"Different units better at different tactics?" Topic

I was at a convention and during a game a guy told me that he was familiar with almost every regiment that fought on both sides. He went on to say that different troops were better at carrying out certain fighting tactics or battle plans than others. This would depend on were the men came from, what type of training they received and what kind of officers directly commanded them.
Some examples were that some units were better at flanking because they were better at moving around, knowing the terrain, conducting hit and run probes, etc. Other units were better at skirmish style battles because they had been drilled in firing quick, rapid, accurate volleys. Other units may have had more training centered on using the bayonet and thus were better suited to assaults, charges and closing with the enemy lines type of battle plan.
So, do you guys think there is some truth to this or was he trying to think more in terms of interesting game rules and in reality regiments were not that particularly different, outside of experience, morale, etc.
If he was correct are there any units on either side that come to mind or perhaps some other battle plans that would play into the strengths or weaknesses of certain regiments and make them stand out under certain actions/battle plans, etc? Thanks, Travis.

In the ACW? Except for a few notable exceptions (ie: Mosby's raiders, Berdan's Sharpshooters, the mounted infantry in the west) I don't think this is accurate. Perhaps some regiments had reputations at being good at this or that, but both sides relied on masses of civilian-soldiers whose training was
essentially the same for all on both sides.

Drill depending a lot on the commanding officers, so yea I suspect some regiments were in practice better at certain tasks than others. But there's no documented evidence that I know of that this ever played a role in planning or a major role in any battle. Even the all-around tough units that everyone has heard of fought where even and how ever needed.

-Will

IMO…there were certainly differences in training, level of drill, and experience (both in the ranks and in command positions) that affected the ability of different regiments to carry out different types of commands or handle different types of tactical situations.

There are also clearly units which acquired reputations as being tough to move from a defensive position, or as excellent shock troops, etc. that tended to be used in those roles repeatedly. Hood's Texas Brigade comes to mind in the shock category.

There were "sharpshooter" units comprised of proven marksmen (e.g. Berdan's). And late in the war, Lee formed "sharpshooter" battalions in each Brigade for skirmishing duties. Grant/Meade drew experienced miners drawn from the ranks to dig the tunnel leading to the Crater fiasco. etc.

I honestly can't think, however, of examples of typical line units whose utilization in a particular battle was determined primarily on specific attributes like bayonet training, rate of volley fire, or skill at flanking moves.

I can see examples where Commanders might prefer to assign maneuvers to local troops who knew the terrain, especially in situations like a night march, flanking move in terrain, or leading a column. Another instance might be later in the war when the green Union Heavy Artillery Regiments were used to make frontal charges on confederate works that the jaded (and depleted) veteran units wouldn't make.

Otherwise an interesting theory that I'd love to see the evidence for.

The guy is a blowhard who is full of crap. What were there, 1,500+ Union infantry regiments? NY, Ohio and PA raised almost 800 infantry regiments themselves, and this guy is familiar with them!?

I think the ACW was a period of experimentation. And that generally the training was so bad you would not have to do much to make the units better.
"The Stonewall Brigade of the Confederate Army during the American Civil War, was a famous combat unit in United States military history. It was trained and first led by General Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson, a professor from Virginia Military Institute (VMI). His severe training program and ascetic standards of military discipline turned enthusiastic but raw recruits into an effective military organization, which distinguished itself from the First Battle of Bull Run (First Manassas) in 1861 to Spotsylvania Court House in 1864."

Thanks for the feed back guys. I do agree that having "reasonable" knowledge of all the regiments would be difficult at best and considering many probably didn't have a lot of information recorded about them, even more unlikely. I figured he was thinking more on the divisional level at best and didn't realize it:)
I also tend to agree that while their were certainly "famous" units that this was more the exception than the rule. But I think it is interesting to wonder if Army, Corp or even divisional commanders did "hand pick" certain units for a particular job as part of a overall battle plan because they were proven to be better than average at it and could be "relied on to come through".
Either way, I thought it was an interesting thought and IF there was any consistent historical proof of it, it might could be somehow used as a fun game mechanic, depending on the focus and level of the game to provide extra flavor if nothing else?

+1 79th PA

Blowhard all the way…

Blowhard indeed. I think "moron" probably applies to him as well. I suspect that his units were the ones that historically should have had the special abilities.

Zouaves?
link

In my reading on the AOP I was left with the impression that some outfits were better disciplined, better drilled, or better led, but I would be very surprised if the differences were a specific as this guy seemed to imply.

John Miller

Tossing the BS flag on this one.

I vaguely recall a brigade that advance "Indian style" that had been specifically trained that way. I'll need to look up the battle, but it assaulted somewhere in the west, and suffered minimal casualties compared to other regiments taking part in the assault.

