there. Such a stalemate could only be overcome by bringing fresh reserves. Opening fire at long ranges could already achieve this, like 400 to 600 paces. A fire fight has a psychological component, the soldiers would have always liked by instinct to fire first and fast, there by that they gain the impression to have an edge over the opponent. |
McLaddie | 12 Nov 2017 9:37 a.m. PST |
When did i say anything about firing and advancing? If the enemy runs from your fire. There isn't any "advance". Gunfreak: I was responding to this comment: Unless you are very close. Firefight caused slow attrition of soldiers. This gave you tactical options. I was suggesting that any firefight reduces tactical options unless you have very disciplined troops. Stopping fire was not necessarily an easy thing to do…to actually employ any other tactical options. However, I am not finding many examples of troops 'running away' from volley fire. Those rare examples have a number of things in common: fairly Poor morale, already disorganized and damaged and/or surprised. In other words, I don't see military men expecting troops to retreat in the face of volley fire unless something else happened, a charge, flanking movement or enemy reinforcements. |
McLaddie | 12 Nov 2017 9:48 a.m. PST |
Maybe once our understanding of battle psychology is more complete then it will become a logical absolute. Whirlwind: Ah, if that were only a possibility. It is fascinating to read the Napoleonic military man's understanding of battle psychology and how that influenced their tactical decisions. "It is in the nature of the French to attack. It is why I abhor any defensive action." ---Napoleon 1814 |
Gunfreak | 12 Nov 2017 10:26 a.m. PST |
I was suggesting that any firefight reduces tactical options unless you have very disciplined troops. Stopping fire was not necessarily an easy thing to do…to actually employ any other tactical options.
Attacking in dense columns that has a big chance of failing reduces tactical options. Fixing the enemy with fire doesn't. It let's you fix the enemy m look for weakness and do all the stuff I've already mentioned. It's not hard to stop men from firing. It takes time. Offices and NCOs will go around. Making sure they stop. However, I am not finding many examples of troops 'running away' from volley fire. Those rare examples have a number of things in common: fairly Poor morale, already disorganized and damaged and/or surprised. That was the norm for most of the 18th century. Why should it be any different just because someone invents columns for maneuverig?
In other words, I don't see military men expecting troops to retreat in the face of volley fire unless something else happened, a charge, flanking movement or enemy reinforcements. Even with an extremely low hit rate. A battalion can expect to suffer 20-30% in a 15-25 minute full on firefight. More then enough to push the them off their ground. This is with out close range artillery support. But remember they can open fire at various ranges the longer away the less damage you do. But you'll still partly fix the enemy. Letting you see how you want to deal with then. Charges of course did happen. It seemed to be the only truly effective way of silencing enemy cannon. And if the defenders have a redoubt or town you aren't going to throw them out with fire. But 30 000 men aren't going to use million of rounds of ammo by firing a volley and then charge. Or not firing at all but just charging in. And of course you aren't going to see the number of casualties we did either. The only way to get those huge casualty numbers are with attention. A successful charge isn't going to cause many casualties. Since actual meles were rare. It means a defending battalion would only suffer casualties from skirmishing and artillery. And even counting for artillery doing most of the killing and maiming. You're still not getting those huge attritonal casualties. |
von Winterfeldt | 12 Nov 2017 10:49 a.m. PST |
"Even with an extremely low hit rate. A battalion can expect to suffer 20-30% in a 15-25 minute full on firefight. More then enough to push the them off their ground. This is with out close range artillery support." I disagree, the hit rate of rank and fire firing was abysmally low. The huge casualties were achieved by attrition. |
Littlearmies | 12 Nov 2017 3:16 p.m. PST |
'A successful charge isn't going to cause many casualties. Since actual meles were rare. It means a defending battalion would only suffer casualties from skirmishing and artillery. And even counting for artillery doing most of the killing and maiming. You're still not getting those huge attritonal casualties.' A sucessful charge caused the enemy to break without actually contacting them – the British way was two or three close range volleys followed by a cheer and the charge. We're back to morale again. The close range fire decimated the first few ranks of the column, the guys behind were aware of the pause ahead, the shouts and screams of the wounded and heard the cheers of the enemy. They knew that things weren't going to plan and hesitated, became aware that men behind them were giving way. With dwindling support behind and trouble ahead a sensible soldier fell back. At that point the guys still at the front realised that their colleagues behind were ready to bolt and that it was time to go. The vision of several hundred Brits fixing bayonets and yelling for your blood helped you on your way. I'd suggest that 'those huge casualty numbers' mostly came from artillery fire used in relatively small spaces and that Wellington was more concerned to shelter his men from the French advantage in artillery than from French infantry. |
