"What rules have the deadliest artillery? Weakest?" Topic
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Stoppage | 17 Oct 2017 4:14 p.m. PST |
@m-the-a Very interesting. Perhaps the 30% casualty figure for miliatry unit ineffectiveness is below the catastrophic break point. Removing from play at this point (from the map) prevents a cascade of catastrophes. The "scare an angry dog and it'll run" rather bears out McLaddies's observations on firefight breaks. The "anger a frightened dog and it'll attack" might explain the performance of the Neopolitan component of the Napoleon's expeditionary force. |
McLaddie | 17 Oct 2017 5:21 p.m. PST |
Adapting to change in technology(so you don't get murdered) Isn't different behavior, it's different tactics based on experiences from the last war. Gunfreak: But it is different behavior…that's how you know it's different tactics…people are doing different things--as you say--based on experience. Humans are still animals with the same basic psychology, there is not "American" psychology or British psychology. This comes down to the old nature vs nurture dichotomy. Innate biology or experience, which is more important? It definitely is a combination. Everyone feels fear at one time or another, but not everyone feels it when they see a spider. Everyone feels anger, but not everyone when they see me squeezing fruit. I would think there is an American psychology vs a British psychology. It's called culture and ethnic upbringing. Even Canadians behave differently than Americans. My oldest son has lived in Ottawa for several years and I can say categorically that his behavior has changed. Not dramatically, but very obviously. Here is description of an engagement by a French Veteran, Georges marquis de Chambray, in his work Mélanges … link Pp. 336 On the eve of the battle of Talavera, several deserters of an English regiment, composed of foreigners, arrived at the outposts of a French regiment, which had a large number of old soldiers, and said that many of their comrades were like them Willing to desert, if they found the opportunity. The next day the French regiment was in the presence of the English regiment, to which the deserters belonged. The troops were deployed on both sides. The French loaded the gun into their arms according to their use. Having reached a short distance, and the English line remaining motionless, some hesitation appeared in the march. The officers and non-commissioned officers shouted to the soldiers in front, walk, do not fire; some even cried, they will make. The forward movement is thus restored, and it was only a very small distance of the English line, when a fire started in two rows brought destruction within of the French line, stopped Its motion, and produced some disorder. The forward movement is thus restored, and it was only a very small distance of the English line, when a fire started in two rows brought destruction within of the French line, stopped its motion, and produced some disorder. As part shouted to the soldiers in front not to fire, some fired despite the cry. The English, suddenly ceasing their fire, charged with the bayonet. Their order, the impulse, their resolution of fighting with the bayonet was gone. On the contrary, the French, the ranks thinned and disunited, and the surprise caused by the unexpected charge of the enemy; The French had to flee. This flight, however, was not the result of fear, but of necessity; the French regiment rallied behind the second line, went to new forward and valiantly fought the rest of the day. Such circumstances will always bring about the same results; because the most impetuous courage may fail to succumb if it is supported by of good methods of war. When the French infantry overturns that which is opposed to it, it pursues it with great vivacity, and it needs rather to be moderate than excited. Sometimes, carried away by her ardor, she breaks her ranks; And in several cases, it was vigorously repulsed by the second line of the enemy, for having pursued the first line too vividly and too far after having overthrown it. Now, how do you compare that to combat in WWII and make the statement that the emotions and behaviors are the same when the tactics and circumstances aren't. How do you compare the British and French behaviors? Where does that 30% limit come in? Notice how Guilbert's description of the French matches the above behavior… General Essay on Tactics M. Guilbert London J. Millian 1781 P. 100
Formerly every nation had its arms, Tactics, and particular constitution, because the people, more separated from each other, had genius, government, and customs particular to themselves. P. 101
