"The Midway Story is Incompete" Topic
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Editor in Chief Bill | 14 Jun 2017 5:35 p.m. PST |
Victory at Midway was in no small part the result of the extraordinary work done by naval intelligence. Never before had naval intelligence played such a decisive role that an operational commander would describe it as "deserving a major share of the credit for the victory." 2 The story of how a group of dedicated and resourceful intelligence professionals lifted the fog of war at the moment the United States needed it most is worthy of the "miracle" terminology often used to describe it. The moral of the Midway story is beautiful in its simplicity: Hard work begets sufficient operational intelligence begets victory. To this day, it shapes conventional thought on the mission of naval intelligence. There is only one problem. It is incomplete… link |
CampyF | 20 Jun 2017 9:47 p.m. PST |
Thank you. It would be interesting to game it without the prior intelligence. Maybe the Japanese changed their codes earlier. Midway would probably have only had the Buffaloes, Vindicators, and not as many PBY's. Not as many ground troops, not as well prepared. Possibly a couple of submarines in the area. The Yorktown might not have had the speeded-up, makeshift repairs. The US carriers definitely would not have been in the perfect position to attack the Japanese the first day. Would the US have responded the way the Japanese expected? That didn't usually happen. Would they have run into the submarine line? This might be a very interesting game. |
foxbat | 22 Jun 2017 3:45 a.m. PST |
"At the end of the day, it is essential that naval intelligence becomes an integral part, not just of the process that provides the U.S. Navy useful operational intelligence, but also in determining how that intelligence is applied. " A highly debattable conclusion based, in my opinion, on questionnable intelligence. The paper shows clearly that accurate intelligence is not sufficient to win a battle : at Midway, luck played just important a part, which Nimitz, the CinC, willingly acknowledged himself. Wasn't the holding place of the carrier groups awaiting the Japanese force christened "Point Luck"? On the other hand, a commander has to do with the intelligence at hand, and instinct and savvy can at times supersede' defective information. One can't but think of Jellicoe's deployment at Jutland, made on very flimsy material, a decision which nonetheless could – should – have brought the annihilation of the High Seas Fleet had British shells not been so defective. This is why, in my opinion, the preconisations of the author are so dangerous. The man on the spot is the most important factor, his capacity to act on his technical knbowledge, his strategical culture, the intel he has been fed and, last but not least, his instinct. This is especially true now, as some very crucial factors cannot be properly factored, due to a lack of experience. The relative military values of the aeronaval systems of teh PRC ad the USA are, in my opinion, very much in the dark. If, God forbid, push should ever come to shove in the South China Sea, clear thinking on the part of the US commander would be more crucial than his capacity to collect intelligence. |
Mark 1 | 22 Jun 2017 6:12 p.m. PST |
It would be interesting to game it without the prior intelligence. It would be fascinating. To me at least. Not sure it would make a good game, but it makes a fascinating "what-if" from a historical perspective. Midway would probably have only had the Buffaloes, Vindicators, and not as many PBY's. Not as many ground troops, not as well prepared. The PBYs had been withdrawn from Midway. The Pearl Harbor force included a two destroyer detachment that attempted to neutralize Midway via a nighttime shore-bombardment. They managed to do significant damage to the flying boat base. After that, Wake was attacked (first unsuccessfully, but then successfully), and there were three instances of IJN submarines surfacing to fire shore-bombardment missions against Midway (all quickly repulsed). With this much action, the PBYs were withdrawn. The 18 USMC Vindicators had been planned for Midway since before Pearl Harbor. Lexington was actually ferrying them to Midway the morning of 7 December, but did not deliver them as she got busy searching for the IJN fleet. They later flew themselves from Hawaii to Midway with the help of a PBY for navigation. The 14 Buffaloes that came to be based there had been sent with the Wake Island relief force. They were instead transferred to Midway when the relief force was called off as word was received that the Japanese were already ashore on Wake. Somewhat famously, Midway also played host to torpedo-carrying B-26s. These 4 planes mark the first and last occasion of the USAAF operating torpedo bombers. The poor crews were basically called out for this assignment from forces in Hawaii heading to re-enforce Australia. The torpedo carrying mechanism was a lash-up, and the crews had never practiced torpedo bombing. Navy pilots already considered torpedo attacks on defended IJN carriers to be effectively one-way missions. The B-26s, when they flew from Hawaii to Midway, carried one torp each, with no spares. It seems the USAAF pretty much considered their role to be one-way missions as well. The 6 TBF Avengers at Midway were part of VT-8, Waldren's fabled torpedo squadron that flew from Hornet at Midway. VT-8 had been pegged to be the first to receive the new Avengers to replace their Devastators. When Hornet shipped out for the Pacific, a detachment from VT-8 remained at Norfolk to receive and work-up in the new planes. They then transited to Hawaii, where they arrived the day after Hornet sailed for the Midway battle. 6 crews from this detachment these then flew the new TBFs to Midway, while the rest of the VT-8 detachment shipped aboard Saratoga. As to the carriers -- prior to the intelligence coup that uncovered Japanese intentions, the Enterprise and Hornet were patrolling in the area of the Solomons, having arrived in the South Pacific too late to participate in the Coral Sea action. Yorktown was undergoing repairs from Coral Sea at Tonga. Saratoga was on her way, but would not arrive until after the battle of Midway was resolved. So the USN CVs were far away and not on a path to be in the area until the need was clear. The IJN had seen and identified Enterprise and Hornet in the Solomons. The IJN believed Yorktown was lost at Coral Sea. This was the basic premise of their plan. They expected to neutralize and seize Midway without significant interference from USN air power. Then they would await the USN response. Just try running a wargame where Midway is defended by 18 Vindicators and 14 Buffaloes. Even the B-26s and Avengers, all sent as improvised last-minute reinforcements, would not have been sent until after Japanese intentions were clear. After Midway is overrun (an inevitable conclusion), you can then game the USN marching into the face of Kido Butai and the combined fleet. Maybe the USN gets Saratoga to bolster Yorkie, Hornet and Enterprise. But Nagumo is not seized by indecision, as his next step is always clear in a direct naval engagement. Fascinating what-if, but I'm not so sure about the gaming potential. -Mark |
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