"Grenadiers à Cheval" Topic

Paul, not sure I agree with the chocolate fire guard stuff above – they attacked well at Ligny and had a strong 1814 campaign

The French lost Waterloo for many reasons but I think wellington described it best as a close run thing. Many what ifs of course – like some British victories, and their 7 year struggle in the peninsula

But it is only history

And I never mind your pro British stance – you are honest about it. I don't quite understand it if I am honest, but I enjoy reading your selected extracts. So long may you continue

Marc

"they attacked well at Ligny"

I believe that it was the 4 service squadrons, indeed one of grenadiers à cheval included. Similar to at Gilly the day before, one charge was ordered toward Bry when Napoléon thought the French attack was slowing.

The grenadiers and chasseurs sustained no officer casulaties.
The capitaine adjudant-major Tierce of the dragoons was killed.
The capitaine baron Jean-Pierre Gauthier (dit Leclerc) and the capitaine Jean-Baptiste Cabart of the lancers were wounded.
The lieutenant Viénot of the gendrames was killed (the gendarme company formed with the service squadrons).

I was talking infantry, but whatever

…I never mind your pro British stance…

I don't either. Everyone has their favorite army, people, commanders, etc. That is completely normal and can lead to interesting discussions on this and other forums.

It degenerates, however, when comments get personal and out of hand and that happens just too often. The Napoleonic forum on The Armchair General died because of it. There are seldom any postings there any longer which is a great shame.

Another problem arises when people take personal offense when someone criticizes their favorite army. That can also lead to ad hominem attacks that are never worthwhile nor needed.

No army of the period was undefeated. The French lost battles and campaigns, as did the British and everyone else. And to take offense when those topics are brought up is just plain nonsense as well as being ahistorical and illogical.

What is also noteworthy about Nord's collapse and retreat from Waterloo is that no eagles were captured by the allies. The two eagles lost were early in the action by the 45th and 105th Ligne during d'Erlon's repulse and rout.

No Guard eagles were lost and units brought their eagles out which indicates that at least a hard core of every French regiment formed around their eagle during the rout and retreat.

In contrast, as Andrew Field mentions, the allies lost six colors (as well as the British losing one at Quatre Bras), see page 266 of his Waterloo volume.

Nord was routed, but it appears that the allied pursuit was somewhat ineffective and amateurish. The British cavalry was stopped by the Guard and the Prussian pursuit only attacked stragglers and not formed units. Eagles and colors are usually lost during a pursuit, but this did not happen at Waterloo by either the Anglo-Dutch or the Prussians.

Marc,
Sorry, I thought you meant the à cheval guys.
:-)

Worth thinking how few eagles the regts of Guards Infantry were actually carrying, which they might have therefore lost.

Not saying it proves anything. If you take to your heels early on you are more likely to save any emblem, than if you do a last stand thing,after all

One eagle for Grenadiers and one for Chasseurs?…not one for each regt….(STRESS, I THINK that is what I remembered)

Worth thinking how few eagles the regts of Guards Infantry were actually carrying, which they might have therefore lost.
Not saying it proves anything. If you take to your heels early on you are more likely to save any emblem, than if you do a last stand thing,after all
One eagle for Grenadiers and one for Chasseurs?…not one for each regt…

One eagle per infantry 'corps' in the Guard was an 1812 decision by Napoleon, not an 1815 one. The other Guard regiments were to carry a colored fanion for identification and location purposes and not an eagle.

As the battle wore on, British infantry units, especially those who were suffering heavy losses, were ordered by Wellington to send their colors to the rear to avoid capture.

dibble

If you read my posts again, you will see that I did point out to repaint that none of the authors of those titles mentioned or implied that the British cavalry were afraid of the French cavalry.

Anyway, nice to see you warming to Barnton's account.

However, I am not sure it is wise to base everything you believe and accept on what is written in memoirs by those present at any battle or campaign.

Events, battles and actions are often described differently in different memoirs and you yourself, despite warming to his account, described Barton's version as contradictory.

I think the British officer Vivian put is best when he stated 'but in truth every part of a field of battle must differ markedly & so must the account of every one engaged & still all must be fully persuaded of the truth of the statement they make.' (page 149. 1815 The Waterloo Campaign by Peter Hofschroer)

And according to PH Vivian, in his account, he appeared to be taking the credit away from Halkett for capturing the French General Cambronne.

But in terms of what happened and what did not happen, who to believe and who not to believe, I think it best to keep an open mind, whichever side you might favour. For example, in terms of 'eyewitnesses' stating that the some units of the Guard either stood and resisted or fled with the rest of the French army, it is interesting to read the account by Stawitzky.

'Charges by some Prussian cavalry under Major von Falkenhausen forced the retreating bodies of men to form square several times, delaying their withdrawal. However, after beating off the cavalry charges the columns withdrew in a chequer-board formation' (page 150. 1815 The Waterloo Campaign by Peter Hofschroer)

The point I'm trying to make here with the above extract, is that anyone seeing the Guard form squares, resist the Prussian cavalry attacks and then withdraw in order, would, I imagine write how well they looked and performed. However, someone seeing the same units later on, would, as Stawitzky goes on to describe, see the same units break up and the troops fleeing with the rest of the army. In other words, all memoir accounts are based on who saw what and when. And that is why no memoir account should be taken as gospel, no matter which side you favour.

End of sermon

+1 Gazza

what is the obsession with being "afraid". Nobody "accuses" anyone of being afraid, this totally misconstrued self-offense.

People are blinded sometimes by their identification to one or the other side for their own reason that has nothing to do with reading interesting accounts and analyses unless it is oriented in the direction that feeds -their- preferred narrative.

We're talking about exhausted human beings, galvanized by victory or disgusted, scared and angered by defeat.

Fields' book on the French perspective is very interesting to read and offers a balanced light on the "close run affair".

Gee, breath people.

The Remark of the Garde being a 'chocolate fireguard' is meant in relation to the battle of the 18th.

There are a lot of myths about the 18th which have been used for well over 100 years by historians treading the same path as those who went before. These days we are spoilt by the wealth of information that has been released which on scrutiny shows that many of the said historians were mistaken. In general, those historians could only go on what they had access to at the time so can't be held to account but all the same, they should be highlighted.

