"Old French Guard or not?" Topic

Using conkers rules, the British Guards and the Oxfordshires, among others were better than the French Guard, based on their respective performances at Waterloo.

That said, half the Guard ended up sent to Plaucenoit and the grognards were not committed at all until it was too late, they were terribly badly used at Waterloo imo.

If you are going to compare British line and French guards, compare their performance in adversity. E.g the retreat from Moscow and the retreats to corunna / from burgos where a great many of the British regiments (not all), disintegrated.

Erm, if you do compare them, then the British guards come out extremely well, much better than the French…was that the point you wished to make?

If you are going to compare British line and French guards, compare their performance in adversity. E.g the retreat from Moscow and the retreats to corunna / from burgos where a great many of the British regiments (not all), disintegrated.

Where Burgos is concerned the great many regiments didn't disintegrate! If they had, then the army as a whole would have been lost.

Perhaps you can furnish me with a long list of those disintegrated Regiments.

Have you read the accounts of the retreat to Corunna? What happened to the Imperial Guard? Albeit a cavalry arm, when it came into contact? what happened when the rear-guard turned and fought? what was the result of the battle outside Corunna? We have all heard of the drunkenness that occurred, which only blighted a few on the retreat but has been over highlighted in its telling. All the same, whenever the regiments mustered for a fight, they were always keen at the prospect and almost always won through or put up an excellent show.

Anyway! We didn't make the history, they did. That the British Regiments almost always won through in actions is fact. That they did it on occasion in spite of their leadership or circumstance that they were in , is also fact. Whose leadership did the Imperial Guard Grenadiers fight under throughout the Wars? Whose leadership did the British regiments fight under?

Paul :)

The French Imperial Guard developed into a combat organization of all arms, something no other combatant or nation of the period did.

The Imperial Guard functioned as the Grande Armee's reserve and even its presence on the battlefield could be intimidating. Wrede found that out at Hanau in 1813.

The Guard cavalry and artillery was usually committed to action, the Old Guard infantry, which was usually never more than a few picked regiments, usually was not. That changed from 1813-1815.

The Middle Guard infantry and the Young Guard were committed to action when needed, and the Middle Guard was made up of picked troops, the Old Guard of picked veterans, and the Young Guard of the pick of the conscripts.

The Guard itself, besides being an excellent combat organization, also functioned as a military school which sent trained and experienced soldiers back to the Line.

There were eight Old Guard infantry regiments in 1815. The Middle Guard was not reactivated upon Napoleon's return from Elba. Their combat performance in Belgium is documented by Petit and Mauduit. Pelet's performance with two Old Guard battalions in Plancenoit on the French right flank at Waterloo was an outstanding example of fighting outnumbered.

In point of fact, Napoleon fought outnumbered against Wellington because 16,000 French troops (Guard and Lobau's VI Corps) were sent to face the Prussians. And Wellington was done at Waterloo without the Prussians.

The Guard had attacked the Prussian center at Ligny and was successful. However, only five battalions actually attacked Wellington's center at Waterloo and fought outnumbered and were overwhelmed after savage fighting, during which Maitland's Guards were driven back and had to be supported by other allied units.

At Waterloo's ending, the two battalions of the 1st Grenadiers a Pied left the field in perfect order, as did the Grenadiers a Cheval. The Prussian pursuit didn't bother them as Gneisenau only his broken units, not those that toughly remained around their eagles. Pelet's two battalions broke out of the encirclement at Plancenoit and headed south.

There is an excellent recent volume of the British defeat at Burgos, and subsequent retreat, in 1812: Wellington's Worst Scrape: The Burgos Campaign 1812 by Carole Divall.

It should be noted that Wellington did not have his entire army at Burgos, using the units that did not suffer heavily at Badajoz.

The 3d and Light Divisions remained behind in Madrid and the 4th Division was at El Escurial. The 2d Division was en route to Madrid.

The 1st and 7th divisions were the least experienced in siege warfare which didn't help the overall situation.

Regarding the proficiency and experience of the British Army units of the period, it should be noted that they were not always successful.

