"What rules have the deadliest artillery? Weakest?" Topic

@ Gunfreak

There is also a correlation between time and casualties.

If you space out 30% casualties over 30-40 minutes the unit might stand. But if you give a volley/attack that delivers a massive 5% casualties(so a battalion of 600 would lose 30 men) in a single volley/attack) they would probably run.

I think this is an important point. I started out with Quarrie rules where units being attacked fired throughout the attacker's charge. If the defender was British they got a higher fire factor, supposedly to model the effect of the British volley, which might have the outcome of increasing casualties enough to stop the charge. It didn't take us long to notice that this didn't at all reflect what actually happened. So we altered the rules so that the defender declared a range at which he wanted to fire, and then took a morale test to see if his unit would stand until that point. The shorter the range, the higher the morale penalty. If it failed, it failed; if it stood, it fired at 30 yards' range or whatever, and the attacker took a morale test with the same short-range penalty applied.

The actual effect of the fire was usually not that great. The real impact was the morale deduction reflecting how unpleasant a volley was at 30 yards. Quite often this brought the attacker to a stop and all he could then do was try to deploy, while under fire at 30 yards. Other times the defender would break and the attacker would then pursue.

It did indeed have the result of separating the morale sapping effect of musketry into two things, moral and physical.

the whole casualty discussion is leading into a cul de sac, if a battalion suffers 30 casualties in one volley, who within the battalion will notice it.
What they will notice it that they are under fire and that the enemy is inflicting casualties and they they want to fire back and retaliate and distract themselves by that from the psychological threat.
It is not to inflict casualties it is to brake the equilibrium of the opponent.

Well, think about it. If a line of infantry, 200 files long and three deep [600 man battalion] takes 30 casualties, those losses would *probably* be spread out. So every six or seventh man would be down. If a column was hit and flanks part of the target, the spacing might be even greater. Or it might be very localized in only part of the line or column. Regardless, we are still stuck with the question about what the unit will do as a unit.

Sooo, it still comes down to what number of casualties CAUSES the unit to halt, take up firing back, retreat or whatever.

What I've been trying to suggest is what von Winterfeldt is saying:

the whole casualty discussion is leading into a cul de sac, if a battalion suffers 30 casualties in one volley, who within the battalion will notice it?

And if enough men do notice it, what will they do about it…as a unit?

We are only speculating on what might be the effects of X casualties. What we really want to know is not the number of casualties, but what are the range of behaviors in response to casualties and the odds of those occurring depending on range, weapons and casualties. However, if we knew the range of behaviors and the number of the times such behaviors occurred, we could then see IF there was a relationship between casualties and unit behavior…. But if we collected that kind of information, then casualty counts wouldn't be all that necessary.

As 4th Cuirassier points out, one of the desired results of defensive volley fire was to halt the enemy. One of the major concerns for troops attacking what not to be halted. That was Napoleon's observation about artillery: What would halt or stop a brigade of infantry.

As I noted before, I can find lots of examples of attacking troops being halted by volley fire, but I haven't found any examples of troops retreating or routing because of just volley fire, except for very raw troops.

Average casualty rates don't tell a wargame designer what he needs to know, which is 'so what?' What are the results of X casualties and can we make a 1:1 or linear relationship between the number of casualties and unit behavior… and we can't.

In the book Brains and Bullets, the author notes how a frontal assault has both sides taking heavy casualties, but a flanking attack reducing casualties on both sides simply because the enemy doesn't stay once flanked. This is from modern combat.

We get hung up on casualty rates. They simply don't tell us what we want to know.

It is the same with morale calculations. No doubt that artillery had a significant morale factor. John Keegan documented that in his book Face of Battle.

But again, what was the impact, unit responses? How did the enemy unit respond to morale factors and under what conditions. That too is a statistical question and trading anecdotes and guesses doesn't get you the information we need.

Bill I always love to follow these discussions, even if nothing is resolved, things are considered.

Do you think the information is out there? If enough primary documents are found and studied will we arrive at a better understanding? Or was the data we want simply not considered important to the people who were writing? And can they be trusted?

I have a vivid memory of one of my gun chiefs confidently lecturing his troops about "Shrapmetal". I am pretty sure he meant shrapnel, but what ever it was, he was totally wrong about how a modern HE round works. And it didnt matter, because his job was to put them into the air like I told him to, not estimate what would happen. And he was very good at that. But if future wargamers read an account of his, they will be vastly mislead. Not that I think he was all that literate, but you never know.

Owen

the documentation is out there, read memoires and skim them for tactical notes, one is flooded with information but most of it – doesn't fit into our pre conception of wargaming rules.

for example

"Die feindlichen Kanonenkugeln sprangen ä la Ricochette dicht an der linken Flügelspitze unserer Masse vorbei auf das Grenadierbataillon des zweiten Regiments, welches sogleich einige Mann verlor. Wir deployirten darauf unsere Massen und begrüssten die rasch anmarschirende feindliche Infanterie aufs Beste mit einem wohl unterhaltenen Rottenfeuer, so dass sie auf 7 — 800 Schritte vor uns doch stehen blieb.