The French were without order or discipline, little fit for battle on the plains, or for the use of fire arms, but always formidable in the attack of posts and sword I hand. They had at that time [the reign of Gustavus], as at this day, their first moment of force and impetuosity, that shock, which in one instant nothing can oppose, and in another the most slight obstacle can repulse; an inconceivable intrepidity of courage, which at times is able to surmount everything, and a panic very often carried to the greatest excess of weakness… Or perhaps this: "It has been seen, in the previous article, that the properties of the French Army are different. The French soldiers are impetuous; their courage requires something to excite, and movement to keep up its warmth. Their attack is more violent; but they are not, like the Austrians, able to sustain a regular and open fire from the line; they have not that moral and physical immobility, which, without being affected, can see whole ranks fall beneath the bullet, and whole files wept off by the cannon. The Courage of the French is less constitutional than artificial; emulation and vanity are its most powerful incentives: honour, example, and habit, keep it up to its proper pitch." --Character of the Armies of the various European Powers at the Peace of Amiens, 1802" pp. 189-190 Essays on the Theory and Practice of the Art of War… chiefly translated from the best French and German writers, Vol. 3 1809 Published in London, this description would seem to be little more than an English author denigrating a hated enemy. Actually, this was written by French officers in 1800 in a work published by the French Army entitled Le caractère militaire des différentes armées européennes engagées dans la guerre tardive. (The Military Character of the Different European Armies Engaged in the Late War). Now, this may well be self-fulfilling results, but it is cultural and distinct behaviors seen as real determinants by veteran officers. |
basileus66 | 17 Oct 2017 8:20 p.m. PST |
Gunfreak All humans are subjects of the same biological pressures, indeed. Culture, however, conditions how humans will react at those stimuli. We know how different were the reactions of Western soldiers when surrounded by the enemy and without hope of success, and Japanese soldiers, in WWII. Wouldn't you say that was a significative "national characteristic" that should be reflected in any wargame set in the Pacific theater? If those fundamental differences in behaviour due to cultural pressures can be observed in armies from the same period, can you imagine how much more evident will be when comparing armies from different historical periods? We can't expect a Napoleonic soldier to behave equal than a WWI soldier, under fire. |
Gunfreak | 18 Oct 2017 1:33 a.m. PST |
All humans are subjects of the same biological pressures, indeed. Culture, however, conditions how humans will react at those stimuli. We know how different were the reactions of Western soldiers when surrounded by the enemy and without hope of success, and Japanese soldiers, in WWII. Wouldn't you say that was a significative "national characteristic" that should be reflected in any wargame set in the Pacific theater? If those fundamental differences in behaviour due to cultural pressures can be observed in armies from the same period, can you imagine how much more evident will be when comparing armies from different historical periods? We can't expect a Napoleonic soldier to behave equal than a WWI soldier, under fire. The Japanese soldiers were indoctrinated, there is no problem doing to western soldiers too, we just didn't do it. There are many ways of doing this. To compare one of history's most extremely indoctrinated soldiers(Japanese during WW2) vs A Frenchman during the Napoleonic wars vs another Frenchmen during WW1 is silly. To compear your everyday behavior of a Canadian vs an American is a strawman we aren't talking about how to pick up fruit in the grocery store, we are talking seeing people getting disenbolwed and fearing for your life. At that point, culture is wiped out and you are working on your base instinct, different armies from different periods and cultures have developed different ways of both negating this and exploiting this. If you indoctrinated American children in the 1920s the same way Japan did and indoctrinated the American soldier the same way Japan did, then Americans would behave like the Japanese did during WW2. Gunfreak: But it is different behavior…that's how you know it's different tactics…people are doing different things--as you say--based on experience.
