"General Jean-Dominique Bourgeat" Topic

General of Brigade Bourgeat was a French artillery officer and at the Battle of Albuera on 16 May 1811 he was serving as the artillery chief of Girard's V Corps under Marshal Soult.

I had no idea about the outstanding artillery action fought by the French artillery officer at Albuera in 1811 and came across it while conducting some research in Nick Lipscombe's Wellington's Guns.

At the end of the action with the French infantry defeated and broken, Bourgeat employed the V Corps artillery with their backs to the Chicapierna stream because he could not withdraw his artillery and hope to survive intact because the running French infantry were blocking the ford and the allied troops were pursuing the defeated French infantry.

Bourgeat ordered h is chief of staff, Colonel Bouchu, to take command of the corps artillery reserve of twelve pieces and deployed them facing the allied pursuit. Bourgeat them formed the rest of the V Corps artillery, 17 guns, into a second battery alongside Bouchu's command.

The 1st Battalions of the 12th Legere were in hand and were in support of the artillery as was Latour-Maubourg's cavalry on the left flank.

As the French infantry headed to the stream to cross, Bourgeat opened fire as soon as his two batteries were unmasked. Firing canister, the French artillery stopped the allied pursuit. Bourgeat's ADC, Captain Jean-Etienne Pernet, present at the action, noted that 'Each time the enemy advanced in pursuit, we crushed them with our artillery fire.' Every officer and man understood the grave nature of the situation and stood to their guns and continued to pour canister into the allied ranks. One horse artilleryman, Lt Kernier of the 3d Horse Artillery, 'carrying a telescope and wearing a bearskin cap' was wounded twice but refused to be evacuated and stayed with his troops. He later died of the third wound incurred in the action.

This outstanding artillery action not only stopped the allied pursuit, but the example given by Bourgeat and his gunners slowed down the French infantry and allowed many to be rallied around their eagles. They continued to cross the stream and formed line of battle on the other side.

When the time came to withdraw, Bourgeat had his two large batteries withdraw, firing, by alternate bounds to the rear and not a gun nor a caisson was lost. Beresford remarked that the French artillery and cavalry saved their infantry.

This action is akin to Senarmont's action at Friedland in 1807, except that the quick-witted Bourgeat did it in the opposite direction while defeating the allied infantry.

It is much more important, as well as being larger and much more decisive, artillery-wise, than Norman Ramsay's more celebrated artillery exploit at Fuentes de Onoro the same year.

Sources for this are Wellington's Gunners by Nick Lipscombe, 189, and Albuera 1811 by Guy Dempsey, 195-197.

Primary sources for this action can be found in Le General Baron Bourgeat 1760-1827 d'apres sa Correspondence et des Documents inedits. Pernet's memoir is contained in this volume.

It can be found on Google Books:

link

Terrific post. Thank you.

Kent

Agreed great post!

Love the reference to the horse artillery officer in a bearskin (I assume colpack). I love this we sort of uniform details that are never in regulations but were used anyway

Wonderful information. The obvious question is why we never heard of this man before. I suspect the answer is simply that we rely too much on English language sources. French wargamers and historians probably are familiar with this episode.

I came across it doing research for a project and it has been in print in English for 9 years in Guy Dempsey's book.

Wonderful information. The obvious question is why we never heard of this man before. I suspect the answer is simply that we rely too much on English language sources. French wargamers and historians probably are familiar with this episode.