Legler, p.28
Very interesting, so the units deployed form close column into line to reduce the effect of artillery and then they greeted the adavancing enemy with a well norished fire of files so that the enemy stopped 7 to 800 paces in front of them!!
"

or

"and we advanced under the most horrible fire of grape and canister, round shot and musketry that can be imagined. Our ranks were thinning fast but we went to quick to perceive it (…)

We had most of our officers wounded, by canon shot, i.e. grape canister, $ c. Robbins was run through the body by a lancer and Beattie was struck by a musket ball; tell Walter that at the moment I was going to shake hand with Irving of the 13th he was knocked off his horse by a grape shot. Gregoire safe.

5th Brigade of Major General sir Colquhoun Grant
7th Hussars
No. 54 Lieutenant Standish O'Grady

Gareth Glover : The Waterloo Archive – volume III British Sources – Kindle edition
"

Casualties, noise, near misses ( and even the slowest just rhinks when in the one going in me is coming) and fear. When I was looking deeper into 1870 past the usual noticed slaughters ( guard st privat, totenritt) I found Germans for ex stating, at Forbach, Hat hell fire, such casualties etc. Etc. Visibly impressed, but when looked at the actual rgt losses the wargamer was unimpressed.
We have to be careful, what we often read is the unsusual, because they( from the time) talk about it. The normal stuff often skip as well, nithing noticable.
And what we wargamer look for first, is just that the average normal effects and variance.

Also about the % of loses/ wounds. If it is wounds from hospital, it is not totally relevant for stats as most artillery hits would be dead, unless canister which might well be registered as bullet wounds.
What we call close combat, or heaven forbid in many rules, mêlée, might have a good deal of very efficient point blank firing.

The trouble is we very seldom have intricate details of how this unit fled for ex, not often they proudly state it. How long , how they took that village.
A lot of the reading are from writtings of pros of the time mostly talking to others. "Every one knows".
So we have to at least revert to the overall effect for our games, do the end casualties look historically right in most cases, do our corps fight as long as they said they did. Etc.
The very low level details, hardly we can be accurate.
I remember when I started, being a curious fellow, who can count, figuring out the few minutes B Quarie was giving his turn, on an average gun firing, the ball had to come back in my English line to actually do it. Australian balls, no doubt.

Do you think the information is out there? If enough primary documents are found and studied will we arrive at a better understanding? Or was the data we want simply not considered important to the people who were writing? And can they be trusted?

Badger:
Yes, I do…depending on the questions you ask and what you need to know. Look at all the information folks have come up with concerning hit rates and casualties. The problem isn't the lack of information, the problem is that the questions and thus the answers don't provide the information needed. It is a common problem with simulations in a variety of arenas.

One solution is to ask different questions. I have been simply collecting brigade and battalion accounts looking for results, behaviors rather than body counts.

Some of the things that seem to be coming up [I have about 400 accounts so far] are:

1. Troops don't retreat because they received volley
fire, something else has to happen.
2. They do retreat from artillery fire.
3. The majority of engagements end with routs
4. Surprise or unexpected enemy actions are often
significant in determining outcomes.
5. Any troops will rout if conditions are right.
6. Any troops will stay if conditions are right.

I haven't done the statistical work yet. These are just impressions so far. However, if say zero troops retreat from just volley fire, then what are the die-roll chances that a unit should retreat after receiving volley fire--regardless of the actual casualties?

funny – I come to different conclusions, I won't say that troops won't retreat by a volley fire, but they would stop, often, just to fire as well.

Some good discussion here but I will make a comments based on game design rather than historical examples.

Any system that uses a bucket of dice to determine hits will kill more castings than a matrix or a single kill chart.
The flip side is the troop ratio, the bucket of dice are often used with troop ratios of 1:20 or less. So you may be killing more representative men at a ratio of 1:50 or 1:100, than the bucket of dice when you kill 12 castings and it is only 12 or 60 men.

funny – I come to different conclusions, I won't say that troops won't retreat by a volley fire, but they would stop, often, just to fire as well.

That is my conclusion too--so far. What made you think it wasn't?

Hi there

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Do you think the information is out there? If enough primary documents are found and studied will we arrive at a better understanding? Or was the data we want simply not considered important to the people who were writing? And can they be trusted?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

Depending on the interaction there may well be, but the data will be complicated.

Take for example the cavalry charging and breaking squares debate that was here (or was it also on another forum?) – you can tally up the examples but each might have contributing factors, bad weather, raw troops in square, elite cavalry charging, artillery softening up the square etc that each need the be teased out.

A comprehensive collection and description of examples of the interaction between troops and situations would be a gold mine for rules writers.

Regards

David F Brown

Hi there

I see McLaddie has made a collection of the type I was thinking of.

