"Grenadiers à Cheval" Topic

I have a newbie question on what made them so imposing and effective. For heavies they didn't have cuirasses. Was it their reputation, size of the unit, or maybe size of the horses?

First, they were an excellent regiment, largely of veterans.

They were big men on big horses, well-trained and led.

That and the fact that they were the senior cavalry regiment in the Imperial Guard made them quite formidable.

Espirit de corps I would imagine

When they withdrew from Waterloo nobody dared to attack them.

Agree with all of the above

Big men on big horses, all seasoned veterans, elite troops and they knew it – the last thing you would want is to face a boot-to-boot charge from an outfit like them

Not sure the cuirasse counted for half as much as the morale and discipline of the unit.

Household Brigade smashed the cuirassiers during d'Erlon's attack. Their rig was very similar to Gren a Chev, give or take a bearskin. OK, a slope helped and a shorter advance to action, if only they had shown more discipline.

Big men, on big horses, convinced they were the elite..that was the secret.

Hmmmm. Smashed….

repaint

"When they withdrew from Waterloo nobody dared to attack them."

Evidence? This old carrot has been argued with brechtel. It's a myth. Even Paul Dawson (a Grenadier a Cheval fan) doesn't make that claim.

And what about the other regiments, one Dragoon and one Lancer who said that they 'walked from the battlefield'? The Dragoon regiment commander in particular also reckond that 'no one dare attack them' Vivian's brigade would beg to differ.

This myth has come about by a quote 'not always relayed in full' of a 12th Light Dragoon's officer who said he saw them 'walk from the battle field' but went on in the same quote to say that it looked like they were joining the rearguard.

So! Were they walking from the battlefield? Or were they joining the rearguard?

You might want to read William Turner, 13th Light Dragoons' account if you think that the Allied cavalry were shy in attacking them.

But the real supposed evidence of the Grenadiers a Cheval 'walking from the Battlefield was because of what Barton of the 12th Light Dragoons wrote.

"At this time we saw to our left front, at no great distance, a strong Regiment of Cavalry, which we soon ascertained to be the Grenadiers a Cheval of the Imperial Guard; they were formed in a dense close column and appeared to take but little notice of our advance, when opposite their flank they fired a few carbine or pistol shots. We were some distance in front of our Brigade, and being too weak to make an impression [on them],
they literally walked from the field in a most majestic manner. I had subsequently an opportunity of learning from a French officer that this Regiment, as well as the Red Lancers of the Guard, was not in action during the day.
I can only account for their steadiness in such perilous situation, by ascribing to a wish to cover their infantry and cavalry that were retreating in such great disorder, and by perceiving that we had outmarched our guns.
The brigade continued its pursuit of the Enemy, still further, and when we were ordered to retire a short distance for the purpose of taking up our bivouac, rather an extra ordinary circumstance occurred. While retiring we met the 1st Hussars Kings German Legion advancing."
But I say:

"Lets have a bit of level headedness about this incident.

Barton loitered how long to observe the Grenadiers 'Walk off the battlefield'?

If he observed the alleged feat, It would have meant that he had to have watched them leaving 'at a walk' for some considerable amount of time.

Where had the Grenadiers a Cheval disappeared to when Vivian's Brigade passed through that of Bartons (Vandeleure's) Brigade soon after?

If The Grenadiers a Cheval were 'walking' why did Vivian's Brigade not clash with them? (which according to Vivians brigade, they did)

If the Grenadiers a Cheval walked off of the battlefield, why did they not help the beleaguered Guard rear-guard?

The other part of Bartons account is also telling:

"I can only account for their steadiness in such a perilous situation, by ascribing it to a wish to cover their infantry and cavalry that were retreating in such great disorder, and by their perceiving that we had outmarched our guns"

The reason for the steady withdrawal of the Grenadiers a Cheval was because what they could see (It was getting dark) was a single, much depleted regiment of the 12th Light Dragoons who were down to about 250 men, and no real threat. Barton also says that The Grenadiers a Cheval were:

" by ascribing it to a wish to cover their infantry and cavalry"

Which may mean that the Grenadiers a Cheval were doing what they would naturally do, and that is to try to resist (along with the other Guard rear-guard cavalry units) the onslaught of the enemy. They couldn't do that by 'Walking away' which would be a dishonourable thing to do.

And If Barton's account is veratim, is Henry Lane's?

Lieutenant-Colonel H. Lane of the 15th or Kings Hussars:

"We at once returned to our former position,. Leaving one Squadron to keep the French Lancers in check.

We were no sooner on our ground than we advanced in line, and charged the Grenadiers a Cheval, who fled from us. our next attack (in line without reserve was [on] a square of French infantry, and our horses were within a few feet of the square. We did not succeed in breaking it, and of course suffered most severely."

For more fuller accounts read this link

link

Full thread

link

Paul :)

To get back to the original question, one of their nicknames was "the gods."

Usually nicknames like most stereotypes, were originally founded on at least some degree of truth.

Tom

Hi Paul,

I think it was in

Waterloo: The French Perspective Hardcover – October 24, 2012
by Andrew W. Field

or
Waterloo: Four Days that Changed Europe's Destiny, Clayton Tim

or
Waterloo: A Near Run Thing (Great Battles), Howarth, David

don't remember well.

I am ok to believe that British troops were pretty much exhausted by this point and would not be over zealous to attack a formation still solid and impressive. Holding the battlefield and pushing back the enemy up to its lines was a strong achievement in itself.

By "walking away", I mean withdrawing from the battlefield in good formation after all was lost. By this time all coordination was nil and each regiment if not battalion was pretty much on its own with personal ties between commanders dictating what could or couldn't be done in the crisis.

I think you might read too much in a situation. Would you prefer them to flee in disarray?

I'm curious.

Personally, I have no problems with the concept that if an army is in retreat, the pursuers (who are frequently exhausted themselves) will go after the easy prey of the fleeing army, rather than bother with units that are maintaining discipline and retreating in good order.

That said, so far no one has actually offered an offensive action/ successful charge against the odds or similar exploit to sustain their reputation.