This episode does get a mention in Oman, but it is pretty bare. The French account is here: link

I've had a go at translating Pernet's bit:

We again encountered the enemy army on the heights of Albuera on 16 May 1811. We formed up our attack columns. Marshal Soult gave me the order to lead a battery of six horse artillery guns commanded by General Latour-Maubourg, which formed the left of our line-of-battle and which was threatened by the right wing of the enemy. I engaged in a lively cannonade with the enemy; during this time, our infantry advanced in close column and then deployed into line of battle; the fusillade and the cannonade became general along the whole line. We defeated an English regiment to our left and took two cannon, that I sent away to our park. Whilst I was busy with the battery and gathering the two pieces that the English had just abandoned to us, their cavalry charged us in a lively manner and they had just come to the point of driving in my battery before a regiment of our hussars crossed steel with the enemy. General Latour-Maubourg, seeing the danger to our position, charged with his dragoons the English cavalry's flank who, believing themselves to be beaten, retired and were then clear. My battery was reunited with its division, following the orders of the Marshal, I rejoined my general and I received a light wound on the left shoulder from a musket ball. The enemy, who was much superior to us in number, marched upon us, and disordered one of our regiments, which had not been able to deploy properly and which retired with great difficulty; our whole line felt this and retreated. My general gave the order to Colonel Bouchu, his chief of staff, to put himself at the head of the reserve artillery, composed of 12 guns. We went forward onto the battlefield, our divisional batteries rejoined to us; our infantry retired to behind our artillery line of battle and continued to retreat. Each time the enemy came up to pursue us, we struck them with our artillery. We carried out our retreat by echelons, and continued our fire. Our troops were cornered at the Albuera stream, very deep and wide, which we were only able to cross at a small number of fords which had been established. Meanwhile, as our artillery protected the retreat by a continuous and well-directed fire, our infantry crossed the stream by the fords and then reformed in battle order at the rear, on the heights, facing those on the heights of Albuera, which were occupied by the enemy army. Our artillery also arrived successively, losing neither a cannon nor a caisson. Many times General Latour-Maubourg said to us to retire with our artillery, because the infantry hadn't stayed to protect us, and in case the enemy came to attack us determinedly, he believed that we wouldn't be able to protect ourselves effectively.
On this day, we had quite severe losses, and although the field of battle remained in the hands of the enemy, he was stronger than us. Fortunately our artillery supported the retreat of the French army with intelligence and courage which had a nearly impassable obstacle behind, save for the fords.
Each army remained in place through the night, the following day, and the following night without exchanging a single shot. We limited ourselves to carrying out reconnaissance, treating our wounded and burying our dead. Our army quitted its position on the second night and we reached Zafra that day. After some hours of rest, our army corps was divided into two columns; one was directed upon Monasterio and the other on Constantina and we returned to Seville.

It is a very interesting little part of the action, reading how the French artillery managed to save the French from complete destruction.

And the main text:

After these laborious conquests, the V Corps had to leave Estremadura. Marshal Soult left a garrison in Badajoz, evacuated the other places and came back to Seville with all his troops. The enemy profited by re-taking their old positions; with the help of their English and Portuguese allies, they reconquered all of Estremadura and forced the French army to restart these annoying endeavours. The Duke of Dalmatia marched to meet them and make contact with the Allied army on the heights of Albuera. In this important battle, the General Bourgeat had a decisive role. He behaved bravely and showed himself to be a skilled tactician. V Corps, crushed by the number of its enemies, had to retreat slowly because of the difficulties of the terrain. Bourgeat was able to protect this movement with some guns without an infantry escort. Placed at the rear guard with his artillery, he bombarded and retreated by echelons, and so stopped the pursuit of the enemy. He divided his batteries into two distinct groups, taking command of the principal group himself and confiding the direction of the reserve to Colonel Bouchu, his chief-of-staff, then whilst the infantry retired in good order and passed in succession through some practicable fords over the Albuera stream, he held off the shock (mass) of the enemy, no group retired without the protection of the guns of the other; the army remained always protected by the sustained fire of a body of artillery.
This retreat by echelons was made especially remarkable by reason of the special conditions in which it was effected: a small contingent of guns and artillerymen, without accompanying infantry, an ardent pursuit and well-conducted by the Spanish army and an absolute necessity of only retreating extremely slowly. Bourgeat took into account all of these diverse factors and saved V Corps from an irremediable rout, which was able, thanks to him, to cross the Albuhera stream and form a line of battle on the heights where the enemy didn't dare to attack us. After two nights and a day of rest, Marshal Soult returned to Seville.