The British human didn't change psychologically or biologically from 1915 to 1943. We are discussing innate human behavior here, not a military adaptation to changing warfare. And using a historic Source from the 18th century when people falsely believed French and British different races is kinda useless, it will most likely exaggerate differences to continue the concept that the French and British were different. And even so, he is still basically just describing different training. The French had their training, the British had there, that doesn't point any biological difference. |
basileus66 | 18 Oct 2017 3:47 a.m. PST |
Gunfreak So, basically, you are in agreement with me: culture is as powerful as biology at shaping how men behave under extreme pressure, as it happens in battle. Therefore it can be concluded that you can compare British soldiers with French or Spanish soldiers from the same historical period. Moreover, you will also accept -following your answer- that given the differences in training, vital experiences, culture and education, each of those soldiers behaved under a different set of vital pressures that went beyond their basic biological pressures as humans. I would add that given that in the time under scrutiny the State had a relatively limited ability to impose comformity and the lack of fluid communications induced a level of cultural parochialism, it can be assumed that the particularities can be considered even at regimental level -i.e. why a regiment behaved heroically while other had a brittle morale would be due not only to immediate causes, but also to the cultural bias of the officers, NCOs and, of course, the rank and file. |
Gunfreak | 18 Oct 2017 4:42 a.m. PST |
No, because the training Japanese soldiers went through wasn't part of culture, it was a training regime, just as running an obstacle course isn't standard western culture, or shooting at human shaped targets isn't something you usually do when training to be a bricklayer. I'm talking about mental training, not culture, anybody can be trained to do anything with the right mental training, no matter what culture they come from. And again, the mental training of Napoleonic soldiers was the exact same, there was no modern psychological training, it was an organic training where they played up camaraderie while training marching, formation changes etc. There were no superior training methods used by any particular country during the Napoleonic wars, it was all basically the same. The number 1 variables that you can use for which units would hold on the longest was vetrancy. It wasn't a 100%(like the French recruits at Blenheim that stood and got shot down where they stood) But it was the nr 1 thing you could count on, a unit with lots of veterans generally stood longer, then one with lots of recruits, no matter what country they came from, or culture. Because back then and even today. No training can really prepare you for real combat and the real horrors of war. I agree with your last statement. NCOs privates took their lead from their officers. (hence France rather lackluster reputation during the SYW, when the cliche was the French officers cared more about their silverware then actually fighting or training) While the exact same country had just 50 years later formations like the 3rd Corps, You can't say that France was a totally different country in 1805 than 1760, in fact, it was a whole the exact same country. The difference was Napoleon and other French generals of the Revolution had instilled a marshal spirt. But that was again military training and doctrine, not a change in French culture. French officers and soldiers fought well during the war of Spanish succession, not so well during the SYW, and then well again during the Napoleonic wars. Yet France was France. |
Blutarski | 18 Oct 2017 7:56 a.m. PST |
With respect, Gunfreak, I believe that you underestimate the connection between traditional Japanese cultural values drawn upon by the training/indoctrination program of the Japanese military. B |
basileus66 | 18 Oct 2017 10:41 a.m. PST |
Gunfreak That's incorrect. Training, mental or otherwise, doesn't occur in a vacuum. Since childhood how you experience life, the world and social relations shape your self, and therefore what kind of training will hold and which one won't. People is not just a conglomerate of cells and biochemical processes. You can't train modern Westerners to behave like Spartans… except if you somehow are able to reproduce Spartan society, culture and mores! Mental training of Napoleonic soldiers wasn't equal beyond the basic traits imposed by the technology of the times, not just accross national boundaries but neither between regiments in the same country. The Spanish Army, for instance, hadn't a training manual common to all regiments; each colonel decided which manual to use; some were more popular than others, particularly French manuals, especially if translated into Spanish -often in abridged editions-. It wasn't the only one. Standarization took years to be implemented; even at the end of the wars, when most countries had, more or less, standarized their practices, each had their own system, which was a product of their particular tactical needs, strategic constrains and cultural bias. You can't expect that an army with a high proportion of illiterate peasants in its ranks will train the same than an army were recruitment fall heavily upon artizans, industrial workers and volunteers. You are falling into biological reductionism. Biology is important to understand how humans behave, but if you ignore culture you will be telling just half of the story. |