These days, John Franklin, Gareth Glover, Erwin Muilwijk etc should be the major published port of call, together with Barbero and Adkins overview of the battle as a whole. I will just add that many historians have done a good job of telling the story but they are all (including Barbero) guilty of including Eyewitness quotes used out of context, sync or cut to fit their narative which in turn exposes them to their bias.

As I have said of accounts in the past. I go by what those accounts say, especially those that cooberate with each other more than what an historian thinks happened, no matter how esteemed. The latest popular 'historian' Nigel Sale, who's account of the Garde defeat puts him in a class of his own, and one that I definately have no truck with even though I am reading his book 'The Lie at the Heart of Waterloo: The Battle's Hidden Last Half Hour', or I should say, struggling through. It's almost as bad as the account on the Napoleonistyka site.

Gazzzola,

Can you please point me to source where Vivian tried taking credit for capturing Cambronne? If it's Hofschoerer's book, then don't bother as Hoffi had a notable distasteful and unhelpful anglo-saxon allergy.

repaint

Field's attempt in Waterloo French Perspective was woefully let down by it's lack of French accounts, relying too much on Allied accounts, not using quotes in full, hearsay and his opinions which highlighted a bias, which are all the same faults that blight other historian authors.

Paul :)

Seriously Paul? :)

Of course you have only a small bias ;)

I do agree with Gaz, eyewitnesses' accounts do have to be taken with a grain of salt because they can witness different events at different moments with a big change in the narrative. Notwithstanding the limited scope of one's own experience of the battlefield. Just recent engagements are quite difficult to tell "accurately". On the whole, we may eventually get an idea, actually reasonably accurate but with many shades of grey or a few completely erroneous events.

Waterloo is very interesting to read about and no, I would not include Adkins as a final reference. A few number of self perpetuated mistakes.

I was reading Martin Windrow's account on Dien Bien Phu lately and one quality of the book is that he recounts several versions of ambiguous events… and this happened a lot more recently than Waterloo!

Excellent posting and I agree with you completely on Adkins' volume. There are just too many mistakes in it, especially in artillery, for it to be useful as a reference. And there are better maps around. The map of the French Grande Batterie is especially in error.

I wouldn't consider Franklin's work, specifically the three Ospreys on Waterloo to be of any importance at all. They are repetitive and contain errors that are somewhat striking. I have not read his other Waterloo material and I am wondering when his Hougoumont volume is coming out.

Eyewitness accounts have to be balanced against each other and it should be remembered that none of them saw the entire action, and some relied on other people's accounts or what they heard over the years.

Glover's work on Waterloo letters is very useful. Barbero's account is pretty good, but the old reliables (Siborne, Houssaye, and Ropes) are excellent resources for the action.

And as a footnote, I highly recommend, again, Andrew Field's excellent book on Waterloo as well as on Quatre Bras as he expertly uses primary source material liberally in his volumes, more than I have seen anywhere on the same subjects.

He has a third volume coming out, if its not out already, on Grouchy during the campaign in Belgium.

(Double entry)

Adkin's book is still a good tome as an overview of the battle, which explains the O.O.B and the general state of the battle and movements through maps like no other tome does. That it has inaccuracies is as every other on the battle. Barbero's telling is again, another good overview of the battle but he too uses bits of quotes and opinion again, just like the rest.

The post: When they withdrew from Waterloo nobody dared to attack them.

Should that comment go without remark? Why is that comment and similar on the same incident flagged up on the net and in books?

It is because of an incident that involved Barton and his quote. It has been read by many to exacerbate a myth. I have questioned this with evidence from two other cavalry officers and a brigades movements (mentioned by Barton himself) that contradicts it. I also pointed out that Barton went on to mention the rearguard.

Taking eyewitnesses reports that are unsubstantiated are only applicable when? Oh! of course, they are applicable when Siborne uses them and weaves them into his tome

And that's the rub! people continue to post what old historian wrote, without researching what is known now. or in some cases what was already known to those historians but for some reason, was not accessible, ignored or overlooked.

How do we know what happened in a battle? Perhaps Waterloo should be consigned to its name, date, line-up and result. the big bit in the middle can be discarded. especially when people from both sides try to question those bits in detail

And don't forget that people in this discussion have argued many points that have been questioned on this and other sites. First hand accounts are used. Sometimes unfortunately, even though people bring evidence and accounts to the table, they are dismissed by people who who bring nothing but a historian's utterances.

to put it bluntly, If historical bubbles are burst, then they not a comfortable feeling.

Repaint

Of course you have only a small bias ;)

I'm wrapped in my Brit-flag so there is no small bias to be seen where I'm concerned but what I do is post quotes, the words are obviously their's not mine and are for all to peruse. But don't think that I will not question British accounts.

When Gareth Glover started to publish his Waterloo archives series, I expected and Gareth Muted, a holy grail of books which would include French accounts as part of the series, which would have been 'the' books of the series but Gareth failed on that point. And Andrew Field's tome was another book which I thought would sate my thirst for a French Perspective of the battle. That too fell rather flat with his mainly British perspective of a French perspective, so I purchased Paul Dawson's 'Charge the Guns!' and 'Au Pas de Charge! which partly assuaged my disappointment.

Paul :)

Waterloo is so fascinating while at the chore it is about the French not breaking the British lines and rolled up by the Prussians. But indeed, it is full of drama, bravery and suspens! The Allies were impeccable.

I always found the battle a lot more interesting to read about than to wargame, and still… the always drawn to it.

I will check Paul Dawson's book, Paul. Thanks for the tip.

Oh, I quite liked "the French perspective" – now I find out it's no good – curses

I felt the description of the fighting around Plancenoit to be very interesting – only titbits of course, but an interesting soldier's view.

I shall check out prices for Dawson's books if you are recommending them Paul

Thanks

Marc

Curses – out of stock. That's a shame

Field's work is excellent and very well documented.

It is riddled with primary source accounts that support the narrative very well.

I have, though, seen critics of French sources very critical of their veracity, while accepting without comment any British source on 1815.

I have found that perspective quite simplistic and simply wrong.

So here's your chance to highlight those

I have found that perspective quite simplistic and simply wrong.

so they can be debated in the tone that this thread has been in.

Field's book is good though even his falls down just as the rest do. I rate the personal evidence over the best of any of the historical versions because that's what they all are 'versions' which as we also know, have a bias.