As has been noted, they were a hand picked elite, and I'm sure that given an opportunity, they would have performed superbly.

But now I'm wondering if they ever, in fact, got that opportunity?

I confess, I've never paid a lot of attention to the Guard. For me, Napoleons line army was a thing of excellence in itself and I prefer to study that, rather than Napoleons hand picked veterans.

I know other Guard cavalry units were in combat frequently, but the lack of combat citations in this list is disturbing, to put in mildly, for such a highly regarded unit.

Eylau with Louis Lepic.

Regards
Russ Dunaway

As has been highlighted, their opponents didn't always know who they were at the time. However, even more than is the case with foot, the cohesion of a mounted unit is, I suggest, apparent the instant they start to manoeuvre. Perhaps I should instead say, any deficiencies are immediately obvious.

To add to Brechtel's earlier post on the experience of the riders and size of the mounts, I understand that they were also fairly evenly mounted, ie their horses were relatively uniform in height and gait, and, of course, the guard often enjoyed better quality horses. It is certainly more challenging to retain dressing, even in the walk, if there are significant differences in gait between the horses of a section. Throw in his point about being well led (experienced officers and NCOs) and the lack of a cuirass becomes less of a factor.

In comparison, the oft shown footage from the 70s of the French Republican Guard is an excellent example of competant riders on large and well matched mounts, but lacking officers and NCOs with experience of maintaining unit cohesion in the field. The result is more akin to a steeple chase than a disciplined body of heavy horse moving into contact.

Regards,

janner: I believe I have seen the video you are referring to and wondered about that. It has been my impression that the idea was for the charging cavalry to close almost boot to boot. I cannot remember ever having seen any film depiction that would represent what I thought was supposed to occur and wonder if you know of one? Thanks very much, John Miller

repaint

The myth of the allies being too scared (not dare charge them) of the Grenadiers a Cheval are the words of historians made on the basis of one quote from a British cavalry officer who had no say on whether they should have engaged them. People like Field don't stop to think or do proper research. Read Paul Dawson's Au pas de Charge and Charge the Guns. Those two tomes concentrate on the cavalry in the battle, Gareth Glover's Waterloo Archive series and of course, Siborne's collection of Waterloo letters, both published and unpublished.

Anyway! the 13th Light Dragoons (with the 15th) charged the Grenadiers a Cheval and chased them off.

Here is the full and interesting account from Lieutenant William Turner, 13th Light Dragoons, which gives a most graphic account of the Battle of Waterloo and the march to Paris, may well be inserted.
It confirms in its main narrative the story of the battle as told in the regimental records and in Colonel Doherty's papers, but it also adds other details which are full of interest.
The letter, which is a long one, runs as follows :-

VILLEPEUTn, ear PARIS,

3rd July 1815.

"MY DEAR BUSBY,-I assure you it is with the greatest pleasure I can find time to inform you I am perfectly sound and in good health and spirits. We marched into this village last night from near Louvres, and are only nine miles from Paris and can distinctly hear the firing, which takes place at Paris, between the Prussian advanced posts and the French. This war cannot possibly last long, for every town and village is completely ransacked, and pillaged by the Prussians and neither wine, spirits, or bread are to be found.

The whole country from the frontier to Paris has been laid waste by the march of troops, and the crops nearly destroyed, we are waiting for the Prussians when that infernal City Paris will be attacked and no doubt pillaged, for it is a debt we owe to the whole of Europe, all the inhabitants for leagues round here have taken themselves and their effects into Paris, so that it will be worth taking if we loose 20,000 men.

You have no idea of the enthusiasm of the troops and their determination to carry before them everything in their way; the Prussians are also determind soldiers and I expect in one week Paris will be completely sacked and perhaps burned.

Our Rocket Brigade went to the front yesterday, and Blucher is much exasperated because they have detained the flags of truce.

I will as shortly as possible give you some particulars of what I have seen since I wrote to you at Ghent, three days after I joined the Regiment at Castrds near Grammont, where we were quartered for some days and had a review by Lord Uxbridge with the other Cavalry Regiments. On 15th June I rode to see the City of Brussels 16 miles distant, it is a handsome and pleasant place, returned in the evening home (very fortunately); at 7 next morning 16th instant was rousted out of my bed by a Sergeant to say we were to march immediately, soon turned out but owing to the Regiment being so distributed about the country we were not able to march before 11 A.M., we then marched by Eughien [Enghien], Brainale, Cante and Nivelle and arrived on the field of battle near Genappe about 10 P.M. just as the battle ended, (nothing to eat all day), bivouacked all night in corn, at 3 A.M. turned out, had . . . at 10 A.M. rode over the field of battle which was covered with dead, went to the front when I was near being shot by four Frenchmen, whom I took for Belgians, they all fired but luckily missed me . . . and the officer who was with me retired, and soon after began the retreat.

The Cavalry in the rear went slowly, the French followed the ~ Hussars and Life Guards on one road, we and the 15th on theother were about 300 yards distant when the 7th charged and the Life Guards charged in support. We then continued retiring and one of the heaviest showers I ever felt made us wet to the skin, we halted close to the village of Mont St Jean with the whole Army, it was a dreadful rainy night, every man in the Cavalry wet to the skin and nearly all the Infantry as bad ; nothing to eat all day, being without rations and our baggage at Brussels. At 4 A.M. on the memorable 18th June turned out and formed on the field of battle in wet cornand a cold morning without anything to eat, nothing but some gin, which Ipurchased from a German woman, saved and enabled me and three other officers to stand the fatigues of the day.

About 10 A.M. the French began to move large columns of troops in our front, and about half-past eleven the Battle began, we were put with the 15th and commanded by General Grant, we were on the right of the great road and nearly the right of our line, we covered the Artillery of Captain Macdonald's troop who behaved well, before two o'clock we had three officers and several men killed by Cannon Balls and Shells, we were then put close to some Belgian Artillery, to keep them to their guns and there we suffered from musketry and roundshot; we then moved to the right of the line to charge the French Lancers but they retired. We then came back to our place close to the Artillery which the French Imperial Guard a Cheval and Cuirassiers had taken, we immediately formed up in line with the 15th, gave three cheers, and went at them full speed, they retired immediately and we charged after them all down their position up to their Infantry, when we were ordered to retire, which we did but in confusion, we formed and told off again having lost a good many men ; I shot one Frenchman with my pistol but did not use my sword, (I had the misfortune to break the double barrelled one in marching up the country or else I should have shot two).