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Some of the things that seem to be coming up [I have about 400 accounts so far] are:

1. Troops don't retreat because they received volley
fire, something else has to happen.
2. They do retreat from artillery fire.
3. The majority of engagements end with routs
4. Surprise or unexpected enemy actions are often
significant in determining outcomes.
5. Any troops will rout if conditions are right.
6. Any troops will stay if conditions are right.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

What does point-3 mean?

That engaged troops (infantry v infantry?) don't somehow gracefully retire but stay doing their thing until their nerve snaps and/or an enemy engages them to break them?

David F Brown

That engaged troops (infantry v infantry?) don't somehow gracefully retire but stay doing their thing until their nerve snaps and/or an enemy engages them to break them?

David:
What examples are you thinking of? What I am finding is that engagements end with one side leaving ungracefully. They may reform, but that is after.

For example, the Fusilier brigade at Salamanca hit one of Clausel's battalions and drove it back. It withdrew [semi-gracefully? ] to the second line of another battalion and both advanced again against the Fusiliers. The action ended when the Fusiliers 'retreated' ungracefully.

The large and small actions at Waterloo each ended with a rout/ungraceful withdrawal.

I'm talking about battalion and brigade actions, not whole armies orchestrating withdrawals.

Take for example the cavalry charging and breaking squares debate that was here (or was it also on another forum?) – you can tally up the examples but each might have contributing factors, bad weather, raw troops in square, elite cavalry charging, artillery softening up the square etc that each need the be teased out.

The thing about statistical analysis is that with enough examples, all those 'contributing factors' fade into the background OR begin to stand out as significant. That kind of
analysis is what is so valuable to determining what are the significant factors and what aren't as well as what is the 'average' behavior.

It is also a very common practice among simulation designers.

For instance, if you can collect enough instances of squares vs cavalry, [at least 40 statistically speaking] you can make some statistically useful conclusions, such as how often squares were broken, how often cavalry broke into squares and still failed to break them.

Once you have an average, let's say 85% of all squares failed to be broken. That means that regardless of the wide variety of circumstances and other contributing factors, you can say that a wargame should find 85% of all cavalry attacks on squares failing, give or take 5% for error.

THEN You can then look at that 15% that were broken and see if statistically any particular factors [Say, veteran cavalry or poor infantry, taken by surprise, etc.] are found among most of them all. Either you will or you won't. If you don't, then you have no need to worry about any other contributing factors in developing your rules. If you do find significant contributing factors, then you have something that you can build rules around concerning that 15% of success.

Whatever such an approach [method] comes up with, based on a solid body of examples, [a base], it will be far superior in simulating squares vs cavalry in Napoleonic battle than any 'WAGs.' [Wild-ass guesses or 'by feel' or a few antidotes.]

And that is a very simple use of statistical analysis. If you are going to recreate the odds of something happening just like an actual Napoleonic battlefield, if you want to suss out the significant contributing factors, statistical analysis is a very practical tool--particularly when it comes to probabilities.

A comprehensive collection and description of examples of the interaction between troops and situations would be a gold mine for rules writers.

David, I agree. AND the nice thing is that to be significant, you don't have to have a thousand examples, though I think of all the examples that have been given/quoted on just TMP makes me wish that I had collected them all. We'd already be there… I certainly will make my efforts available when I've finished with my rules.

I have added this comment from the musketry thread as there is something of an overlap.

I am thinking of using a rule mechanism where losses due to artillery and firefights are not determined until a shock or assault takes place. This means you record the "weight of shot" that a unit has received but you do not determine the casualties or moral effect until a close assault is made or received.

If the attack succeeds then the defender with a heavy level of artillery loss will rout with little chance of recovery.

If the attack stalls then you end up in a firefight with more weight of shot applied to both sides.

If the attack is beaten off then the halt will occur nearer to the start line if the weight of shot is high.

This concept is simple enough but I am still calibrating it.

To add to this the weight of shot is converted to losses when a unit rallies or reforms and potentially the morale rating is lowered at the same time

Mike:

That is basically what I have done in my rules. Commanders didn't have running body counts or 'morale levels' during battle. They had impressions of damage and the condition of their units. Body counts came afterwards, often behind the lines once the unit had retreated or won a position and had time to sort out the ranks.

This discussion seems to have focused almost entirely on Napoleonic artillery and rules. However, I notice that the OP was sent not only to the Napoleonic discussion board but also to ACW and 19th Century.

Question for the OP, then: are you really only interested in Napoleonics? Or did you want answers for later in the century as well?

Chris

Bloody Big BATTLES!
link
bloodybigbattles.blogspot.co.uk

HI there

Mc Laddie said.

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
David:
What examples are you thinking of? What I am finding is that engagements end with one side leaving ungracefully. They may reform, but that is after.

For example, the Fusilier brigade at Salamanca hit one of Clausel's battalions and drove it back. It withdrew [semi-gracefully? grin ] to the second line of another battalion and both advanced again against the Fusiliers. The action ended when the Fusiliers 'retreated' ungracefully.

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

Brown

I wasn't sure if your original point-3 was a reference to infantry v infantry or a more broader point about close interaction of troops of various arms.