Guy Dempseys's Albuera book gets a good mention there too.

Of course the other difference between the artillery exploits at Albuera and at Fuentes de Onoro, is that the French were beaten in both, so Ramsay's exploit was part of a success.

Paul :)

attilathepun47

Wonderful information. The obvious question is why we never heard of this man before. I suspect the answer is simply that we rely too much on English language sources. French wargamers and historians probably are familiar with this episode.

You will be pleasantly surprised what is mentioned in English speaking accounts. Unless that is you find anything penned in that language, by a British author questionable.

Apart from Dempsey, Oman, and lipscombe, mentioned above, other English speaking authors mention the episode too. But then, the exploits of the French cavalry and Allied infantry are much more of a salient point to linger on so are naturally the main talking points of the battle.

Paul :)

It is a very interesting little part of the action…

As Worf once said to Commander Riker: 'Little?'…

@Whirlwind,

Thanks for the translation.

I had not been aware of this and it seems an ideal basis for a scenario. Always interesting how the real world works. Often in game-land this sort of scenario is difficult to make work as ones troops block the guns. But in real life these sort of situations are possible.

Marc

Brechtel198 & Whirlwind: Very interesting stuff here, none of which I was aware of. Thanks for the information and the translation. John Miller

You're welcome.

It certainly surprised me when I came across it by accident.

Brechtel198: As a student of the Napoleonic Wars, especially the French Army, I always find these kinds of items fascinating. Even though I managed to obtain what I consider a substantial collection of volumes on the subject it seems I seldom get a chance to read much of it. John Miller

@ Attila and John,

You are very welcome.

John,

I understand completely. I have some I need to get to and haven't had the chance yet.

Have you gone to Google Books to download out of print and out of copyright material? The site has many, many volumes worth having and they don't take up space in the house.

K

It is much more important, as well as being larger and much more decisive, artillery-wise, than Norman Ramsay's more celebrated artillery exploit at Fuentes de Onoro the same year.

the two should not be compared.

Considering one was at the head of 6 batteries of guns, on the other side of a stream, (enemy side) with large bodies of cavalry ready to help if need be. The way the batteries were handled was an example that showed how the artillery of the French outshone its infantry arm in battle.

As for Ramsay, his exploit with a couple of guns and a regiment of light Dragoons was really nothing to write home about unless that is, you are William Napier, scrawling some over-hyped glory-fest years later. OK, saving the guns and getting out without casualties was a episode of note but it wasn't the myth-made telling penned by Napier. It was not the fateful Ramsay's fault and obviously he would have no say in the matter as he was long dead when Napier's 'tour de force' was published. Anyway! Ramsay's record as a brave and excellent artillery officer is there for all to see, He didn't need the Napier touch, he had his own, by the bucket-load.

Paul :)

Just took a look at Oman's account of the artillery action at the end of Albuera and it's nothing to write home about.

Bourgeat is not mentioned, Oman gets the number of guns wrong, mentions six French artillery batteries when they were task organized into two, and downplays the significance of the action.

Interestingly, he does not have Bourgeat listed in the index, but does have Ramsay's exploit chronicled by name and in the index as well.

So, interesting but not unexpected.

It is a great account.

I think as the war progressed there were any number of aggressive--and well-conducted actions by artillery officers that often get overlooked. Artillery officers had a better status in the French army than the Allied forces, so their exploits are more often mentioned, if at all.

The British action at Talavera detailed in Adye's Pocket Gunner is a good example. Only alluded to in Wellington's AAR. And of course, aggressive actions such as Senarmont's at Talavera where he attempted a similar Friedland charge lost him several guns.

As mentioned before, the French were more than willing to risk losing guns if they could gain a tactical advantage on the field.

Bourgeat is not mentioned, Oman gets the number of guns wrong, mentions six French artillery batteries when they were task organized into two, and downplays the significance of the action.