At 4 P.M. the French Cavalry came up again but on our trotting to meet them they immediately retired, we then came back on our side of the hill beyond our guns; the Battle was now most dreadful and the field covered with dead
and dying in all directions. Lord Wellington repeatedly passed us, whenxwe Huzzared him; the French Cavalry advanced again to the muzzle of our guns, the Gunners were ordered to retire and we charged them again in the grandest style between our masses of Infantry; they retreated and we charged them close to their Infantry, who were formed in Squares the same as ours; in this charge I am sorry to say the black mare I purchased from Paddock, got two musket balls in her close to my leg just behind the shoulder joint, it was with difficulty I got her to the rear of the Artillery when I dismounted and sent her to the rear by a Dragoon, whose horse I mounted as he was; we still continued retiring on guns when the havoc amongst us was dreadful, one cannon -ball killed General Grant's horse, Col. Dalrymple's horse and took off his leg, it then passed between Wallace and me, we remained here still exposed, every minute some man or horse falling, Captain Goulburg (Goulburn ?) at whose side I was, had just mounted a trooper after having had his horse wounded, when he was knocked off by a spent ball but fortunately without injury.

About half-past six we charged again down the hill and then retreated to our guns; again about 8 P.M. the great attack was made when the French were repulsed, we were immediately ordered to charge as our Infantry were . . . General Hill came in our front and called out "now 13th come on" he took of his hat with several other Generals we immediately Huzzared with the whole of the Infantry and charged, the French retired in the greatest confusion, our Infantry advancing kept us at a trot for three miles when we with the whole of the Cavalry pursued them about three miles further when darkness, at 9P.M. put an end to the slaughter.

The last charge was literally riding over men and horses, who lay in heaps; such is the account of the battle I myself saw and can vouch for the general particulars you have in the despatches and newspapers. I assure you our Regiment had been without rations since Thursday, and it was not till Monday evening June 19th that we got our meat, I luckily had one fowl and some mouldy bread in four days.

We bivouacked for the night and next day advanced and have continued to do so (except one day) ever since we crossed the frontier on the 21st June, the Cavalry have advanced here chiefly by cross country roads through the fields as it is not enclosed as in England.

I have heard since of the Black mare and find she is in Brussels and hope she will recover but have no great hopes, she is an excellent charger. Our loss in Officers is Captain Gubbins killed, do. Pym (Pymm), do. Gale (Geale), the two former by cannon-balls, two Lieutenants severely wounded and five slightly, seven or eight Officers had their horses shot and wounded under them, and General Grant had five horses shot under him. When the Regiment mustered after the action at 10 P.M.

That night we had only 65 men left out of 260 who went into the field in the morning, the restwere either killed, wounded, or missing, the 15th have also suffered most dreadfully as well as the whole of the Cavalry, and yet notwithstanding such losses we are as ripe and anxious to try our fortune once more at Paris and settle the peace of Europe. You may expect and depend upon everything from the English and Prussians who will go hand and heart together as brothers.

I must finish for the Bugle sounds for ….but I hope not to march this day."

*****************************

Barton's quote alone shows that they didn't actually walk from the Battlefield as he went on to say that it seemed to him that they were going to join the rearguard; which to be honest, is exactly what they would do. If they just abandoned the army, they would have been as ill looked upon as the Cumberland Hussars, who did abandon the battlefield earlier.

I do believe that Tripp's heavies also came into contact with some during the final advance. I have an account of this, but I can't remember which book I read it in….Perhaps it was John Franklin's?

The Grenadiers a Cheval were an excellent heavy cavalry regiment, but it didn't prevent the allied Light Cavalry regiments from taking them on whenever and whatever the circumstance

Paul :)

Hi Russ,

Many thanks. All the units in the cavalry charges at Eylau deserve recognition for extraordinary courage and ability in my view.

Hi John,

I put up some stock footage of a turn of the century French cuirassier unit on here a while back, but cannot find it for the moment. I've lost many an hour watching such stuff on YouTube from Critical Past

To be fair on the gandarmes, I think it was an event to commemorate a commander's retirement and never intended as an example of cavalry maneouvre on the battlefield. I wonder if they would have approached it differently if they'd known how often it would be used as a point of reference.

If you look past the troop in open order at the rest of the squadron, this footage of the Inniskillings from the Great War is helpful to show how a formation could retain dressing even in the canter, youtu.be/ASVIrwE19nI

They're certainly the most boring-looking elite heavy cavalry unit out there…

I kind of like them – they are "imposing" all in dark blue and grey, with tall bearskins. The orange lace helps.

Art Miniaturen make some lovely poses in 1/72

Not sure from reading Paul's letter where they charged the GaC at the end of the battle – it seems to refer to the general cavalry action, but I'm tired so maybe I missed it.

Or maybe I need a bit of myth in my life – it can be a bit hit and myth sometimes… Sory, I'll get my coat…

Marc

Give them the longer tailed coat with the white lapels, give them a cavalry style bearskin. Instead, most models in 28mm show them in the dull surtout and a lower, rounder form of headwear, more like what Modern Guardsmen wear for guarding HM.

Add the aurore aigulettes and the horse furniture and they are magnificent.

Top look, not the lower one;

I always liked the surtout…

You can get excellent models of them in 54mm…

I have some excellent 30mm flats of them also.

Marc at work

I get what you mean.

Not sure from reading Paul's letter where they charged the GaC at the end of the battle – it seems to refer to the general cavalry action, but I'm tired so maybe I missed it.