McLaddie

>>>>>>>>>>>>
A comprehensive collection and description of examples of the interaction between troops and situations would be a gold mine for rules writers.

David, I agree. AND the nice thing is that to be significant, you don't have to have a thousand examples, though I think of all the examples that have been given/quoted on just TMP makes me wish that I had collected them all. We'd already be there… I certainly will make my efforts available when I've finished with my rules.

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

Good luck to you and I look forward to seeing how you go.

You might find volunteers here if you ask for help gathering the data in a particular format.

Regards

David F Brown

David:

The volunteer idea is a good one. I'll think on it, as to how to present it.

Of course, it return everyone who participates will get a copy of the all the spread sheets and any analysis. And yes, it would be a gold mine… providing anyone with some solid information.

I was talking strictly about formed infantry on formed infantry actions. The other arms and any cooperation would be other groups of examples.

Chris:

Yes, most of the conversation has been about Napoleonic artillery.

Gunfreak-

I think you're very close to the reality with your basic idea. American Kriegspiel states exactly what you've said; whether a unit of infantry break is a function of casualties over time. The more casualties in a shorter period of time, the more likely they break. He has some exact numbers and times in the calculations he uses; I can't remember them off the top of my head. It really supports the DBA-style of combat resolution.

Instead of a system of progressive combat strength degeneration based on hits, a DBA style system combined with a brigade-by-brigade "fresh troop" bonus might be more apt, especially in games that have turns longer than ten minutes.

Almost ALL units will break at 30% actual casualties, which is a 90% reduction in combat effectiveness. This is as true today as it was back in the 19th century. A unit that is at 10% actual casualties is barely combat effective (I've done BDA analysis in the military, so trust me on this one). A unit at 25% actual casualties can (and often is) just "taken of the map."

Only a minor point: many post-Napoleonic memoirs weren't candid about what actually happened in the battlefield. Not only because of fading memories, of self-centered rememberance , or an intention to spare readers from the worst experiences of the battle, but also because you could be challenged by survivors and needed to be careful when retelling events that could be construed as dishonourable; thus, a rout was replaced by a controlled retreat or similar euphemisms.

And "many dead and wounded enemies" could be a dozen or so…..

Like:

Don't believe every story written by the veterans trying to impress their families and friends. Sergeant Wheeler of the British 51st Regiment of Foot left a very graphic account of a total annihilation of entire squadron of cuirassiers from one musket volley at Waterloo. He writes, "There were nearly a hundred of them, all cuirassiers. … We saw them coming and were prepared, we opened our fire, the work was done in an instant. By the time we had loaded and the smoke had cleared away, one and only one, solitary individual was seen running over the brow in our front. One other was saved by Captain Ross from being put to death by some of the Brunswickers. I went to see what effectour fire had, and never before beheld such a sight in as short a space, as about an hundred men and horses could be huddled together, there they lay."

Captain Ross however mentioned only 8 and not 100 cuirassiers killed. Ross writes, "There were 12 horses and 8 men killed on this occassion …" There were also wounded and some could be taken prisoner. The remainder simply fell back, or moved against another infantry unit.

@forwardmarch

Your casualty percentage versus combat effectiveness curve sounds interesting:
Casualties -> Effectiveness
0% -> 100%
10% -> "Barely" %?
20% -> %?
25% -> "Take off map"
30% -> 10%

What is BDA Analysis?

I think you're very close to the reality with your basic idea. American Kriegspiel states exactly what you've said; whether a unit of infantry break is a function of casualties over time.

Forward:
Keep in mind that Livermore was copying the German conclusions from the Franco-Prussian War. During the Napoleonic wars, units could and did endure far more casualties and didn't 'break'.

Almost ALL units will break at 30% actual casualties, which is a 90% reduction in combat effectiveness.

Who wrote that? Livermore didn't.

This is as true today as it was back in the 19th century. A unit that is at 10% actual casualties is barely combat effective (I've done BDA analysis in the military, so trust me on this one).

Are you talking about modern artillery? What does that mean, 'barely combat effective?' A brigade of 1200 men is barely combat effective with the loss of 120 men? I don't see that born out during the Napoleonic wars… depending on what you mean by 'barely effective.'

A unit at 25% actual casualties can (and often is) just "taken of the map."

Then how do you explain Albuera--for not only the British and Spanish, but the French too? Most all of the battalions suffered 25-50% casualties?

I think that we have to be careful in applying modern combat experiences on the 'empty battlefield', where everyone worked to find cover, from those during the Napoleonic Wars 200 years ago where men stood shoulder to shoulder firing at the enemy 100 yards away. Different circumstances can and do produce different reactions and behaviors, even though danger and death are present in both situations.

Only a minor point: many post-Napoleonic memoirs weren't candid about what actually happened in the battlefield. Not only because of fading memories, of self-centered rememberance , or an intention to spare readers from the worst experiences of the battle, but also because you could be challenged by survivors and needed to be careful when retelling events that could be construed as dishonourable; thus, a rout was replaced by a controlled retreat or similar euphemisms.

