"What Sparked Japan's Aggression During World War II?" Topic

"The short version: Japan's actions from 1852 to 1945 were motivated by a deep desire to avoid the fate of 19th-century China and to become a great power.

For Japan, World War II grew from a conflict historians call the Second Sino-Japanese War. The Second Sino-Japanese War began in earnest in 1937 with a battle called the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. However, before this, there had been years of border clashes between the Japanese and the Chinese, having started with the 1931 Japanese invasion of Manchuria. So, to explain Japan's behavior in the years from 1941 to 1945, we have to explain why Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931, and in order to do this, we have to go back to 1853.

Before 1852, Japan was isolationist. Contact with the West was limited to trade with the Dutch in the city of Nagasaki—Westerners otherwise weren't allowed in the country, and Western influences were strongly discouraged. In 1853, Commodore Matthew C. Perry of the United States Navy steamed into what we now call Tokyo Bay. The Japanese told him to leave and go to Nagasaki. He ignored the directive and was surrounded by the Japanese fleet. He presented a counterdemand to have a letter from U.S. President Millard Fillmore presented to the de facto ruler of Japan at the time, the shogun. When this demand was not met, he shelled a few buildings in the harbor. The letter was presented. Perry returned a year later to sign the Convention of Kanagawa, a treaty that opened the Japanese ports of Shimoda (a city between Kyoto and what we now call Tokyo and was then called Edo) and Hakodate (located on the northern island of Hokkaido) to U.S. trade. The terms were dictated by the Americans, and the Japanese had little choice but to agree, seeing that they were seriously technologically outmatched.

This is where modern Japanese history begins. The importance of Perry's missions to Japan in the 1850s really can't be overstated. While Japan had previously thought itself to be a strong country, Perry's actions and the signing of treaties widely viewed in Japan as unequal destroyed this image. While Japan's isolation had allowed the Japanese to think that they might escape the fate the Chinese were suffering, the end of this isolation gave lie to that idea…"
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Amicalement
Armand

Not a word said about the endemic racism that led the Japanese to believe they could easily win every war.

Getting the bushito beat out of them in WWII was no doubt a sobering experience that ended their lofty "fantasy" ambitions.

"The importance of Perry's missions to Japan in the 1850s really can't be overstated."

Really, I think the author probably did. I agree with Murvihill

The Japanese sparked Japan's aggression during WW2.

Somewhere in there the US imposed sanctions on Japan for it's war in China. The US would not sell it scrap iron or aircraft fuels and oils. The British and Dutch also stopped shipments of oil to Japan.

And, of course, it was impossible for Japan to stop its aggression in China to get the sanctions ended.

The Russians did it ???

Regards
Russ Dunaway

Japanese didn't understand why what was moral for Western countries, i.e. colonialism, was frown upon Japan. Being shun off in the post-WWI peace settlements -or at least, that is how it was perceived in Japan, at the time- gave the ultra-rightists the leverage they needed to destroy Japan's budding democracy and lead their country in an expansion through Asia that was bound, eventually, to lead Japan into a conflict with Britain or the US, or both.

Mobius is on the right track.

For thousands of years, the world wide economic system has been competitive and a race to control resources, trade, and sea lanes. That's not going to change anytime soon.

Countries are always looking for new markets and resources. The US opening trade with Japan in 1853 was the latest. England had pretty much a monopoly in "trade" (if you can call it that) with China. The US did not want to be left out.

Once Japan signed a non-aggression pact with Russia on April 13, 1941 (ending their advance into Siberia) it was clear their next target would be SE Asia and the rubber, oil, and mineral resources the US and Europe were using/controlling. They also moved into French Indo-China and Taiwan. This threatened the national security of the US and Europe. So what is a nation to do?

In the article, I think

"The Japanese were petrified that they'd go the same way China did, and it wasn't very long before a reform movement got started. "

they are referring to the Opium Wars which allowed vast foreign influence into China. This was another war started mostly over trade and economics. Japan did not want to be dominated by the West – who can blame them. They saw by losing a trade war would open them to exploitation by the West.

Roosevelt had promised in the 1940 election not to get the US into a foreign war despite starting the military draft in Sept 1940. There was a strong Isolationist movement in the US it would not be easy to rally the people into another war. He needed a reason to enter the war and go after Hitler first. What if Japan attacked the US first? They had already sunk a gunboat in China.

Roosevelt had the US Navy come up with eight naval actions into Japanese area that could trigger an attack by the Japanese and threaten to cut off their trade. One was a carrier demonstration off the coast of Japan and another a cruiser squadron threatening to blockade the oil shipping choke point the Straights of Malacca that could stop the Dutch oil shipments.

