"What if the Allies actually did attack Calais?" Topic
5 Posts
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Tango01 | 28 Sep 2017 10:10 p.m. PST |
"I'll start off with the reason for the question, on June 5th 1944, Calais was defended by six divisions, 3 infantry 3 static, all along its coast. The closest reserves being the 2 Panzer. Out of all of these units, the only one composed of troops with experience I can find is the 326. Infanterie. Which was the only veteran infantry division from the eastern front in France, but many other infantry divisions were made from remnants from the eastern front. Meanwhile in Normandy, we had the 352. Infantry, 91. Luftlande, 6. Parachute group, 77. Infantry, that were all very experienced divisions that were defending the Norman coast within days. And there were some serious reserves all near- the 3. Fallschirmjager were assisting the 352. within the first 3 days of the invasion, the Panzer Lehr, 21. Panzer, 12-SS. Panzer, all began showing up on allied situation maps by the 11th of June- already the Allies destroyed much of the 716, 711, 709, and the 715. (can't find this one on the German map but its listed on American maps as being rendered to only remnants by the time the 21. Panzer showed up). While its often said that Rommel (commander of Army Group B that encompassed all of Northern France) wanted to immediately use the tank reserves to destroy the initial landings, and von Runestadt (Commander of Group D and OB West) wanted to hold back the tanks for after the landings happened and to pull them out. Clearly at least in history we know that the static division had great difficulty holding back the initial invasion, and the tank reserves immediately had to be called to supplement them within the first three days and only arriving after the first week. What would have happened if the Allies did go for the relatively weak Calais coast? Would the second invasion (possibly in Normandy) have been as effective as the Falaise pocket? Would Germany have been able to supplement the quick destruction of units there as fast as it had historically in Normandy? Would the Allies have been in Germany much faster then historically? Or because it is an even worse marsh then Normandy, that it would be even harder then historically? Would taking the ports in the Netherlands have made the supply issues in September less of a problem? I find that contrary to whats normally portrayed, we possibly attacked one of- if not the most heavily defended area in France, and it worked anyway, and was extraordinarily effective because of the Falaise pocket entrapment. What do you think would have happened if we attacked Calais first?" Main page link Amicalment Armand
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Skarper | 29 Sep 2017 3:04 a.m. PST |
This is IMO anyway quite an interesting what if. When the allies plumped for Normandy it was much more weakly defended than at the time of the landings. Few if any obstacles or minefields and the widespread flooding that caused so much trouble had not been done – though probably was foreseen by the planners. One should hope so anyway. So they expected a wider difference in initial resistance. Had the allies done the obvious and gone for pas de Calais, I still think the initial landings would have succeeded, albeit at a higher cost. All 5 beaches much more akin to Omaha perhaps. Once ashore the build up would have been faster for the Germans and could have been an issue. It was close in Normandy what with the channel storm. The terrain behind pas de Calais is much more open tank country and there is little cover from the air, which is also closer to the UK airfields so the Germans would have suffered more from the dreaded Jabos etc. Once the allies crushed the German forces sent to defeat the landings, and I think they still would have, they would then be much closer to Germany than Normandy was. So maybe even all over by Xmas?? Getting stuck in attritional warfare in the hedgerows was the closest the allies came to defeat in the ETO. After the breakout there were setbacks and blunders but the outcome was never in doubt. The German strategy of 'roping off' the invasion was the right one, but in the end the German casualties could not be replaced and the allied casualties could be. Simple as that. |
ScottWashburn | 29 Sep 2017 4:24 a.m. PST |