badger22 | 18 Oct 2017 6:58 p.m. PST |
And training methods were not the same. Take discipline for instance. The British army still used flogging. The French were horrified at such measures. Just as modern soldiers would be. Not sure about other armys, but still a very basic and stark difference |
McLaddie | 21 Oct 2017 9:00 a.m. PST |
I always find it interesting how a thread will wonder and turn on different topics. I know several veterans who insist that the experience of combat, particularly the emotions, are the same for soldiers in any era. Perhaps, perhaps not. I don't know. Without any intention of minimizing the terrors of combat, in portraying combat in a wargame, the question is 'So What?' What is the resultant behavior? I can believe that WWII and Napoleonic soldiers would have experienced the same gut-wrenching, instinctual terror while under artillery bombardment. Seeing a comrade's brains appliqued on those around him, cannon fire shredding human bodies would have been frightful. WWII grunts would have "taken cover", dispersing and hugging the ground…perhaps being considered 'suppressed.' Napoleonic soldiers? Not unless they were skirmishers under canister fire. Otherwise they would have remained upright and shoulder-to-shoulder. In a panic they might have ducked as cannon balls flew over, hid behind ranks in front of them or simply ran, but they wouldn't have 'taken cover' unless ordered to lie down, and even then it would have been in their ranks. The Netherland battalion that the Prince of Orange sent to stand in the open at the beginning of Waterloo endured twenty to thirty minutes of artillery bombardment, being one of the few targets in sight. They stood there the entire time, only 'dispersing' when the French I Corps advanced on them. This goes back to the question of "What rules have the deadliest artillery? Weakest?" The question was answered regarding casualties caused, but as others have asked, was that the only criteria for being 'deadly' on the battlefield? The terror was there, but the average reactions to that terror on the battlefield isn't clear and comparing it to 20th and 21st century battlefield experiences doesn't answer that question. |
4th Cuirassier | 23 Oct 2017 5:03 a.m. PST |
Returning to the start of the thread, if all of Quarrie's artillery rules are used it isn't very deadly at all. - you can't fire at or through smoke (your own or anyone else's) - you can only fire at the nearest target - gunners become tired after 3 moves, exhausted after 5 - you throw an average dice to see if / what you hit - when itself under fire, the normal morale rules apply, so a battery that's getting shot up may bug out off its own bat. When all those are applied, artillery is best kept well back where it can't be enfiladed, it is best massed so opportunistic cavalry can't charge odd batteries, it is silent for much of the game to conserve its effect for when needed, and it's essential to have a chunk of your artillery in reserve (to replace exhausted or routed batteries). |
Allan F Mountford | 24 Oct 2017 4:42 a.m. PST |
@ 4th Cuirassier Which edition of Quarrie's rules are these from? I only have the original Airfix edition. |
HappyHussar | 24 Oct 2017 10:46 p.m. PST |
Empire III thru V has some pretty rough artillery fire results for fire by Grand Batteries. Adding in the "bounce through" effect with one shot from a battery in a "GB" at about 18" range I lost 60 men (ea.) in three different battalions. Step up closer and you get wiped out. A 12lb battery of 6 guns firing at under 8" can hit for between 2-3 castings I believe. If you approach the same battery when its out of Grand Battery the losses fall somewhat but a casting loss is still almost guaranteed. Probably 120% at 7". 1 inch = 40 yards in Empire rules. |
4th Cuirassier | 25 Oct 2017 2:08 a.m. PST |
@ Allan It was in all of them from the later hardback on. Essentially your aiming point was taken to be the front rank of the unit you were firing on, and the rounds would bounce through it, up to their penetration distance (their bounce distance really). At ranges beyond the 0 modifier range, you rolled average dice to see where you actually hit, which could be on target, short, long, or to either side. You just looked along the path beyond this "first graze" and resolved fire against whatever was in the way up to the penetration distance. If you missed short, you resolved the artillery's effects in more or less the usual way because your rounds would bounce through the intended target anyway. If you missed over or to either side, the target escaped unscathed, but you resolved the effects of your fire instead against anything you hit inside the penetration