Like a lot of ACW gamers, he probably forgot that there were other armies besides the AoP and ANV.

But, yes, there was some regiments/brigades that emphasized the bayonet, others marksmanship, etc.

IF – and it is an "if" – I was looking to reflect this idea in a game, I certainly wouldn't do it by making Regiment A statistically better than Regiment B at (insert manouvre here).

As others have pointed out, that degree of difference between regiments just isn't historically justifiable.

How I'd do it: make Regiment A more likely to do (insert manouvre here) than Regiment B, by means of a small bonus at the 'changing orders' phase of your rules.
If you think Regiment A were trained by officers who emphasized advancing drills, give them a +1 when attempting to order them to advance.

That way, they're no better at it – just somewhat more ready to attempt it.

Now that I think about it, and contradicting myself above, I seem to remember that the 1st Michigan Cavalry Regt. in Custer's Michigan Cavalry Brigade was referred to as "the sabre regt." Not sure if they were trained any differently or if that's just the way things worked out. I do believe that they were used more in this role than the other regts. of the Brigade. John Miller

While I am amused by the thought that anyone could possibly be "familiar" with every ACW regiment and their supposedly unique characteristics, the old saw about " even a broken clock still being correct twice a day" does come to mind –

Certain individual volunteer regiments at the start of the war were trained in French Zouave rapid movement and mass skirmishing tactics (although I believe that such a distinctive ability rapidly faded as casualties mounted over time. Also, I'm not sure how meaningful such unique training would have proved in the context of a battle fought at army or corps or even division level.

B

I'm onboard with the BS label.

But, if such a creature existed then the first question to ask would be "during when time period?"

This would be especially true of Union units that tended to burn out over time.

The 2nd Iowa Cav. had one battalion that specialized in sabers.

As regards the infantry it appears to be very much a matter of who the first Colonel was.

I say the first as it comes across in period accounts that they set the bar, in terms of not only how much drill there was but also what manoeuvres were practised the most.

Some commanders went pretty much through the entire book and beat it into their men line by line, others took a more pragmatic approach and kept things more low key.

Good enough to pass muster with the Brigade commander and make sure the Regiment didn't make fools of themselves and the rest of the Brigade but with a more limited menu which they had a chance of doing first time, every time, under fire.

Some always struggled with particular aspects and Colonels would avoid them if possible, in favour of something that simply got the job done.

One important thing to remember, as has already been touched on, is turn over. Newbies had to be fitted in and if you lost 15-20% of your effectives each time you showed up for a fight, it was best to keep it as simple as things would allow.

That applied to officers too. The Confederate performance later in the war was severely hampered by the loss of so many Regimental officers.

I second (third, fourth?) the BS. However, remember that Willich's brigade at Chickamauga had trained for advance by rushes. A slightly different set of maneuvers from Casey. But they were the exception from the norm.

In this regard I remember reading that the Irish Brigade kept its' smoothbore muskets for the entire war, (if I am not mistaken), so they could "get close and shoot fast". Along with that, as questionable as it may sound to us now, it was also considered part of the "Irish temperament" to be prone to close with the bayonet. With things like this in mind, if correct, there may be some truth in what the guy says but, IMHO, it is also mixed with some degree of exaggeration. John Miller

"the Irish Brigade kept its' smoothbore muskets for the entire war, (if I am not mistaken)"

….. I know that they still had them as late as Gettysburg.

B

The principal reason the Irish had smoothbores was Thomas Meager, who had decided that the war was still going to be fought at 75yds or less and decided that the impact of Buck and Ball followed by a bayonet charge was the way to go.

Regardless of that, when the "Catholic" 28th Mass were traded into the Brigade for the "Protestant" 29th Mass before Fredericksburg (lucky them) they came with Enfields.

As a result they often pulled duty as skirmishers or flankers for the Brigade.

The rest (or what was left of them) kept their muskets until June 1864 when the Brigade was temporally broken up. On reconstitution into the "Consolidated Brigade" they managed to loose the muskets along the way!

It's worth noting that although we talk of any unit having one type of weapon or another, Ordnance Returns (where completed) often show a mash up between different companies right through the war.

However for wargames purposes unless playing at a level where individual companies matter its less hassle to go one way or the other!

And of course the Petersburg Crater, forget the chocolate soldier marching manual, a commander will always carry out additional training if they think their troops will benefit.

Without examples of what gamer1's gaming friend was referring to, who knows what he meant.

Let's not forget that regiments and even brigades had to maneuver and fight together, so each unit doing their 'own thing' wasn't conducive to success in the long run.