But surely Guard a Cheval means 'Horse Guards' If he meant Chasseurs a Cheval, he would almost certainly have identified them as 'Hussars of the Guard'. He would almost certainly have seen the Cuirassiers as part of the guard too, as did most others in the allied recollections.

Who do you think Turner mean't by 'Guard a Cheval'? He mentions his 13th engaging them and cuirassiers with the 15th light Dragoons, the self same regiment that Lane was in, and who mentions them by their correct name.

Paul :)

Paul, sorry, still cannot see the "we charged them at the end of the day" bit. I know I must be being stupid here, so apologies (come on, what do you expect, I'm a French fan

Ok Marc! And yes I'm a Brit fan, I get my information specifically from accounts of the people who were there, I'm wary of historian story-tellers with agendas.

OK, if you can't understand what lane is saying here….

"We at once returned to our former position,. Leaving one Squadron to keep the French Lancers in check.

We were no sooner on our ground than we advanced in line, and charged the Grenadiers a Cheval, who fled from us. our next attack (in line without reserve was [on] a square of French infantry, and our horses were within a few feet of the square. We did not succeed in breaking it, and of course suffered most severely."

Which is happening within minutes of Barton's encounter with the Grenadiers a Cheval….

And again, Turner's account of counter charging during the French grand cavalry attacks shows that the allied cavalry attacked the enemy in front of them; no matter which regiment they were!

"We then came back to our place close to the Artillery which the French Imperial Guard a Cheval and Cuirassiers had taken, we immediately formed up in line with the 15th, gave three cheers, and went at them full speed, they retired immediately and we charged after them all down their position up to their Infantry, when we were ordered to retire, which we did but in confusion, we formed and told off again having lost a good many men ; I shot one Frenchman with my pistol but did not use my sword, (I had the misfortune to break the double barrelled one in marching up the country or else I should have shot two)."

For Reference:
((The 13th (replacement for the absent 2nd Hussars, King's German Legion) and 15th and the 7th were part of the 5th Cavalry Brigade under Major-General Sir Colquhoun Grant.

And what of Vivian's brigade 1st LD KGL, 10th, 18th LD, the very brigade that moved (and very nearly clashed with) past Barton's (part of Vandeleur's brigade of 11th 12th 16th LD)regiment?))

full account of Lane's quote can be found here:

xvld.org/waterloo-1815.html

And finally, If the Grenadiers a Cheval had 'walked from the battlefield', how come they were still their when Vivian's brigade attacked the Imperial Guard rearguard? Remember! Vivian's brigade advanced past Vandeleur's brigade just after Barton's encounter with the GaC.

Lt. Colonel the Honourable Henry Murray, 18th Light Dragoons (pages 68-69 The Waterloo Archive volume IV):

"He [Vivian] took the flank officer's place, and led the column down the hill in the direction he wished to move, and thus advanced across the ridge in left front of Vandeleur's Light Cavalry Brigade. We were saluted by the latter with cheers of encouragement, and in similar manner by Maitland's Brigade, as we passed their flank. As soon as the smoke allowed General Vivian to see the disposition of the enemy's troops in his front, he formed line with with the [18th Hussars] regiment and the 10th [Hussars], with the 1st Hussars [K.G.L] in support….
On the Front stood two squares of the Grenadiers of the Old Guard, on its left front and much nearer to it were artillery and cavalry in advance of the proper right of these squares. This cavalry consisted of Cuirassiers, the wrecks of entire brigades; nearer to, and and partly in rear of the squares stood the Chasseurs and Grenadiers a Cheval of the Imperial Guard, greatly diminished in numbers. It was immediately evident to Vivian that the attack must in the first instance be directed against the advanced artillery and cavalry, and having put the regiment in motion, he placed himself in front of the centre besides Colonel Murray, for the purpose of putting us in the required direction. He on this said to the regiment '18th, you will follow me.' on which Sergeant Major Jeffs and several others said, 'by Jagus, General, anywhere, to hell, if you will lead us.' He then ordered the charge to sound, when the regiment dashed forward with greatest impetuosity, and at the same time with as much steadiness and regularity as if they had been at a field day exercise on Hounslow heath. Thus the direction of the charge by the regiment diverged as much to the left as that of the 10th had inclined to the right. Just as our charge commenced, some French artillery coming from their right, and slanting towards the regiment, made a bold push to cross our front at the gallop, but the attempt failed, and we were in an instant among them, cutting down the artillerymen and drivers and securing the guns. In the next moment, we fell upon the advanced cavalry, which we completely dispersed, and then bringing forward our left shoulder we attacked the cavalry and guns that stood more to our right front and near the right square which was now retiring. This cavalry appeared at first determined to make s stand, and an officer in its front dashed forward and fired at Colonel Murray, but in another moment the regiment was fiercely and dexterously plying their sabres amongst them, and we next charged their Imperial Guard, their Cuirassiers and Lancers, a regular medley of them all including infantry and guns, etc, such a scene! The Infantry threw themselves down except two squares, which stood firm, but did no good. The sneaking prisoners we had taken hollored 'Vive le Roi'…..
On charging, not only did the infantry throw themselves down, but the cavalry also from off their horses, all roaring 'pardon' many of them on their knees."

Which shows that the GaC were indeed retiring to join the rearguard when Barton observed them. remember also, that at the time Barton observed them, his regiment had been very badly depleted through rearguad actios covering the heavy brigades retreat and counter charging the grand cavalry attacks thus were in no real fit state to charge the GaC at that time through exhaustion and having about half their number.

Paul :)

janner: Thanks very much for posting that. I have been under the impression that that is what was supposed to happen. John Miller

Thanks Paul – it is always good to read these first hand accounts, and the nearer to the event the better, as memoirs written years later may "cloud" the issue.

My question is about your second para as that appears to relate to the action during the grand cavalry charges not at the end. The fuller quote below is better as it deals with the end of the battle. Or am I misunderstanding that first quote

Thanks as always Paul

Marc (the French fan )

You understand correctly Marc, the Turner 13th (Together with the 15th) Light Dragoons episode does indeed occur during the Grand cavalry attacks. I posted as much in my last:

"And again, Turner's account of counter charging during the French grand cavalry attacks shows that the allied cavalry attacked the enemy in front of them; no matter which regiment they were!"

