"Separation between pre-dreadnoughts in battle formation" Topic

I'm wondering if anyone has information about the common distance between friendly ships (sharing the same division) in a battle line during the pre-dreadnought era?

In naval gaming I generally use about one inch separation between ships in column formation at a scale of 1" = 500 yards, but with 1/2400 scale models (that are about 2 inches long themselves) that comes to nearly 1500 yards separation between vessels.

(The models would be about 1000 yards long at game scale, but of course that's a gross exaggeration of the size of the ships they are meant to represent, so most of that distance has to be considered as part of the "separation" between ships if we are considering the length of the battle formation on the gaming table.)

1500 yards separation may be way off historical practice, but I really don't know. Any thoughts? Thanks.

I have a similar problem with my 1/3000th PD rules but probably less severe.

I use bases 50mm by 25mm and a ground scale of 25mm=1 cable (200y). A squadron in column has bases in contact in my rules so ships are mostly a cable or a bit more apart. I feel that is still a bit too much but the convenience is, IMHO, worth the historical 'error'.

Look for the description of the sinking of the Victoria, I have a feeling that there is a discussion of steaming distances in various formations in one of the articles on line.

GildasFacit…I was just going to recommend the same, the Victoria incident should give you a good baseline to start with!

At Jutland, British battleships in line were 500 yards apart. A good reason to use 1/6000 scale (…).

In my games, both 1/2400 and 1/6000, I impose a minimum separation distance of 1" (or risk collision), as anything greater looks like a naval version of Flames of War. This as you say is over scale, but I rationalize that for small battle lines typical of WW2 the dispersion effect is acceptable. However, with a large battleline, if it is twice as long as in real life, this could have a significant impact on ability to concentrate fire on the opponent.

MH

I think the rule of thumb for the era of gunnery duels in line of battle was to maintain a separation of about three ship lengths between friendly ships in line--which works out fairly close to the 500 yards apart cited above for the British at Jutland. Various nations might have defined the matter in different ways, but I think without great difference in practice.

Sailing ship interval was 200 yards but the higher speed of Late Victorian ships made a greater interval necessary. remember the fate of the "Victoria" and Adm. Tryon.

Looks like 250 yards in the Victoria sinking incident.

Interval in battle line was two-and-a-half cables (500 yards) for both dreadnoughts and pre-dreadnoughts; the IGN specified 500 meters interval for the battle line. IIRC, this was not necessarily the actual distance between one ship's bow and the stern of the ship next ahead. Rather, it was the distance as measured/estimated from bridge to bridge as it were. I recall with reasonable confidence having read that, but am totally unable to summon up the specific reference.

Intervals between ships in cruising formation were considerable greater – 1000 yards IIRC.

In the Age of Sail, the interval between RN ships formed in line of battle and expecting imminent action was usually one cable (200-240 yds, depending upon what century's definition of a cable length was in use; ships maneuvering in line of battle (i.e. no expecting imminent action) was normally two cables. a squadron or fleet in cruising formation would typically take up intervals of anywhere from 500 yards to a mile between ships and up to several miles between columns, depending upon weather.

The Victoria/Camperdown disaster (see "Admirals in Collision" by Hough for a decent account) was the result of Admiral Tryon's order for two parallel columns of ships, separated by 6 cables (1200 yards) to turn toward one another in succession. The 1200 yards interval was insufficient to accommodate the tactical diameters of the two leading ships; by the time this fact was realized, it was too late to avoid a collision. Tryon died (perhaps chose to die) in the sinking of Victoria, so the motivation behind his order was never ascertained with any degree of certainty. Tryon was, at the time of his untimely demise a leading campaigner in the RN for simplification of what had become a ponderously large and complicated signal book. His belief was that signals should not seek to micro-manage every aspect and action, but rather to simply communicate the intent of the OTC to the captains of the ships who bore the responsibility to safely carry out the maneuver. Pure speculation on my part, but the best sense I can make of the event is that Tryon was testing his captains by ordering an evolution that could not be executed under the customary bounds of formation maneuvering, which would consequently require them to make adjustments on the fly (greater rudder angle, reversing the inside prop, adjusting speed, etc).