Oh, I quite liked "the French perspective" – now I find out it's no good – curses

Now, now Marc! The opinion about Field is mine. If you think his work was good and useful then that's your opinion. But then, I think Field's book is good too.

I'm not here to sway anyone, but I am to question and give opinion.

Paul :)

dibble

Firstly, I am just pointing out that all memoir accounts should be read with care and not considered as gospel.

In terms of Field's books, it will be interesting to compare his latest title on Grouchy with Dawson's forthcoming book on the same subject, and then of course, compare them to what others have said. The same will go for Dawson's forthcoming 'truth' title about Waterloo when that appears. We may never have to buy another book on the battle after we've read that. LOL

Love him or hate him (or his work), I find it a bit hypocritical that you feel anything found in PH's books should be dismissed, because you feel he is biased against the British. That would suggest we should ignore any sources you offer because of your bias for the British?

In terms of PH and the source for the extract in his book that suggests Sir Hussey Vivian tried to take the credit for the capture of General Cambroone at Waterloo, I can only suggest you look for PH's source yourself, if it bothers you. Saying that, although I did not find the topic that interesting to pursue, I did look up the BL catalogue tag PH offered, which, in his book, he gives as BL Add MSS 34,707 fols 42-5.

From what I could find, the result appeared to indicate that the contents connected to this tag contained no letters from Vivian. However, I then checked out a few more around this number and discovered that 34,706 does contain letters from Vivian which relate to Waterloo. So perhaps PH's source can be found there and the number in his book is a typo error or PH got the number wrong?

I will dismiss Hofschoer's tomes (though not all of what they contain). The reason? You have outlined it yourself. He gives his evidence from what? An reference in which alleges and to quote you "that suggests Sir Hussey Vivian tried to take the credit for the capture of General Cambroone" could be anywhere within it for those wishing to chase it up in the British Library. Reference vagueness with Hofi' was his trademark. Read any critique of his works and you will find it thus.

I have read much about Vivian, even where he 'blows his own trumpet' loud and clear. At no time does he so much as hint that he captured Cambronne. What he does do is mention the amount of prisoners, guns and horses his brigade took. He also mentions in a letter dated 23rd June and addressed to his MP for Cornwall: a 'Colonel' of the 3rd Chasseurs as a witness to his brigades actions. He had conversed with the colonel who lodged with him in the same house on the night of the 21st of June.

Just to make things clear, Vivian also publicly gave praise where it was deserved and criticism (Vandeleur)in the same manner.

Your "BL Add MSS 34,707(or 6)" fols 42-5:

BL Add MSS 34706 etc, are pertaining to Siborne's papers; Add Mss 34,703 to 34,708.

I no longer have Hofi's Books as I gave them to charity some years ago, can you please post his quote? Perhaps then I may be able to find what he is pertaining to.

have you got or read Dawson's Books? If you haven't then I suggest you do because he gives both sides and puts all his sources on the same page that the text alludes to.

Cheers,

Paul :)

Captured flags. This old chestnut does rear its head again and again. It does seem that a distinction should be made between the miscellaneous French reports of up to six flags taken, mostly unidentified, and 'allied' colours reported lost on 18th June, which only amount to three at most, relating to three battalions in Alten's division in the area around La Haie Sainte.

Depending on who you read.

On a separate point- How did Wellington communicate to the British battalions that colours should be sent to the rear, I ask myself, given that his rapidly dwindling staff might have had more pressing matters to attend to.

And how, I wonder, did the regiments react to this expression of confidence, relating to a matter which, frankly, was none of the Duke's damn' business?

And I wonder how the Duke felt when his orders were ignored.

This period the conqueror must use in order to make the real gain in the destruction of physical forces; only so much of these as he attains remains secure to him; the moral forces of the enemy will recover themselves by degrees, order will be restored, courage will revive, and in the majority of cases there remains only a small part of the superiority obtained, often none at all, and in some cases, although rarely, the spirit of revenge and intensified hostility may bring about an opposite result. On the other hand, whatever is gained in killed, wounded, and prisoners, and guns captured, can never disappear from the account.

The losses in a battle consist more in killed and wounded; those after the battle, more in artillery taken and prisoners. The first the conqueror shares with the conquered, more or less, but the second not; and for that reason they usually only take place on one side of the conflict, at least, they are considerably in excess on one side.

Artillery and prisoners are therefore at all times regarded as the true trophies of victory , as well as its measure, because through these things its extent is declared beyond a doubt. Even the degree of moral superiority may be better judged of by them than by any other relation, especially if the number of killed and wounded is compared therewith; and here arises a new power increasing the moral effects.

Clausewitz has it right: prisoners and guns are the indices of victory. And show the enormity of the French defeat and rout.

Mr. Flanker,

I know of the sending colours to the rear only in Halkett's brigade, on local orders. See the accounts of Howard (33rd), Macready (30th) and Tincombe (30th). At that point only 800 men were left standing in the brigade, and Halkett had just promised Wellingotn that they would "stand to a man !"

Perhaps our colleague(s) who think Wellington gave any orders on this topic might provide us with the original source(s) for this?

Le Breton, 42flanker

Careful chaps! You'll be called out by people who read the evidence in books by esteemed, historical authors.

Kevin has dismissed John Franklin and his historical narratives. I haven't read them but I have his Netherlands and Hanoverian correspondence series which are a must for any library.

(Siborne, Houssaye, and Ropes) are excellent resources for the action.

Of course they are very good tellings of the battle, like many others, but what is known now is much more than they knew then. We know even more because modern historians have done more research into all the combatants even with the French, though there must be a lot more out there where they are concerned.

There is a lot more to go on now than there was as late as 2012, and we have the modern editor/historians to thank for this wealth of unpublished (new to most) information. The start of the interest in new accounts of the battle is down to Gareth Glover and his 2004, Letters from the Battle of Waterloo 'Unpublished correspondence by Allied officers from the Siborne papers" and his Waterloo Archive Series and on to John Franklin and his Correspondence series.

I rate most editor/historians, because they publish first hand accounts without weaving them into a narrative that would inevitably include personal opinion and bias.

That those mentioned above have gone on to publish their own idea as to what happened on that day, does not detract from their hard work and the goldmine they unearthed.

If an opinionated telling of the battle is recommended, then Erwin Muilwijk's tour de force and especially his 'Quatre Bras, Perponcher's Gamble' and 'Standing firm at Waterloo' are about the best and most refreshing telling of the campaign there is out there and the books to read if one must read an account by an historian.