It isn't a minor point. As Gunfreak's quote from Wheeler shows, there are reports from different individuals that don't jive, that are blown out of proportion… but then there is the context. Wheeler states that 100 men AND horses were down, and Ross separates the killed from the wounded which Wheeler does not.

So, what do we do about that? One very valuable thing about statistical analysis is that it can smooth over all the individual details and intent.

For an example outside of the military, Emile Durkheim, sometimes called the Father of Modern Sociology, looked at suicides in Europe during the 1880's. There was a large spike in them and no one knew why. Suicide is such a personal, individual specific issue with all sorts of causes. What he did is take the aggregate numbers and look for similarities, even for such an individualistic decision. He found that there were 20 times the number of Protestants taking their lives than Catholics, in comparable population numbers. Once he had those numbers, he could start sussing out the differences that would account for those numbers.

In other words, even with the wide variety of very personal reasons for individuals taking their own lives, even with very different reporting of those events from country to country, Durkheim was still able through statistical analysis to find those common denominators… which is what we are attempting to do with combat.

Stoppage-

Hi! BDA stands for "Battle damage assessment." Its a modern military intelligence process by which you use information about the condition of an enemy unit to infer its remaining combat capacity. It goes something like: "We know that the (enemy) 3rd armored brigade lost 8 of its tanks last night; what does that reduce its combat effectiveness to?"

Livermore does say exactly what I said, its in the book. But its also common military knowledge.

@forwardmarch

- Thanks for the explanation.

I've downloaded Livermore's American Kriegspiel – amusingly the google book is by Houghton, Mifflin and Company – hopefully nothing to do with Dunder Mifflin.

This is the pdf:

Livermore – American Kriegspiel 1882

Some of your notes from the past:

Some notes on American Kriegspiel Topic

Ahh, I remember that post! At the time I had an entire notebook filled w/ charts and calculations based on it. There are a lot more factors that can be added to those; exhaustion, even a brisk march across an open field, effects accuracy. A fleeing enemy makes you a better shot too; its easier to aim when shooting someone in the back, for obvious reasons.

To reiterate, a unit that has taken 30%+ actual casualties is not combat effective. It could nominally hold terrain, but it can't be used offensively with good effect. If half of your officers and NCOs are dead or wounded you're not going to be able to use the unit as part of a coordinated action.

Livermore does say exactly what I said, its in the book. But its also common military knowledge.

Forward:

This is what you wrote:

whether a unit of infantry break is a function of casualties over time. The more casualties in a shorter period of time, the more likely they break. He has some exact numbers and times in the calculations he uses; I can't remember them off the top of my head. It really supports the DBA-style of combat resolution.

Almost ALL units will break at 30% actual casualties, which is a 90% reduction in combat effectiveness. This is as true today as it was back in the 19th century.

This is what Livermore writes about casualties: [Italics and boxed statements mine]

[A company of 64 men used here.]

P. 77

§ 141. THE second phase of the combat is the diminution in the effective strength of troops who have been under fire. Besides the loss in killed and wounded, some leave the ranks through fear, some to assist their wounded comrades, some crouch behind shelter, and some fire rapidly and without aim.

§ 142. It has been found that the loss of strength is from two to three times as great as the number of killed and wounded; a loss of five men from a company of 64 diminishes the efficiency of INFANTRY or CAVALRY by about .2, both for fighting at close quarters and for firing, a loss of 10 by about .4; a loss of 15 by about .6; a loss of 20, .8. After the loss of one third, the remnant is either so exhausted or so demoralized as to be of little or no value for fighting.
§ 143. The effect of exposure to a shower of projectiles, in keeping down the fire of troops, has already been described, in speaking of the mutual influence of the opposite sides of the battle; but besides the permanent loss of power, and the temporary suppression of fire, the demoralizing effect is still more
P. 78
apparent in a hand-to-hand combat. Troops that lose one twelfth of their number, or five men per company, from hostile fire, immediately before a collision, do not in general fight with more effect than one third of the number of fresh soldiers, and their power is reduced in the same manner by an additional loss of five men. [a whole company of troops with 1 out of twelve lost, don't fight as well as 1/3rd of a fresh company.

It now remains to consider in how many cases troops suffering at certain rates from the fire of musketry and artillery are forced to retire, or put to flight and dispersed. A skillful commander generally seeks a place of safety for his men as soon as he finds that their loss has become serious and the effect of their fire proportionally diminished; but it sometimes occurs in the course of a battle that a great sacrifice at an important crisis is justified by the object to be gained; or the fire may be sudden and unavoidable, or an indiscreet commander may expose his forces unnecessarily.

