"Wargames Accurately Simulating War" Topic

Etothepi, even if you can see it all the enemy at one time you still need to assess the strategies to defeat him. Game theory will be part of this so yo need to simulate the various strategies to assess the one that is the optimum for the situation. That is the key use of simulation to assess potential solutions, be it war or engineering stress analysis. In all cases the solution is not 100% but if it's a good simulation the solution will be way better than a guess.

Dear List

Etotheipi has stated something very prescient when he says

"War doesn't accurately simulate war. Why should wargames?"

The problem is that war destroys its own generalization.

The problem is that war destroys its own generalization.

So does Science and Political Parties. That's life. It doesn't mean much other than asking what part of war are you going to model in that process of 'destruction.'

I was talking about miniatures games, not computer games.

So was I. If I have a modern conflict going on, there are a number of situations where you can "see" all the relevant actors.

if you can see it all the enemy at one time you still need to assess the strategies to defeat him

Absolutely. I was just saying that there are situations where the players' view of the tabletop is not an unrealistic amount of information for the combatants to have had.

A lot of situations before other than just modern, too. At Puebla Zaragoza and Lorencez both knew the composition and disposition of the opposing forces pretty much the entire battle. What was in the hearts and minds of the Mexican people is really what made the difference.

I would guess that most (more than half) large Ancients battles were this way too. If you're on a plain, if you can't see them, they probably can't get to you.

Those beautiful displays did not help in Millennium Challenge 2002 against Marine General Van Riper.

That outcome had nothing to do with the visibility of the units or information in the C2 systems, but rather with Mr. Van Riper (contractor consultant at the time) not knowing what he was doing or what he was supposed to do.

I do not know much about wargaming (I know even less about war) but this question is interesting to me as someone who builds mathematical and computer models of complex systems.

I do not think it makes sense to talk about models suffering or bleeding, because if that is the demand then the question itself does not make sense. Instead one has to specify the level at which you are assessing the wargame as a model of war. Should it predict the movements of forces, engagements and the outcome of an individual battle? Would it be better if it also predicted the long-term effects across multiple battles (pyrrhic victories etc.) in a campaign?

All models are simplifications of reality, and so you have to go in with an idea of: 1) your expectations for the level of detail in the output (should the rules determine whether Sergeant Spencer in particular survives?), and 2) how much detail you are willing to specify in the input (should the rules handle the fact that Sergeant Spencer has uncomfortable shoes?).

In a deterministic universe a complete set of details down to the position of every atom on the field of battle should lead to a completely predictable outcome if the commanders also make entirely pre-determined decisions. In reality we have access to nowhere near that level of detail, and so the outcome of real battles appears (to some degree) random. This is the great point about "war not accurately simulating war" made above, that many historical battles could be imagined to have gone entirely differently due to tiny details ("for want of a nail…").

All of those unknown or unmodelled elements in a wargame are treated as random, which is a simplification, however from a commander's perspective (in a well-designed game) it should make little difference. I would imagine part of the value of wargames as a teaching device is to train soldiers in managing that uncertainty and risk (in this sense it would be far superior to Chess!).

I like the idea from toofatlardies that the model is good if players converge on using historical tactics – this would be especially true in cases where players do so without knowing that those same tactics were also those used in history!

In conclusion: 7

P.S. I think I remember a point in Hyde's Wargaming Compendium about an (ignored) Japanese wargame in WW2 predicting some strategy that the Americans would use?

All models are simplifications of reality, and

Spot on. Remember everything you know about history is also a model of the real events.

I would add "what you think to be important" as a third criterion, though in some senses it is integrated into your two specified criteria.

GrenadierPartha,
Good posting.

etotheipi,
You're entitled to your conclusion.

My conclusion is that Van Riper did know what he was doing as he won. I agree he did not do what he was supposed to do which is be a willing participant and go along with the simulation and it's pre-arranged outcome. He pissed everyone off so he was kicked off the simulation.

The simulations you showed most likely show known and identified and known and unidentified locations. They do not show a surface skimming anti-ship missile over the horizon (maybe if they have AWACS up)being controlled by satellite and not active radar of its own. Does not show all submarines unless they are using active sonar and giving away your location. Stealth aircraft may be in the area but not showing up. They may or may not have a Dong-Feng 21 missile on re-entry coming down at Mach 10. Are the fishing trawlers in the area showing a Panamanian flag really neutral ships or an enemy SigInt asset that may have missile launching capability? What are other asymmetrical threats out there?

Most wargames all of the pretty models are on the table. It's the entertainment value, not realism. Nothing wrong with that if it's what everyone agrees on. I'm not here to judge others tastes or what they want to simulate.

Wolfhag

All of those unknown or unmodelled elements in a wargame are treated as random, which is a simplification, however from a commander's perspective (in a well-designed game) it should make little difference.

Well, not necessarily completely random, but rather circumscribed [blackboxed] where the limits of possible results are known when all the actual elements involved are not. This may be randomized, but if done correctly, the randomized results are bracketed by statistical analysis of similar events. In other words, there are ways to do more than a simple randomization of unknowns.

I agree he did not do what he was supposed to do which is be a willing participant and go along with the simulation and it's pre-arranged outcome. He pissed everyone off so he was kicked off the simulation.

And there is one of the human problems with simulations: They are tools that people may not want to use correctly. Instead of Ripper's tactics being taken as educational, it was seen as 'pissing everyone off' [i.e. the big wigs].

The same thing happened with the Japanese Midway simulation. The junior officers running the Americans demonstrated what they could do as an effective strategy and the higher command ignored it because it didn't fit with their 'plans.'

In other words, the simulations did exactly what simulations are supposed to--and ostensibly why the Japanese and later US Military carried out their simulations: Provide possible outcomes to consider in carrying out the real thing. The informal--and real--reason for the simulations was to justify the plans made by the higher command.

That is not the fault of the simulations or the people running them. I have had the very same experience with a few of my simulations.

I'm part of a discussion group that develops high-end military simulations. They agree that if you want your simulation accepted it better damn well please the Pentagon group shelling out the bucks and live up their expectations. Realism does not sell.

This is also an underlying reason why strategic intel is politicized. A low-level analyst cannot tell a ranking general, admiral or politician something he does not already know.

There is a story about I think Fredrick the Great (?). He would take his top generals along with middle and junior ranks out to a hill overlooking a likely avenue of approach by the enemy. He would then ask the junior officers to evaluate and make recommendations. Then the middle field grade officers and finally the generals. The thinking was that the junior officers did not have to agree with their superiors and the generals, in the final estimation, could not ignore good recommendations from the lower ranks.

Wolfhag

McLaddie said:
Well, not necessarily completely random, but rather circumscribed [blackboxed] where the limits of possible results are known when all the actual elements involved are not. This may be randomized, but if done correctly, the randomized results are bracketed by statistical analysis of similar events. In other words, there are ways to do more than a simple randomization of unknowns.

This is why I use binomial tables that "bracket" the results and eliminate unrealistic outcomes.

Wolfhag

Wait, you don't have your lead or plastic unit commanders write letters to the families of lead or plastic soldiers killed in action, and you don't have medics or squadmates hold the hands of dying lead or plastic soldiers in the field?

What kind of monsters are you?

I agree he did not do what he was supposed to do which is be a willing participant and go along with the simulation and it's pre-arranged outcome.

There was no pre-arranged outcome for MC02. The outcome was dependent on the actions of the staff in training.

What Van Riper did not do is (1) work toward the goal of the actual military commander who paid for the simulation (which he was not any more; he just thought he was still the commander) and more importantly (2) play within the bounds of the simulation as constructed.

The "asymmetric units" he played did not have Pk values built and validated for the simulation. Specifically, he had small craft with OTS AT weapons engage an aircraft carrier. There was no data (and still is no data) on the effectiveness of that type of weapon against that platform. And when they built the simulation, they didn't put numbers in the Pk matrix for that type of engagement, so the Pk was the default number, which was 100%. TOW do not have 100% Pk against tanks (their intended targets), let alone against an aircraft carrier hull, which is substantially stronger. One TOW missile sank an aircraft carrier because the tool he was using was not built to evaluate that engagement. Also, BTW none of the battle group units had a Pd number against the boats, either, so there was no opportunity to detect and intercept them. Also the small boats were intended for costal, short time use, so there was no fuel logistics built into them, especially not to go full bore into the Adriatic in winter.

In addition, he did not use the proper engagement sequence, he just ordered the sim operators to play the missiles against the carrier at a range greater than those weapons can fly, let alone accurately hit.

So:

(1) I don't have a problem with using unexpected tactics against a training force.

(2) I do have a problem with "I'm not the commander. These people's lives are not in my hands. The person who is the commander and is responsible for their lives, after months of consultation with his staff and the people currently in the theater where he is going to deploy said he wanted to practice A. But I used to be in charge of something like this, but not this exactly, in the past, and I know better than everyone else on the planet and we are going to do B."

(3) I do have a problem with using interactions that weren't built into the simulation.