And I'll repeat again that Paul Dawson's 'Au Pas de Charge' and 'Charge the Guns' are also a must.

Paul :)

Paul, thanks. I don't know what I was thinking.

Yes you do! Your thoughts on the subject Georgian British army, are 'in the main' excellent!

Paul :)

G'Day Gents

After reading both Vivian and Barton accounts, there is absolutely no question that both are telling it exactly as they saw.

In fact both Officers give us the opportunity to examine a perfect picture of what actually transpired and not what is proposed on the forum.

"He [Vivian] took the flank officer's place, and led the column down the hill in the direction he wished to move, and thus advanced across the ridge in left front of Vandeleur's Light Cavalry Brigade"…

Both Officers were in different brigades and each had a different view of the battle field and each state an important difference:

Vivian states he saw "…the Chasseurs and Grenadiers a Cheval of the Imperial Guard, greatly diminished in numbers."

Barton states he saw "…a strong Regiment of Cavalry…"

The Grenadiers a Cheval were in three bodies that day.

Vivian saw the Duty squadron and Barton saw either a division or both divisions of the Grenadier a Cheval.

Enough said…

Best Regards
Art

I agree with Mr. Art.
I was confused as to why this issue was "on the table" : it seemed quite clear that the grenadier à cheval "regiment" fought well, and could well have "walked off" more or less majestically and in some degree of cohesion. And that the duty squadrons evaporated when sent into action. Actually, I have often wondered which of Napoléon's aides-de-camp led them at the time.

Every early (pre 1840) French account has the duty squadrons launched against Vivian's brigade (and usually mentions Vandeleur's as well, but actually to their rear when the clash occurred). The duty squadrons are usally said to be rapidly "culbertés"(overturned) by the English, and an excuse of overwhelming numbers is made, and nothing is heard of them afterward.

The accounts for Vivian's brigade all tend to also mention chasseurs and lancers, and some include débris of wrecked cuirassier regiments.

If the duty squadrons were during the Cent Jours (as usually before) "topped up" to/near their established strenghs, and including the gendarmes' company (which formed with them), we might have 800+ French guardsmen in action, plus some number of cuirassiers – the very best of the best of the French cavlary.

And since they did *not* actually mix with Vandeleur's men, Vivian did not outnumber them by much. So, whether we want to say "over-rated guardsmen" or "unexpectedly good show !" for Vivian's troopers – it is clear that the French lost in this encounter. That is why I have wondered about who commmanded them – was there some tactical blundering that did not make it into the French accounts ?

Conversely, the size of the grenadiers and dragoons remaining "regiments" were really quite small, perhaps 1200-1300 troopers or so combined. Really rather few.

Mr. Art, when you say the grenadiers "regiment" formed in two divisions, do you mean this as explicitly "2 divisions" = "4 squadrons" = "8 companies", or do you mean that of the 3 nominal squadrons present, they divided themselves into 2 tactical bodies of troops

dibble

I'm not trying to down anyone or up anyone either, in this case Vivian or PH. I'm just mentioning what I have come across and am asking questions about it, which I think is sensible to do with any author or source.

Anyway, below is what PH offers in his Waterloo Campaign book and the full extract that mentions Vivian and the capture of Cambronne.

'This contrasts with Vivian's denial of Halkett's role in this incident.

I cannot help thinking General Halkett must have imagined some of the events that he states occurred to the part of the brigade with which he was…Where the devil Gnl Halkett found the 12 or 14 guns of the Guard in full play after he had witnessed an Attack of hussars on a Square of Infantry I am quite at a loss to imagine. As to his Capture of Cambronne all I know is that in front of the Square of the Enemy attacked by the 10th there was a mounted officer. A man of the 10th rode by my side, & was about to cut him down. I ordered this man & an Infantryman [?] to take him to the rear. It was the affair of a moment & who this officer was I know not but I was afterwards told it was Cambronne. – Whether or not it was I cannot say – but from the very distinct account given by Gnl Halkett of his first capture & subsequent chase & recapture of this said General I suppose it could have been him. Unless as it is possible may have been the case that the Attack of Infantry to which Gnl Halkett refers was the Attack of the 10th under Howard & that Cambronne after being captured by the man as I have described was again captured by Gnl H. when tottering [?] to the rear. But [word unclear] in this case where he afterwards found his 12 or 14 guns in full play I am totally at a loss to conceive because if I swore a very oath [?] I should say after the 10th charged the French square near la belle Alliance I do not recollect having perceived a shot from a French gun – but in truth every part of a field of battle must differ markedly & so must the account of every one engaged & still all may be fully persuaded of the truth of the statements they make. 35

One wonders if personal rivalry clouded Vivian's memory.'

Note 35 – BL Add MSS 34,707 fold 42-5. The original manuscript of this report is difficult to transcribe with certainty. Where the reading is not certain the marking [?] is used.

The above can be found on pages 148 and 149.

You recommend Dawson's Charge the Guns, but the 3 star short review on Amazon UK, which appeared to have been written by you or someone with the same site name dibble, does not really inspire me to buying it. In terms of other books by Dawson, I feel I have bought far too many titles on Waterloo and 1815, although, of course, I suppose one can never have enough books and accounts.

However, I am considering buying his forthcoming title on Grouchy because it would be interesting to compare it to the recent book by Field and other titles/accounts covering the same commander and his involvement in 1815. As to his forthcoming 'truth' book I am not too sure. But then again, I am sucker for new books, so we will see what happens.

thanks for the info on Hofschroer's that Vivian seemed to have taken credit for the capture of Cambronne, which he most certainly did not. He seems emphatic over the roll the French '12-14 artillery played in his recollection.

That letter is infact, on 148-150.

Methinks Hofi' is playing with the reader.

Already mentioned, a letter to Wynne Pendarves esq 23rd June 1815. and an even earlier letter to Major-General Benjamin Bloomfield. 19th June 1815, and more letters to Siborne that tell of the same incident, at no time does he state or even mention Cambronne. A Siborne letter to a question about Cambronne's capture. He mentions an infantryman as being there when a mounted officer was cut down by a trooper of the 10th. What is known of the Halkett's capture of Cambronne incident, can be found in Glover's Waterloo Archive volume V Appendix 1 pages 191-195, where 6 accounts including that of Halkett himself, can be found. I might add they are very intriguing.

