"Odds of a squadron surviving 1 pass at a square?" Topic

By my estimate, they could only get one or two in. I'm looking at my 2mm figs while trying to figure this out. If a squadron got within 15 meters or so of a square, they would face a quarter of the battalions or brigades firepower at extreme close range. Cavalry are large targets, and the bodies of the horses would present a major impediment to further charges. Unless the calvary got very lucky, it seems more likely that they could only really keep the infantry immobilized, unless they were supported by artillery or something of that nature. But, if the cavalry charge failed, I could very easily see the squadron losing 40 or 50 troops per pass. That's about a third of an average squadrons number. It's really not sustainable, or even to be recommended. I imagine this is exactly why heavy cavalry wasn't used except as an arm of rupture against a retreating enemy (ideally…). Otherwise it was a waste of men and horses.

So, my thought is, where rules treat cavalry charges at squares as life-or-death for the infantry, maybe they should also be life and death for the cavalry squadron?

Thoughts?

So many variables I think.
Even if 25% of a battalions muskets were aimed at the squadron, that would be what 100-200 muskets. Every rank won't fire so maybe only half of them fire, and a few of them don't work. I doubt a whole squadron could be wiped out… they'd halt and retreat before they got wiped out. If they get too close I'd imagine the infantry wouldn't fire. You don't want human and horse missiles ploughing into you. And horses won't drive them selves into a wall of spikes.

Is there any guarantee that the square would form and not break and run let alone fire?

The squadron wouldn't be wiped out, but could it be reorganised quickly enough to have another go? I'm guessing if it's a group of squares then attacking cavalry might well become very disorganised and difficult to get back into a state that they can carry on the attack.

Cavalry had well-known strategies for engaging squares – they didn't just run at them and offer themselves up to successive broadsides. They would typically engage on the corners, and disperse at high speed if the square didn't look to be breaking up. A squadron also would not engage alone, but ideally in waves of several successive squadrons, at staggered intervals in different locations. The image of nicely ranked cavalry stoically suffering serried volleys is not what usually happened. Engagements usually resulted in extremely light casualties on both sides, with the infantry pinned and the cavalry likely disorganized IF it chose to engage, rather than simply pin the infantry and tease them with maneuvers out of musket range.

The actual casualties suffered by cavalry in charging squares could be very light and were rarely heavy unless repeatedly attempted. Any result would not be as catastrophic as a square breaking.

How many times did the French "charge" the squares at Waterloo?

Deliberately not quoting a number here, it depends who you read, but lets say more than twice! :o)

One squadron alone attacking an infantry square would be highly unlikely. Cavalry commanders would normally attack in a column of squadrons and would begin with at least a regiment and if possible supported by horse artillery.

There's an excellent story told by Faber du Faur during the Russian campaign where Murat was attacking a large Russian square of infantry caught in the open and did not coordinate his charges with his attached artillery (which isn't surprising). Faber du Faur, who was there with the supporting artillery, was quite disgusted with the outcome, for though the Russians suffered significant casualties, they got away. Faber du Faur believed they could have been destroyed if Murat had paid attention and used his artillery competently.

I am sure Murat looked good while he was screwing up, though.

A gallant hussar once said, "It's much better to look good than to feel good."

We tend to overestimate the effectiveness of musket fire in our games. Just because "25%" of a square could fire doesn't mean that 25% of those muskets aren't fouled with powder, have too many musket balls jammed in them, don't have a misfire, don't have a terrified soldier unable to pull the trigger, don't have poor aim, don't all aim at the same target, etc etc.

IIRC, the infantry were supposed to hold their fire unless the horse were definitely committed. Firing at a squadron that peeled off early would mean unloaded guns for an actual attack.
Even against a full charge, the front rank's job was to hold off the enemy with bayonet, not firing. If they did fire too soon, then the musket would be empty for when it might be needed at very close range and reloading would mean the front rank are not prepared to receive a charge with bayonet.
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I remember reading somewhere that if infantry fired at cavalry that were too close, the falling / dying horse could crush the men in the square (bear in mind horse and rider could weigh in excess of a ton) and provide a route in for the remaining cavalry. I think something similar happened somewhere in the Peninsular but not sure?

That would obviously be a factor when deciding to fire / not fire

J

Think of charging squares as much more as a skirmish affair. Lots of feigned starts and stops by smaller formations then the squadron to psych the infantry into breaking or to take advantage of some disorder and gaps. The infantry did not fire allout volleys either but always held some muskets in readiness. All out charges are Hollywood. Squares were best addressed by combined arms and the horsemen usually understood this and thus if a square was formed and in good order there was not much the cav could do, the all out charge being pretty much useless. Luck, such as a dying horse creating a gap was not to be relied on, better to get up a section of the 6lb flying battery.

Think of charging squares as much more as a skirmish affair. Lots of feigned starts and stops by smaller formations then the squadron to psych the infantry into breaking or to take advantage of some disorder and gaps. The infantry did not fire allout volleys either but always held some muskets in readiness. All out charges are Hollywood. Squares were best addressed by combined arms and the horsemen usually understood this and thus if a square was formed and in good order there was not much the cav could do, the all out charge being pretty much useless. Luck, such as a dying horse creating a gap was not to be relied on, better to get up a section of the 6lb flying battery.

Pretty much rock, paper, scissors. Properly formed squares with steady troops will keep off cavalry. Reading some accounts of the Autumn Campaign of '13 the other night I was struck by the fact that the weather caused huge problems for formed infantry and there squares were broken because the infantry could not put down an adequate volume of fire.