But the Henry's lane and Murray accounts are clearly of the attack on the Guard/artillery/Cavalry rearguard after the repulse of the final Guard infantry attack.

Paul :)

Thanks Paul – I told you I was tired…

Good reading, good debate

Marc

There is one French account that I have alluded to above, which can be found in Andrew Field's Waterloo The French Perspective, which is on page 222 and which is by Chef d'escadron Rigau of the 2nd Dragoons. His quote may give you something to go on.

Paul :)

@ deaders

Very pretty, but for my money, out-posed by carabiniers, Dutch Guard lancers, cuirassiers, Guard chasseurs a cheval, and line hussars, in that order. They upstage only line chasseurs and dragoons.

One aspect of the Grenadiers a Cheval at Waterloo that is usually overlooked is that a squadron of the regiment was on duty as one of the four duty squadrons with Napoleon.

At the end of the action they charged, 400 of them, quite outnumbered by the British cavalry they were charging and were overwhelmed by numbers, but they bought time, which was their mission. This is probably where the comments about the Grenadiers a Cheval being overwhelmed came from.

Andrew Fields notes that the Guard infantry, cavalry, and artillery stopped the British cavalry pursuit and he certainly believes that the bulk of the Grenadiers a Cheval left the battlefield in formation at the walk and were left alone by the British cavalry.

I highly recommend Andrew Fields' Waterloo: The French Perspective not only because it is an excellent book, but because French first-hand accounts are usually left out of most Waterloo narratives.

It should also be noted that errors are made on who and what unit was seen by observers in the middle of a fight, especially in the chaos of a pursued retreat. Careful reading and research will sort things out, but it takes time.

Fields' book also covers the loss of allied colors to the French (four or six depending on who you want to believe) as well as the breaking of allied squares during the French cavalry attacks. Fields provides a very balanced account.

I've got Fields tome and it's an opinionated tome just like Nigel Sale's and many others.

Always read the 'Full' accounts from the horses mouth so as to speak‘ for yourself. There is no evidence whatsoever, even in Rigau's statement that no allied cavalry dare attack them. That his squadron had walked from the battlefield unmolested seems fine by me but it was dark, confusing, his horses and men exhausted and perhaps the enemy that surrounded him had different jobs on their minds thus ignored his Squadron. He was just fortunate that his squadron was ignored to the point he was able to stay overnight in some buildings just off the battlefield without interference

And Again! The only evidence that the GaC 'walked from the Battlefield' is from the contradictory words of Barton ( "literally walked from the field in a most majestic manner" – "wish to cover their infantry and cavalry that were retreating in such great disorder"). Which is it? Deserted their Guard and ed off? Or did they do what they were meant to do! Which is try to act as an effective rearguard?

Other accounts attest for the GaC being engaged by allied cavalry during the battle and at the rout. Perhaps anyone can provide first hand accounts to the contrary. Perhaps evidence that the GaC who were engaged, were other than those observed by Barton.

Paul :)

Actually, an interesting point. As wargamers, "we" think of 1,200 men as the regiment. But in battle, they would be used by squadrons or in even smaller sub-divisions. So I wonder how many we are talking about for each matter (walked off, routed, charged, etc etc). Sadly, at this remove, we are unlikely to ever know. But fascinating to see the arguments (as in discussion, not toys out of pram shouting matches)

Marc

I painted them up about ten + years ago, (a la Empire), but have used them in battle only three or four times, (rarely do we field Guard units in our games). I find their uniforms quite impressive, maybe it's the bearskins and black horses. Speaking of bearskins, from a city kid who has never even sat on a horse, I can't conceive of wearing them while mounted on a galloping steed, waving a large sword around with malice aforethought, in headlong flight toward an equally angry opponent. Even with chin straps I can't imagine how they stayed on the head of their wearers. John Miller

repaint

Neither Field, Clayton or Silbourne mention that the British cavalry were afraid to attack the French Guard Grenadiers a Cheval. So dibble owes Field an apology.

The quote used in Andrew Field's book states that the British did not attack the French cavalry, due to being inferior in numbers. He did not state anything about being 'scared' (pages 222-223. Waterloo, The French Perspective)

The same goes Tim Clayton in his book on Waterloo (page 542)

And neither does Silborne, but it is very interesting what he does write-

'In the midst of the crowd of fugitives which impeded the progress of the brigade, there appeared a regiment of cavalry, moving at a walk, in close column, and in perfect order, as if distaining to allow itself to be contaminated by the confusion that prevailed around it. It was the "grenadiers a cheval." The 12th British light dragoons were nearest to it, having got in advance on the rest of the brigade, and were opposite the right flank of the column, whence a few pistol or carbine shots were fired at them. The 12th made a partial attack, but they were so much inferior in numbers, (being very weak at this period,) and were so greatly obstructed in their movements by the crowd, that they were unable to produce any impression upon so compact and steady a body of cavalry; which literally walked from the field in the most orderly manner, moving majestically along the stream, the surface of which was covered with the innumerable wrecks into which the rest of the French army had been scattered. As Napoleon and his staff were at this time retiring along the high road, on the right flank of this cavalry of the guard, it is reasonable to infer that the latter was therefore induced to maintain the admirable order in which it was thus seen, to secure the Emperor's retreat.' (page 378. The History of the Waterloo Campaign by Captain W. Silborne)

Silborne's account suggests both sides of the 'Grenadiers and fear' debate may be correct. Firstly, the British cavalry were not afraid to attack and secondly, the regiment did indeed walk off the field.

Gazzola:

Andrew Field page 222

"Rigau's point about the allies avoiding troops who show a bold countenance is well illustrated by this account of a British officer who came across the Guard Grenadiers-a'- Cheval"

Which means what?

I will also ask you for the evidence that the GaC walked from the battlefield. You won't, because you know as much as Siborne; as do all the other historians who allude to the incident.