§ 146. After a line of infantry skirmishers like that

P.79

taken as a standard [64 men] has lost one thirteenth of its entire strength, or 5 men per company, it is dispersed by this fire in 7 cases out of 24 (or in 20 cases out of 100), when the loss occurs within one minute. When the loss occurs in four minutes, in 3 cases out of 24; when it occurs in six minutes, in 1 case alit of 24; but when it occurs in eight minutes, only when other causes combine to demoralize the troops. Those who remain and suffer a total loss of 10 men per company are dispersed by this fire 13 times out of 24 if the last five men fall within one minute, 9 times out of 24 if within four minutes, or 7 times if within six minutes, etc.

Those who remain and suffer a total loss of 15 men per company are dispersed in 17, 13, or 9 cases out of 24, if the last five men fall in one, four, or eight minutes. After an additional loss of 5 men in one minute 19 out of 24 are dispersed, etc., etc. ~ 147. When the loss does not exceed five men per company in one minute, they are rallied, and again brought into action on the same duty in about three cases out of the seven (above mentioned); but not so frequently after suffering more severely. If attacked at close quarters before they have rallied they are almost sure to be annihilated.

CIRCUMSTANCES OF TROOPS UNDER FIRE.
§ 148. In the case taken as a standard, the troops under fire are deployed as skirmishers. When they are in line of Battle the influence of their leaders is more effective for keeping them in ranks, and still more so if they are in column, and the following

P. 80

Figures show the percentage of cases in which infantry under different circumstances are put to flight.
§ 149. In a skirmish line the more extended the intervals the more easily are the troops dispersed.

Now, Livermore doesn't say troops will almost always break at 30%, he speaks of whether they will be combat effective and gives odds of 'dispersal'. He also doesn't just use casualties as indicators, but also includes shirkers and lowered morale, particularly with 'suppression', which had a far different meaning, if it applied at all, in Napoleonic warfare compared to the 1870's.

He gives odds of dispersal, the worst case being 19 out of 25 which isn't 'almost always.' That's 75% of the time…

He gives better odds of 'dispersal' for skirmish troops… which is interesting as that is more in line with modern tactical deployments.

And keep in mind this is based on breech-loading rifles and the Prussian experience in the 1970-71 war which was not like the Napoleonic wars.

I hesitate to take modern conclusions and apply them across the centuries as is. or even across 70 years. Would someone figure that the same responses to casualties at the Somme and Ypres applies to Desert Storm without checking?

Just to add to that. On P. 40, Livermore, after explaining that his ratios and calculations for the various tables are based on accounts of the 1870-1 War and the then recent Russo-Turkish war, writes:

The conduct of troops under fire cannot be determined with as much accuracy as the number of killed and wounded, and in expressing the probability of dispersing, it becomes necessary to assign a wider range to the element of chance. Although a company is sometimes dispersed and passes out of the control of its officers after the loss of one twelfth of its numbers, it sometimes happens that good troops retain their organization after the loss of one half.

Here's an example. Were I've got some clearish numbers.

Arnold in his Crises in the snow. Says that the 13th légère in Davout's corps became combat ineffective early in the fight at Eylau. He doesn't give a specific time table. But based on how he wrote it. I think we are talking somewhere between 1 and 2 hours of fighting.

I've found the stats for the regiment.
It had 49 officers and 1228 other ranks pluss 144 men from the grenadiers/voltiguer companies of the 3rd battalion. So 1421 men 10! Days before Eylau. It lost 6 officers a day 74 men at Hoff on the 6th.
Also given the servere riggers of that campaign. We should at minimum add 100 just from desertion, sickness and other stuff before the battle.

So maximum 1250 effectives before Eylau.

At Eylau they lost 476, almost 40%
The regiment didn't rout but had to be held back and did not take further part in the battle.

And this one of the best regiments in the army in 1807.

So 40% over 2ish hours made the unit non functional. And would probably have broken lesser regiments.

Gunfreak:

Those are interesting states. Do you know if that was formed fighting or skirmishing at Eylau? Also, did Arnold use officer casualties as the indicator for overall casualties?

My only thought would be ammo depletion. During the Jena camapaign, 17th Legere was pulled from the line twice, once at Saalfeld and once at Jena, being held back for the rest of the battle for burning through all their ammo, though in both cases they were in the fighting for around two hours and suffered more than 15% casualties both times.

The strength and casualties are from Napoleon's Finest by Scott Bowden.

Arnold doesn't specify specifically the formation, But as they were attacking head on a stong position I assume Line/column.

I'll check Scott Bowden's book again, it usually shows the formations.

I refuse to take the bait.

"Only a minor point: many post-Napoleonic memoirs weren't candid about what actually happened in the battlefield. "

I dislike such sweeping statements, so how meany memoires did you read and where did you find that they weren't candid.

I could also state a lot of Napoleonic memoires provide a deep insight waht did happen – you just must read as many as possible to find the context

@forwardmarchstudios

To reiterate, a unit that has taken 30%+ actual casualties is not combat effective. It could nominally hold terrain, but it can't be used offensively with good effect. If half of your officers and NCOs are dead or wounded you're not going to be able to use the unit as part of a coordinated action.