The deployment of a division of long-range heavy cruisers (Action D) and two divisions of submarines (Action E) to the Orient. The last key factor McCollum (Head of Naval Intel in the Pacific) called for was to keep the United States Fleet in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands (Action F).

Roosevelt personally took charge of Action's D and E; these actions were called "pop up" cruises. Roosevelt had this to say about the cruises, "'I just want them to keep popping up here and there and keep the Japs guessing (Stinnett 9).'

Hmmm, let's see what's going on here. Roosevelt is micro-managing naval cruiser assets in SE Asia pushing little wooden ships on a map in a recon-in-force operation saying, "I wonder what happens if I put them right here today? Will I start WWII?"

FDR signing Lend-Lease: In 1940 and 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt formalized U.S. aid to China. The U.S. Government extended credits to the Chinese Government for the purchase of war supplies, as it slowly began to tighten restrictions on Japan (US loans China money and they buy US military hardware – now that's what I call creating jobs!). The United States was the main supplier of the oil, steel, iron, and other commodities needed by the Japanese military as it became bogged down by Chinese resistance but, in January, 1940, Japan abrogated the existing treaty of commerce with the United States (violating an economic treaty, sanctions and embargoes are like declaring an economic war). Although this did not lead to an immediate embargo, it meant that the Roosevelt Administration could now restrict the flow of military supplies into Japan and use this as leverage to force Japan to halt its aggression in China.

Then there was the "indirect" action taken with US planes (P-40's) with US pilots under Chinese contract to help stop the Jap incursion into SE Asia – the Flying Tigers. Chennault spent the winter of 1940–1941 in Washington, supervising the purchase of 100 Curtiss P-40 fighters and the recruiting of 100 pilots and some 200 ground crew and administrative personnel that would constitute the 1st AVG Just to be clear – this was all within the Neutrality Act of 1939.

So until 1940 the US is a top supplier of war materials to the Japanese and then cut off all supply, oil, embargo and freeze their assets in the US and start supplying their enemy China. They start a military draft in 1940 and Spring of 1941 call up the reserves. That's when my Father-in-Law went to Pearl Harbor and was there on Dec 7, 1941. Does this sound like a nation with peaceful intentions?

So right about now you may have come to the conclusion that the US, Dutch and Britain did everything in their power to bring Japan to it's knees economically and lash out in self-defense. Adding to that is planning an "illegal" undeclared war with the Flying Tigers. If that conclusion is right it appears they did not break any treaties or international law. Japan broke a treaty with the US. So who is right, wrong or occupies the moral high ground (if there really is any)?

It's easy to condemn so lets look at some options. Should the West have partnered with Japan and split the spoils of China, SE Asia and the Pacific? That would have made economic sense. Should the US have ignored Japan? Going to war with Japan could make the argument that it got the US into the war in Europe. No US in Europe could have meant Communism over the entire continent after Russia defeats Germany – with the help of the US? The US could have partnered with Japan to get influence in the East and Russia to occupy Europe.

Far fetched? Maybe? I mean it does make total economic sense. The US could have supplied Japan, Russia and Germany with war materials without violating the Neutrality Treaty (I'm pretty sure that is correct) taking payment in gold and really cashing in without entering the war and losing any lives. The US, Russia and Japan dominate the globe. Africa and South America here we come!

This is all food for thought before you start criticizing the US and Allies on their decisions and options. We're in a similar position around the world right now. Are there any lessons to be learned from WWII?

Wolfhag

Overpopulation. Japan had to expand or starve.

Good thread Wolfhag!

Amicalement
Armand

Wolfhag has it right. FDR did everything he could to back Japan into a corner where they would have no choice, but to cave in or start a war, knowing full well that the Japanese would never lose face by caving in. Bear in mind that SE Asia is Japan's back yard I am sure the US would not have taken kindly to anyone else telling them what they could or could not do in their own back yard. Racism wasn't unique to Japan either. What was it like being black in the US during the 40's? No picnic that is for sure.

Japan had unresolved territorial ambitions since Hideyoshi figured a way to thin out the ranks of the Samurai, which were still a potential threat to his control of Japan, by sending them to conquer China via Korea.

Post 1853, Japan took careful notes and followed the European model of modernization, including the acquiring of colonies and overseas territories.

With early success against powers like China and Russia, Japan grew in confidence that it could exist on parity with the Western powers and gain their recognition. So much so that it became a cult, the manifest divinely inspired destiny that Japan would rule a major chunk of the world.