range given. This might be nothing at all, it might be friendly units, etc. So if you were firing ball from a French 6-pounder at 350 yards' range, that's into the -3 modifier range, so you'd dice to see what you hit. If you missed to, say, the left, you look up the penetration for a 6-pounder which is 300 yards, and then you lay your tape measure along a line between the guns and the graze point and you see what's 300 yards beyond that point. If, 200 yards beyond it, there's another enemy unit, you resolve for a 6-pounder attack at 550 yards' range. Any unit that loses more than 10% in a move took a morale test. A typical result for a French foot battery that lost say one-eighth of its strength in a move would be to Retire. To avoid this you were best off with grand batteries (that were too powerful for skirmishers or counter-battery fire to affect), but typically these would be sited well back where they couldn't be flanked and then you had all the missing-the-target malarkey. There were also rules about how much smoke a battery generated and how long it lasted. ISTR tired gunners suffered -2 and exhausted -4 – or was that how many moves it took to become so? I'd have to check. The book's in the loft. On balance, it is arguably simpler to abstract all the above away, but it did make artillery a lot less nuclear. |
Allan F Mountford | 25 Oct 2017 2:18 a.m. PST |
@HappyHussar Are those results for one hour of firing activity? |
Allan F Mountford | 25 Oct 2017 2:21 a.m. PST |
@4th Cuirassier Thanks for the explanation. I only played a few games back in the 1970's using the original rules. There is a later copy ('Napoleon's Campaigns in Miniature'?) on a shelf at our wargames club, so I'll dig it out and take a look. |
von Winterfeldt | 25 Oct 2017 2:39 a.m. PST |
the Quarrie rules – his tables for firing are different in the Airfix booklet compared to the later version |
4th Cuirassier | 25 Oct 2017 4:33 a.m. PST |
@ von W Yes they are, although there are two heinous mistakes in even the later ones that he never noticed or corrected. One is that he notices that 33% of a three-deep line is in the back rank and can't fire, so for two-deep lines, he adds 33% to the result. This should of course be 50%. The second issue is that he directs you to one table for three-deep melee results and to another for two-deep, although he has in fact dealt with this already via the different unit frontages. So he double-counts – the three deep line not only gets more figures into the melee but they get a 33% bonus added on top. |
Le Breton | 25 Oct 2017 6:16 a.m. PST |
Fascinating discussion. Many thanks to all the contributors for sharing their excellent analyses. "There were no superior training methods used by any particular country during the Napoleonic wars, it was all basically the same." It is not exactly a "training method", but there was something unique in the Russian service that did not apply to western armies. The Russian society was essentially feudal, and upon induction, a new soldier actually changed social class, from serf to soldier. He would never go "home" again. He would not marry a local girl and work the land. He might or might not be able to have the regimental priest write home to have a letter read tohis family – usually not, and over the years not at all. He would no longer be "owned" or tied to a piece of a noble's land-holding. He would have all the rights to pay and allowances and to impartial military justice that a western soldier might expect. After active service of as many years as he was capable, he would become an artel'shchnik (something like a cantinier), then go to a garrison unit or a military settlement. If he married, it would be late in life and to a soldier's daughter. His son would be be born to be a soldier, go to a regimental school and then enter the regiment. Our soldier, now an old man, would die in a regimental hospital or lazarette, treated by the regimental medical team. This was not the same as in western armies, and I think there was something to the psychology of the Russian soldier that was unique in the period. I think it goes a long way toward explaining their "durability" under fire and under the hardships of campainging, their obedience, the rarity of their deserting, etc. We often say "band of brothers", the small unit acts like "family group", etc., etc. But for the Russians, this was all literally true. |
4th Cuirassier | 25 Oct 2017 7:32 a.m. PST |
@ Le Breton I think there was something to the psychology of the Russian soldier that was unique in the period. I think it goes a long way toward explaining their "durability" under fire and under the hardships of campainging Yes, absolutely. The doctrine, training, and experience of the Russian army resulted in a military culture that made them extraordinarily hard to break on the battlefield. They stubbornly refused to accept that they were beaten, and as a result they often weren't, when by anybody else's lights they should have been. No other army of the era could have fought Borodino (well, apart from the French). There was no Austrian Eylau, no Prussian Malojaroslavetz. This is a national characteristic, pure and simple. Some in this and other threads have reflexively sought to dismiss these as non-existent. This is to mistake characteristics arising from doctrine and training for native racial characteristics. As a result, there are people who a priori reject national characteristics as unacceptable, essentially for reasons of 1980s political discourse, despite the very clear documentary and historiographical evidence for their existence and significance. Where this leads, as I have predicted elsewhere, is that one ends up having to assert that the Spanish, Neapolitans, Russians, and French were indistinguishable from one another in tactical quality – one's 1980s prejudices instruct one unerringly. |