Generally speaking, if they were under Wellington's command they did well. If not, their fortunes were mixed at best. Walcheren in 1809, Moore's campaign in Spain in 1808-1809, and Bergen-op-Zoom in 1814 were all failures.

In North America in 1814 three British operations/invasions all failed: Plattsburg, Baltimore, and New Orleans. On the Niagara frontier of the three main actions fought with the Americans, two were definite losses and the other a hard-fought draw. When the British fought American militia, as at Bladensburg outside Washington and at North Point outside Baltimore, the militia inflicted more losses than they incurred, even though the militia ran at Bladensburg. Stricker's successful delaying action at North Point not only gave more than they got, but also killed the British commander, General Ross.

In these four separate operations also, the British had three general officers killed in action, and two wounded, one of them being captured as well.

So, even good, solid units have bad days and the British were no exception.

When the British fought American militia, as at Bladensburg outside Washington and at North Point outside Baltimore, the militia inflicted more losses than they incurred, even though the militia ran at Bladensburg.

I'd thought that the US artillery inflicted the majority of these casualties? Anyway, the overall losses were pretty similar, except that the Americans ran away and left their guns and some standards behind. To my mind though, this argument has certain logical consequences: if we look at Lutzen link we see that the French lost over twice as many as the Allies, but with very big numbers involved. Would we then want to argue for the gross inferiority of the French Army, or say that they had a particularly bad day?

Regarding the proficiency and experience of the British Army units of the period, it should be noted that they were not always successful.

Generally speaking, if they were under Wellington's command they did well. If not, their fortunes were mixed at best. Walcheren in 1809, Moore's campaign in Spain in 1808-1809, and Bergen-op-Zoom in 1814 were all failures.

I don't get this lack of distinction between the British Army's (and generals) failings as a body for winning campaigns (it had lots) and the tactical abilities or otherwise of the individual units, which aren't dependent upon it. Maida was in its way just as crushing a victory over the French at Waterloo – just because the overall campaign wasn't as successful doesn't change that, any more than thinking that the French units at Ligny were better than the French units at Quatre Bras just because the first were involved in a victory and the second in a defeat.

There is an excellent recent volume of the British defeat at Burgos, and subsequent retreat, in 1812: Wellington's Worst Scrape: The Burgos Campaign 1812 by Carole Divall.

I'd agree with Kevin on this one. I'm currenlty rereading it and it's an excellent study of the campaign.

There have been excellent books published in the last year or so on Burgos, Wellington's artillery, Bergen-op-Zoom, Walcheren, Torres Vedras and Sir John Moore all of which I have found to be excellent and very well done by a variety of historians.

'The French Imperial Guard developed into a combat organization of all arms, something no other combatant or nation of the period did.'

Except the Russians had Guard Infantry, Artillery, and Cavalry, of course………

John

But they weren't French! That is what matters!

I agree too that the book is very good, mind you, Carole Divall is an excellent author. I have all her books, which mainly have a 30th foot theme to them. Wellington's Worst Scrape is an excellent departure.

Can someone tell me what British regiments were beaten at Plattsburg heights?

their fortunes were mixed at best. Walcheren in 1809,

Who, or rather what was it that did for the army there? Was it Bernardotte's Franco-Dutch? Or was it that internationally renowned, Marshal Disease?

Moore's campaign in Spain in 1808-1809,

Moore's army was outnumbered by four to one. Every time elements of his army clashed with the French, the French got a bloody nose (with a highlight of the Guard Chasseurs-a-Cheval getting a good beating under Nappy's nose) and a drubbing at Corunna. It was Nappy that failed anyway, because he wanted the British driven off the continent, but failed.

and Bergen-op-Zoom in 1814 were all failures.

Bergen-op-Zoom was not down to the fighting abilities of the regiments (the debacle of the South American expedition was the same).

With all the dreamed up expeditions forced on the army that were failures, the regiments weren't.

So if 'as with brechtel's post above which includes 1814' we include all the dates that the Imperial Guard were active, we have:

"On the rare occasion that the Guard…

The French Imperial Guard developed into a combat organization of all arms, something no other combatant or nation of the period did.

…came into contact with the British, they lost! And when the Guard got beaten, they got beaten spectacularly. The 1st Grenadiers of the Guard lost a paltry handful.