Perhaps you are happy with the alleged bravado of the GaC walking away and into oblivion rather than them bravely resisting with the rest of the Guard rear-guard (Which Barton alludes to). Perhaps you "and the people like Field" don't stop to think that seeing as they had suffered the fruitless grand cavalry charges, the men and horses exhausted, that they were seen walking because the horses were blown.

Silborne's account suggests both sides of the 'Grenadiers and fear' debate may be correct. Firstly, the British cavalry were not afraid to attack and secondly, the regiment did indeed walk off the field.

Don't forget to post that evidence will you?.

Paul :)

Interesting that one squadron of Grenadiers was 160% of the size of the Household regiments.

Numerical superiority it seems.

A squadron of French cavalry, Guard or line, was two companies.

As the Duty Squadrons assigned as Napoleon's escort numbered about 400 all ranks, one squadron would be about 100 all ranks. The Duty Squadrons were drawn from each Guard cavalry regiment, one squadron from each.

The regimental strengths of the French Guard cavalry in the 1815 campaign:

Grenadiers a Cheval: 796 all ranks.

Dragoons: 816 all ranks.

Guard Lancer Regiment: 880 all ranks, including one squadron, (the 1st) being from the old 1st Lancer Regiment who had gone to Elba with Napoleon in 1814.

Chasseurs a Cheval: 1197 all ranks.

Gendarmes d'Elite: 106

There are different totals for the Guard cavalry at Waterloo, this being the reported present for duty. Other strengths are a little higher, but I believe this represents the initial mustering in Paris before the campaign.

The regimental strengths of the British Household cavalry regiments at Waterloo:

1st Life Guards: 265 all ranks.

2d Life Guards: 267 all ranks.

Royal Horse Guards: 296 all ranks.

The British cavalry was organized in two squadrons per regiment. The French Guard cavalry was organized in five squadrons per light cavalry regiment and four squadrons per heavy cavalry regiment. The Mamelukes were part of the Chasseurs and the Gendarmes had only one company present, which would be half a squadron. That partially explains the strength differences. But I don't see where one squadron of the Grenadiers a Cheval was 160% the size of the British Household cavalry regiments.

the discussion on armchair general clearly showed evidence that the Guard was washed away in the general panic and flight of the whole army – some units tried to make a stand – but did not succeed for long.

The only battalion – more or less intact was that of 1st Chasseurs à Pied, who even had to shelter the eagle of the grenadiers (the 1er grenadiers à pied – just desintegrated by desertion during the rout).

The French army was saved by the night and the high wheat which covered the routing mob.

Paul Dawson (who else I may add) checked the archives in Vincennes

Dibble was so kind enough to provide some citations :

"Note du commandant Duuring, chef de bataillon au 1er chasseur de la garde.
« (…) je fis rassembler le bataillon en colonne par division à distance de peloton(…) »p. 118
« Je mis le bataillon en route, il marcha dans le bled qui était d'une hauteur au-dessus de la tête des hommes »p.118
« La nuit s'avança (…) je fuis appuyer de ce côté, rencontrai quelques détachements de la Garde, en outre l'aigle des grenadiers, que je fis rester avec moi »p. 118
« Je continuai la route de Charleroy que j'ai traversée avec environs 300 hommes dont quelques grenadiers ainsi que l'agile »p 119

In the words of Paul Dawson. Charge the Guns! ISBN:978-1-907212-11-6
link
"The Imperial Guard contrary to the myth of the battle, and some eye-witness accounts written decades after the battle, did not make a glorious last stand on the field of battle. The 3rd Regiment of Chasseurs, shattered by the counter attack of the allied light cavalry and musketry of David Chasse's troops, broke and fled and were rounded up like sheep by the cavalry, the entire regiment being virtually captured on the field of battle 437.
…The regiments two battalions seem to have been shattered by the 1st Foot Guards and the men rounded up by cavalry. Neither the 3rd or 4th Chasseurs had been under fire as a military formation before the attack at Waterloo, which may explain why when fired upon by the allies the regiments never made contact with the allied lines before breaking and fleeing, the men being herded up by the cavalry. Allied reports of the 1st Foot Guards all make the comment that the Imperial Guard was there one minute and then it disappeared – the striking sudden appearance and routing of the regiment is born out by archive paperwork from the regiments.

437 Compiled from SHD/GR 20 YC 44, 45, 46 Chasseurs a' pied de la garde, divers corps, 1814-1815
***********************
The 2nd Battalion of the 1st Chasseurs….Was nearly entirely captured. Only nine men from the 1st company escaped being made prisoner of war. The battalion lost 446 other ranks out of 635 men, or 70 per cent of the total, of which 419 were prisoners of war, 65 per cent of the losses the battalion sustained being men captured by the allied cavalry during the rout of the French army when clearly the square collapsed.438