Well…

You are right he doesn't mention Bougeat and says that Soult used most of his 40 guns. The reason he doesn't mention is that Soult got his name wrong in the despatch and Soult himself said he used 40 guns link . So the problems here lie in Soult's despatch – well-known already, since he explicitly lied about his own casualties and the result of Albuera and made wild over-estimations of the Allied casualties (his despatch is contradicted by the stuff above, never mind the obvious lies about his casualties). Because Soult lied in his report, he didn't give Bougeat the credit for this particular action. Beresford pretty much put in his report what Oman reports, which is more than Soult did: i.e. the strong, well-handled French artillery and cavalry prevented any pursuit. He doesn't mention particularly heavy casualties from the French artillery because the Allies seemed not to have suffered any (the Portuguese brigades probably involved here didn't report heavy casualties) link (Hamilton's Div and Collins' Bde) – not in the context of Albuera.

I don't think anyone apart from Soult downplays the significance of the action by the French artillery and cavalry at the end: their skill after the utter defeat and rout of the French infantry prevented the complete destruction of V Corps, a most noteworthy achievement.

I cannot find any reference in Oman regarding Senarmont attacking with artillery as he did at Friedland. The artillery that was lost belonged to Leval's division and it was lost because Leval was defeated.

There are no indications that there was an attempt to duplicate the artillery charge at Friedland. Leval's artillery was advancing to support Leval's attack. In short, the artillery was under Leval's control, not Senarmont's and while advancing in support of the French infantry was lost. They were not conducting an artillery attack.

Regarding Adye and Talavera, here is what is in the 1813 edition of Adye, 20-21, regarding the British artillery action concerned which includes a diagram.

'At the commencement of the battle, the British artillery was stationed by brigades of 6 guns, with the divisions to which they were attached; a temporary redoubt, unfinished, was thrown up at F, in which was posted a brigade of 3-pounders; on the hill, at A, the most commanding point, were two brigades, one of heavy 6-pounders, the other of light sixes, and two Spanish guns afterwards were added to them.'

'The French had a battery of 14 guns in the center at K, and others at G and H, independent of others which were brought up during the action. On the second day, when the columns at M advanced, supported by artillery fire, to the attack of the British right, which appuyed on the unfinished redoubt, the three brigades at EEE were formed in an oblique line from L to E, as represented by the dotted line, and took the columns in the flank, whilst the redoubt kept up a direct fire to their front. It must be observed, that when an oblique line is formed with the artillery, as at LE, it should be directed without the extremity of the enemy's flank, otherwise the guns would be exposed to be enfiladed.'

Here, the British artillery was emplaced to support the defense of the position and to support the infantry being attacked by the French infantry. This was not similar to Senarmont's action at Friedland. It was very similar to Smola's action by his reinforced cavalry battery (14 guns) which supported the defending Austrian infantry against a French infantry attack.

Brechtel198: Thank you for the advise. I am a computer idiot but fortunately for me, when I showed your posting to my son-in-law, a computer whiz, or so he says, he has agreed to help me attempt to do what you suggested. Thank you very much for assisting me. John Miller

You're welcome. I have found Google Books to be a great help in period research.

There are no indications that there was an attempt to duplicate the artillery charge at Friedland.

Kevin:
I'm surprised you haven't come across that. Senarmont was at Talavera. It was an embarrassment for Senarmont and blame for losing several guns because of it was deflected back and forth.

Here, the British artillery was emplaced to support the defense of the position

The three artillery brigades were moved forward of the British position by several hundred yards with its flank hanging in the air toward the French lines to take the attacking columns in flank. A very aggressive move regardless of why it was done, organized by the Robe, a artillery division commander early in Britain's Spanish campaigns.

Ah ha. So it is here where this thread will de-rail. Thank you gentlemen up to this point as it was an interesting start, but I will leave you now as I think the name calling may be about to start. At this point, discretion will be the better part of valour

Marc

I too have found this thread informative and interesting to this point but, with McLaddie now deciding to goad Kevin I too will move on – why must this always happen to these otherwise useful threads!?! Sigh!