"Bottom line is that one deserted their fellow Guardsmen and were driven off of the battlefield. The other, even though 'retiring' in good order (not surprising seeing it stood around for almost all the day) fell apart from the 19th of June.

Compared with most of the other units on all sides that fought out a bloody days battle! One Guard 'unit' did little except get away lightly in the confusion of the multitude of the rest of the army and the darkness of the night." So the French regiments in general at Waterloo did exceptionally well, the 1st Grenadiers ran away into the dark, confusion and high cornfields, and desertion on a huge scale.

Posted by me on another site:

"
On the 18th of June they had about 1,280. By the 26th, they had only 644 they fell apart from the 19th (with about 600 deserting). During the battle itself they lost a paltry bakers dozen men (plus 1 man wounded). The 1st company lost 2 men captured, 1 deserted , 1 dead and 1 wounded at Plancenoit, the remainder of the battalion lost a total of 9 men overall at the battle.

So overall, the guard lose badly at one battle then proceed to fall apart after it. Just as useful as an ornate chocolate fire guard, looks impressive but as soon as the heat gets to it, it melts away.

Paul"

'The French Imperial Guard developed into a combat organization of all arms, something no other combatant or nation of the period did.'

Except the Russians had Guard Infantry, Artillery, and Cavalry, of course………

So did Naples.

Whether Naples' army was combat worthy or not is another topic entirely.

When Murat turned against Napoleon in 1814 in order to keep the throne Napoleon gave him, the French units in the Neapolitan army went home.

When Murat turned against Napoleon in 1814 in order to keep the throne Napoleon gave him, the French units in the Neapolitan army went home.

Out of interest, are there any first-hand accounts of this from any French soldiers or officers actually involved?

We should not forget British success in India (often against opponents stirred up by the French authorities) during this period, usually against massive odds and under an oppressive (especially to Europeans) climate. Wellington described Assaye as the toughest battle he ever fought.

Nor should we forget that the Army was very much the poor relation of the British armed forces – possibly analogous to the French navy of the time, which produced the occasional success in spite of itself (mainly in one-on-one actions, when the superiority of French naval architecture could be exploited).

The French Imperial Guard developed into a combat organization of all arms, something no other combatant or nation of the period did.

Just out of interest, and I have no idea of the answer to this, was there ever and instance where all three elements of the Imperial Guard were employed as a distinct tactical formation on the battlefield. For instance, was there ever an attack made solely by Guard infantry that was supported solely by Guard cavalry and artillery?

Or, in other words, could a gamer commanding a division find historical justification for fielding an army composed solely of the Guard?

The closest would be Hanau in 1813 when Wrede was attempting to stop French 'fugitives' from Leipzig and round them up.

Instead, he ran into the Imperial Guard led by Napoleon.

Drouot deployed his Guard artillery which was supported by Guard cavalry and the Old Guard infantry was sent into action, the Grenadiers in line and the Chasseurs in open/skirmisher order.

The Gendarmerie d'Elite also went into action. They were with the trains under the command of General Radet and Cossacks thought the trains would be easy pickings and were repulsed and then pursued by the elite Gendarmes.

You might want to look up Napoleon et Les Allies sur le Rhin by Lefebvre de Behain.

Thanks Brechtel,

I shall now use that as an excuse to pile all my guard on the table at once. It's nice to know the Gendarmes d'Elite also got a look in. Those chaps have been sitting on my shelf doing nothing for an awfully long time.

Napoleon fought outnumbered against Wellington because 16,000 French troops (Guard and Lobau's VI Corps) were sent to face the Prussians.

Not quite, Kevin. Lobau's Corps was detailed to face them but was not actually engaged until 4pm, so at all points prior, his troops were available to intervene against Wellington had that been necessary. By the time Lobau and the Guard were committed to Plancenoit, Wellington had a lot fewer men left in the line than he had started with.

And Wellington was done at Waterloo without the Prussians.

And vice versa even more so, of course. Without Wellington on the 16th the Prussians would have been engulfed from their right rear and had he not stood against the largest French concentration yet seen on the 18th they'd have been destroyed.