(4) I do have a problem with using interactions that weren't built into the simulation and then claiming your tactics were valid.

Now, I believe you said something about unrealistic outcomes ..?

The simulations you showed most likely show known and identified and known and unidentified locations.

Those aren't simulations. They are actual C2 displays. This is what an actual warfighter looks at in my actual experience in Kosovo, Bosnia, Somalia, the Persian Gulf, The Eastern Med, North Korea, Eretria, Djibouti, the Red Sea, East Timor and exercises in Australia, the Caribbean, the Sea of Japan, and Thailand.

They do not show a surface skimming anti-ship missile over the horizon (maybe if they have AWACS up)being controlled by satellite and not active radar of its own.

You should learn about SPY-1 radar.

Does not show all submarines unless they are using active sonar and giving away your location.

Believe it or not, you can passively detect submarines. I spent a lot of time in class and a lot of lot of time doing this in real life. There are a lot of other signatures other than acoustic. Also, perhaps you have never heard of a sonobouy.

And so on … there is no problem with using miniatures to do the fog of war issues you list in the rest of the post. Exactly what is it that prevents you from having a dozen civilan minis on the board, one of which may or may not be an enemy player? Whatever it is that stops you from doing it, that has never stopped me from doing it.

Thanks for the detailed info. Some of it I was not aware of. Looks like he took advantage of the enemies unpreparedness, poor planning and refused to play by their rules. Sometimes the real enemy fails to get the memo on how they should behave.

Von Riper was told "OPFOR would never have done that" and but by doing that he played the game exactly the way it should have been played. My opinion.

In an interview he was asked:
Was the game rigged?

Answer: There were accusations that Millennium Challenge was rigged. I can tell you it was not. It started out as a free-play exercise, in which both Red and Blue had the opportunity to win the game. However, about the third or fourth day, when the concepts that the command was testing failed to live up to their expectations, the command then began to script the exercise in order to prove these concepts.

This was my critical complaint. You might say, "Well, why didn't these concepts live up to the expectations?" I think they were fundamentally flawed in that they leaned heavily on technology. They leaned heavily on systems analysis of decision-making.

From: link
Finally, the JFCOM report explicitly acknowledged:
As the exercise progressed, the OPFOR free-play was eventually constrained to the point where the end state was scripted. This scripting ensured a blue team operational victory and established conditions in the exercise for transition operations.

Like I said about the military sim guys in a group I'm in. The sim is for the guys at the top to justify money Congress has given them. From what you wrote it appears MC2001 turned out the same way even though it may not have been planned that way. I was told by the defense sims guys the Navy would never accept a sim that could sink carriers because Congress might pull funding for them.

I wonder what play testing was done. As a taxpayer, I'd like my money back.

How would you feel if the GM changed the rules after you used unexpected tactics your opponent was not prepared for and he was losing the game?

Was the outcome unrealistic? Maybe, at least according to the guys running it – carriers cannot be sunk. Von Riper generated an unexpected outcome because of tactics and exploiting the enemies unpreparedness, not from a lucky die roll. Maybe he didn't play fair – too bad. The outcome did serve a lesson. It's not his fault the game did not have Pk's for his weapons and tactics. I can understand if you'd never want to play a war game against him. I would.

Wolfhag

etotheipi,
Yes, I stand corrected. I knew it looked like a ship CIC but used "sim" instead. Sorry about that.

I've heard of sonobuoys. You normally need to have a potential contact to interrogate and it takes time to get a chopper, P3 or Viking there. I'm not aware of other methods so I may be wrong.

I'm aware of passive sonar but I was referring to this situation:
link

Ideally, in the future, the Navy is already tracking enemy subs with their own hunter-killer subs. I'm aware of the "supersonic" torpedoes but I doubt if they have the range to be a threat to a carrier group but I'm no expert.

I'm somewhat familiar with the SPY-1 phased array radar and Standard Missile but not it's current capability against low observable SSM in an ECM environment. The new the SPY-6 is roughly 30 times more powerful than the current SPY-1 so that adds a real safety factor. Detecting is one thing, knocking it down is another and that's probably pretty classified. Is the SPY and SM a defense against the the Dong-Fen?

When you were in the Navy did you guys ever do simulations against a multi-layer (sub, surface, air) attack on a carrier group? Any unexpected outcomes?

I'll concede your knowledge of naval warfare and technology is better than mine. You were the professional. However, I think the biggest challenge is a surprise attack that gives the enemy the initiative and the enemy forgot to read the memo on how to behave in an attack. I just hope that does not have an unexpected outcome. Sinking or a mission kill to just one US carrier will most likely give the strategic initiative to the enemy for quite awhile. Remember, I'm on your side.

Thanks, good discussion.

Wolfhag

Detecting is one thing, knocking it down is another and that's probably pretty classified.

Completely agree. The discussion was about whether or not it was realistic for a wargame player to "see" "everything" on the battlefield. In some situations it is, in others not. I was just pointing out not to dismiss the times when you can.

Is the SPY and SM a defense against the the Dong-Fen?

That is part of the ASCM defense in depth suite. As you point out in several of your other comments, one C2 capability is not enough to prosecute any modern military engagement.

When you were in the Navy did you guys ever do simulations against a multi-layer (sub, surface, air) attack on a carrier group?

All the time. Did them in Live/Virtual/Constructive events of various stripes. Ran them later a sim monkey. I also integrated cyber into the combined arms space.

I think the biggest challenge is a surprise attack that gives the enemy the initiative and the enemy forgot to read the memo on how to behave in an attack

Agree. There is also the policy constraint. We have agreements, international policies, and rules of engagement that in some cases guarantee the adversary a first strike. I like to make that part of the initial conditions, if it fits the need. (That actually led to developing my now favorite fantasy RPG campaign starter …)

Along those lines, lots of "uninvited guests" participate in Allied and Partner military exercises. Truly discussing how "surprised" anyone was at any time would lead into the classified realm of how well we can detect and whether or not we would use OPDEC if we did. Also, for Naval engagements, these are in international waters, so you really can't "close the gate". Again, we are in reactive rather than proactive mode.

Thanks, good discussion.

Back at you. You bring up a lot of good points and have well-formed views. Don't undersell your view just because someone else has more practical experience doing something.

I like to evaluate ideas based on the merit of ideas, rather than the attribution of the source. What you say has a lot of merit.

And what I said about war not accurately simulating war also applies to experience. Your experience there and then has some, but not absolute, relevance to here and now. The key is having the wisdom to sort out an appropriately apply the relevant bits.

As a taxpayer, I'd like my money back.

This leads to an interesting, subtle, and important point for the use of simulations in preparation (analysis, training, etc.) for warfighting. The exact point that you brought up about limiting outlier random events.

Backing up a bit, from my POV the Commander requested he and his staff be trained to add and subtract fractions and Van Riper decided that it was more important that he teach the art history of Piet Mondriaan. As a taxpayer, that bothers me.

Along those lines, let's discuss "constraining" the exercise. If you are spending taxpayer dollars to practice against events A, B, and C and the simulation is only presenting event B, do you "constrain" the sim to provide A and C or do you say, these were important objective, but we're just not going to do them.

I believe this is an exact parallel to your idea that there are some events that are possible in the state space, but they're not the ones we want to play. I also think that ensuring you cover the desired objectives is a reasonable basis to apply this idea.

Van Riper portrays himself as someone who was speaking truth to the establishment.

I wonder what play testing was done.

Actually, a lot. They play tested the hell out of the parts of the performance space of the simulation that aligned to the objectives. They did not play test events and situations that were not part of the plan.

In an MC02 type simulation the total state space is at least 100,000 times the size of the intended operational space. As a taxpayer, do you want to spend at least 100,000 times the money (it ends up being actually way more than that because things like that don't scale linearly) to have people test events that are not going to happen?

As I said before, I don't have a problem with an OPFOR being innovative and going off script. I did that myself and encourage it my teams. (That goes for BLUFOR and GREYFOR, too!)

I do have a problem with taking an simulation that was designed and tested for A, B, and C and trying to perform B, D, E, and F with it.

And I do have a problem with the lack of professionalism in taking a tool that was not designed to do several types of event and saying anything about the validity of those events, especially, "I am so awesome. Look how innovative I am. Not them."

I do agree with a number of Van Riper's ideas and principles. MC02 was not particularly innovative or forward thinking in its objectives. It did, however, focus on a lot of boring basics. There are a lot of places these days where we would get more benefit from reinforcing (or, in some cases, introducing) the basics than exploring advanced situations.

Ultimately, it is up to the commander to strike that balance between competence and challenge, basics and innovation, the routine and the outlier.

Regardless of how well that was done, the simulation tool was built to support that state space and not a different one.

I do have a problem with taking an simulation that was designed and tested for A, B, and C and trying to perform B, D, E, and F with it.

etotheipi:

I totally agree, and I either agree [or admit to] all of your points about MC02.