McLaddie | 12 Nov 2017 5:03 p.m. PST |
That was the norm for most of the 18th century. Why should it be any different just because someone invents columns for maneuverig? Was it? At Battle of Mollwitz it was advancing fire, which was later detailed in the Prussian Regulations--given an important place in the regulations [with diagrams] and seen as preliminary to a charge. [Translated into English in 1757] Frederick early on often advocated no firing, but later saw fire power as primary. However, a unit engaged in a firefight with an enemy unit basically locked both. Tactical options generally meant other units maneuvering on the flanks of the firefight. Volleys alone by-themselves didn't general resolve the combat. Even St Hilaire's Division at Austerlitz, which was involved in a prolonged firefight with both Austrian and Russian units ended the engagement and drove them off with a bayonet charge. |
1968billsfan | 13 Nov 2017 10:08 a.m. PST |
Stoppage 12 Nov 2017 4:05 a.m. PST @1968
Would the leading platoons' casualties be replaced by the succeeding ones?If the battalion needed to deploy then the succeeding platoons would have been depleted and be 'out-of-order'. Perhaps if it got to the point that the succeeding platoons' order were affected (by feeding replacements forward) then that would prevent deployment and fix the column to fight in place.
A attack by a column of divisions (for a 4 company battalion, this would be two companies wide and two companies deep) would be 6 ranks deep. An attack by a line, would be 3 ranks deep. In the CoD's, the casulaties in the front 3 ranks would be stepped over by the back 3 ranks in the same fashion as in a line, the 2nd and 3rd rank would stepped over and around a casualty in the first rank. What is the big deal? I imagine that the soldiers would fill up gaps in the front 3 ranks, just like they filled up the gaps in the front rank (for a line). As to causing problems with the organization, they would be of the same sort that happen when the ranks became uneven due to casualties in the front rank in a line. (Most formation changes were done based upon 3 ranks and not uneven numbers of files in the 3 ranks.) |
McLaddie | 13 Nov 2017 10:17 a.m. PST |
Even with an extremely low hit rate. A battalion can expect to suffer 20-30% in a 15-25 minute full on firefight. More then enough to push the them off their ground. This is with out close range artillery support. The casualty rate is very difficult to establish, but the 'push them off their ground' is easier. When has that happened? At Albuera both sides suffered those percentages and great over double the time and neither was pushed off their ground. It comes down to finding examples, enough of them to establish that kind of response to volley fire alone. |
Stoppage | 13 Nov 2017 12:09 p.m. PST |
@1968 Hiya. What I was getting at – and not explaining it very well – was: * Leading platoons depleted through fire * Following platoons depleted by replacing leading casualties this might give A: * Battalion no longer able to deploy (as following platoons are depleted) * Officers accept broken internal organisation * Keep feeding troops forward within the column * Battalion continues to fight in place (in column frontage) or give B:
* Battalion attempts to deploy following platoons * Those are too depleted to do so effectively * They are beaten back and 'hide' behind the column * Battalion internal organisation a mess * No longer able to feed replacements forward * Sauve qui peut |
4th Cuirassier | 14 Nov 2017 5:12 a.m. PST |
@ 1968 A attack by a column of divisions (for a 4 company battalion, this would be two companies wide and two companies deep) would be 6 ranks deep. Not sure that's right. IIRC Prussian 4-company battalions split each company into two divisions, so a Prussian late-war column of divisions was, in effect, one company wide and four deep; about 70 files wide and 12 ranks. Still more like a thick line than a true column, but then in this era, any close formation that wasn't a square or a line was a column of some sort by default. |
Le Breton | 14 Nov 2017 7:04 a.m. PST |
"A attack by a column of divisions (for a 4 company battalion" The examples I know best of 4 company battalions are French foot guards and Russians, both of which typically formed in three ranks. However, their basic unit was a peloton (French) or vzvod (Russian) whihc would be a platoon created from roughly 1/2 of an administrative company (after equalization). Indeed a division frontage would be 2x peloton or 2x vzvod. The depth would thus 24 solid ranks (plus file closers, plus spacing if any). A full stregth Russian division would be 48 files (plus rank closers, plus banner group in the front division). French foot guards would be similar. |
Whirlwind | 14 Nov 2017 7:09 a.m. PST |