So Vivian's reply to Siborne was honest and didn't try taking credit for the capture at all. And like I pointed out above, he gave praise freely but only where it was warranted. he was a stick-in-the-mud type who, in his political career was an anti reformist etc, so wasn't perhaps the nicest of people in that respect but he was honourable and honest.

Dawson's Charge the Guns (Wellingtons Cavalry at Waterloo) I gave it three stars. I would have given it more but like other tomes, it's opinions that I marked it down on not the first hand accounts.

I did not give a rating for Au Pas de Charge (Napoleon's Cavalry at Waterloo) because I didn't get it from Amazon. I would have given that 3 stars too for similar reasons.

The books are still good because they contain good accounts from French and allied sources. But if you feel that you don't wish to purchase them, that's your prerogative.

Paul :)

Art

A very good post but it still doesn't tell of where the main Body of the GaC disappeared to after Barton's encounter.

He [Vivian] took the flank officer's place, and led the column down the hill in the direction he wished to move, and thus advanced across the ridge in left front of Vandeleur's Light Cavalry Brigade"…

As Barton observed:
"At this time we saw to our left front, at no great distance, a strong Regiment of Cavalry, which we soon ascertained to be the Grenadiers a Cheval of the Imperial Guard;"

So between Barton's observation of the Grenadiers a Cheval being on his left front ‘walking' and Vivian's brigade passing on his left front and heading in the same direction, and if the GaC were ‘walking' why did they not clash? How would a large body of some 400 cavalry ‘walking of the battlefield', with their back to a 1,500 strong cavalry brigade fare? You would need loaded dice to get away with not being destroyed on the wargames table in that situation let alone in real life.

But! We have this in two, very detailed letters from Lieutenant Anthony Bacon, 18th Hussars. It's only a small part of the second of the two very long letters.

" After we had pursued them (a mixed bag of lancers, cuirassiers and dragoons) about 200 yards, a body of cuirassiers charged our right squadron on its right flank and forced us to the left, this was the attack of cuirassiers you mention, it certainly did not take place before we attacked, or I must have seen it being in command of the 2nd half squadron. On being charged in that way mentioned, we must have been carried 100 yards or more to our left before we reformed, which we did, our right being brought very much forward from our original direction so that had we continued a direct march from that point, we should have passed La Belle Alliance on our right flank. The cuirassiers that charged us took that direction, and we again became pursuers.

It must have been at that moment that our centre and left squadron passed our right flank and got among the enemy's cavalry, for we saw no more of them. We had just come close upon the Charleroi road when Vivian rode up and said 'halt 10th and let the 18th come up'. Major Howard came up to us at that time and of course took the command, gunning also came with him, he asked me where his troop was, I had scarcely told him he had better remain with us when he was shot.

When we halted, there was a heavy column of the Imperial Guards on the opporsite side of the road, marching in a diagonal direction towards La Belle Alliance inclining to the right, and on its left flank was a large number of mounted officers, on the high ground and close to La Belle Alliance was another column, and on our right of the road, and on our right flank which was thrown back about a quarter distance, was a square of the Imperial Guard behind which some cavalry were reforming. The 18th Hussars came up upon our left and the 1st German Hussars were advancing in the same direction, their right thrown forward, and about 300 yards in our rear.

We were then far in advance of any of our troops, and Vivian sent to request Vandeleur would support him, and we afterwards heard that the answer brought back that he was Vivian's senior officer and he would receive no orders from him.

The 18th were formed towards the column mentioned, and advanced in a beautiful line across the road to charge, as they crossed the high road, a heavy fire was poured into their right flank from the column formed on the high road. At this moment some cavalry appeared in the left front of the 18th , they rode furiously into them thereby changing their former direction rather to the left, the 18th had hitherto been lookers on, and I never met men so bent on destruction when let loose.

Vivian rode after the 18th at full speed first desiring Howard to form the 10th and charge the column in his front, the column however in the mean time had nearly gained the top of the hill had formed square, for they could see the advance not only of the German Hussars, but of Vandeleur's and grant's brigades, and other cavalry…."

And this diagram in his first letter of the movements mentioned in the extract of the second, above (I have circled in blue, the 18th Hussars and in Red, the cavalry? they attacked.

Paul :)

G'Day Paul

First let me thank you for providing yet more substantial proof that validates Monsieur Le Breton and my previous posting.

Of course I must give Monsieur Le Breton most of the credit…

Your observation about not understanding the disappearance of the Grenadier a Cheval, reminds me of another similar event….

That of the Battle of Friedland and the Russian Guard cavalry which disappeared as well…

If we were to believe others…they were destroyed…routed…by Senarmont who destroyed them as they charged his mass battery….

But…the French never say that Senarmont (Senarmont included) was charged…routed them…nor destroyed them…simply that they disappeared…but how do the Russian Guard Cavalry and Grenadier a cheval just disappear on the field of battle…they don't…there is no magic…

Nor did both units run away…and there no need to invent any reason why through supposition…we do not know what their orders were…

So how is it that your map can be a very good tool in understanding how the Grenadiers a Cheval just disappear…vanish…left unnoticed…?

If you place a terrain overlay on the map you kindly provided us with…then it's perfectly clear…and validates Monsieur Le Breton comment that they "could well have "walked off" more or less majestically and in some degree of cohesion."

This is to include the fact that if you put a terrain overlay on Friedland…it is only too clear how the Russian Cavalry disappeared…

In both cases they were masked by terrain…which is abundant in the real world…but not so much on wargames tables…or by looking at the map provided.

If you look at the route Vivian took initially…position(A)…

I rather doubt that Vivian even noticed the Grenadiers a Cheval due to masking of the terrain when he was advancing with his men.

The position of the Grenadiers a Cheval were on the French left hand side of the road…not their right side where you circled them in blue. That is another body…more than likely Cuirassiers…but it is not the Grenadier a Cheval.

Again if you follow the rout that Vivian initially took and place Barton to the right of that…using the known position of the Regiment de Grenadier a Cheval…it fits exactly where Barton saw them…on his left…or near position (L) on your map.

When the Grenadier A Cheval walked off the field of battle…they would have been masked by the terrain in a minute or two…a few minutes at most…

Best Regards
Art

Hi Art!