However, I see a lot of 'group think', organizational conflicting objectives, assumptions and covert goals by those in charge that appear in the the JFCOM report quoted by Wolfhag:

"As the exercise progressed, the OPFOR free-play was eventually constrained to the point where the end state was scripted. This scripting ensured a blue team operational victory and established conditions in the exercise for transition operations."

Here are some of the things I noticed that are fairly common occurrences when organizations carry out simulations to 'test' plans or ostensibly to 'explore' contingencies.

First of, it is typical to have 'outsiders' like retired Van Riper or low-level officers playing the Americans in the Japanese simulation opposing groups of Generals and Admirals. Why?

2. Because the opposition wasn't really a concern and thus either through lack of concern or purposely made weak and [with politically vulnerable opponents] because the 'real' purpose was not to test the plans against a possible enemy, but simply to carry out the plan.

3. That is why Van Riper had many of his forces assets were not folded into the simulation even though he was supposedly given objectives for his country and the ability to fight in a 'free-play' environment. As you point out:
"The "asymmetric units" he played did not have Pk values built and validated for the simulation." Van Riper may have been ethically bound to play the way it was set up…after all he agreed to play their simulation. He just didn't like commanding a lamb set up for the slaughter, so he gave his team permission to really put up a fight with anything they could…including missiles that also hadn't been factored into the simulation.

4. The admirals certainly felt 'betrayed' and/or embarrassed in both the MC02 and the Japanese simulations. Hence the change of direction from 'free play' to what was really the point of the simulation. The real error was not being clear with everyone on the actual objectives. Of course, spending all those millions to script a successful result to the current strategies and tactics of the American forces might have been embarrassing too.

5. Because of these conflicts and members of the simulation not 'playing along', often one will see the simulation controllers intervening to get the simulation 'back on track' leaving some of the participants feeling betrayed because for the reasons above, they had been led to believe the simulation had other purposes.

That isn't to say such an exercise wouldn't be valuable. As you point out,

"I do agree with a number of Van Riper's ideas and principles. MC02 was not particularly innovative or forward thinking in its objectives. It did, however, focus on a lot of boring basics. There are a lot of places these days where we would get more benefit from reinforcing (or, in some cases, introducing) the basics than exploring advanced situations."

but it isn't how it was 'advertised' and set up. That's the core problem. As a tool, participants were encouraged to use it as X, when the actual use was seen as Y. It began with formal objectives, 'real' goals really weren't explained, thus not expected by participants:

The featured activity of MC '02 would be a red team war-game simulation. The hypothetical joint experiment would feature an anti-access, area-denial scenario that was situated in the world of 2007, pitting a U.S. blue team of 350 personnel led by Army Lt. Gen. B. B. Bell against an OPFOR of 90 personnel modeling an adversary, and initially led by Van Riper. Kernan personally selected Van Riper to lead the OPFOR, believing that, since he was a "devious sort of guy" and "a no-nonsense solid professional warfighter," he was the best possible candidate. The OPFOR, widely understood to represent Iraq or Iran's military, had a carefully prepared campaign plan, for which the ultimate objective was to preserve the red team's ruling regime and reduce the presence of blue forces in the region. The blue team also had a campaign plan, which included securing shipping lanes, eliminating the OPFOR's weapons of mass destruction facilities, and compelling the red ruling regime to abandon its goal of regional hegemony. To most participants, MC '02 resembled much of the "Running Start" plan that U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) planners were developing and refining in the summer of 2002 to disarm Saddam Hussein and remove him from power.

Van Riper had participated in previous war games for JFCOM, including the previous year's Unified Vision 2001 exercise in which he played the role of a landlocked regional power. At one crucial engagement during Unified Vision 2001, Van Riper was informed by the white cell, or "control," overseeing the game that the United States had destroyed all 21 of the red team's deeply buried ballistic missiles, even though the blue team commander never actually knew where they were located. It was simply assumed that in the future the United States would have the real-time radar and sensor capabilities to eliminate them. After the Unified Vision 2001 exercise, JFCOM provided a report to Congress that claimed that the exercise had corroborated the effects-based operations concepts. When Van Riper complained that that was untrue, he was promised, regarding MC '02, that "next year will be a free play and honest exercise." On the eve of MC '02, Kernan even declared: "We have a very, very determined OPFOR, both live and simulation. … this is free play. The OPFOR has the ability to win here."

From the articled that Wolfhag provided a link too. The 'simulation' was a 'setup' in a number of ways. You write

Ultimately, it is up to the commander to strike that balance between competence and challenge, basics and innovation, the routine and the outlier.

Regardless of how well that was done, the simulation tool was built to support that state space and not a different one.

So, I can agree absolutely, but also say that what the simulation tool was built to support was not explained to several members of the simulations and given objectives which conflicted with those the simulation was built around. My guess is that after his previous experience, and being retired, Van Riper saw that he was going to experience the same things he had previously, and 'acted out.' What could anyone do, he was retired…?

but it isn't how it was 'advertised' and set up.

No idea where that advertising came from. But apparently, it was written after both UV01 and MC02. The discussion you quoted does not reflect the state going into or during MC02, it reflects attitudes and views after the fact.

The objectives were very clear to the people who were supposed to build and execute the exercise. Including Van Riper. "Free play" is a horribly vague term, used without the context of the exercise.

Do you believe Van Riper should have been allowed to do absolutely anything that came into his head? Suddenly decide that his side had nuclear weapons positioned at strategic locations? Release the Kraken?

How about a less "out there" question … should he have been allowed to use chemical weapons? There are certainly adversaries that have them, have public doctrine that they will use them, and have used them. It's realistic.

But it had nothing to do with the objectives of the MC02 event. Yes it's real. Yes it's important. But it's not what we are doing right here right now. We've intended to do something else and we need to get that done.

McLaddie, I believe you spend a lot of time talking about the intent of the game. Van Riper walked outside the intent of the game and into a performance space that was not even remotely supported by the mechanisms provided for the event.

Talking about "free play" as if it is some type of carte blanche to do whatever you want is unprofessional from a military simulation standpoint. Using it as a reason for your actions without specifying in what context you were intended to free play is intellectually dishonest.

Everybody has seen this guy at the wargaming table. I don't care that it's not in the rules of this game. I don't care that the scenario doesn't address this. I want my guys to be able to do this. Oh, by the way, any actual costs or constraints on my side for doing it are outside the rules, so they shouldn't apply to me.

What could anyone do, he was retired…?

Retired is irrelevant. He was being paid a large, executive salary to drive the objectives of the exercise. What they could do and did do is fire him.

Funny how he doesn't start his story saying this is about how he lost a low-mid six-figure salary. It goes along with not once a description of what was supposed to happen except "free play".

Do you believe Van Riper should have been allowed to do absolutely anything that came into his head? Suddenly decide that his side had nuclear weapons positioned at strategic locations? Release the Kraken?

etotheipi:

Not at all. What he *should* have done is what he was being paid to do. That wasn't what I was saying. I was simply pointing out that all the earmarks of a dissonance between the stated goals and the real goals of the simulation were present. Van Riper's behavior is a symptom of that rather than a comment about what he should have done. It also suggests that some understanding of what simulations *should* do was missing among the participants.

And when I say 'advertised', I mean the stated goals going into the simulation weren't the actual results desired by those running it. That is obvious.

McLaddie, I believe you spend a lot of time talking about the intent of the game. Van Riper walked outside the intent of the game and into a performance space that was not even remotely supported by the mechanisms provided for the event.

My point exactly. That happened because of mixed messages going in, the stated goals given various participants vs the real goals desired by the controllers of the simulation.

How about a less "out there" question … should he have been allowed to use chemical weapons? There are certainly adversaries that have them, have public doctrine that they will use them, and have used them. It's realistic.

But it had nothing to do with the objectives of the MC02 event. Yes it's real. Yes it's important. But it's not what we are doing right here right now. We've intended to do something else and we need to get that done.

Again, any 'should' messages regarding the behavior of the participants have to revolve around the objectives of the simulation. No question about it.

So, why and how were chemical weapons "on the table" in the first place if they weren't part of the objectives of the event? And retired isn't irrelevant. Why weren't there current officers of equal status commanding the OPFOR too? Why call in a retired officer? It's not like they didn't have enough generals and admirals.

From my experience in business and education, organizationally, all the markers for a cock-up in carrying out the simulation were present.

The MC02 issue has gotten away from the OP question, but in some ways UV01 and MC02 does still orbit the question.

It all comes down to that word "accurate."

How does a simulation design achieve 'accuracy'?

The term implies that there is:

1. A target
[the history/reality specifically chosen to be simulated]

2. A mechanism for hitting the target,
[the game system] and

3. A method[s] of measuring the degree of success in hitting the target. [tests to establish validity]

Now most designers are generally vague on #1, produce #2 and claim #3 without any evidence, or say that it is just personal opinion and can't be tested.

Thousands of simulation designers have developed a large bank of methodologies for all three points, built up over many decades since WWII. There isn't any mystery about how to accomplish all three tasks.