Generally speaking, if they were under Wellington's command they did well. If not, their fortunes were mixed at best.

Yep, Wellington was a battle captain par excellence. Unlike Napoleon, he never seems to have had a bad day.

What did you mean by it being an organisation of all arms? There were lots of those in this era; they were called legions – Vistula, King's German, Brunswick, Russo-German, etc. Did you mean that they had things like engineers and stuff as well?

The Imperial Guard had units of infantry, cavalry, artillery (both horse and foot), engineers, naval, artillery train, supply train, pontonniers (part of the artillery), staff and service troops, as well as two companies of veterans as well as a regiment of military orphans (the Pupilles).

And as of 1806-1807 they also had foreign troops-Polish, Italian, German, and Dutch.

Regarding the retreat from Burgos, the following might be interesting. It's taken from Wellington: The Path to Victory 1769-1814, 491:

'When the retreat was over and the army settled back into their accustomed winter quarters along the [Portuguese] frontier, Lowry Cole wrote home that it had been 'by far the severest lesson I ever experienced in my military career, and I believe the severest any British troops have experienced in this war-Sir John Moore's retreat excepted.' But in Wellington's eyes the army had badly failed an important test. The last stage of the retreat had been in pleasant, but it had only lasted four days, the marches had not been particularly long, the country was flat, and while the weather was bad it was not really extreme-snow or ice or intolerable heat would have been worse. The French pursuit had not been much of a threat nor the local civilian population hostile. The hardships of the campaign were real, but they did not excuse the wholescale collapse of discipline that affected much of the army.'

So it appears that much of the army retreating from Burgos actually fell apart on a short march of four days…and the result of the defeat at Burgos strategically was that Madrid was evacuated and Wellington had to retreat all the way back to Portugal.

I don't understand that posting Kevin. Is it to show that the British "worst experiences" (Corunna and Burgos) showed British line units as much better than the French Guard in roughly equivalent circumstances (Russia and Waterloo)? Is it to illustrate the superiority of the British Guards (they maintained their discipline on the retreat to Corunna, which was worse than the retreat from Burgos)? Are you just upset by Dibble's assertion that a load of British line units were better troops than the French guard, so you are just posting a load of random "British troops did badly here" stuff?

All Napoleonic armies did badly on retreats after defeats in battle like Waterloo or failures like Burgos; I think to be worth anything one would have to show how units did comparatively better or worse than their friends and foes in the same circumstances. As I mentioned above, the British Guards (and others) come out very well: link

The whole morale of Moore's army had suffered a dreadful
deterioration from the moment that the order to evacuate Astorga was issued. As long as there was any prospect of fighting, the men — though surly and discontented — had stuck to their colours. Some regiments had begun to maraud, but the majority were still in good order. But from Astorga onward the discipline of the greater part of the corps began to relax. There were about a dozen regiments which behaved thoroughly well, and came through the retreat with insignificant losses : on the other hand there were
many others which left from thirty to forty per cent, of their men behind them. It cannot be disguised that the enormous difference between the proportion of 'missing' in battalions of the same brigade, which went through exactly identical experiences, was simply due to the varying degrees of zeal and energy with which the officers kept their men together. Where there was a strong controlling will the stragglers were few, and no one fell behind save those who were absolutely dying. The iron hand of Robert Crawfurd brought the 43rd and 95th through their troubles with
a loss of eighty or ninety men each. The splendid discipline of the Guards brigade carried them to Corunna with even smaller proportional losses. There is no mistaking the coincidence when we find that the battalion which Moore denounced at Salamanca as being the worst commanded and the worst disciplined in his force, was also the one which left a higher percentage of stragglers behind than any other corps.

The reader should note, in the Appendix dealing with the numbers of Moore's army, the very small proportional losses suffered by the two battalions of the Guards, the 43rd (1st batt.), 4th, 42nd, 7lst, 79th, 92nd, 95th (2nd batt.), and the cavalry.

Brechtel

So it appears that much of the army retreating from Burgos actually fell apart on a short march of four days…and the result of the defeat at Burgos strategically was that Madrid was evacuated and Wellington had to retreat all the way back to Portugal.