An interesting figure. French I Corps at Waterloo deployed approximately 16,800 all ranks (allowing for insignificant losses at Ligny). 30% of their starting strength would be 5,000 or so. After their repulse by Picton and the Union Brigade their losses would have been 3,000 captured (Allied estimates) plus an unknown number of dead and wounded: I would suggest total losses at that point would have been at least 5,000. Having reached the 30% losses you refer to, the entire corps continued in action for a further six hours. Offensive actions during this period included capturing enemy strong points and almost continuous heavy offensive skirmish action, whilst defensively holding off increasing numbers of fresh enemy troops on a gradually widening front. Losses would be steadily mounting during this period of course.
I appreciate you have qualified your 'battle damage assessment' comments, but given the above, how do you explain the French performance?

Re AFM's comment above, I agree with its implication. It is risky to accept that such a statistically derived threshold value carries the force of law. The 30pct threshold may represent the likely case, but any such statistical analysis must digest a range of differing individual outcomes to arrive at such a given average value. As well, when dealing with a formation as large as a corps, the distribution of casualties among its sub-units must be considered.

B

Nice try.

I'm not going to be drawn into a sophistic argument on here.

I admit, yes, there are "military units that fought on after receiving 30% and 50% casualties." Like the 300 Spartans, for instance. There are probably many corps that have been reduced even to 10% of their original number of troops but continued to "take local strong points." So yes, 30% total casualties as a bench mark for a "unit" being destroyed has qualifications, as does any statement one can make about warfare.

This is still a sophistic argument.

I think its time I took a break on here and focused on my blog.
For this epiphany I thank you guys. Maybe I'll be back in awhile. For now count me as a TMP casualty.

Interesting response. Forgive me for asking, but where exactly do you perceive sophistry in play?

Just asking.

B

Wherever that 30% number or average reaction came from, BDA or any other assessment, it is a conclusion drawn from a large data base. It may well be true for modern combat as that is what the BDA is drawn from.

I just think to conclude that it applies to actions 200 years ago without an equally large data base from the period is not reasonable considering the huge discrepancy in weapons, tactics, organization and cultures.

Coming up with a few exceptions doesn't necessarily disprove the rule, but the question is how the rule is derived and what it applies to including any BDA
That isn't a 'sophistic' argument any more than a BDA is.

Humans are humans. We have always behaved in general similar ways.

Soldiers bunch up under pressure. During the Napoleonic wars NCOs and officers worked to keep a functioning line. Now they train so soldiers automatically space out when under fire. Which is against our natural instincts.

If anything soldiers 200 years ago would be even more susceptible to losses. As the nature of training and ranks ment that officer and NCO casualties had an even bigger effect then, then now.

Gunfreak:

Humans are humans, but how the very common emotions are expressed may or may not be identical. Humans don't act the same way in all cultures at all times under even the same circumstances, let alone very different ones.

I had a chance to speak to a British veteran of the Somme way back in 1972. His battalion lost all but 84 men on the first day. He said they got out of the trenches and walked in extended line, 5 paces apart, very 19th century. I asked him what kept him marching into machine gun and artillery fire. He said 'his mates. He didn't want to embarrass himself in front of them.'

They had better machine guns and artillery in WWII, but you don't see that kind of behavior on that scale, let alone the losses among the British in one day. Certainly their mates were important and they didn't want to embarrass themselves in front of them, but in the empty battlefield, it was easier not to… so different behaviors.

When files were lost in the Napoleonic wars, soldiers in line were told and trained to 'close up' and they continually did just that at Albuera, the exact opposite from WWII. A 'functioning' line in 1812 meant something different than 1917 or 1944.

And yes, I am sure officer/NCO casualties had a big effect during the Napoleonic wars. Bigger effect than WWII? Is that 'similar' behavior?

During that same summer in 1872, I went into a grocery store in London. They had fruit and vegetables all laid out the way you saw them in US grocery stores. I grabbed a bag and began to squeeze the apples and plums to find some good ones. The grocery came roaring out of the back room and yelled at me to put them down! Now he felt anger and I surprise and defensiveness, all very human, but that wasn't my normal responses in a grocery store. He explained to me that HE would pick out the fruit that HE had washed. I was being a stupid American and unsanitary.

That whole exchange was very human, but certainly not something I would have anticipated in a US grocery store.

Why should we expect the exact same behaviors in combat two hundred years ago simply because they were human too?

Those are ideas--including that 200 years ago, units were more susceptible to losses because of training and the position of NCOs and officers--that need to be tested.

Mc laddie well said may I quote you ?

I dislike such sweeping statements, so how meany memoires did you read and where did you find that they weren't candid.

I am not sure how many I have read. Maybe somewhat between 70-90 memoirs, plus another 30 journals and unpublished letter collections. And few of them were really candid about what happened in the battlefield. Commonly, they were more open about their battlefield experiences in personal letters -especially those sent to former comrades- or in journals not intended for publication, than in their published memoirs. Memoirs for publication were edited and/or "adorned", possibly to make them more interesting for the potential readers; also, it was relatively common to be cautious when critizing or appearing to critizice other units/commands. Finally, I have found that while in particular letters language was coarser, less polite, in published memoirs veterans tried to be somewhat more delicate.