Meanwhile Japan had transitioned from a feudal society into one of the most liberal democracies in the world, Japanese were eating up the modern lifestyle and this started to become an itch to conservatives and the overly nostalgic with a grudge.

This deeply conservative streak lead to a new generation of young Japanese embracing a hard-line militaristic approach, spurred on by an older generation that had failed to rise to the highest levels of power and resented the higher classes for what they had gained.

A few murders and a quiet putsch later, the militarists took control of Japan and set Japan on a radical new course. It would inherit Britain's role in the pacific and become the caretakers of what was later described as the Asian co-prosperity sphere, IE, an Asia dominated by Japan.

While the British saw Japan as a useful ally against German ambitions in the Pacific region, they didn't trust it to take over, preferring to leave it to the Americans, who by virtue of being of nominally Anglo-Saxon stock made some people in Whitehall more comfortable than leaving a large part of the world in the hands of a non-white race.

As Japan industrialized at an accelerated pace the utter lack of natural resources became critical. So the Japanese embarked on a grand colonial tour which increasingly soured as it became a quagmire that sucked up resources, forcing Japan to seek even more resources, which in turn sucked up more resources and …

There couldn't be a starker contrast between the substantial amount of success Japan achieved and the terminal stupidity that dominated the leadership.

The Japanese were starting to believe their own cult of invincibility, it made them arrogant and blind to the realities in the field.

Early success defeating China and Russia, annexing Korea and moving into Manchuria seemed like the first steps to a golden age. But Manchuria and soon a whole chunk of China was more than they could chew. Rather than become a profitable source of natural resources and a place for Japanese settlers to build a new future.

And this is the point where it becomes a tragedy of errors, because too many lives were lost to call it a comedy.

Japan had a destiny, to become a world power and oust the USA from the Pacific theater and install Japan as the dominant naval and colonial power. To achieve this Japan would have to come into conflict with the USA and defeat it. In order to build up enough power to dominate what was already the largest industrial power in the world, Japan would need massive resources, which meant expanding not only into China, but the rest of Asia, many parts of which were under the control of various European nations and the USA so the logic demanded that in order to be able to challenge the USA they had to declare war on the USA somewhere along the way …

The sad thing is that the leadership was aware of this problem, but nobody dared to play the defeatist, especially if you have a fanatical horde of knife-wielding junior officers breathing down your neck waiting for any sign of weakness. Many began to contend that the USA would probably buckle much in the same way China and Russia had done before. To mask any misgivings, Japan resorted to stereotypes, Europeans/Americans/Whites were weak-willed and decadent, Japan had grown stronger by throwing out Western decadence and returning to traditional values enhanced by modern technology.

A spiral that lead to much of the Japanese army being stuck in China, devouring resources, which forced them to launch attacks across Asia and declare war against the US so that Japan could finally unlock the resources to engage the US on its own terms.

Doesn't add up, the Japanese leadership was aware of this, but against their better judgement believed that divine intervention and serendipity would probably be on their side as it always had been with Japan's manifest destiny …

good thread guys.

Some very good info here guys. Though I'd read/heard much of is before. However, the good thing is, IMO, we can discuss this without any real moral judgement or finger pointing, etc. This thread to me is about historical events. That happened … and I see no revisionism, etc., just the comments that may add to the discussion.

May I recommend a book I read long ago, "War Without Mercy". Pretty enlightening on this topic, IIRC … worth a look.

A cocktail of Rampant Nationalism, Militarism, and Social Darwinism?

Somebody forgot about the summer of 1939. Khalkin Gol. Army lost face to the IJN. Attention turns southwest pacific-way for resources. Had the Japanese outfought Zhukov, many believe the collision with the US Navy might not have happened. oh well.

Somebody forgot about the summer of 1939. Khalkin Gol. Army lost face to the IJN. Attention turns southwest pacific-way for resources. Had the Japanese outfought Zhukov, many believe the collision with the US Navy might not have happened.

I recognize this as a sort of "conventional wisdom", but I think more recent scholarship throws some doubt into that particular reading.

To wit: It appears that the IJA did not report the Nomonhan incident (the Japanese term for what the Russians call the battle of Khalkhin Gol) to the government or the nation as any sort of setback. It is dubious if it was ever reported up the chain to IJA leadership as a military loss.

Looking at the combat results for the several engagements that make up the "incident", it's pretty clear that it was not some great military trouncing, as the Russians describe it. The Russians did an adequate job on the combat front, but not any sort of exceptional job. The Russian's superior grand maneuver, possible in large part due to their greater mechanized mobility, provided adequate compensation for inferior tactical combat efficiency. But not more.