I'll ask you the same. Give the evidence that the army fell apart. perhaps you can also furnish the regiments that 'fell apart'.

There's me thinking that you imbibed all the information that carole Divall released in her excellent wellington's Worse Scrape, but it seems that some of its chapters passed you by

Perhaps a reread of chapter 13 in Divall's tome will counter the Lowry Cole whinge.

But most of all I would like to see the evidence to back up the accusation that the army 'fell apart'.

And just to reiterate that the British regiments performed well on almost all occasions when in battle, whoever the commander was.

Muir's Wellington 'The Path to Victory 1769-1814' is a biography of Wellington and puts forward a letter posted by one of his Generals as a reason for the Duke to slaughter his offices. Muir also puts forward an excuse for the Dukes diatribe in the same chapter 29 'Madrid and Burgos' and page '491' was because his pent up anger finally exploded because he had bit his tongue at the army's indiscipline of the sacking of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos and 'their' failure at Burgos. So perhaps the Duke was being a tad more nasty than he should have been.

What did for the British army at Walcheren? What happened at Plattsburg heights? And what happened to those 'weak' British companies at Bergen-op-Zoom?

Just an additem: I received John Hussey's Waterloo 'volume 1' yesterday. It's as thick as Muir's Wellington tome mentioned above, has a few O.O.B and other charts, maps and a few pages of illustrations half way through the book but all-in all, it looks like he has much to say and I can't wait to read it.

Paul :)

I have omitted a few capital letters and….

For:
"Generals as a reason for the Duke to slaughter his offices"

Read:
"Generals as supporting evidence that the Duke would have had a case to slaughter his offices"

My apologies for this.

Paul :)

"The French Imperial Guard developed into a combat organization of all arms, something no other combatant or nation of the period did."

Really? Are you sure?

Russian Guard 1812, with addtions 1813-1815 noted

Staff
Guards Section of His Majesty's Suite for Quartermaster Affairs
renamed 1814 : Guards General Staff

Heavy Infantry
Life-Guards Preobrazhensky, Semenovsky, Izmailovsky and Lithuania regiments
added 1813 : Life-Guards Grenadiers and Pavlovsky regiments

Light Infantry
Life-Guards Jäger and Finland regiments
Grand Duchess Catherine Pavlovna Volunteer militia (double battalion – attached to the Guard)

Cavalry
Chevalier Guards and Horse Guards regiments (both cuirassiers)
Life-Guards Dragon, Lancer and Hussar regiments
Life Guards Don Cossack regiment, Black Sea Cossack and Ural Cossack hundreds, Bug Cossack half-hundred (attached)
added 1813 : His Majesty's Own Life-Guard Curiassier regiment
added 1814 : Life-Guard Horse-Jäger regiment
added 1815 : Life-Guard Gendarme half-squadron

Artillery
Life-Guard Artillery brigade (2 battery and 2 light companies)
Life-Guard Horse Artillery (2 companies)
added 1813 : 1 battery, 1 light and 1 horse company)

Engineers
Life-Guard Sapper battalion

Navy
Guards Équipage (battalion, later double battalion, included naval artillery command)
1815 : Guards Barge company

NCO Schools
Life-Guards Artillery brigade, 2x Reserve (later Instructional) companies
3x Instructional Grenadier battalions (with Preobrazhensky, Semenovsky and Izmailovsky regiments)
1815 : renamed Guards Instructional Carabinier regiment
1x Guards Instructional Cavalry squadron

Veterans
Life-Guard Garrison battalion
Guards Military Settlements
Guards Invalids (4 companies)
added 1815 : 1 Invalid company

Hospital/Convalescents (attached)
Saint-Petersburg Combined Infantry battalion
Saint-Petersburg Combined Artillery company

Military Orphans (attached)
His Majestey's Own Saint-Petersburg Military Orphan detachment

From Wellington: The Path ro Victory by Rory Muir, page 491-492:

'On 28 November [1812] he [Wellington] issued a circular letter to officers commanding divisions and brigades censuring the conduct of the army in sweeping terms and laying the blame squarely at the feet of the regimental officers whose neglect permitted, even encouraged, their men to misbehave. Inevitably this order became public and it aroused deep and lasting resentment in the army, especially among officers who believed that their unit at least had emerged with credit from the ordeal, but who found themselves all subject to the same opprobrium. As in other cases the sharpness of Wellington's pen did his reputation more harm than much harsher actions would have done; no one condemned Clausel for shooting fifty soldiers for misconduct after the retreat from Salamanca, yet even his admirers struggle to excuse Wellington's order. Earlier in the year Wellington had chosen to overlook serious outbreaks of indiscipline; the sack of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, the looting which followed the fall of the Retiro, and the poor performance of the troops before Burgos, had led only to the punishment of a few individuals. Possibly the retreat from Salamanca was the last straw and Wellington's patience snapped, or he felt that with some months in cantonments ahead of them his generals would have time to deal with the problem. Alternatively he may have acted because the problem affected the majority of the army rather than a small section; but it seems likely that it was the spectre of Sir John Moore's retreat to Corunna that convinced him that he could not allow the poor conduct of the army to pass unnoticed. Ever since his return to the Peninsula in 1809 he had been concerned that in adversity the army might dissolve in his hands, and on the road from Burgos to Salamanca, and even more from Salamanca to Ciudad Rodrigo, he had seen signs that this was beginning to happen. No lasting damage had been done except the loss of soldiers on the retreat-those who reached Ciudad Rodrigo were soon as well fed and obedient as ever-but Wellington could not allow a precedent to be set that would entitle soldiers and their officers to believe that misconduct was the natural and acceptable consequence of adversity.'

From this information it seems that the majority of the army on the long retreat back into Portugal from Burgos was guilty of misbehavior, indiscipline, drunkenness, and excessive straggling. Perhaps it would be better to find the regiments, if any, that did not misbehave because the evidence tends to demonstrate that the greater majority of the units were guilty to one extent or the other.

Kevin,

I don't understand how you can move from quoting..

Alternatively he may have acted because the problem affected the majority of the army rather than a small section; but it seems likely that it was the spectre of Sir John Moore's retreat to Corunna

to:

From this information it seems that the majority of the army on the long retreat back into Portugal from Burgos was guilty of misbehavior, indiscipline, drunkenness, and excessive straggling.

The author you quote specifically indicates that this was likely not the case.

So perhaps the onus does go back on to you, as Mr Dibble suggested.

Have you read the book?

If not, I highly recommend it. And it is volume I of two volumes.

No, I'll add it to the list.

Who was the best? Mercy, if there was ever an argument no one can prove this is it.

If forced to answer, I'd say the 1805-1812 1st regiments of the Grenadiers a pied and Chasseurs a pied of the French Old Guard were the best units to ever walk onto a Napoleonic battlefield. But I can't prove it, just as no one else here can prove their personal favourites either.

But for me, the Old Guard being 'the best' is part of the mystique, the romance even of the Napoleonic period.

Seeing as no one can prove otherwise, I'm happy for them to be the best… both in my mind and also the rules I play…

As Henry Lachouque once sagely wrote: 'Only mediocre men are embarrassed by an elite.'

And:

'The Old Guard breathed its spirit into the Young Guard, and both breathed it into the Line, until the spirit of the Guard animated the whole Imperial army and continued to inspire those that came after…'

And it should be remembered that the Guard came from the Line.

Brechtel

Have you read the book?

I have both! But where in Muir's tome, does it say that the army fell apart? You are quoting from a book that barely skims the retreat.

Have you read Carole Divall's tome that I have mentioned above? And if you have, please point out in her book where the army had fallen apart.

You seem to want to quote from a biography but also to want to ignore an excellent, detailed account written by another excellent historian. Perhaps, if you have Oman, you can point to where he says that the army 'fell apart'. Better still, you could point to author who said it did and the source that he got it from.

Paul :)

Plattsburg.