There is no rule that says any historical wargame designer has to create historically accurate simulations. However, if they are attempting [claiming] accuracy or that their design represents history in some way, they can't avoid those three steps in achieving that accuracy in representation.

Too often it seems that designers rely on Murphy's Corollary:

"If no one knows where you are headed, they can't say you are lost."

And when I say 'advertised', I mean the stated goals going into the simulation weren't the actual results desired by those running it.

And my point was that the only "stated goals" asserted after the fact by someone who got fired for doing a lousy job.

Why weren't there current officers of equal status commanding the OPFOR too? Why call in a retired officer?

Again, they didn't call in a retired officer, they hired a contractor. Van Riper never says he was a hired contractor in his narrative because he wants you to think of him as an officer, a peer to the commander, rather than someone who was working for the commander and did not have any decision authority with respect to the objectives.

It's not like they didn't have enough generals and admirals.

Please provide the backing statistics on the number of active duty generals and admirals who are just sitting around doing nothing to the point where they had about nine months of 50+ hour weeks' effort available to put into such an exercise.

"If no one knows where you are headed, they can't say you

… actually should have been fired for what you did.

The term implies that there is:

1. A target
[the history/reality specifically chosen to be simulated]

2. A mechanism for hitting the target,
[the game system] and

3. A method[s] of measuring the degree of success in hitting the target. [tests to establish validity]

Too specific for my tastes.

Accuracy implies that there is a referent which is a well-defined list of things that are important to be represented. Within that referent there are:

* Static Entities – things with characteristics that do not change over time. (This is from the referent not the real world. I do not believe there are static things in the real world, but we do allow for them in the referent.)

* Dynamic Entities – things with characteristics that change over time.

* Relationships – Well-defined methods for determining how specific characteristics of dynamic entities change with respect to the characteristics of static and dynamic entities and "the pulse".

* The Pulse – a mechanism for organizing the sequence of changes brought about by relationships. This is almost almost almost always a (fixed or variable) "time step", but doesn't have to be.

Kinetic combat interactions are a subset of that space. But so are logistics. And maneuver (which has nothing to do with hitting a target; it's just moving stuff around). And perceptions (morale models, anyone?). And tons of other potential phenomena of interest.

Again, they didn't call in a retired officer, they hired a contractor.

Potato/patatoe. Why a contractor for the Opposing side, and not both, particularly if the Military didn't have general officers 'just sitting around.' This was, after all, a major, multi-million dollar affair.

Please provide the backing statistics on the number of active duty generals and admirals who are just sitting around doing nothing to the point where they had about nine months of 50+ hour weeks' effort available to put into such an exercise.

Meaning the active duty generals and admirals heading up the American side had been 'just sitting around doing nothing, so were 'available?' It's not like the military doesn't have an operational OPFOR unit in each branch of the service.

And my point was that the only "stated goals" asserted after the fact by someone who got fired for doing a lousy job.

I didn't mean Van Riper's version, but the official 'stated' goals. They weren't indicative of what were the reasons for 'redirecting' the simulation back to whatever they 'really' wanted from the exercise.

I repeat, I am not defending Van Riper's behavior or the justifications he gave for 'acting out'. I am saying that his behavior, however wrong, was a symptom of larger problems with the simulation, how it was organized and implemented.

Too specific for my tastes. Accuracy implies that there is a referent which is a well-defined list of things that are important to be represented. Within that referent there are:

etotheipi:
Well, as the designer you get to pick what your goals are, specific or otherwise, [no right or wrong there]. However, I would imagine for a game system, you have to be fairly specific about what you do and don't want to achieve…with specific rules and systems, and have some fairly specific ideas regarding how you will know you've been successful.

* Static Entities

* Dynamic Entities

* Relationships

* The Pulse

Kinetic combat interactions are a subset of that space. But so are logistics. And maneuver (which has nothing to do with hitting a target; it's just moving stuff around). And perceptions (morale models, anyone?). And tons of other potential phenomena of interest.

Yes, and? A designer is either going to attempt to represent all those things in one system--ipso facto, in specific rules and mechanics… or he picks specific aspects of one or more to represent…again fairly precise, I would think.

Yes, and?

And you asserted that "accuracy" implied a target, and engagement, and a success criterion of the engagement. My point was that this is too restrictive to frame the discussion of accuracy.

It's not like the military doesn't have an operational OPFOR unit in each branch of the service.

Kind of. None of the Services, or DoD at large have an "OPFOR unit". All of them have specific OPFOR cells that support specific other processes for the military.

Those people were involved in developing the conditions that defined what OPFOR should do to achieve the MC02 objectives. The conditions Van Riper didn't follow.

I didn't mean Van Riper's version, but the official 'stated' goals. They weren't indicative of what were the reasons for 'redirecting' the simulation back to whatever they 'really' wanted from the exercise.

Well, you've only referred to Van Riper's version of events. What do you think the explicitly stated goals of MC02 were?

I am saying that his behavior, however wrong, was a symptom of larger problems with the simulation, how it was organized and implemented.

Except after he was fired, similar objectives were able to be achieved with roughly the same simulation and exactly the same management and development process.

I'm not sure how someone not using a tool the way it was intended to be used can demonstrate anything about flaws in the way it was organized and implemented. After all, as you point out, the accuracy of a sim is relative to the intent. If you generate a bunch of data that is not related to the intent, you can't draw conclusions about accuracy.

If I use a running chainsaw to stir my coffee and it results in massive property damage, personal injury, and poorly stirred coffee, that experience really can't be used to judge the organization and implementation of the chainsaw.

I'm not sure how someone not using a tool the way it was intended to be used can demonstrate anything about flaws in the way it was organized and implemented.

etotheipi:

We aren't talking about some grunt pushing lead on Saturday, but the chosen commander of the OPFOR forces for a multi-million dollar operation. One has to ask why the organizers of this exercise chose Van Riper in the first place and what motivations led him to accept. [Would he have acted the way he did if money were the major motivator? He was no dummy, he must have known what would happen if he 'acted out.'] And that goes to what enticements were offered to get him to accept if he was so unhappy with his previous experience. And then, what instructions, guidance and goals were given to Van Riper and his team? Any oversight? etc. etc. etc.

And you asserted that "accuracy" implied a target, and engagement, and a success criterion of the engagement. My point was that this is too restrictive to frame the discussion of accuracy.

How can you speak of accuracy without some target and a way of measuring your success in hitting it?

The technical definition is:

The degree to which the result of a measurement, calculation, or specification conforms to the correct value or a standard.

So when a designer says like Rich Hasenauer Arty Conliffe
or Bob Jones state that they have designed a 'historically accurate' game or simulation, they actually don't need a way of establishing 'accuracy'?

If I want to know how 'accurate' my bow skills are, I can have a blank circle, one with a bulls-eye, one with rings and a bulls-eye or a tin can. Each is a target and hitting the target provides a measure of accuracy.

If I want a historically accurate wargame design, how do I establish that? It requires a target/goal of some sort, a way to represent it and some way to determine whether that accuracy/goal was achieved.

Given that the designer is free to chose whatever targets/goals he wants for his design, how would you achieve simulation design accuracy? A goal may be as simple as wanting 80% of playtesters to give the design a 9 out of 10 rating in exit surveys, but that isn't simulation accuracy or historical accuracy.

etotheipi:

According to General Buck Kernan, Commander of JFCOM, Van Riper was chosen to head up OPFOR because:

"he is a devious sort of guy" and a "no-nonsense, solid, professional warfighter."

It strikes me that Van Riper lived up to that set of qualities he was chosen for. From how this played out, the leaders of MC02 really didn't want that kind of OPFOR leader.

Congress Ok'ed the $250,000,000 USD exercise to "explore the critical war fighting challenges at the operational level of war that will confront the United States joint military forces after 2010."

The objectives are detailed on pp. 53-54 of this book. If those are not correct, then I may be in need of some enlightenment.

link

They seem to agree with the objectives given in the July 2002 issue of Signal before the MC02 exercises.

link

I've been following this discussion with high interest. I have exactly zero experience in the DoD gaming community, but I do have some modest experience in the corporate world. Sometimes people are not truthful about their true goals and intentions. You cannot rely upon the label on the can.

My .02, FWIW.

Please continue.

B

@McLaddie:

Don't have the book. What you've cited talks about the vision of the exercise in a vague and general way. You could build hundreds of thousands of different (and some contradictory) objectives for an exercise under those concepts.

Hadn't see the Signal article before. It also has a lot of high level info, but it does a good job at constraining it a bit. Specifically, there are bits in the article that contradict the idea that the OPFOR commander should be able to do "anything he wants" that his objective was to defeat the blue force kinetically, and that if certain bits weren't build into the sim, it was because they weren't part of the actual objectives, not from poor execution:

"conduct rapid decisive operations (RDOs) against a specific adversary"

"The general emphasizes that it is not a force-on-force exercise but rather a look at activity in a nation that is not hostile toward the United States."

Along those lines, the four high-level "objectives" identified are explicitly not about tactical engagement. Following that, the eight RDO processes listed in the article are all "blue-on-blue" processes.