One might make the case that the IJA did in fact outfight Zhukov.

Russian losses appear to have exceeded Japanese losses in terms of manpower, aircraft, and vehicles. Zhukov managed to thwart the Japanese military objectives on the ground in the area, by creating a logistical flow that far surpassed both what the local Japanese forces could muster on their own and what the Japanese anticipated. The "Russian victory" was more a logistical and political victory than a tactical victory. The local Japanese forces could not continue hostilities without support from higher echelons … and when they sought that support it was not forthcoming.

It seems that the larger issue in the IJA "loosing face" compared to the IJN, and the subsequent decision to pursue the "southern option", was that the whole "incident" was unauthorized. It was an adventure by the local IJA commanders that only later escalated to the level of the government.

Japanese culture places a very high priority on consensus -- even when the nation was so highly militarized, decision-making required consensus. The saying in Japan is "the nail that stands up gets hammered down". The very fact that local IJA forces had initiated a fight, when there was no consensus in the government to do so, was a loss of face to IJA leadership, and led to a viewpoint that the IJA in Manchuria was out of control.

It is possible that a significant military victory at low cost might have been forgiven. That was clearly the expectation of the commanders on the scene. I am not as convinced.

As with so many other decisions, the perspective of the IJA commanders seems driven by the odd perversion of "Bushido" from that timeframe that assumed military victory was a virtue unto itself, quite regardless of political or economic considerations.

The fundamental policy question of the so-called "northern" vs. "southern" option was not fear of Russia's military might.

Two IJA divisions getting knocked about was small potatoes in any calculations. The bigger problem was that there was no compelling national interest in starting trouble with the Russians.

There was oil or rubber to be had in the "northern option". Korea was providing much of the coal and iron ore needed, but Japan had no sources of oil or rubber other than trade with the US and European colonial powers. Once that trade was cut off, the options were to pursue the "southern option" (ie: seize the SEA colonial resources) or stop military operations in China.

Taking a few thousand square miles of undeveloped Siberia would take vital resources away from China operations, not provide vital resources to expand China operations.

The local IJA command didn't have any of that calculus in their thinking, and saw only an opportunity to win military victories -- if they could get some support. But they couldn't get support, because there was nothing to be gained by investing resources to the north. So they provoked a fight anyway on the presumption that they could win on the cheap, and then get the support they needed to continue. And the government said, like, "WTF dude?"

Or at least that is how the more recent readings make it appear to me.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

I think Mark 1 fills in some of the gaps I left out and brings out some excellent psychological aspects of Japanese political and military leadership. Many times we look back in history and make "logical" conclusions based on our cultural norms without understanding the underlying influences and cultural drivers of another culture. That enables us to make snap, kneel jerk, know it all conclusions like "Why were they so stupid", "Didn't they know that ..", etc. Fortunately for the Allies, the ability to read Japanese code gave us the insights that our cultural differences may not have picked up.

One more insight into Roosevelt. From what I can recall the US Navy was not real enthused about sending a small detachment of ships into enemy territory to serve as "bait". When Roosevelt asked about causality projections the Navy said about 2,000. Roosevelt's response IIRC was along the lines of, "Well, that should be enough to get us into the war". Ironically, that was about the number from the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Let's not forget Roosevelt's main gambit which was to get us into war with Germany. Taking advantage of the Neutrality Act he helped Britain with the Lend-Lease Program just like in WWI. In addition, he purposely put US naval ships in harm's way with some DD's dropping depth charges on U-Boats and the Ruben James being sunk. When Japan attacked us he had to mount a vast propaganda campaign that the Germans (who did not attack us and had cultural support in the US) were the "real" enemy we had to attack first. It worked.

Today I see too many parallels between competing economic systems and foreign influences. Not much seems to have changed. I don't see any real solutions. Unfortunately, the same tools are being used that got us into WWII. Military action is used to achieve your political and economic objectives. Sanctions can fail and need military action to succeed. If they are effective they may push your opponent to military action. They cannot succeed without cooperation from other nations. Declaring an economic war on a country has the real danger of escalating to military action. If you don't have the military might to back up sanctions and embargoes the strategy fails. But then leaders can just kick the can down the road for the next administration by appeasement.

I'm just glad my son is home safe and not involved in it anymore.

Wolfhag

Good points although I think Basileus has the core of it.

One might make the case that the IJA did in fact outfight Zhukov.

Russian losses appear to have exceeded Japanese losses in terms of manpower, aircraft, and vehicles. Zhukov managed to thwart the Japanese military objectives on the ground in the area, by creating a logistical flow that far surpassed both what the local Japanese forces could muster on their own and what the Japanese anticipated.