Barton was able to observe the GaC at 'no great distance, they had fired when Barton's 12th were opposite their flank'. To his front left, Vivian's whole brigade advanced past to the left of Barton's 12th (the right flank of the 1st Hussars KGL almost clashing with them) and moving in the same direction as to where the retiring, walking GaC were.

At this point the GaC weren't being observed by Barton. The GaC were last noted as in a 'dense column' and 'Walking'. The battlefield on this side of the Genappe road was down to a compact area of about 800 by 1,000 yards, the ground rising to the front and leveling off to the left (Genappe road). this point is about 200 yards beyond La Haie Saint to the left and level with the wood of Hougoumont on the right, with the 1st Hussars KGL advancing in reserve with a front of some 300 yards, to the left of the 12th and in reserve, with the 10th deployed in font on the right and the 18th to their left, their heads being 100 yards further in front of the 1st.

Bacon specified all the cavalry he observed by their type throughout his letter, with the last he used the word 'cavalry' If they were Cuirassiers, he would surely have identified them as such. And let's make it clear that the most respect the allies had for any French cavalry they faced were the Cuirassiers, as noted in many accounts.

Did the Russian cavalry walk off the battlefield? Were they within pistol/musketoon range of the nearest French cavalry unit? The terrain at Friedland isn't that of Mont St Jean.

The GaC were observed by Barton as being much further forward and to the left of his position. which would have put them level with Hougoumont and about half way between it and the Genappe road, and they may have moved further to the left because they saw Vivian's brigade, so got out of the way, which would have taken them beyond the Genappe road with some cover from the farm of La Haie Saint.

Are we to imagine that a few hundred exhausted cavalrymen on blown or tired horses, with their backs to the enemy, abandoning their desperately holding on Guard, who are being assailed by the allies with both cavalry and infantry and with Prussian cavalry swarming over the battlefield to their left, are just walking of the battlefield?

Vivian's Brigade was fresh, His reserve was the 1st KGL Hussars, probably the best allied cavalry unit on the field that day and on a par with the best of anything that day. Vivian didn't even have to engage them in any fight, he kept them in reserve and that's why they had the lowest casualties of any unit 'French or allied'.

But then Barton did not actually see them walk off the battlefield as he thought they were heading towards the Guard rearguard which most certainly wasn't off the battlefield at this point and Vivian's brigade was yet to assault it and Barton's 12th were recalled so his observation had ceased.

So it leaves the options as:

1) The Grenadiers a Cheval were totally ignored and left to walk away abandoning the rearguard.

2) Vivian and or other allied cavalry broke around them like a boulder in a stream.

3) The allies (probably Vivian's 1,500) did indeed take fright and left them alone.

4) They joined the rearguard but took flight with the rest when resistance collapsed.

5) They clashed with the cavalry of Vivian's brigade and fled.

6) Barton's account can't be used as a basis for any of the above.

7) Siborne's further unsubstantiated, embellished account in his book should not be taken as fact.

All the best,

Paul :)

So many great accounts – all demonstrating the confusion of the end of a battle but all fascinating. It is interesting to watch the thought processes of modern readers form in front of my eyes

More gentlemen please, more. This is such a civil discussion now. My applause

Marc

Paul

You have a good day

Best Regards
Art

Again, I will have to join with Mr. Art.
Here is a more-or-less topgraphic map, where you can see exactly the folds of terrain to which Mr. Art refers :

One can note – in the place marked "O" on Mr. Dibble's map – cavalry formations which I take to be the debris of cuirassier regiments and the Empereur's serivce squadrons to French right of the road leading from La Belle Alliance to La Haye Sainte.

On the map, the *regiments* of the garde à cheval are in a line or echelon (left to right) : grenadiers, dragons, cchasseurs, lancers, with the left quite near Hougoumont farm enclousures and the right near La Belle Alliance.

This is exactly as described and even sketched by then-capitiane de Brack of the lancers in Carnet de la Sabretache, 1901, Vol. 9 , page 360 and following.
See : link

He says that after charging the British, the Guard cavalry was ordered to turn and reform at the walk (page 366) – the lancers turning first, forming on a battery of French guns – then following each of the chasseurs, dragons and grenadiers in echelon – and thus arriving more or less at their starting positions. A skimirishing line of a few British light dragoons / hussards follow (wearing blue pelisses trimmed white), do not charge but instead fire a few rounds.

He then says half the troopers are told to dismount, and they wait for 45 mins. and watch as the carabiniers brigade was sent in and dispatched by British artillery and gunfire. He then sees the first of the dark lines of Prussian troops arrving onto a plateau off to his right.

They are told to slowly retraite, which he describes as if for a funeral (so assumedly at the walk), the regiments reduced now to 100 – 150 officers and men each and so told to spreadout to better mask from the sight of the English the rout of most of the army. They so march until they find the "débris" of Old Guard infantry in one square, sheltered by an undulation of terrain from the British canons. He says they and the Old guard infantry are now the extreme rear guard of the army. They turn to face the British, making a line 500 paces left of the Old guard infantry. Night is falling.

The British attack the Old Guard square. The light cavalry commanders are discussing (!) what to do. Lefebvre-Desnoëttes wants to do a death charge and have them perish gloriously. Lallemand wants to try to retreat in order towards Paris (and is at that moment himself killed). They resolve to retreat, to go by the road to Quatre Bras aiming for Maubeuge – and they depart at the walk into what is now the darkness of night.

I get the impression that withdrawing/retreating at the walk was not some sort of mystical method for imposing upon the psyche of the enemy how élite your troopers were – but instead was the normal way to do it so as to retain control of a body of cavalry.

OT (but related)

"This is to include the fact that if you put a terrain overlay on Friedland…it is only too clear how the Russian Cavalry disappeared"

Also true – and mentioned in the relevant Russian regimental history, which (by the way) makes it quite clear that the Russian Guard cavalry was not attempting to cross a ravine and stream and attack Sénarmont, but was instead getting shot at from their left flank by Sénarmont as they charged French cavalry.

Very interesting

Have I got this right-

Vivian challenges Halkett who relates there were 12-14 French guns. (my post 16th June 4.13pm)

But de Brack, in his extract, also states that French guns were present, at least of a battery size. (Le Breton post 18th June 4.30am)

I think it is a perfect example of why we should not take what is written in memoirs as gospel and that it would be foolish for anyone to just accept what someone has written because of their nationality or rank.