Most of us have read of cavalry walking around squares looking for an opportunity to exploit a weak spot. Plainly, if you have a loaded musket you would only discharge it as a defensive measure against an individual cavalryman who got too close. Experienced infantry in square would be confident that they were safe enough as long as the formation held together. Though there are many accounts of 'squares' being overrun by cavalry it is likely the infantry were in a closed column, unsteadied either by surprise or being unable to present the conventional, orderly 'hedge' of bayonets backed up by ranks of loaded muskets.
It is significant that all nations used a 'double line' (four or six ranks) formation when advancing and likely to be opposed by cavalry, but this needed to be supported on the flanks by columns and was effective only against an assault from the front. The 'closed column' concept, though theoretically presenting a solid perimeter, cannot have been as effective as a square since the individuals who had turned to the flank simply did not have the depth to properly wield a musket.

Interesting points and numbers.
I just looked it up in the translation of the original kriegspiel. Reiswitz states about 12 casualties per attempt, whether the cavalry succeed or not. In other words, about 10% casualties from a full strength squadron in one attempt. Pretty high, but far from total destruction. That said, the numbers of casualties suffered by the Cavalry reserve at Wagram are often described as very high, and they equate to about 10% of the total number o men present, IIRC; but then, there is a huge difference between a squadron taking 10% casualties and a corps taking 10% casualties…

I suspect both scale and determination matter. I can see the Waterloo situation--large number of cavalry looking for a weak point. But toss a squadron or so in against a battalion--maybe hoping to catch them before they could form square? Something like Garcia Hernandez or parts of Quatre Bras?--and the resolution might be much faster. In that case, I don't know how many troopers you'd lose off your ration strength, but I wouldn't have big plans for them for later in the battle.

I've often wondered in such a situation how much damage a horse could take before going down. A horse is a huge animal with a great deal of musculature and apart from an obvious mortal wound, how many hits could it take before going down. The reason for this is that, except for a side shot, a cavalryman is masked in large measure by the body of the horse. So, for example if infantry is firing on infantry, virtually every hit can make a man hor de combat. But, in the case of infantry vs cavalry, can the same be said?
Rob

Cavalry very seldom takes huge casualties in most battle cases.
That is one of the big mistakes in most game rules.

When it has more than 1/4th casualty in an action, it goes into the history.
Totenritt at Mars la tour in 1870, with lots of firers who can engage from way further than 1815, and with many times more shots, plus cavalry counterattacks etc. Had say 30-40% casualties ( from memory).

And it is even worse ( for many gamers) or better ( for the cavalrymen) between themselves, very few actual melees, lots of pushing , falling back, routing, rallying.
That's why systems which count casualties for determining the winners with cavalry fights are off the mark.
In memoirs , seen from close it might look impressive with lots of horses falling etc, say 20 in 2 minutes in a close space, ( your bn square has what? 25 m side?) fear… Will translate in memoirs as a fearfull slaughter when 25 casualties for 500 guys engaged.

Von Bredow at Mars la Tour took 52.5% casualties – 420 out of 800. That was actually a charge against three gun lines (with a cavalry counter-charge into the flank.

Which were taken in a way they could see them too late and fire not so,much, the infantry fire that was something else. Even 52% is exceptional, not our normal stuff.

It is my impression that reported casualties to cavalry formations usually refer to men only. If that is the case, as a rule of thumb, would it not be correct to estimate the total loss to the unit as double the number of reported causalities in order to take into consideration the losses in horseflesh? I realize this would be only the roughest of estimates and would depend on many variables. Thanks in advance for any opinions anyone would care to express. John Miller

@ John

That would depend on whether the defenders aimed at the horse, were artillery, etc.

After Waterloo the Guard heavy division mustered about 50% of its pre-battle strength, which could easily mean that by about 7pm, they had nil strength. If half the men had no horse and the other half were wounded the division has ceased to exist until uninjured men can locate uninjured horses to ride.

how much damage a horse could take before going down

Recently read about Grant and staff having a close call (sorry, forgot which battle). They came under small arms fire and had to run for it. Once safe, one of the staff horses dropped dead.

Relative to my earlier point, (and of course I have no facts to support this) if horses masked their riders (to some extent) and if the horses could take more hits than humans and still be functional, then it stands to reason that on this point alone, the casulties for the cavalry would be less than those sustained in an inf vs inf situation.

Having stated that, I suspect that the smaller number of casulties sustained by cavalry against a firing infantry square may have more to do with the duration of fire that they were subjected to. In a game we might say that a turn represents 20 minutes for example. I suspect that once it became obvious that the chances of penetrating the squate was minimal and the cavalry would rally and withdraw. So, that 20 minute interval of sustained fire might only be 5 -10 minutes?

Rob

4th Cuirassier: First, thanks for your response. Sorry to be so delayed in getting back to you. Of course there would be many variables but without some idea of loss to horses can any estimate of actual remaining strength to a cavalry unit be guessed at? I do understand your point in reference to the Guard Heavy Division at Waterloo. I only mention it because it has been an issue I seldom see discussed when the subject of cavalry actions come up. Thanks, John Miller

It really isn't an issue of pure casualties, but of cohesion. Cavalry is brittle even if successful in its attack. Hence why so many charges are really just feints, yet still called such in the memoirs.