F'r'ex, establishing a Joint intelligence control and management process (what that meant as a future operational concept in '02) isn't really about the content or accuracy of the actual intelligence or whether or not forces using that intel were winning, but rather about establishing lines of communication, normalizing information for sharing, capturing and publishing context, and managing national and Service assets holistically. It's about what the blue side is doing internally.

Really, none of the RDO processes listed in the article lead you to the concept of an adaptive red force engaging with the blue. The OPFOR should be pushing on the things that make it hard to share and manage intel (or achieve the other Joint HQ processes) not trying to kinetically beat the blue force.

Sinking an aircraft carrier with missiles that couldn't scratch it's hull delivered on craft that had magic navigation, fuel resupply, and the magic ability to go right to the aircraft carrier removes the carrier as an asset to be managed for the intel process.

Figuring out how to deal with the loss of a major asset in those processes would be a legitimate objective (it was for later experiments, not this one). But you really have to figure out how to carry out those processes before you figure out how to handle contingencies. That's why it wasn't part of this exercise.

There were no Pk tables validated for the aircraft carrier because the intent of the exercise was to practice how to use it properly as a Joint asset rather than how to kinetically protect a HVU. The half-dozen or so defense in depth measures (the things that would have detected and stopped the swarm craft) for a carrier battle group were not instantiated in the sim. Because there was no objective to play that type of engagement during the event.

here are bits in the article that contradict the idea that the OPFOR commander should be able to do "anything he wants."

I don't remember that being part of the defense on Van Riper's part…

Along those lines, the four high-level "objectives" identified are explicitly not about tactical engagement. Following that, the eight RDO processes listed in the article are all "blue-on-blue" processes.

So, there were no tactical engagement simulations planned? Van Riper then created tactical engagements when that wasn't part of the simulation?

Really, none of the RDO processes listed in the article lead you to the concept of an adaptive red force engaging with the blue. The OPFOR should be pushing on the things that make it hard to share and manage intel (or achieve the other Joint HQ processes) not trying to kinetically beat the blue force.

So, part of the overall simulation did not include "a featured activity of the MC02 would be a red-team war-game simulation?"

Sinking an aircraft carrier with missiles that couldn't scratch it's hull delivered on craft that had magic navigation, fuel resupply, and the magic ability to go right to the aircraft carrier removes the carrier as an asset to be managed for the intel process.

Uh, wasn't any damage done by weapons, let alone their capabilities, adjudicated by neutral umpires??? Who allowed the magic? Shouldn't the result have been to deem Van Riper's attacks complete failures???

Figuring out how to deal with the loss of a major asset in those processes would be a legitimate objective (it was for later experiments, not this one). But you really have to figure out how to carry out those processes before you figure out how to handle contingencies. That's why it wasn't part of this exercise.

Figuring out how to deal with the loss of a major asset in those processes would be a legitimate objective (it was for later experiments, not this one). But you really have to figure out how to carry out those processes before you figure out how to handle contingencies. That's why it wasn't part of this exercise.

There were no Pk tables validated for the aircraft carrier because the intent of the exercise was to practice how to use it properly as a Joint asset rather than how to kinetically protect a HVU. The half-dozen or so defense in depth measures (the things that would have detected and stopped the swarm craft) for a carrier battle group were not instantiated in the sim. Because there was no objective to play that type of engagement during the event.

Fine. So what was the Red team supposed to do? Whatever the goals were, 1. What was the part Van Riper was instructed to play and 2. IF there was no kinetic wargame planned, how was the sim 'allowed' to proceed?

There were no Pk tables validated for the aircraft carrier because the intent of the exercise was to practice how to use it properly as a Joint asset rather than how to kinetically protect a HVU. The half-dozen or so defense in depth measures (the things that would have detected and stopped the swarm craft) for a carrier battle group were not instantiated in the sim. Because there was no objective to play that type of engagement during the event.

Okay, if that was the case, then there was no kinetic 'wargame' being planned or played, but rather a test to "figure out how to carry out those processes", then obviously Van Riper 'hijacked' whatever had been planned with elements that had no validated PK values and
in the simulation was allowed [and I do mean allowed] to sink aircraft carriers when that wasn't the exercise or simulation's objectives.

That 'one man' could do that to a quarter of a billion dollar event tells me that there were some real problems in planning, organization and implementation.

The only thing I can add is my experience with a high-level wargame simulation at HQ USMC in 1973.

I was a low-level participant/messenger, not a real player. From discussions, reading messages and intel reports and sitting in on planning it was a logistical exercise on the invasion of NVN by the 1st and 3rd Marine Divisions and the invasion landing. I don't recall any situations of NVN patrol boat launching SSM's at the invasion force or air interdiction by their air force. There appeared to be no tactical combat at all. I guess it was more of a project planning exercise.

In Van Riper was there he may have had a submarine attack by the Russians or a nuke from China. I still like the guy. The military needs a pain in the ass like him to balance the status quo.

Wolfhag

I don't remember that being part of the defense on Van Riper's part…

The whole argument that the white cell was "rigging" the exercise was that they were negating what he was doing.

So, there were no tactical engagement simulations planned?

Tactical engagements were not staffed on the blue or red side. They existed to have some data to feed into the C2 and intel systems.

The engagements were supported by simulations. Tactical interchanges were not validated because they were not the focus of the exercises. That's how half a dozen OTS AT weapons can sink an aircraft carrier. It's like "adding" the text "BLUE" and "YELLOW" numerically on a computer. Depending on how the internals of the operation are implemented, you will get various different results. Unless the "add" operation has been set up to and validated for interpreting colors as text, you won't get "GREEN".

One of the "unrealistic" things that Van Riper said was done to him was the white cell "resurrected" the carrier. It's one of the two big examples he gives. Never mind that the sim wasn't set up to evaluate that combat exchange.

a red-team war-game simulation

Tactical combat is not the only possible thing that can be a red-team engagement.

Uh, wasn't any damage done by weapons, let alone their capabilities, adjudicated by neutral umpires???

No it was adjudicated by a bunch of code. There weren't umpires on that part because that type of tactical engagement was outside the window. They also didn't hire extra people to sit around just in case someone decided to send SOF in a stuff teddy bears in chimneys and they needed to adjudicate it.

That 'one man' could do that to a quarter of a billion dollar event tells me that there were some real problems in planning, organization and implementation.

So now he's gone from being a "retired general" to just "one man" of no significance?

They reset the carrier within a couple hours, most of which was dedicated to talking about what happened and why. This is the core of his complaints "they didn't let me provide a real OPFOR".

If your idea of "real problems" is that a participant can screw up <1% of the activity in an event, and the event can recover and make it up, I envy anyone who participates in an event that you think is "just OK".

Remember, Van Riper is the one who said the carrier event was a big deal. From the other side, it was just something stupid that went wrong and was corrected. The JFCOM reports of the event said they achieved their objectives in demonstrating effects based concepts.

One of the most surprising issues from my reading of "Simulating War" by Prof. Phil Sabin is that commercial wargames are too complicated to be used as simulation exercises and therefore the book presents a series of much simpler games…..

bobm1959,

I've heard the same response from developers of sims for the US defense industry.

I do know that GMT games "Next War Korea" was used by the USAF but with different combat factors.

First, you need buy-in from the top and the people putting out the money. Then you need cooperation from the lower unit and the participants. Taking the time to learn the game ideally should not exceed the amount of time to play the game. Good luck trying to achieve that. Many times the developers know what is needed and can deliver a good simulation but it is not well received by the troops.

I doubt if the end users were surveyed as to what they want.

Wolfhag

etotheipi:

I confess to being a little lost here. I am not saying that MC02 was a waste of time, nor am I condoning Van Riper's actions, IF indeed he went off the reservation. However, here is what was said about the blue team/red team for the simulation:

Gen. William "Buck" Kernan, head of Joint Forces Command, told Pentagon reporters July 18 that Millennium Challenge was nothing less than "the key to military transformation." Central to the success of the war game, Kernan said, was that the U.S. force (or Blue Force) would be fighting a determined and relatively unconstrained Opposing Force (otherwise known as the OPFOR or Red Force). "This is free play," he said. "The OPFOR has the ability to win here."

Senior leaders at the Pentagon and at Joint Forces Command had made much of the fact that Millennium was an "experiment" rather than an exercise. An exercise, General Kernan explained it, simply validates the readiness of forces using current doctrine, systems and procedures. "If you're truly experimenting," he said, "you're looking within the realm of the possible, and you don't know until you get into it. If you already know what the after-action report's going to look like on an experiment, you've probably not got an experiment. You've just validated a known concept." Col. Phil Mixon, the Director of Concept Development and Experimentation at the Joint Experimentation Center in Suffolk, Virginia, told EIR on Aug. 1, "there's some things we think we're going to learn . . . but, no, we're not writing the final chapter before this is over with." Mixon added, however, that the concepts had been put through a process of workshops, seminars, smaller-scale experiments, and so forth, and that by the time of the big experiment, "we've already put them through significant rigor, that they show merit," and all that remains, is to put them through the large-scale war game, "to put stress on it, to make sure that it holds up under stresses."