The 2nd Battalion 2nd Chasseurs, compared to the huge losses of the 2nd Battalion 1st Chasseurs or the 3rd Chasseurs, seem to have suffered far fewer casualties, having three men wounded, twenty deserted and 112 taken prisoner. The battalion seems to have held together against the attack of Adam's brigade and the allied light cavalry, unlike the 2nd Battalion 1st Chasseurs which was stand next to the 2nd Battalion 2nd Chasseurs.439
The 1st Battalion 3rd Grenadiers, shattered by the allied musketry and artillery according to battalion commander Guilleman, broke and fled to seek safety in the square of the 2nd Battalion 1st Chasseurs, and it may well be the breaking of this square that resulted in large numbers of men from the 3rd Grenadiers being captured at the same time.
The 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Grenadiers, contrary to Hippolyte de Mauduit's myth myth making that the battalion was virtually annihilated, suffered the fewest men captured as prisoners of war and appears to have made its way relatively unscathed to Genappe. Here the 4th company of the 2nd Battalion suffered 27 men wounded and 15 taken prisoner. The wounded men were subsequently captured.
At Waterloo and Genappe, the 2nd Battalion 3rd Grenadiers lost combined 154 men out of 520 in the battalion or losses of 29 per cent. The 1st Battalion lost 207 men out of 518 or 39 per cent losses. The regiment lost overall 34 per cent of its manpower at Waterloo, but of greater note it lost a further 62 per cent after the 20th June, more men were lost after Waterloo than during the battle, due to desertion, men being made prisoners of war or being killed in various rearguard actions.440
The 4th Grenadiers, said by Mark Adkin to have been annihilated at Waterloo, retreated in good order and took part in the stand of the Guard at Genappe against the Prussians. At Waterloo the regiment lost 346 men, but between 20th and 23rd June a further 736 were classed as deserted or prisoners of war. Clearly the regiment was not killed to a man at Waterloo, fought well at Genappe, and only disintegrated from the 20th June onward, spurred on we are told, by the men desiring to be with Napoleon as opposed to remaining with the army.441
The 1st Grenadiers appear to have done very little in the battle. The 1st Battalion sent to Plancenoit lost two men made prisoners of war, one deserted, one killed and one wounded, whereas the remainder of the regiment in total lost 9 men overall at Waterloo, but lost a staggering 600 men between 19th and 32rd June. These men quit the regiment and headed off to Paris en masse. Mark Adkin in Waterloo Companion, lists theses men as dead, wounded or prisoners on the 18th June which is simply not true.442
438 Compiled from SHD/GR 20 YC 44, 45, 46 Chasseurs a' pied de la garde, divers corps, 1814-1815
439 Compiled from SHD/GR 20 YC 44, 45, 46 Chasseurs a' pied de la garde, divers corps, 1814-1815
440 Compiled from SHD/GR 20 YC 13, 14 Corps royal de Grenadiers de France redevenu corps des grenadiers a pied de la garde imperiale lors des cent-jours, 1813-1814
441 Compiled from SHD/GR 20 YC 13, 14 Corps royal de Grenadiers de France redevenu corps des grenadiers a pied de la garde imperiale lors des cent-jours, 1813-1814
442 Compiled from SHD/GR 20 YC 13, 14 Corps royal de Grenadiers de France redevenu corps des grenadiers a pied de la garde imperiale lors des cent-jours, 1813-1814
*************************
Overall the Old Guard at Waterloo suffered heavy losses, not in men dead or wounded but in deserters or made prisoners. Five battalions were rounded up and captured once the squares had broken, and the larger proportion of the 1st Battalion 3rd Grenadiers was also captured. The imperial Guard certainly in the case of the 3rd and 4th Chasseurs and 1st Battalion 3rd Grenadiers, never made contact with the allied lines, came under intense musket fire, and the regiments then broke and fled when pressed by allied cavalry. Contrary to the myth of the battle, neither the 1st Foot Guards nor the 52nd Regiment of Foot defeated the Imperial Guard; it was the allied light cavalry that did so."
The last part I don't agree with. It was the infantry that shot them up and the light cavalry that destroyed them. So both defeated the Guard.
Paul :)
"

The heroic stand is pure propaganda by fiction books such as Manduit – who just was a file closer at the battle – but years later could quote almost each general.

dibble

You really do need to take your Union Jack blinkers off.

I think they are clouding your opinion of what Field has written and indeed those in the extracts he employed.

I do not see the extracts or what Field said as the Allies being afraid, but rather, in pursuit of a retreating army, and after a long day of fighting, are more attracted to attacking disordered units, possibly with the aim of increasing the retreat/route of the enemy. I mean, why should they risk further losses against what may appear as a steady and formed body, when the battle is won.

And if you look at the Rigau extract more carefully, he himself does not say that the allies were afraid, but that they were surprised by their success and attacked disordered bodies rather than formed ones. And we have to remember that those doing the attacking against a retreating army or possibly a routed mob at the time, may well have been fairly disordered themselves.

This could be supported by Siborne's account which suggests that, although inferior in numbers, the British cavalry may have still undertaken some assaults against the formed body, which had little effect, and they were hindered by 'the crowd'.

Depending on the condition of those doing the pursuit, I imagine that unless the allies were not disordered or in disarray themselves, due to their pursuit, that someone would have had to order them to attack any formed bodies, that it may have been natural for an unformed body (allies) not to attack a formed body (French)at that particular time and situation anyway.

I don't think you should dismiss Siborne, Field, Rigau, Barnton and anyone else because you feel there has been some kind of insult against British courage been implied. In terms of research, what's the point, you only seem to accept those that s ay what you want to hear and are far too quick to dismiss those that challenge your viewpoints. But in this case, I do believe you need to get off your high horse and realise that no one (other than possibly repaint, although I don't think he meant it) is accusing the British of being too scared to attack the French. I imagine everyone knows the courage and stubbornness of the British soldiers of that period, and I do believe you are misreading what is written.

As expected, the topic is diverted by the usual suspects from an alleged insult to British cavalry to how the Guard fared at Waterloo, or, going by the diverting post, how bad they did.

And we wonder why people are put off Napoleonics!

I have much confidence in Andrew Field's material in his book on Waterloo.

Comments from General Petit, the commander of the 1st Grenadiers a Pied, and from Sergeant Mauduit, have not been negated by any means. Both were there, and talked about what they saw. It doesn't matter what rank in the square in the 2d Battalion, 1st Grenadiers, that Mauduit had, he had ample opportunity to see what he relates.

Field also comments that the British light cavalry 'pursuit' was stopped by the Imperial Guard-infantry, cavalry, and artillery, which allowed the two squares of the 1st Grenadiers to withdraw in perfect order and the Grenadiers a Cheval to walk in order from the field, almost the last French unit to withdraw. Apparently, the 1st Battalion of the 1st Engineer Regiment was the last to withdraw.

There is also an excellent map depicting the Old Guard attack against the allied line. It clearly shows that the five battalions making the attack did not attack together.

The 1st Battalion 3d Grenadiers attacked the Brunswick contingent and to the left of Donzelot's troops. The Brunswickers were pushed back and a counterattack by Kielmansegge's remnants and the Nassauers which was led by the Prince of Orange was defeated and the Prince was wounded. The Old Guard battalion was then attacked by Detmer's Dutch-Belgians and defeated, and the battalion was broken.