[My emphasis]

…I think you pretty much made the case for a clear Soviet victory.

Modern video games and tabletop wargaming have conditioned us to believe that the relative body count is the greatest indicator of victory. For a generation coming out of the slaughter of the Great War, the body count would have mattered only insofar as the losses could be replaced.

The Soviets could replace their equipment and casualties. The Japanese couldn't.

Also, you neglected to mention that during the final clash at Khalkhin Gol, the Japanese 23rd Division was enveloped and destroyed. They may have given as good as they got… But in the end they were gone and their enemies weren't. It takes some pretty substantial spin to call that anything other than a defeat.

…I think you pretty much made the case for a clear Soviet victory.

Yes.

But … not a victory in the way that it is normally "told" in the "conventional wisdom". It is somewhat conventional to say that the Japanese got handed their hats by Zhukov, and were so afraid of Russian combat might that they turned their attentions to the south.

I don't think that's it at all.

The two sides fought each other to a standstill, with the Russians still controlling the ground.

Sure, that was a victory for the Russians.

But it was much less of a loss for Japan than it has usually been portrayed as. There was no real recognition on the Japanese front that they had lost. Only that they had fought, and their adversary was tougher than the Chinese, and was getting more resources than they were, and so they would need more resources to continue fighting. Given that the government had already instructed the Kwangtung Army only to stabilize and fortify the border, rather than more materiel they received a rebuke from the Government, which then proceeded to negotiate a settlement with the Russians in Moscow.

Modern video games and tabletop wargaming have conditioned us to believe that the relative body count is the greatest indicator of victory. … the body count would have mattered only insofar as the losses could be replaced.

The Soviets could replace their equipment and casualties. The Japanese couldn't.

I assure you I do not fall into the category of those who count combat results like jousting contests.

But in fact this set of battles was not fought over strategic ground. How each side perceived the battle was not dictated by some grand imperative or symbolic goal line. It was in fact a sparring match. Yes, there was something the Russians wanted out of the fight … but the Japanese didn't really have any agreement of what would constitute victory if it came, nor what qualified as a defeat in the actual results.

The popularized Russian version, digested inside the Soviet Union for several decades and told in the West over the past 20 or 30 years, had indicated something like 60,000+ Japanese casualties inflicted, at a cost of 10-15,000 Russian casualties. A real beat-down, that sent the Japanese away, tails between their legs, to look elsewhere for their next adventure.

More recent scholarship indicates it was more like 20-23,000 Japanese (and Manchurian) casualties inflicted for a cost of about 26-28,000 Russian (and Mongolian) casualties. More importantly perhaps is that the Russians lost some 250+ tanks, and another 125+ armored cars, while the Japanese lost fewer than 50 tanks, something like half of which were not even permanent losses (they were recovered and returned to service). The air combat seemed a bit closer, with something like 160 Japanese planes lost for a cost of about 200 Russian planes.

I don't suggest that those "scores", that the body count or the tank or aerial exchange rates define who won or who lost. I only suggest that those numbers are NOT an indicator of a Russian force taking the IJA to school on modern warfare.

They did take the Japanese to school on hubris, on creative logistics, on under estimating adversaries and over estimating the importance of motivated infantrymen with bayonets. But that was a set of lessons the Japanese were not wont to learn.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

Yep. Typical Russian battle, Khalkin Gol. Outnumber everyone else with everything, lots of losses, double envelop the Japanese 23rd Division, take their position, stop the rescue attempt. Zhukov doing his thing. No more threats ever from the Japanese. Standstill only if Zhukov never crosses the river. And that was just the bolshie's helping out a fellow puppet state. The Nazi Russian non aggression pact then pulled a rug from the Japanese. No need to go north anymore. How's that south option looking now?

More recent scholarship indicates it was more like 20-23,000 Japanese (and Manchurian) casualties inflicted for a cost of about 26-28,000 Russian (and Mongolian) casualties.

Interesting, if perhaps not relevant. During both the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 and WWI, the victorious attackers routinely suffered much heavier casualties than the defeated defenders-- and those would have been the benchmarks generals were measured against in the 1930s. No one was expecting otherwise in a modern war between Great Powers.

More important is that, as you say, the Japanese didn't think themselves beaten, and perhaps gained the impression that challenging another Great Power could be accomplished cheaply. Regardless of the tactical outcome and strategic outlook, the USSR opted for a negotiated settlement, rather than renewing the war; if the Japanese couldn't win, this was obviously the next best outcome for them, and one that would've confirmed their belief in the dividends of aggression.