EIR-Executive Intelligence Report Sept. 6, 2002 vol. 29 No. 34 p. 69

etotheipi: That is doesn't sound like the exercise goals of fine-tuning a system you describe. It doesn't match the official objectives, though they are very short on specifics. [I refrained from posting them here!] In other words, your understanding doesn't necessary jive with what was presented to audiences by the organizers of MC02
That doesn't mean you are wrong, only that there is some miscommunication here.

Van Riper's objections were very specific, however, in terms of how new concepts should be tested in an exercise. He is known as an expert in running opposing forces in exercises. He apparently went into Millennium Challenge believing he would have the freedom to "stress" the concepts of the supposed 21st-Century military transformation to its limits. In an Aug. 14 e-mail quoted by the Army Times, Van wrote, "Unfortunately, in my opinion, neither the construct nor the conduct of the exercise allowed for the concepts of rapid decisive operations, effects-based operations, or operational net assessment [all described in EIR's Aug. 23 report] Yet, until this long-overdue celebration, the two had never to be properly assessed. . . . It was, in actuality, an exercise that was almost entirely scripted to ensure a Blue ‘win.' "

EIR executive Intelligence Report Sept. 6, 2002 vol. 29 No. 34 p.70

Now, without saying who is right or wrong in their understanding of the purposes of MC02, it is apparent that the goals and purposes were not clearly details to those running the operation or any audiences.

Tactical engagements were not staffed on the blue or red side. They existed to have some data to feed into the C2 and intel systems.

So the 350 members of the Blue team and the 90 members of the red team commanded by Van Riper did what? Just fed data into the C2 and intel systems? Doesn't sound like 'free-play' unless they were allowed some freedom in feeding the C2 and intel systems. What you describe does sound like an exercise, but doesn't explain how Van Riper could give his team license to do what they did, let alone actually provide a situation where OPFOR 'could actually win.'

No it was adjudicated by a bunch of code. There weren't umpires on that part because that type of tactical engagement was outside the window. They also didn't hire extra people to sit around just in case someone decided to send SOF in a stuff teddy bears in chimneys and they needed to adjudicate it.

What? The Defense Department spent $250 USD million over at least two years to stage Millennium Challenge 02, a three-week, all-service exercise. The experiment involved 13,500 participants waging mock war in 17 simulation locations and nine live-force training sites. The military usually have observers AND umpires adjudicating questions during simulations and large exercises. [Maybe stuffing teddy bears is more prevalent than one would think.]

Are you are saying is that they couldn't afford or find qualified folks to act as observers and umpires, even though it is an SOP?

Tactical combat is not the only possible thing that can be a red-team engagement.

Fine, what do you think General Kernan was talking about then when he said that OPFOR could actually win?

So now he's gone from being a "retired general" to just "one man" of no significance?

Not sure how you got that from what I said, but no significance? The man was the commander of those 90 team members--or about 20% of the total manpower involved in Blue and Red Teams. He didn't effect 1% of the simulation and he wasn't fired. He resigned.

Again, I am not saying that the whole thing was a waste of time. It wasn't. I am not saying that Van Riper behaved properly. I am sure he had other, more productive ways to make his point. I am not saying the exercise goals of MC02 were bad ones. They weren't.

I am saying that serious mistakes in communicating and implementing those goals and thus the entire operation were made--which in part should be evident from the quotes above--mistakes that led to the Van Riper ‘incident'. The fallout from that incident led to MC02 having less impact that it should have, to some serious controversies, which we are still working through at the moment… and indirectly led to the Joint Forces Command being disbanded.

One of the most surprising issues from my reading of "Simulating War" by Prof. Phil Sabin is that commercial wargames are too complicated to be used as simulation exercises and therefore the book presents a series of much simpler games…

bobm1959:

I think the major point for Phil was the time element required to play the commerical games rather than their rules complexity. In terms of space needs and paraphernalia, that complexity also created problems for a 'classroom' environment.

Phil has pointed out that board games have a wide variety of positives over the typical computer simulations the military has used when it comes to training and education.

Doesn't sound like 'free-play' unless they were allowed some freedom in feeding the C2 and intel systems. What you describe does sound like an exercise, but doesn't explain how Van Riper could give his team license to do what they did, let alone actually provide a situation where OPFOR 'could actually win.'

Tactical free play and making up OPFOR processes outside the intelligence based OPFOR plan are not the only ways to free play. There were a lot of things the OPFOR did during the other 9 1/2 days that stressed the blue force in ways that were relevant to the specific objectives.

Fine, what do you think General Kernan was talking about then when he said that OPFOR could actually win?

The OPFOR had the freedom to control the speed of operations and distribution of C2 within their forces to see if the blue force could adapt their processes to maintain tactical advantage. They actually changed these operational postures several times during the event.

Are you are saying is that they couldn't afford or find qualified folks to act as observers and umpires, even though it is an SOP?

No. I said they had them. The engagement of the aircraft carrier was put into the system at Van Riper's direction. It executed and the umpires called foul, and fixed it.

You've never seen a tabletop where two players say something, roll dice and then an umpire interrupts and resets the situation? That's essentially what happened here. Remember Van Riper complained about the "resurrection" of the aircraft carrier – something predicated on the idea that the umpires caught what he was doing and reversed it.

He didn't effect 1% of the simulation and he wasn't fired. He resigned.

I didn't say he affected <1% of the simulation or the manpower. I said the aircraft carrier event affected less than 1% of the simulation objectives.

He got paid for the whole MC02. JFCOM removed him from the contract for future events. He may have resigned from BAH after he was removed from the contract.

I am saying that serious mistakes in communicating and implementing those goals and thus the entire operation were made--which in part should be evident from the quotes above

So you believe that the few sentences in the article comprise the total of what was done to communicate the objectives? The objectives were established and worked over hundreds of hours in multiple meetings and published in multiple documents. For such an event, the Commander's Intent is usually 20-30 pages of info, not five minutes of general statements to the press. For such an event, the typical OPFOR playbook is a couple hundred pages of guidance and provided to everyone on the OPFOR side.

No. I said they had them. The engagement of the aircraft carrier was put into the system at Van Riper's direction. It executed and the umpires called foul, and fixed it.

etotheipi: This is what you originally wrote and what I responded to:

No it was adjudicated by a bunch of code. There weren't umpires on that part because that type of tactical engagement was outside the window. They also didn't hire extra people to sit around just in case someone decided to send SOF in a stuff teddy bears in chimneys and they needed to adjudicate it.

You've never seen a tabletop where two players say something, roll dice and then an umpire interrupts and resets the situation? That's essentially what happened here. Remember Van Riper complained about the "resurrection" of the aircraft carrier – something predicated on the idea that the umpires caught what he was doing and reversed it.

There was a lot more things that Van Riper did that led to far more simulation 'damage', so any 'corrections' were NOT that quick--or simple.

Remember Kernan's explanation about what MC02 was going to be: an experiment. He was very clear on what constituted an 'exercise' and what made it an 'experiment.'

My point is that there was a whole hell of a lot of confusions, miscommunication and dropped balls involved around those two basic goals. Van Ripper had several complaints, but here are a few:

"Not so," Van Riper told Army Times. "Instead of a free-play, two-sided game as the Joint Forces commander advertised it was going to be, it simply became a scripted exercise. They had a predetermined end, and they scripted the exercise to that end." … Exercise officials denied him the opportunity to use his own tactics and ideas against Blue, and on several occasions directed the Opposing Force not to use certain weapons systems against Blue.

It even ordered him to reveal the location of Red units, he said "We were directed … to move air defenses so that the Army and Marine units could successfully land," he said. "We were simply directed to turn [the air-defense systems] off or move them. … So it was scripted to be whatever the control group wanted it to be." …

[General Ripper quit], he said, to avoid presenting one of his Opposing Force subordinates with a moral dilemma. That subordinate was retired Army Col. George Utter, a full-time Joint Forces Command employee who, as the Opposing Force chief of staff, was responsible for taking Van Riper's commands and making them happen in the simulation. But several days into the exercise, Van Riper realized his orders weren't being followed.

"I was giving him directions on how I thought the OPFOR ought to perform, and those directions were being countermanded by the exercise director," Van Riper said. The exercise director was Air Force Brig. Gen. Jim Smith, Utter's real-life boss at Joint Forces Command.
Matters came to a head July 29. "That morning I'd given my guidance for what was to happen, and I found that [Utter] had assembled the staff and was giving them a different set [of instructions] based on the exercise director's instructions to him."

"War games rigged? General says Millennium Challenge 02 ‘was almost entirely scripted", By Sean D. Naylor in the Army Times (16 August 2002)

Now, all the things that Van Ripper was directed to do make total sense if the military were running an exercise, testing systems and making things 'work.' Van Ripper's problem was that he thought he was running an experiment, 'free-play' to stress the system. Obviously, those orders and directions ran quite counter to a 'free-play' experiment as Kernan described it.