To their left, the single battalion of the 4th Grenadiers reached the top of the ridge and engaged in a firefight with the British 5th Brigade. The Grenadiers were supported by horse artillery. The British began to fall back under the pressure of the attack.

In turn, the counterattack by Detmer on their right and the arrival of van Smissen's horse artillery company defeat the grenadiers who retire back down the slope, some accounts saying 'tumbling' down the slope.

Both battalions of the 3d Chasseurs attack together and are defeated by Maitland's British brigade of Guards. General Michel was killed here. Both French battalions break and retreat.

The 4th Chasseurs come up on the left flank of the 3d Chasseurs, and drive Maitland's brigade back to the ridge in disorder. They are in turn flanked by Colborne's 52d Light Infantry, and are defeated and broken.

Field's account isn't the first time I've seen it. It first appeared in print as far as I can recollect in 1964.

It is interesting to wonder what might have happened of the five Guard battalions had attacked together, which was Napoleon's intent. Ney led them forward, was unhorsed and lost control of the action on foot.

And interesting how much we are worrying about "deserters" AFTER the battle. Too late by then…

Weren't we talking uniforms or something a while back?

Keep it polite please people. I love the Naps period but I can understand why some would find it unpleasant once the threads drift too far

Marc

I Dunno. I think it is relatively harmless to free-associate and let the conversation develop.

The initial posting asked if they were overrated, as being the elite of an elite. It quickly drifted into a topic purely about whether they fled from Waterloo..in a formed body…or slowly fell back in formation to cover everyone else fleeing. That is what it comes down to.

von W then added data I have never seen about how the Guard in general disintegrated….in detail I have never seen before

Then is the discussion as to why the Allied cavalry allowed the
Gren a Cheval to perform either of their two functions. Flee in formation or cover the army as it does just that, in chaos. Allied Cavalry cowardice, exhaustion, or depletion of their own ranks.

Great thread. I will again say how much I regret that surely this will be lost to future researchers. Within two years someone will ask did Gren a Chev flee from "Waterloo" (La B All, Mt St J etc)

Mr. Deadhead,

Do not try the "Search" function on the site.

Go to Google.

In the search field put
site:theminiaturespage.com grenadiers Waterloo
or
site:theminiaturespgae.com "grenadiers à cheval"
or
site:theminiaturespage.com "grenadiers a cheval" Waterloo
and so on.

Very little is ever lost from the internet.
:-)

Yes just read the data and French accounts, pure propaganda fiction stories by Manduit excluded, they all agree on the general panic and rout of the French Army.
The Guard, especially those units – which just had been in reserve till then – tried to create some order, but all collapsed, they were human after all.
1st battalion of 1st Chasseurs à pied – a notable – the only exception and even During – the commander agreed that he had next day only 300 soldiers under arms and ready for combat.

Very good point, the "search" function is not the best feature on the otherwise brilliant site, shall we say?

The links above, with the occasional spelling change, did indeed get me back to this.

I now have hope that this information is not lost into the ether!

Mr. Deadhead,

I cannot spell, I am sorry – in French, in English or in Russian.
And if I could spell, I certainly cannot type on a keyboard with much accuracy.
Please forgive me.

THE 4TH chasserurs never drove anyone back as all they were doing was advancing.

The third and forth Grenadiers were defeated by the Guards and part of the 5th brigade (33rd/69th) and the other half 30th/73rd.

It is interesting to wonder what might have happened of the five Guard battalions had attacked together, which was Napoleon's intent. Ney led them forward, was unhorsed and lost control of the action on foot.

So what would have happened had La Haie Saint not fallen? we can all "what-if"

Anyway the Attack by the Guard infantry would have ended the same way as all the rest.

And as I also posted on the subject of the Guard over on the Armchair General site:

"The French Guard were like ornate chocolate fireguards. When things got hot they melted away."

For more on the retreat of the Guard retreat and grenadiers a Cheval at Waterloo:

I have given theses link before but it's worth repeating.
link
link
link

For reference; I'm Dibble201Bty in the Armchair General links above.

Paul :)

Err Gazzola!

Take that Tricolour from around your waist (or wrist) and see that "not daring" means the same as the enemy being afraid.

Oh! I have already nailed my colours to the wall in a post above and in other threads too. I make no secrets about it:

"Ok Marc! And yes I'm a Brit fan, I get my information specifically from accounts of the people who were there, I'm wary of historian story-tellers with agendas."

So If you can post first hand accounts of the Grenadiers a Cheval deserting their fellow Guardsmen and army as a whole, I would be only too pleased to be shown to be wrong and that in fact the GaC were no better than the Duke of Cumberland's hussars. Then I can safely use their example of cowardness in similar threads too.

But really, I personally think that the GaC did what the Dragoons of the Guard, Lancers, Chasseurs a Cheval and some Cuirassiers did at the end and put up some resistance alongside their compatriots.

I have not dismissed Barton's observation. In fact, I believe him when he says that he thought that they were retiring to be part of the rearguard as that is the only outcome apart from mass desertion, which I don't believe for one second.

I do belive that your friend Massena dismissed Bartons's quote once, untill that is, I put him right on that score too.

I'm also not dismissing Siborne as a whole either but I am his prose as to exactly what happened to the GaC after the encounter with Barton. Siborne has clearly embellished the story at this point as there is no other evidence of what the GaC did after, other than that of the words of Vivian's Brigade, and specifically those of the 18th LD. and that of the 15th LD.

Where is Sibornes prose where he weaves into the story, that of the 15th and 18th LD's encounter with the GaC that occurred after that of Barton's?

Barton observed the GaC for a couple of minutes before the 1st Hussars KGL (Reserve regiment of Vivian's brigade) advanced through Barton's 12th Light Dragoons (Vandeleurs brigade) who were retiring due to being too far forward. I might point out that the 1st Hussars KGL (580 total) only lost one man dead and two wounded throughout the entire day.

As for the performance of the Guard overall? Well! by all the accounts, perhaps you are right, and the Grenadiers a Cheval did desert their countrymen and Emperor after all?

Paul :)