A major factor for the Calais landing would be the enormous distance between the high-tide and low-tide lines. This is something close to a mile! The beach obstacles at Calais were far more numerous and if the Allies had been forced to drop off the troops at the low water mark they would have had to advance a mile over flat ground just to get to the dunes. Not a pleasant prospect at all. |
Dynaman8789 | 29 Sep 2017 4:33 a.m. PST |
Are we assuming that the deception plans would have made Normandy the deception? If not the reserves would have been released for Calais much more quickly than Normandy. Even if so they may still have been released more quickly – with Calais meeting German expectations of where to invade to begin with. |
Prince Rupert of the Rhine | 29 Sep 2017 4:46 a.m. PST |
The Germans had a large number of big costal guns around Calais and the Dover straight to •Three 30.5 cm (12.0 in) guns at Friedrich August Battery, to the north of Boulogne-sur-Mer •Four 28 cm (11 in) guns at Grosser Kurfürst Battery at Cap Gris Nez •Two 21 cm (8.3 in) guns at Prinz Heinrich Battery just outside Calais •Two 21 cm (8.3 in) guns at Oldenburg Battery in Calais •Three 40.6 cm SK C/34 (16-inch) guns (from among the so-called Adolf Guns) at Lindemann Battery between Calais and Cap Blanc Nez. The battery was named after the fallen commander of the battleship Bismarck. By early August, Siegfried Battery and Grosser Kurfürst Battery were fully operational as were all of the Army's railway guns. Seven of the railway guns, six 28 cm (11 in) K5 guns and a single 21 cm (8.3 in) K12 gun with a range of 115 km (71 mi), could only be used against land targets. The remainder, thirteen 28 cm (11 in) guns and five 24 cm (9.4 in) guns, plus additional motorised batteries comprising twelve 24 cm (9.4 in) guns and ten 21 cm (8.3 in) guns, could be fired at shipping but were of limited effectiveness due to their slow traverse speed, long loading time and ammunition types. Land-based guns have always been feared by navies because they are on a stationary platform and are thus more accurate (and can be larger, with more ammunition stowage) than those on board ship. Super-heavy railway guns can only be traversed by moving the entire gun and its carriage along a curved track, or by building a special cross track or turntable. This, combined with their slow rate of fire (measured in rounds per hour or even rounds per day), makes it difficult for them to hit moving targets. Another problem with super-heavy guns is that their barrels (which are difficult to make and expensive to replace) wear out relatively quickly, so they could not be fired often. Better suited for use against naval targets were the four heavy naval batteries installed by mid-September: Friedrich August, Prinz Heinrich, Oldenburg and Siegfried (later renamed Todt) – a total of eleven guns, with the firepower of a battlecruiser. Fire control for these guns was provided by both spotter aircraft and by DeTeGerät radar sets installed at Blanc Nez and Cap d'Alprech. These units were capable of detecting targets out to a range of 40 km (25 mi), including small British patrol craft near the English coast. Two additional radar sites were added by mid-September: a DeTeGerät at Cap de la Hague and a FernDeTeGerät long-range radar at Cap d'Antifer near Le Havre.[4] Perhaps the most remarkable gun was the 21 cm (8.3 in) Kanone 12 in Eisenbahnlafette, which had an effective range of 45 km (28 mi). Designed as a successor to the World War I Paris gun, it is claimed to have had a maximum range of 115 km (71 mi). Shell fragments from the gun were found near Chatham, Kent, 88 km (55 mi) from the nearest point on the French coast. There were two of these guns, operated by Artillerie-Batterie 701 (E) and they remained on the Channel Coast for the rest of the war. The guns started shelling the Dover area during the second week of August 1940 and continued firing until 1944. Over a thousand rounds were fired but the German coast batteries only sank: •Sambut, 7,219 BRT, 6 June 1944 •Empire Lough, 2,824 BRT, 24 June 1944[5] Empire Lough was one of 21 coastal vessels in the convoy ETC-17, escorted by the frigate HMS Dakins and corvette HMS Sunflower. On 24 June 1944, the convoy left Southend en route to the Seine Bay when the ships were engaged by German long-range coastal artillery guns off Dover. Empire Lough was set on fire and declared a total loss after she was beached near Folkestone. The master Robert Robinson and one crew member were lost. The freighter Gurden Gates (1,791 grt, built 1943) was damaged in the same action. Which I imagine played on the minds of any invasion planners. |
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