They should be read, enjoyed, compared to other accounts and memoirs, so that hopefully, they will help create a more clearer (if possible) account of what may have occurred. It is all part of the learning game.

After describing 5 essentially ineffective charges against the British squares and heavy losses to enemy gunfire and artillery, the général de Brack says (page 366 of the Sabretach linked above, my translation) :
"A guard battery is finally sent to support us, but instead of being chosen from the light artillery, thay came from the foot reserve of 12-pounders. They had had all the trouble in the world to advance across the muddy plain, and, after interminable delays, they established themselves to our rear. Their first shots were poorly aimed, such that they took out a platoon of our regiment.
We were ordered to retreat. We executed at the walk and came to reform ourselves behind the previously mentioned battery. The chasseurs, the dragoons and the grenadiers prolonged their movement more than we did, and were echelloned at a short distance to the rear and on the left of the lancers."
The battery is not mentioned thereafter.

From the général de Brack's sketch, I would make the battery's position about 250-300 m in front of La Belle Alliance, with its right flank abutting the road. Houssaye writes of 3 companies of guard reserve artillery being sent into this general area. De Bas and de T'Serclaes are more specific (page 169) :
"Pour préparer l'attaque qu'il méditait, l'empereur fit renforcer l'artillerie déjà en action par 8 obusiers de la garde, qui furent mis en batterie à l'Ouest de la Belle-Alliance; 34 bouches à feu placées à l'Ouest de la chaussée de Charleroi tirèrent pendant une heure entière contre le centre droit des alliés."
link
To prepare the attack that he contemplated, the Emperor had the artillery already in action reinforced by 8 howitzers of the guard, which were put in battery to the west of La Belle Alliance; 34 [???] pieces of artillery placed to the west of the Charleroi road fired for a full hour against the center right of the allies".

The colonel du régiment d'artillerie à pied de la garde lieutenant-général baron Henri-Dominique Lallemand was engaged at the army headquarters and then with the "Grand Battery", which did not include any artillery from the guard.

There were four companies of French guard reserve artillery present, each with 6 canons de 12-livre & 2 obusiers de 6 pounces "à long portée" – the heaviest artillery of the French field artillery.
major du régiment d'artillerie à pied de la garde Jean-Augustin Bitsch – mortally wounded
--- 1ere compagie du régiment d'artillerie à pied de la garde – capitaine commandant Joseph-Henry Gentil (dit Maurin) – wounded (5/119)
--- 2e compagnie du régiment d'artillerie à pied de la garde – capitaine commandant Charles-Pierre-Antoine Radet (5/120)
--- 3e compagnie du régiment d'artillerie à pied de la garde – capitaine commandant André Tessier (5/116)
--- 4e compagnie du régiment d'artillerie à pied de la garde – capitaine commandant Pierre Aubertin (5/116)

The companies formed for the old guard infantry were equipped with 6 canons de 6-livre & 2 obusiers de 24-livre.
chef de bataillon du régiment d'artillerie à pied de la garde Nicolas-Louis Raoul * – wounded (crushed femur) and taken prisoner
--- 5e compagnie du régiment d'artillerie à pied de la garde – capitaine commandant Résigny (4/114) – 1er & 2e grenadiers à pied
--- 6e compagnie du régiment d'artillerie à pied de la garde – capitaine commandant Charles Jacques (4/98) – 1er & 2e chasseurs à pied
* a favorite of Napoléon, whom he had joined in exile on Elba, he may have been acting as an officier d'ordonnance de S.M. at Waterloo

Other officer casualties :
capitaine en 2e Auguste-Stanislas Gardeur-Lebrun – wounded (arm amputated)
lieutentant Tattet – killed
lieutenant Coulombon – mortally wounded (died 12 July)

Le Breton,

What happened and the topography at Friedland has no baring in this discussion. As I said above: "Did the Russian cavalry walk off the battlefield? Were they within pistol/musketoon range of the nearest French cavalry unit?"

I am not questioning the fact that Barton saw the GaC walking, all cavalry do it most of the time. and fresh cavalry walk rate is 4mph. (6.5kph). It's his assumption that they walked off the battlefield when he clearly did not and could not have witness it. He also says further on, that he thought they were going to join the rearguard, which is another part of his quote that I agree with but is a self contradiction of Barton's.

Siborne's further embellishment of the incident is fanciful.

Believe me when I say that I can read a map

I laid out 5 of seven scenario's in my last post. What is your idea of what happened?

I dismiss that they just walked off the battlefield abandoning the rearguard.

My idea of what happened was that at the time of Barton's last sighting, the GaC saw Vivian's brigade coming up so accelerated their pace and rejoined the rearguard engaged in the fight but turned and fled along with the rest of those that could get away when they saw the game was up.

But then, the cavalry marked 'O' on the map above could be the GaC or other cavalry, I'm sure that had they been cuirassiers, Bacon would have labelled them thus. The inclusion of Bacon and his map is nothing but a possibility of what could have happened to the GaC.

As can be gauged by my posts, I have argued many scenario's.

I would like input from other posters of what they think happened, but also give a reason why they come to there conclusions.

Gazzola

The reason we know of what happened in the battle is due in the main to eyewitness accounts that were compiled and used in Siborne's 'History Of The War In France And Belgium In 1815'. My questioning of Barton is to do with what he said happened, what Siborne and many other historians said happened, and what likely happened.

cheers,

Paul :)

Paul,

I hate to give my own opinion. I prefer just to quote, cite and link original sources – and let everyone decide for themselves.

But if you ask, I will say that I find de Brack's narrative compelling. He was a very level-headed, clear-thinking and well-regarded young officer. He writes simply, directly and without bragging or flowery language. His "manual" of light cavalry managment reads like simple and direct guidance of an experienced battlefield leader. I wish someone gave me such a "manual" for my first command!

For de Brack, all of the retrograde movements of the horse guards are done at the walk (whihc I take to be just good practise not something unique or praise-worthy), and the British horse are not seen to press home any attack. Eventually, the French do just walk off, rather abadoning the foot guards, I might add.

However, from his position, de Brack might have missed some events effecting the grenadiers à cheval, which were on the other end of the horse guards formation. He really doesn't tell us how exactly the grenadiers and dragoons left the field, only the lights. But if the heavies did anything much different than the lights (ran like heck, or did some kind of last stand, or a death charge) I think he would have noted it.