I could also state a lot of Napoleonic memoires provide a deep insight waht did happen – you just must read as many as possible to find the context

And I don't disagree. It is precisely what I am saying: that memoirs must be treated with caution by the historian, contrasting the information not only with other memoirs, but also with other types of historical evidence. Also, that we should always have present the fact that people back then had a way to see the world and social relations that were different to ours. What we construe as mere evidence, a reader at the time could understand it as a non so-subtle insult. We need to know how and why language was used the way it did, before being able of qualifying the information provided by any particular author.

That is a sweeping statement, indeed. I don't believe I am wrong, though.

McLaddie

Very well said. One of the first things you need to learn as a historian is to understand that regardless common shared humanity, people in the past had a different set of values, believes and experiences to ours.

Humans are still animals with the same basic psychology, there is not "American" psychology or British psychology.

It's just psychology, 200 years ago British and French did believe them self to be different "Races" the French were totally foreign. Today we know there are slight social differences, But when you are shot at, cultural differences are wiped out, we revert to our basic animal instincts, our adrenalin rises, our fight or flight programming takes over.

And from the start of warfare leaders have tried to control and use our instincts, young men are more aggressive and violent, and are easier to condition. Perfect raw material for soldiers.
The band of brother feeling is not new, it as always existed and leaders have known this and exploited it.

It's possible that humans 200 years ago were more desensitized to death than us, (massive infant death rates, rampant disease spread) But this is happening to modern humans to living in similar condition, and again because you are used to seeing death, will not affect YOUR survival instinct, it will not make you react differently from danger. Seeing your 5-year-old brother die from disease does not make you any more ready to see your NCO get his head torn off by a cannonball.

Modern soldiers are infinitely better psychologically trained then a soldier from the Napoleonic wars or WW1 or even WW2.

One talk to a WW1 veteran that is not evidence that humans in WW1 behaved differently under fire from one that fought during the Napoleonic wars. That units fought until near or even total destruction has been recorded throughout history.

Very roughly the British lost 14&% on the 1st day of the Somme(I have no idea of how many of those 390 000 were actually engaged in combat, but say it was half that actually took part in combat, then the casualty rate was 28% ) Well within what you would see during a Napoleonic battle.

One talk to a WW1 veteran that is not evidence that humans in WW1 behaved differently under fire from one that fought during the Napoleonic wars. That units fought until near or even total destruction has been recorded throughout history.

Gunfreak: I didn't compare WWI veterans to Napoleonic soldiers. I compared them to WWII soldiers.

LORDGHEE: Sure. Let me know what you quote though. That was 1972, not 1872. I'm not that old…

Ah Sorry didn't notice the last I.

The reason you don't read about during WW2 is that they learned about it during WW1, that it was a bad I idea, They generally didn't do it later in WW1 either.
Adapting to change in technology(so you don't get murdered)
Isn't different behavior, it's different tactics based on experiences from the last war.

Small unit tactics(squads and sections, with a base of fire for cover, while flanking with a different section) Which are the bases for how modern and WW2 warfare works, was developed during WW1.
Just as massed massive artillery became a stable of Napoleonic warfare, the Russians started it, Napoleon didn't have any new technology to counter it, so he could only counter it with his own massed massive artillery.
And so all countries(with the exception of the British) did the same, and you get the classic set piece Napoleonic battle dominated by artillery.

Interesting to reflect on this thread with one of the focal points being the proportion of casualties before a unit becomes ineffective. There is an implicit assumption in this that the this is essentially a continuous function.

Arguably the fight-flight relationship is in fact discontinuous. Catastrophe theory attempted to describe a model for this sort of discontinuous behaviour.

For background see
link
and
link

The challenge with the theory has been to calibrate the controls surfaces and complexity.

If you watch the video a couple of points to note – between 10 and 12 mins you see the hysteresis curve for the first time. The buckled beam example from 20:50 to 27:30 to me seems to be a starting point for considering a unit coming under fire. There will be a point where casualties can be tolerated by the unit and it progresses into fight mode but after further losses there will be a point where it passes onto the cusp and jumps down to a flight reaction. See also the section from 45:40.

One example I can suggest is the routine bonus for "General with unit" that you get in some games. This is usually used to help stop a unit from under pressure from breaking. Usually we add this in, roll the dice for both sides and determine the result in accordance with a standard result table.

If we consider this in the Catastrophe model we could say that the unit is under pressure but the presence of the General keeps it on the upper surface. If the combat result is a defeat then it is not simply down to a slightly lower level of morale in the continuum, rather the unit drops over the cusp resulting in dramatic flight – a good penalty for failure of the "General with" bonus. It is a sort of delay process with the unit being in a bad state but it stays too long and makes a catastrophic jump to flight.

In essence it is the journey that gets you to a position that may vary incrementally or may mean that there is a catastrophic change in state/

Good luck