McLaddie | 25 Oct 2017 8:00 a.m. PST |
The 'owner' of the serf families in a village or district was the one who chose the recruits. Russian 'recruits', those chosen to go into the army based on government requirements for an area, were considered 'dead' to the family and community. There would be a funeral for the recruits and morning the family loss followed the pattern for any death in the family. The regiment became the recruit's family for all intents and purposes. Such men had little reason to 'write' home, even if they could. Regimental pay was just that, regimental, not to individual soldiers. Where this leads, as I have predicted elsewhere, is that one ends up having to assert that the Spanish, Neapolitans, Russians, and French were indistinguishable from one another in tactical quality – one's 1980s prejudices instruct one unerringly. What is interesting is that Western military forces today don't accept that notion. They don't believe that a ISSIS fighter will act just like an American Special Forces operative in all cases or that an Iraqi unit will behave just like a Kurdish unit the same circumstances. There are cultural differences in behavior on the battlefield. |
Blutarski | 26 Oct 2017 7:13 a.m. PST |
4th Cuirassier - +1 to you, sir, for some very well written prose. B |
Allan F Mountford | 26 Oct 2017 7:51 a.m. PST |
@Le Breton & 4th Cuirassier I think you have the case for national characteristics (particularly Russian) very persuasively. Allan |
McLaddie | 28 Oct 2017 9:18 a.m. PST |
I ran across a little booklet that Nosworthy put out which are excerpts from a two volume British work entitled Military Library on Practical Tactics London 1799-1801. Some of the comments are applicable to our discussion and some are unexpected, but this is only part of the content. When it is considered, that the effect of artillery is much more striking than that of small arms, that it terrifies the troops in a more forcible manner, and that victory is not decided merely by the number of killed, it appears, that it is of much more service to dismount a cannon, than to kill 100 or 200 men. Moreover, shots fired against batteries, serve two purposes, viz. of dismounting the guns and killing the artillerymen. If they miss the former, they generally hit the latter, which, in fact, is of considerable importance, as good artillerymen are extremely valuable, and not easily replaced in a campaign. Some "Practical Observations." The object, against which the fire is directed, should not be too distant for the point blank shot of the piece; for shots, fired with any degree of elevation, are always uncertain.It often happens, that the enemy's balls reach us, which our's, of the same caliber, cannot reach him, which is a very unpleasant circumstance for the artillery-officer, who, in such a case, are generally blamed, without its being considered that the real cause of it exists either in the length of the piece, the thickness of the metal, the quality of the powder, or the smoothness and rotundity of the ball. It is frequently of very material consequence that the batteries be masked. We shall allow six shots in a minute for a field piece; we are not ignorant that artillery may fire much quicker, but as in this case there is not sufficient time for taking aim, many of the shots will do no execution. Infantry can advance 100, nay 120 paces in a minute with out running; if, therefore a battalion advances from 200 to 250 paces in line, under cannon fire, it will not receive above 12-13 rounds out of each piece, and most of them will miss their aim, because the line being in continual motion, it becomes necessary, that the direction of the gun be changed at every shot.** Shots fired in a perpendicular direction to the enemy's front, cannot kill above three men, and seldom kill more than one; but those which are fired in an oblique direction, frequently kill four, five, or more men, according to the acuteness of the angle, which they make with the enemy's line. ** Taken from Teike's An Account of Some of the Most Remarkable Events of the War & A Treatise on Several Branches of the Military Art 2 volumues 1787 vol. 1 p. 186