What is ALSO obvious, is that miscommunication purposely continued. Instead of ordering/directing Van Ripper to help carry out his part in the exercises, those running the simulations instead directed Utter to give different directions than Van Ripper's. Why? Because the ones running the simulations had told Van Ripper to do things they in actuality didn't want at all and were unwilling to make that mistake overt. I have seen that kind of thing before--trying to sweep the error under the rug or dance by it.

The leaders of MC02 really wanted to run a quarter of a billion dollar exercise to test systems and coordination. That is fine with me, particularly on something like this, a joint operations involving so many moving parts of an untested, complex strategy. What the leaders did was sell an experiment. [Again, see Kernan's description I quoted in a previous post.] Van Ripper was hired under that presentation for an experiment to stress a system that wasn't tested yet to even see if it worked. They also sold Van Ripper and others on the Experimental nature of the simulation.

I would think that
1. That basic miscommunication in planning between exercise goals and experiments is obvious and at different points purposeful
2. So were the subsequent problems, confusion and needed corrections to get the effort back on track--as an exercise.

Another example of the fallout from this confusion over objectives. One question raised by a number of military folks is whether the US fleet could actually have been destroyed as quickly as the simulation allowed. The answer was No. The reason reveals more exercise thinking rather than experimental. The reason the fleet was destroyed is because the fleet was given only a few hours to do what it would normally have done in several, bringing it far closer to the shore and the enemy than 'over the horizon' tactics by the Navy would have dictated. The short period allowed was administrative and for exercise reasons without any thought to actual tactical placement of the fleet. Detailed here:

link

Here is how Kernan explained The issue with Van Ripper in a briefing afterwards:

Q: How do you respond to General Van Riper's criticism that basically he wasn't given a free hand to act effectively as an opposition force in some of these scenarios?

Kernan: Yeah, I mean, it is a very fair question, and I'll be straight up with you. I was the reason why Paul Van Riper was at Joint Forces Command. He's a very controversial individual. He is a good warfighter. I admire and respect him very much. I brought him in because he is controversial.

I will tell you that what he did was he -- I think it goes back to this explanation of an experiment versus an exercise. I think he looked at it more from an exercise perspective. And it's one of the things we learned about this whole process. [Please notice that this explanation assumes a definition of Exercise and Experimental that is a complete opposite of what Kernan gives above--or assumes that Van Ripper only saw the exercise elements and not the experimental part…both communication issues. Also note that it isn't surprising that what Van Ripper did was controversial considering that Kernan knew that about him. Talk about asking for trouble….]

For instance, he really focused on the OPFOR and he didn't want any additional information, he didn't want -- there were certain people that we had that were trusted agents because you have to do this exercise control group -- you know, there's certain things you have to look at: When are the platforms available? Are we going to meet the time lines that we've been given? We only had 36 hours, for instance, to have the C-17s available to us. There were certain times that we could only use the -- some of the shipping. Now, because he focused on just the OPFOR piece of it, he was not privy to some of this. [All exercise issues]

We were looking at it from an experimental concept perspective. He was looking at it from an exercise perspective. So I think if you -- you know, if you neck it down and look at it just from his perspective, an awful lot of what he had to say was valid. But if you look at it from what we were trying to accomplish in the way of setting conditions to ensure that the right objectives were satisfied, the experimental objectives, it's a much bigger picture, broader picture. [What is obvious is that what ever experimental objectives were set, Van Ripper and his team wasn't privy to them, nor do they seem all the experimental or 'free-play' from the description Kernan gives.]

Yeah?

Q: Well, for instance, if you declared it was a chemicals weapons area, and the troops coming in by C-130 or C-17 might have been exposed to chemical weapons, would that have put a wrench in your works there?

Kernan: Yeah, and it did. Now it's one of those things that we identified and basically we had to adjudicate. I mean, he's a pretty slick fellow. He knew exactly when we were going to have to do certain things.

But like I said, we had 36 hours in which we had those platforms available to us. If you'd have put, say, persistent chemicals on the area in which you were going to employ those forces, we would have waited. We didn't have the luxury of waiting. We didn't have the luxury of waiting for the weather to clear the effects of the chemicals, and we would never subject our troops unwittingly to that environment. We would do everything we could. We'd look for alternate places to go. Well, there's a restriction here in the United States, based on training areas, as to where you can go. There was a restriction as to the amount of time that was available to the platforms. So we basically said he can't do it right now.
If he'd have done it -- once again, we had about 17 days in which we could do this, and that was it, and we didn't have the luxury of being able to stretch it out. So yeah, fair question. [So, why weren't those things either taken into account with a 'free-play' scenario so they wouldn't be an issue, or do what obviously was done, use the time for system tests as was the apparent goal, ignoring the tactical issues.
All he is saying is that if they'd had more time, Van Ripper's tactics wouldn't have been effective.]

Q: General, his point, was, you were testing concepts and that, you know, by preconditioning the way the outcome would be -- he says you were preconditioning the way the outcome -- to validate those concepts, and that was his critique.
[Exactly, doing an exercise instead of an experiment]

Kernan: I disagree with that. I disagree with that. And I think that -- I have not had a chance to talk with Paul. I asked him to comment at the after-action review, which he did. That's at the point in time in which he told me that he had prepared a report. That is one of the things that we are assessing with all this other data.

I think what we need to do is sit down and look at point/counterpoint as to his assessment versus our interpretation of what we did and why we did it. But I disagree with that context at all. We did not scope anything. We did not preconceive anything. I can tell you that emphatically.

Q: Will there ever be an opportunity to really exercise these concepts and have more free play?

Kernan: Yeah, I think to a degree. I mean, you got to be careful about the word "free play." And I used it, and I wished I hadn't,…

All the benefits Kernan described in the briefing of MC02 were exercise benefits. Not once are the 'experiments, such as they were, mentioned as part of anything but Van Ripper's actions that had to be 'adjudicated', let alone anything that might have been learned from them. Note that last question assumes this in asking "Will there ever be an opportunity to really exercise these concepts and have more free play?"

The entire debriefing can be read here:

Gen. Kernan And Maj. Gen. Cash Discuss Millennium Challenge's Lessons Learned

link

We have strayed from the original question, being, how well (0-10) do our Miniature games simulate whatever they are meant to simulate
Now in the debates over how well simulation games simulate, I would lower the simulation score for the traditional published played Miniatures games because of the figures/models, Paddy Griffith amd John Elting had something negative to say, as well as Ned Zuparko many years ago in the old Courier and Empires, Eagles and Lions. In a word, the simulation/game is all about the metal or plastic soldiers, from the wargamer painter artist who wants to show his art, to the extremely crowded hattlefield, as the figures take up too much space, to
the distortion of terrain. Wally Simon, commenting on the all too clean miniatures battlefield introduced stands of dead soldiers. Ned got the frontages right and fought battles where the battle area was much larger than the available figures, in sharp contrast to any game of Team Yankee or Flames of War.
At least Chadwick in Command Decision keeps the heavy artillery off board, but they all, including Vive L'Emperuer, have huge distortions regarding formation depth, even to oversized figures to ground scale. And those paint jobs,well to quote Elting, there are the regulations, what the artists drew and painted, And what they really wore.
Indeed, the real uniforms are only good for that day of battle, not for the next year, month or week.
There are other defects such as tbe treatment of fighting in forests or urban areas, hidden units (figures not on the table, unacceptable to the tradional miniature gamer) the lack of airpower, the unimporrance of brigade or divisional command and control, logistics. Now a few miniatures games try to address one or two of these, yet even these do the traditional
Miniatures wargame in placing the figures before the simulation. This is Miniature wargaming, not live fire exercises, map games, staff rides or rehersals,
So I amend to all simulations a minus 4 if using Miniatures.

Rick Done Burnette, Not sure your statements can be so generally attributed to us all. Figures are definitely not the be all and end all for some of us.

Where it makes the simulation progress at a reasonable rate we hide figures. We most certainly do not put minatures first, they are just part of the game like a golf ball is to golf, not a great game without a ball.

The lack of command comment is by definition incorrect. If you are doing a platoon simulation much of the highe level command will have minimal impact on the tactical excercise which would have been set with those as part of the simulation boundary condirions. For example if Main Effort it may have been allocated some artillery. The duration of the simulation will accont for the fact that ther platoon canot last longer than X to ensure logisyics within the timeframe are not an issue OR that it is part of the simulation to prevent gross errors. We use both dependent on the game.

Just as an aside Skytrex was a supplier of models to the
milaitary for simulation. A friend of mine drove a visual simulator using 6mm models as part of his military training.

ERGO You can have reasonable simulation if that is your aim. You can have very poor simulation if the system is poorly designed or even none if simulation was intended within the game.

I remain at +8 for simulation for the intended subset of warfare.

We have strayed from the original question, being, how well (0-10) do our Miniature games simulate whatever they are meant to simulate.