Royal Artillery 2 killed 3 wounded.
19th LD 1 wounded 5 missing
1/3rd 2 killed (both officers) 4 officers and 34 ORs wounded, 2 missing
1/5th 1 killed 1 Wounded
2/8th 1 wounded
13th 2 wounded
1/27th 3 killed, 14 wounded, 1 missing
3/27th 3 killed, 14 wounded, 4 missing
1/39th 1 wounded.
49th 3 wounded
58th 3 killed, 3 officers and 30 men wounded,
76th 1 officer, 11 men killed, 3 wounded, 3 officers and 23 men missing.
1/88th 9 wounded
Meurons Rgt 6 killed, 15 wounded, 9 missing
Canadian Voltiguers 4 killed, 10 wounded , 1 officer and 7 men missing.

Doesn't include Navy casualties.

Who was the best? Mercy, if there was ever an argument no one can prove this is it.

If forced to answer, I'd say the 1805-1812 1st regiments of the Grenadiers a pied and Chasseurs a pied of the French Old Guard were the best units to ever walk onto a Napoleonic battlefield. But I can't prove it, just as no one else here can prove their personal favourites either.

Sure. But what can be tested and discussed are the criteria for making the choice.

Whirlwind, to what end?

Because why people think things is interesting, sometimes persuasive. What created a good soldier and a good unit in the Napoleonic Wars? What is the dynamic between combat experience, success and losses? How "much" better?

When we write wargame rules, we have to put a number on all of these things – so a variety of views can be helpful. If one says that the romance of the era depends upon the Old Guard being the best, that could be very helpful if one is writing so-called "flavourful" rules. If one was looking at the combat experience and service as key determinants, we might look at some of the postings and think that, actually, some Allied units were composed of just as many picked veterans as the Old Guard. And so on.

Totally agree, why people think things is interesting. So what unit do you rate the 'best' in the Napoleonic rules you happen to play?

Why are you happy with that?

Regarding the retreat from Burgos:

'Under these circumstances, many irregularities and excesses were committed by the men in the course of their march, many of whom took to marauding for the purpose of obtaining food, whilst others from exhaustion or indifference lagged behind and fell into the hands of the enemy. Lord Wellington on his arrival at headquarters wrote a letter, severely censuring the commanders of the different brigades and regiments, which produced a powerful effect…On 18 November, the headquarters of Lord Wellington were at Ciudad Rodrigo, and on the two following days, we crossed the Agueda, and were distributed into cantonments, where we were suffered to enjoy the repose necessary to prepare us for the toils of the succeeding campaign.'-Sgt Anthony Hamilton.

'The village in whose vicinity we had last encamped, contained a great quantity of new-made wine; and as many of the inhabitants had left their houses, our soldiers drank of it to excess. The effects of which, we found in this day's march, for it was with great difficulty the men who had thus indulged themselves could keep up with their regiments.'-George Burroughs.

'After the troops had taken up their winter quarters in Portugal, the commander of the forces expressed his disapprobation in general orders, of the conduct of officers commanding regiments, as of those of companies, during the retreat. In no situation is the more strict discipline required, than by a retreating army, and here it is in general, the least successfully exercised. Officers become indifferent and men careless; the road to relaxation is not sooner opened than the most highly disciplined armies are converted into rabble. Notwithstanding the bravery and contempt of danger which has uniformly distinguished the British soldier, he exhibits less resolution and patience under privations and inclement seasons, than those of other countries; but this perhaps is more properly characteristic of the nation, than of the individual. Officers commanding battalions hold those of the companies responsible for the conduct of their men, for the very obvious reason, that from the difference both in point of rank and situation, they are more intimately acquainted with their immediate habits and characters, than they are themselves; but from the Marquis's orders, it appeared, the colonel with the captain, and subaltern with the soldier, consulted their own comfort indiscriminately. The consequence was, many men had quitted their ranks, some with a view of plunder and others from sickness, and either had not rejoined for a considerable time after, or had fallen into the hands of the enemy. In situations of distress, self-preservation supersedes all other considerations, and we prefer existence, however wretched, to its sacrifice for the good of others. This motive of self-consideration, is very incompatible with that disinterestedness and sense of honor, which distinguishes every corps in time of peace, and animates them in war; for then the destiny of one is so closely involved in the anxiety experienced for the safety of the whole, that personal feeling is rendered but a secondary consideration.'-George Burroughs.

So, this poses a question: if the British army didn't fall apart on the way back to Portugal from Burgos, why did Wellington write the letter that he did admonishing the army's senior and junior commanders?