@billsfan, 3 differences I suppose: 1 – you can close to the centre whilst on the march in a line, whereas with a column your rear ranks have to catch up and potentially close to the centre at the same time. 2 – you can halt the column to dress of course, but you would be doing that whilst under effective musketry fire (and losing one of the advantages of using the column in the first place) 3 – if you fill up a column from behind, you are breaking your company (or division, platoon, zug whatever) organization, whereas when you are dressing a line you aren't (suddenly some of your grenadiers are in the middle of one of your fusilier companies, knowing neither the men nor the officers) |
attilathepun47 | 14 Nov 2017 11:35 a.m. PST |
@4thCuirassier, You are correct about the Prussians. Their word for a platoon was a "zug" (plural "zuge"), and that was their element of maneuver within a battalion because their companies were so large (200 men at full strength). A prussian assault column would have been formed either with a frontage of two zuge and a depth of 12 ranks, or as a column of zuge and a depth of 24 ranks. |
1968billsfan | 14 Nov 2017 12:09 p.m. PST |
4th Cuirassier 14 Nov 2017 4:12 a.m. PST @ 1968 A attack by a column of divisions (for a 4 company battalion, this would be two companies wide and two companies deep) would be 6 ranks deep. Not sure that's right. IIRC Prussian 4-company battalions split each company into two divisions, so a Prussian late-war column of divisions was, in effect, one company wide and four deep; about 70 files wide and 12 ranks. Still more like a thick line than a true column, but then in this era, any close formation that wasn't a square or a line was a column of some sort by default. Without looking things up, I remember that the Prussians used 4 companies and each was of composed of two "Zugs", which were often called "sections" in other armies. My impression is that they usually operated in this 6 rank deep formation for moving around and for attack. If you think about it, there were certain advantages: .. You could move around better,(e.g. there were more openings of your front's size that you could just march thu without complicated and time-wasting and dis-organizing confused marching frenzies), (so fewer battalions in reserve could be effective in being a backup- good economy in force) .. you could approach the enemy (to charge or shake out into line) using more sheltered-from-artillery or observation routes, .. These only had to be 75 yards versus 150 yards wide to help your out (even if they were 50 yards wide- you were 66% helped rather than 33% helped) …. if you marched to an attack the supporting line was right behind you. (might you feel better about not being on your own) … the "oh-shit" factor on the defender was increased. Remember that the troops could only fire or see ? 30degrees?? (45- it doesn't matter) to either side- that was their universe. ) (do you remember the high, head-twist-restricting collars in the 7YW?). Imagine seeing 6 or 9 ranks coming to spit you on their bayonets rather than a thin 3 ranks…. … the NCO's were more concentrated (the rear file closers-wackers were twice as numerous!), .. |
1968billsfan | 14 Nov 2017 12:38 p.m. PST |
Stoppage 13 Nov 2017 11:09 a.m. PST@1968 Hiya. What I was getting at – and not explaining it very well – was: * Leading platoons depleted through fire * Following platoons depleted by replacing leading casualties this might give A: * Battalion no longer able to deploy (as following platoons are depleted) * Officers accept broken internal organisation * Keep feeding troops forward within the column * Battalion continues to fight in place (in column frontage) or give B: * Battalion attempts to deploy following platoons * Those are too depleted to do so effectively * They are beaten back and 'hide' behind the column * Battalion internal organisation a mess * No longer able to feed replacements forward * Sauve qui peut
Well, we are all guessing about what may have happened. The people who wrote records about this were 3-4 level up in the command level and(I'll guess) not really knowing or pushing an agenda……… Realize that "companies" suffered uneven losses from combat, disease and detachments, so they were used to being significantly reassigned to different tactical "peletrons". Or joining up to something that looked like where they were supposed to be. I think (in this thread about whether 3 rank or 3-9 rank formations were useful for attacks to close to the enemy), that having a useful bunch of comrades and NCO's around when you took some casulaties was a good thing that would make forward motion possible---- rather than feeling all alone. And having that feeling spread….. ….. every have a squad/platoon "count off" to reassure them that they were not alone? |
gamer1 | 14 Nov 2017 5:23 p.m. PST |