If artillery be posted 350 to 400 paces in the rear of the village, it can rake both the streets and the passage out, and the enemy troops will susteain so server a loss on passing it, as to give up every idea of forming under your grape-shot-fire. A soil which is rather hard and firm, pasture-meadows, meadows, etc. favour the effect of atillery. IF in front of the position of artillery expands a level ground of about 300 paces in extent, the effect of grape-shot is half as great again as in soft corn-fields, hilly ground, etc. In a level country artillery will do more execution at the distance of from 1,200 to 1,300 paces, than it does in a hilly and broken ground, with a degree of elevation suitable to the distance. In terrain which is very hilly, marshy, or intersected with ditches, you can scarcely expect any certain effect from your artillery, at the distance of 1,200 paces. On elevated ground, which, to an extent of from 600 to 1,000 paces, slopes gently towards the enemy, artillery is posted to the greatest advantage. If the terrainin front of a cannon rises in inequalities of surface, or contains knolls, mountds, etc. it loses much of the direct effect it would produce in a level tract, though its position be such as to command the whole terrain. A battery should not in general consist of less than eight pieces of ordnance, that it may be able to produce a decisive effect. But if it is intended to attack or defend a certain point, the batter should be divided into three or four smaller ones, which are to fire on this point; yet this division can only take place if the enemy employs against you a numerous artillery, and on account of the broken and intersected ground, you cannot fire with effect upon every point, or if cavalry act against you, lest they should, by the rapidity of their movements, pass the intervals between the two batteries, without sustaining the least loss from your fire. Unpon the whole, it is of the utmost importance, that the distance between the two batteries do not exceed 8 or 900 paces, if you wait the attack of the enemy. The artillery should always form a reserve of some light pieces, which, during the attack, are to be kept in constant readiness for succouring the weakest points. The ammunition wagons should be posted in the rear of the battery, in this manner, that half of them be placed about fifty paces sideways, behind the guns, that both divisions many not, at the same time, suffer from the enemy's fire. The intervals between the ammunition wagons, should be at least twenty-five or thirty paces, if there is sufficient room,… I can give the volume and pages if anyone is interested. The contrast between the technical issues cited about and most all artillery rules show a real contrast, particularly when you consider the technical detail that most all WWII rules sets have concerning weapons, effects and terrain. |
basileus66 | 28 Oct 2017 1:44 p.m. PST |
Where this leads, as I have predicted elsewhere, is that one ends up having to assert that the Spanish, Neapolitans, Russians, and French were indistinguishable from one another in tactical quality – one's 1980s prejudices instruct one unerringly. Absolutely. But it is not just prejudices, but a lack of understanding in the part of many historians about how military doctrine -or lack thereof- inform the behaviour of military units in the field of battle. |
McLaddie | 28 Oct 2017 3:55 p.m. PST |
Absolutely. But it is not just prejudices, but a lack of understanding in the part of many historians about how military doctrine -or lack thereof- inform the behaviour of military units in the field of battle. Also the impact of the period beliefs about 'National Characteristics' how that affected tactics and organization of the various armies. |
4th Cuirassier | 28 Oct 2017 4:40 p.m. PST |
If you thought your recruits' national character lent itself to crashing volleys at 30 yards' range, or to bayonet charges a l'outrance, or to skilful sniping at long range, and you emphasised that in your training accordingly, you would end up with an army that was most effective at that and less so at everything else. It would be surprising if nobody then remarked on your nation's preference for such tactics. |
McLaddie | 28 Oct 2017 10:06 p.m. PST |
If you thought your recruits' national character lent itself to crashing volleys at 30 yards' range, or to bayonet charges a l'outrance, or to skilful sniping at long range, and you emphasised that in your training accordingly, you would end up with an army that was most effective at that and less so at everything else. It would be surprising if nobody then remarked on your nation's preference for such tactics. That certainly appears to have happened during the Napoleonic wars to some extent. England, Prussia and Austria all chose nationalities they believed where 'natural light infantry', Germans, Tyroleans and Croats. That's why they hired them at the beginning of the wars. For instance, the British 60th regiment, particularly the fifth battalion were Germans as well as many of the original 95th Rifles. Everyone, certainly the French and Allied officers such as Scharnhorst thought the French were 'natural skirmishers.' But it goes beyond that kind of thing. There were beliefs that each nationality such as all line battalions behaved in particular ways and had unique abilities. I quoted only a few of many, many similar quotes about the French. |
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