B

So far I can only find one reference to intervals in line of battle from the period and that is debatable as it is an observation rather than a 'regulation' or specific order. I can't find the exact reference source as I have it as a note in amongst my researches but, if I remember correctly, it was a 'battle practice' shoot and referred to the next ship in the line being 'less than 2 cables' away. The date was 1887.

I think that the transition from the sailing distance of one cable to the later 2.5 was not likely to be sudden and earlier practice may have been somewhere between the two. The assumption that all pre-dreadnoughts were fought in the same way as those at Tsushima is very common – and almost certainly incorrect. Tactics evolved rapidly from the 1880's – haphazardly, but rapidly.

The argument that Tyron was 'testing' his captains doesn't hold water. Not only would that mean he expected his captains to risk court martial but also he confirmed the order on more than one occasion. Once it became clear to the captains that Tyron was not going to issue new orders nothing could have been guaranteed to avoid some sort of collision, only trying to lessen the effects was possible. The later Admiralty reports did criticise both captains for not reacting quicker and more effectively but upheld that Tyron was responsible as he was in command.

GF wrote – "he expected his captains to risk court martial"

I don't desire to start a great debate here, but I think the above comment rather overstates the case. Tryon had led his squadron into Alexandria harbor and made the following signal to put his squadron into anchorage positions -

"Second division alter course in succession 16 points to starboard preserving the order of the fleet. First division alter source in succession 16 points to port preserving the order of the fleet."

The key phrase here IMO was – "preserving the order of the fleet" – which implied that, once the evolution had been completed, the column led by flagship VICTORIA should remain the starboard column. With both columns turning inward, VICTORIA's column would have ended up to port. The only way the order of the fleet could have been preserved was if CAMPERDOWN led her division column in a turning arc <outside> that of VICTORIA's division. A hint that this might have been Tryon's intention (we will never know for certain) was that VICTORIA put her helm over a full 35deg and reversed her inboard engine, executing as tight a turn as possible to make way for CAMPERDOWN to lead her column around on the outer arc.

Tryon's signal was, to be sure, as much a puzzle as it was an order. Unfortunately (IMO) it appears that the captain of CAMPERDOWN became confused, misapprehended its intent and perhaps panicked when prodded by Tryon to commence his turn.

Strictly my opinion, of course.

B

That doesn't seem to have been the opinion of the Admiralty. Your possible interpretation was commented upon at the time and dismissed both by the court martial and by the officers with Tyron.

Tyron is supposed to have accepted that it was his fault and was heard to say so by two of his bridge officers as Victoria sank. It may be that he realised that he had not been clear enough in his orders, even though two other officers had queried his intent before the turn was made.

As you say though, it can only be one of a number of possible interpretations and is likely no more or less a possibility than yours. Even the Admiralty admitted that.

GF -
First off – I referred to Alexandria as the locale of the disaster; it was in fact Tripoli.

The blame IMO was assigned to Tryon because: (a) he indeed bore (IMO) a legitimate degree of responsibility, (b) Tryon's deceased state made him suitable for the role of procedural scapegoat, and (c) Tryon's efforts to overturn the existing signals hierarchy was resented in certain quarters of the service. It is worth noting that, although Rear Admiral Markham was technically exonerated, his career was sadly brought to an end by the event as well.

Re my comment on "preserving the order of the fleet" in an earlier post, Oscar Parkes made note in his "British Battleships" that William Laird Clowes came to the same conclusion. Further reading in Hough's "Admirals in Collision" (a slightly over-dramatized but nevertheless valuable account IMO) shows that Rear Admiral Markham also understood the implications of that phrase. It seems to me that the fatal flaw was the silence of Tryon's signal with respect to which division was to take the outer turning arc. Unless there was some particular convention that dictated in such cases, that omission must arguably be put down to Tryon's account.

Interesting exchange. I haven't delved into this for many years.

B