More on the retreat from Burgos:'Before long the dismounted far exceeded the mounted men in number, and these were sent off every morning under a subaltern an hour before the rest of the regiment. Further, although the army marched no more than four leagues a day, yet night had always fallen before the cavalry reached their allotted bivouacs…At each bivouac there was little to be done but tie each poor horse to some tree, and lie down in the mud, while the melancholy sky continued to discharge its rain. The men hardly had heart to light fires and, when they did, the glow of the still smouldering embers in the early morning would reveal the pale faces of comrades who had died during the night.'-Journal of the 1st (Royal) Dragoons.
'I had placed him under Sir Edward Paget, in the 1sr Division; and on the night after poor Paget was taken, he and certain other General officers commanding divisions (new comers) held a council of war to decide whether they should obey my orders to march by a particular road. He, at the head, decided he would not: they marched by a road leading they did not know where, and when I found them in the morning they were in the utmost confusion, not knowing where to go or what to do. This with the enemy close to them, and with the knowledge that, owing to the state of the roads and the weather, I felt the greatest anxiety respecting the movement.'-Wellington to Colonel Torrens, regarding General Stewart.
'…the enemy was either not up in force today, or did not choose to press-for the greatest confusion prevailed throughout. The principal columns of the army went astray without any cavalry to cover it, and 'tis difficult to imagine the extent of the evil that might, and probably would, have ensued from a vigorous and well-directed attack.'-Benjamin d'Urban.
'…the weather being very unfavorable, raining as hard as it could pour, the soil being clay, and the roads at the best of times not very good, the marches were very distressing. Add to this on a retreat it is seldom prudent to have baggage with you, so that after being drench'd all day with rain, we had but the wet ground to sleep on at night. Neither ourselves nor our horses had much to eat, and both men and officers three days without bread. Our loss had been very severe, many men exhausted by fatigue, and want, died on the road; others were left with their legs in a state of mortification from cold and wet.'-George Bingham.
'To give you an impression of the miseries of out retreat would be impossible unless I had you here to talk it over. Suffice to say that nothing could have been worse conducted. We commenced our march on the 14th November and it never ceased raining until our arrival at Alamandilla on the 21st, therefore you may suppose the state of the country was in for the poor men and horses. I am unacquianited with the number of each we have lost, but it must be prodigiously great. You can easily imagine this when I tell you that the enemy were pushing us hard the whole way and that I saw some hundreds of men, women, and children stuck in the mud, and unable to move from hunger and sickness. In a great many instances our poor wounded men had only the alternative either of being left behind and falling into the hands of the enemy, or being dragged along by two men of their regiment. You may judge of my feelings on being obliged to refuse applications to carry these unfortunate being on our gun carriages. Many of them, to excite compassion, would pull their clothes aside to show their wounds, but we were obliged to turn a deaf ear to them or risk the loss of our guns by overloading the horses.'-Thomas Dyneley.
'Many men who had been under General Moore, during the disastrous retreat to Corunna, avowed they had undergone more fatigue, and suffered greater privations on the retreat from Madrid, than they had ever done the whole of their lives.'-William Brown.
Brown also remarked that what they had gone through were 'unparalleled and unheard of hardships.'
'…the Corunna retreat, from what I experienced of it, and the opinion that I have heard given by those officers who were on both, will bear no comparison with this.'-George Wood.
'The difficulties, privations, and hardships we encountered, were probably almost as severe as those endured in the retreat of the French from Moscow, with the exception of the distance; and, for myself, I certainly should prefer marching through frost and snow, to rain and mire. I do not think that I exaggerate greatly, in saying that we lost nearly as great a number of men, in proportion, as the ill-fated host of fugitives from Russia.'-George Wood.
It is not in doubt that the army suffered privations etc, But where is your evidence that it 'fell apart'? You have brought absolutely no evidence.
You also brought the drinking episode at Torquemada as evidence that the army fell apart, but though there was many still drunk, they nevertheless were very much with the army.
Napier reckoned that 'iirc' some 12,000 were drunk! 'which is greatly exagerated' But even if they were they did not fall apart as the division ( which was only a part of the army, not 'the' army) still marched off next morning. Pages 106 to 108 will tell you as much….No evidence of a falling apart.
Seeing as in fact you do have access to Divall's tome, you can tell those who haven't read it, where the evidence shows that the army fell apart as there is absolutely no quote from any of the eyewitnesses of any nation that said it did and there is certainly no evidence of any British regiments doing so either, and the author Carole Divall, certainly doesn't.
A bit of information of what book you are quoting from wouldn‘t go amiss. I show you the courtesy of letting you know where I get my information, perhaps reciprocation would help not only me, but others with the ongoing topic.
There is nothing to show anything other than that of an army retreating, perhaps not in good order under the circumstances of the privations, even with a bit of disorder; but still an army that stayed together just like that of the army that retreated to Corunna. Neither army fell apart.