Throughout de Brack speaks of the "regiments" of horse guards. The duty squadrons and the gendarmes (and some débris of cuirassier formations) seemed to have more or less disappeared after their encounter with Vivian, near where you have the "O" on the map you posted – "melted like chocolate soldiers" is flowery, but it is what seems to have happened.

OK – that's just my *opinion*. I have no reason to think I am "right". But you asked, and you have every right to expect an answer for all your excellent contributions to this discussion. I think you are also very much entitled a round of "thanks" from all the participants, me especially.

G'Day Gents

With Monsieur Le Breton's added posts and explanation on why the Guard walked off the field…I see absolutely no reason to doubt it…

To add to de Brack's account of them walking off…it is also supported by Rigau who states his body also retired off the field of battle walking, who was also in the same area nearby.

"…champ de bataille avec un escadron, et toujours au pas, sans que l'ennemi ait ose s'adresser a nous, quoique nous debordant de tous cotes."

With that said…I also concur with Mr. Walsh…to compare other accounts and memoirs…just not those that work well in someones agenda…

Best Regards
Art

When one is analysing the movements of a given unit in battle at this sort of level, isn't it always better to use relatively neutral terms? Thus, 'fell back', 'withdrew' or 'retreated' are a better starting point than 'fled' or 'melted like chocolate soldiers' (Apologies, Paul- I simply use those examples as closest to hand); as a starting point, anyway, while we work out what was going on?

I know that some criticise use of such neutral terms which can serve as a euphemism used to sugar the pill of one's own 'side' suffering a repulse or defeat, but I believe that is a distraction.

This is partly because of the risk of value judgements creeping in as to how a unit ought/> to have behaved, (particularly if there is a element of partisanship in play) Who are we to judge how men in battle should behave- on our 'team' or the other? Hence, I believe it is better to describe their movements and the state of their formations without automatically adding the colour of our approval or disapproval.

Moreover, 'flowery' terms, as Breton describes them, can ascribe emotions and decisions to groups or individuals, which we cannot know. Yes, we may be able to deduce how a unit is reacting by the direction in which they are moving, the speed (if we know it) and the integrity of their formation, but surely we can only draw firm conclusions as to an individual's state of mind if we have direct evidence, ditto, a group of individuals.

We might be able to say that Captain so-and-so fled if a reliable witness reported that. We might be able to conclude that a unit broke if their formation disintegrated and scattered, with that elusive reliable witness reporting cries of "Sauve qui peut!" (Well, we are discussing Waterloo).

Conversely, a unit of cavalry might be walking in an measured pas to the rear, in ordered formation, while individually, each man is catatonic with stress.

Otherwise, neutral and, dare I say it, respectful terms seem to me to be the best starting point to describe the performance of men in the midst of experiences that what we can hardly imagine, despite our enthusiasm and imaginative engagement with their exploits.

G'Day Paul

I was quite willing to have an intelligent conversation with you…

But when you posted the following:

So it leaves the options as:

1) The Grenadiers a Cheval were totally ignored and left to walk away abandoning the rearguard.

2) Vivian and or other allied cavalry broke around them like a boulder in a stream.

3) The allies (probably Vivian's 1,500) did indeed take fright and left them alone.

4) They joined the rearguard but took flight with the rest when resistance collapsed.

5) They clashed with the cavalry of Vivian's brigade and fled.

6) Barton's account can't be used as a basis for any of the above.

7) Siborne's further unsubstantiated, embellished account in his book should not be taken as fact.

Such rhetorical options as these…I can't even begin to take you serious…

So if possible to get back on track…let me ask you…what do you make of de Brack's narrative and his drawing?

Best Regards
Art

And when you do get to the conclusion, can we have a summary please, as I am sure when I read this it appears more and more that the GaC did retire gracefully from the field of battle – I am sure half way through we had them fleeing like a bunch of schoolgirls in a thunder storm.

I await developments with interest.

Marc

Art

<p>Such rhetorical options as these…I can't even begin to take you serious…

I'm not asking you to take your pick of my options and indeed, Some of 'my' seven options are outlandish. I also gave my opinion as to what happened:

"My idea of what happened was that at the time of Barton's last sighting, the GaC saw Vivian's brigade coming up so accelerated their pace and rejoined the rearguard engaged in the fight but turned and fled along with the rest of those that could get away when they saw the game was up."

So if possible to get back on track…let me ask you…what do you make of de Brack's narrative and his drawing?

His drawing is of the fateful attack of the Carabiniers from what I can make out so I can't see the relevance with the final advance of the allied cavalry.

For de Brack, all of the retrograde movements of the horse guards are done at the walk (whihc I take to be just good practise not something unique or praise-worthy), and the British horse are not seen to press home any attack. Eventually, the French do just walk off, rather abadoning the foot guards, I might add.

I posted this:

"I am not questioning the fact that Barton saw the GaC walking, all cavalry do it most of the time. and fresh cavalry walk rate is 4mph. (6.5kph)." So I am definitely not questioning cavalry walking tactically or non tactically."

and the British horse are not seen to press home any attack.

The allied horse did press home their attacks. They mention the cavalry that they encountered and sent to flight…..Cuirassiers, Grenadiers a Cheval, Dragoons, Chasseurs, 'Hussars' of the Guard, and 'cavalry?' are all mentioned by multiple witnesses during the attack on the rearguard. There are also accounts of Cuirassiers and Lancers of the rearguard attacking their assailants.

It's Barton's assumption that they walked off the battlefield when he clearly did not and could not have witness it. He also says further on, that he thought they were going to join the rearguard. So what is it?

I have already alluded to Chef d'escadron Ragau of the 2nd Dragoons, who also reckoned that he was the last to leave the battlefield, that no-one dare attack is squadron even though he was surrounded by the enemy. And he spent the night with his body of men in a farmhouse next to the battlefield.

As for deBrack's quotes in the Carnet de la Sabretache, are they from his Outpost duties book? If they are, I have a translated edition. If not I'll translate what has been quoted and get back to you.

I'll also post some interesting French and Dutch accounts.

Marc at work

I am sure half way through we had them fleeing like a bunch of schoolgirls in a thunder storm.

Umm! Sorry Marc, but I haven't likened them to how you say and if you read above, I have given my Idea as to what I think happened…..More to come (when I get the time). Watch this space.

Cheers

Paul :)