@HappyHiker, I am late to this thread but I hope you see my input. BTW this has been an interesting thread and sounds a lot like many, many discussions at conventions between the Nappy "experts". Let me offer a different approach in finding your answer, thinking outside the box some if you will. To ME, the purpose of a historical rule set is to give players the feel, challenges of the period and still be fun to play. The rule set doesn't and I don't think any ever could be absolutely historically accurate. So don't get to hung up on that, greater men then us have tried and failed:) IF this thread proves any answer to your question it is, as some have said that no one knows for sure and more than likely the French did BOTH, with varying results. So…………..how to put it in your rules and why. I have a set of my own rules that I have been using for years, its on the battalion level. Some have told me its the best convention Nappy rules they have played that gave them that Nappy feel but they still got to play, role dice, and finish the game. I have had others tell me it is one of the worst because it is highly unhistorical and doesn't give players all the challenges of the period, shrug. My point, outside the box, why do YOU have to decide which way the players use their troops, let them decide, that's the fun of having your own guys. Give advantages and disadvantages to either method, make sure both choices are tempting at different times then let the players decide, THAT should be the real challenge, and certainly shows one of the major distinctions of that period, what formation to use when and how. See, now the pressure is off you and on the players:) As for the mechanics, I give the French a bonus to movement and morale in attack column but make them easier to hit, much like a square and thus a greater chance of casualties going in and possibly failing morale, BUT, if they do close and break the line, it was probably worth it. My point is don't get so hung up in trying to be historical that you lose some of the fun factor and take choices away from the players. Gamers love to have choices, lots of them, so give it to them. Also someone I think made a good point that the dice can be used to decide some of those variables for you:) For example, my game turns are roughly 15 min long. A lot or nothing can happen in that amount of time, depending on the unit, the situation and the officers. Point being, once again, instead of trying to figure out the realistic/historical way the fight would play out, I just assume that a lot can happen during 15 minutes of close range shooting and hand to hand combat. Let the dice decide how it played out:) My bottom line, and yes I may be talking in circles at this point, give equally tempting options and turn the players lose and watch the fun:) Travis |
4th Cuirassier | 15 Nov 2017 2:39 a.m. PST |
@ Le Breton If a battalion had four companies and formed columns two half-companies (in effect) wide, then it would be 12 ranks deep, not 24, surely? There would be four such pairs one behind the next? |
Le Breton | 15 Nov 2017 6:05 a.m. PST |
@4th Cuirassier Yes, of course 12 ranks (plus file closers, plus spacing if any) …. sorry for the typo …. and *many* thanks for catching it!!! |
davbenbak | 15 Nov 2017 8:32 a.m. PST |
Many thoughtful responses posted but to echo "gamer1", I think all of the examples given to illustrate/defend the wide variety of opinions are valid and only show that the commanders and troops were a lot more flexible that we gamers/rule writers want to give them credit for. We should be careful in our creation of "national characteristics" not to pigeon hole or hamstring gamers, but to allow them to make decisions and choices. Yes, military doctrine was important. Yes, training was important. Yes, morale was important. However none of these alone should be an overriding factor to success. Do we want to play a game or demonstrate an accurate reconstruction of a historical battle with all the historical forgone conclusions? I think the OP wants to play a game where he is allowed to make decisions BASED upon the ALL the historical options available to commanders at that time and is asking what those were. To the credit of those responding, I think the wide variety of options, when they were used, why they were used, and to what end have all been expressed. I myself am very grateful for all of the knowable sources that present themselves on this forum. They all make my gaming experience better. |
McLaddie | 15 Nov 2017 2:41 p.m. PST |
It should be remembered that the French changed the organization of the battalion from nine to six companies. In his Dec. 18th Decree, article 7, vol. 16 pp. 339 wrote: When all six companies of a battalion are present, they should march and manoeuvre by division [two companies/platoons]. When the grenadiers and voltigeurs of a battalion are absent, the other companies should always march and manoeuvre by platoon [peloton]. Two companies will form a division; each company will form a platton, [and] each half-company, a section. As the voltigeurs and/or the grenadiers weren't with battalions a good portion of the time on the battlefield, the column was usually formed a column with a one-company/peloton front. Attack columns, whether formed by division or sections to fold out on both sides, they were not used very often, particularly after 1808. Part of the reason was they could not be formed except from a battalion or more in line, which made it awkward to form, having to go to line before forming it. Most 'attack' columns were formed on the right or left rather than on the center. |
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