Rick: True.

Miniatures wargame in placing the figures before the simulation. This is Miniature wargaming, not live fire exercises, map games, staff rides or rehersals,
So I amend to all simulations a minus 4 if using Miniatures.

There is a boat load of assumptions in your post that need to be sussed out. You assume that:

1. The various designers, from Paddy Griffith through Wally Simon [particularly] to Frank Chadwick knew what we know now about how to design simulations, let alone when they were designing games a decade or more ago.

2. That they were attempting to design simulations.

3. That simulations have some element of "live fire exercises, map games, staff rides or rehersals" to be simulations.

4. That all miniature wargame designers feel "In a word, the simulation/game is all about the metal or plastic soldiers."

5. Because miniature games have not done a good job or even attempted to do a good job at some of the issues you mention:…"they all, including Vive L'Emperuer, have huge distortions regarding formation depth, even to over-sized figures to ground scale."

In other words, you are using examples of wargames of not
doing particular things well assuming that:

1. The designers attempted to do them well, or even cared.

2. The designers knew how to design simulations AND couldn't with miniatures.

3. Some basic misunderstandings about how simulations work and don't work.

4. Particular defects in how previous wargames have been designed proves that such defects are inherent and unavoidable in miniature wargames.

I do agree that for many designers and players, other considerations are more important than simulating anything and that is just fine, their choice, but it doesn't define or speak to how to design accurate simulations.

I should be clear here:

How well do our wargames simulation war: 0-6 depending on the wargame.

How well is it possible for miniature wargames simulation war: 10

Does that mean ALL of war: No, simulations purposely DON'T do that.
Does that mean that everything and anything in war can be simulated? No.

It means that what miniature wargames can simulate, what wargamers generally WANT to simulate, can be done with accuracy.

Van Ripper's problem was that he thought he was running an experiment, 'free-play' to stress the system. Obviously, those orders and directions ran quite counter to a 'free-play' experiment as Kernan described it.

And Van Riper was a contract support for OPFOR, not the person who defines the objectives and terms. He was not the person to say what the wargmers sponsoring the event "WANT to simulate".

I would think that
1. That basic miscommunication in planning between exercise goals and experiments is obvious and at different points purposeful
2. So were the subsequent problems, confusion and needed corrections to get the effort back on track--as an exercise.

Van Riper twice (for the two things he complains about being overconstrained) used units that were not in his OOB. That alone is very difficult to attribute the miscommunication to the people putting on the event. He was given an OOB by the white cell running the game. He used other units and didn't tell anyone until the referees came to him after the engagement that didn't make sense.

What you quoted reflects what I have been saying about this event the entire time. Van Riper's objectives to test the C2 concepts were legit. Trying them with unvalidated units using methods outside what the tool was designed to support was unprofessional.

So here, imagine you are sponsoring (paying for) a wargames campaign event. You hire an expert to play OPFOR for your participants. We are using "Modern Combat 2.0" rules. Specifically, we are going to execute some "what if" scenarios using WWII combined arms units with experimental OOB on both sides.

Everyone's here. Let's play.

Now your hired OPFOR is using F-22 Raptors against the Allied air and ground units. After all, MC 2.0 has rules for Raptors, so what he did must be realistic "free play".

-----

And this gets at the heart of the discussion of how accurately wargames simulate war. It is only legitimate to evaluate the performance against the intended objectives. Any discussion of accuracy has to be couched in terms of the intent.

Well, I have to somewhat begrudgingly accept etotheipi's last statement. If I designed a game I'd want it judged on my goals and what it is designed for. Well written.

However, Van Riper is still da bomb.

I'll now try to get back on topic:
One of the things I've tried to do to get the players into the "mood" or "feeling" that the game is more of a military simulating the real thing is to use real military nomenclature and terminology. This includes labeling real tactics from manuals.

Movement Example:
Typical Game: Infantry Movement Phase
More Realistic: Fire & Maneuver Phase(better chance if enemy is suppressed to move under fire)

Gunnery Example:
Typical Game: First shot to hit #
More Realistic: Ranging shot with player risk-reward decision to use Battlesight tactic to fire sooner but with an accuracy penalty

Most games could use the same concept to reword some of their rules and mechanics to better resemble military terminology.

The other is risk-reward decisions for the player to make. All games to a greater or lesser extent constrain the player to random chance activations that are not in any military manual or tactic. Let the players take chances, even if it involves doing something the GM may think is stupid. I've seen too many examples of players not taking my advice and end up having a stellar success.

Some players like simulating being a Company Commander and his Platoons may not follow his orders. Others like pretending to be the Company Commander but control all of the squads. Minimum control of the Platoon may be more realistic but many players would not like it. There is no right or wrong way as it depends on what you like.

I understand activations and randomness needed in a game. There is no need to digress on it.

My opinion: The more a player is controlled and constrained by the artificial mechanics of a game (and they all have some to an extent) with less decision points the less it is going to come across as a real simulation.

You can also think of it as "painting a picture" or "telling a story" that sounds more militaristic rather than "gamey".

Wolfhag

And Van Riper was a contract support for OPFOR, not the person who defines the objectives and terms. He was not the person to say what the wargmers sponsoring the event "WANT to simulate".

etotheipi:

Granted, so as an experienced simulation participant and the leader of the OPFOR team, either Van Riper was poorly briefed on the 'real objectives"…or he deliberately went off the reservation in direct opposition to the stated objectives… something he was never accused of. Kernan simple suggested that Van Riper was mistaken in how he 'viewed' the exercise/experiment, seeing only one and not the other. If true, that again is a serious problem of miscommunication, considering his leadership role.

Van Riper twice (for the two things he complains about being over-constrained) used units that were not in his OOB. That alone is very difficult to attribute the miscommunication to the people putting on the event. He was given an OOB by the white cell running the game. He used other units and didn't tell anyone until the referees came to him after the engagement that didn't make sense.

So, the umpires/white cell running the game didn't immediately correct his actions, and his actions occurred over several engagements, not one and only in one did he use 'unvalidated' units, but because of the dramatic results, it is often the focus. "Not in his OOB?" Meaning not in the sims that were given PK ratings, rather than the entities in his 'country' that he had access to.

And this gets at the heart of the discussion of how accurately wargames simulate war. It is only legitimate to evaluate the performance against the intended objectives. Any discussion of accuracy has to be couched in terms of the intent.

I totally agree--intent = design goals/objectives.

What you quoted reflects what I have been saying about this event the entire time. Van Riper's objectives to test the C2 concepts were legit. Trying them with unvalidated units using methods outside what the tool was designed to support was unprofessional.

Your argument appears to say that Paul Van Riper went totally off the reservation, ignoring objectives, his defined role and and resources provided.

His complaint was that he was being asked to act as an opponent but was continually told to do things that any intelligent adversary wouldn't do: Turn on Radar so they could be targeted. Move all friendly aircraft away from the Landing sites. Ignore hostile ships within sight of home territory, etc. etc.

In other words, something he said repeatedly: He was continually directed to do things with his 'validated' resources and units, weakening or simply neutralizing any effects they might have had… basically dictating his use of those 'validated' units.

There were a number of 'unprofessional' actions on both sides. How his 'misbehavior' or misunderstanding of his role was handled also was 'unprofessional--leading him to resign.' Those objectives may have been clear in everyone's mind, but how they were implemented demonstrates what was actually important to the controllers and how that dissonance frustrated Van Riper.

What is 'real' in a simulation to make it 'accurate'? How can a bunch of tiny toy soldiers and weapons be 'realistic?

We can work on making the uniforms, relative sizes and shapes 'realistic' and accurate. Regardless of the size, we can tell a T-34 from a King Tiger, so something is resonating with history enough to be recognizable. they only way we know what those tanks look like and operate is either relics from WWII or written records.

But those are just fancy, even beautifully rendered meeples on the table. How is moving them around and 'fighting' with them 'realistic' or accurate?

Well, first the rules and game mechanics must have a relationship to actual historical records and relics.

Second, the rules and game mechanics must provide action parameters similar to the real world/historical environments.

Third and most important, players' decision-making relationship TO those rules and counters has to mirror actual participant's challenges, opportunities and decisions. This takes place in the mind of the players. The player experience is the target of any game play and/or participatory simulation play.

To be accurate, there has to be methods to determine how closely those three areas mimic actual events and dynamics. The relationship between the game and history at those chosen points [and only those points] are where a wargame succeeds or fails as a simulation. If it succeeds, where it succeeds, that is where it can be said to be 'realistic', and only there.

To establish that relationship, one has to know what history/reality is being targeted, to be simulated, how that will be done, and lastly, what methods are used to determine how closely the finished design succeeds in mirroring the the chosen reality, past or present.

Chosen history targeted, game systems meant to 'hit' that target, some methods for measuring success, how close the 'hit' was to the chosen bulls eye.

It's not all that mysterious a process and there are lots and lots of methods developed to achieve and measure success. Whether designers know about them or chose to use them is another issue altogether.