I'm surprised you haven't come across that. Senarmont was at Talavera. It was an embarrassment for Senarmont and blame for losing several guns because of it was deflected back and forth.

Embarrassed Senarmont may have been, but he didn't lose them, they were Laval's division artillery employed by him and lost by him. And it was not during a maneuver a la Friedland. And I knew about Senarmont being at Talavera. He was a corps artillery chief.

The three artillery brigades were moved forward of the British position by several hundred yards with its flank hanging in the air toward the French lines to take the attacking columns in flank. A very aggressive move regardless of why it was done, organized by the Robe, a artillery division commander early in Britain's Spanish campaigns.

Yes, and it was in response to a French infantry attack with the British artillery supporting their own infantry against that attack. Again, not a maneuver a la Friedland. I posted the portion in Adye which says nothing about an artillery attack and supports the artillery being part of the defense, not conducting offensive operations.

I'm surprised you haven't come across that. Senarmont was at Talavera. It was an embarrassment for Senarmont and blame for losing several guns because of it was deflected back and forth.

Embarrassed Senarmont may have been, but he didn't lose them, they were Laval's division artillery employed by him and lost by him. And it was not during a maneuver a la Friedland. And I knew about Senarmont being at Talavera. He was a corps artillery chief.

And as this discussion of Talavera has gone on before I suggest that we leave it here.

The three artillery brigades were moved forward of the British position by several hundred yards with its flank hanging in the air toward the French lines to take the attacking columns in flank. A very aggressive move regardless of why it was done, organized by the Robe, a artillery division commander early in Britain's Spanish campaigns.

Yes, and it was in response to a French infantry attack with the British artillery supporting their own infantry against that attack. Again, not a maneuver a la Friedland. I posted the portion in Adye which says nothing about an artillery attack and supports the artillery being part of the defense, not conducting offensive operations.

If the Allied cavalry at Albuera had been half the value of their infantry, Bourgeat's guns would have been in the bag along with many more French infantry. As it was, the allied cavalry 'to some, Sackvillesque' bit part' seems to be lost in the overall drama of the day.

As for numbers, occurrences and happenings, It all still needs a lot more research. Dempsey's book is very good and the best to date, but I'm sure there is another possibly more detailed tome on the battle waiting to be written.

Paul :)

Embarrassed Senarmont may have been, but he didn't lose them, they were Laval's division artillery employed by him and lost by him.

Well, that certainly was Senarmont's story, but not Laval's.

Yes, and it was in response to a French infantry attack.

Yep and Senarmont's request for more guns at Friedland was in response to Dupont's un-ordered advance. He was attempting to cover Ney's corps precipitous retreat on the right. Senarmont's stated intention to Napoleon and Victor in his request was to support Dupont, not charge the Russians without him. Things develop from the aggressive use of guns in response to any number of things, sometimes successfully and sometimes not so much.

good posiing McLaddy, Brechtel198 repeating his obsolete postings of yesteryear on Friedland – which is no surprise indeed.

If the Allied cavalry at Albuera had been half the value of their infantry, Bourgeat's guns would have been in the bag along with many more French infantry. As it was, the allied cavalry 'to some, Sackvillesque' bit part' seems to be lost in the overall drama of the day.

That is a bit unfair. Considering that a small amount of British and Spanish cavalry held several thousand to a stand-still for most of the battle, does say something. They were the only thing keeping more than just the Polish Lancer regiment and Hussars from hitting the British Flank. The problem is that there is little said about the Allied cavalry because nothing happened with them… and being a threat was more useful than any charge against great odds. It also may have helped that the Allied cavalry stood behind a stream and marshy ground.

Well yes! And I agree to a point but then like the people who were there, and across 216 years of discussion since, the controversy is still good for debate, like the other incidents being scrutinised on this and the other artillery related thread that Brechtel has started.

Paul :)