The British Army didn't do too well when they had to retreat under any kind of hardship-Corunna, Burgos, and Plattsburg are three excellent examples of discipline failing during the retreat. The British troops also had problems when their rations weren't delivered on time-then they tended to loot and maraud to find food-and drink, usually some type of spirits. The French were amazed that British troops would get drunk during a retreat and then scooped up as prisoners by the pursuing French.

When comparing units, such as British infantry with the Old Guard, it should also be noted that French line and light infantry units were just as good as British infantry. That is usually overlooked.

it should also be noted that French line and light infantry units were just as good as British infantry. That is usually overlooked.

It is? Where, for example?

The British Army didn't do too well when they had to retreat under any kind of hardship-Corunna, Burgos, and Plattsburg are three excellent examples of discipline failing during the retreat. The British troops also had problems when their rations weren't delivered on time-then they tended to loot and maraud to find food-and drink, usually some type of spirits. The French were amazed that British troops would get drunk during a retreat and then scooped up as prisoners by the pursuing French.

The French Army did even worse in moments of deprivation and defeat. The retreat from Portugal, the retreat from Salamanca, the occupation of Moscow, the retreat from Moscow…one could go on. Perhaps the retreat from Lepizig will serve as a good a summary as any: link

No Napoleonic Army fared well in these circumstances. The idea that the British Army was worse than anyone else is without foundation or merit.

When comparing units, such as British infantry with the Old Guard, it should also be noted that French line and light infantry units were just as good as British infantry. That is usually overlooked.

There are two problems with this:

1 – The pretty much unbroken record of battlefield success the British Army enjoyed against the French.

2 – The changing quality of both armies, in particular the French. I think there is a strong argument that both armies were pretty equal in terms of infantry quality in the 1805 – 1809 period; I think that this in itself is a strong argument that the two sides must became progressively more unequal as the list of French casualties and defeats grew. From 1812 onwards as more and more good troops were withdrawn from the Peninsular to go to Russia and then to rebuild the Imperial Army, then the idea is frankly very hard to sustain.

Totally agree, why people think things is interesting. So what unit do you rate the 'best' in the Napoleonic rules you happen to play?

Why are you happy with that?

I wouldn't say I am totally happy, but…

The best units in my favoured rules (Polemos Napoleonics) tend to be veteran light infantry units of all the major nations in the General de Division game (roughly a corps per side); if I were writing more scenarios, the best infantry units would probably be:

The French Old Guard and Middle Guard Chasseurs, if you believe them to be genuine light infantry as opposed to merely given light infantry appelation; in that case the 1st Chasseurs throughout the period, the 2nd Chasseurs and the Fusiliers-Chasseurs until 1812, perhaps.
The Russian Guard Jagers in 1813-4, perhaps.
The British 43rd, 52nd and 95th from 1807-10, perhaps.

(The game rates light infantry units as marginally more useful than line infantry units, in case one was wondering)

For the cavalry, difficult to look beyond the French Imperial Guard Cavalry 1805-12 and the Russian Guard Cavalry.

The army-level rules (Marechal d'Empire) use slightly different modifiers; in their case, it is simpler: veteran light infantry brigades (or large regiments) of any nation and veteran or guard cavalry of any nation. I'd guess at that scale the brigades of the Anglo-Portuguese Light Infantry Division would be the most consistently high performer I can think of off hand. Did the French employ their Old and Middle Guard infantry in brigade strength? I'd have to check.

One further point Pessa00; although comparatively rating troops is tricky, judging the effect size is really difficult. How much better or worse has even more effect upon a game, particularly as most rulesets use quite broad cuhnks of combat effectiveness – it may be more realistic at those levels of granularity to have quite 'flat' troop ratings. The evidence/research really doesn't exist yet (unless McLaddie has got there?!?) to allow fine percentile gradations between troops.

Still ignoring me I see brechtel. Still no evidence of the army falling apart either on the retreat to Corunna or from Burgos.

As for the Duke's letter. Best you look at all the evidence rather than a cigarette stub with a 'poppy' coloured lipstick smear at its base.

You clearly haven't read Carole Divall's tome have you?

Perhaps you can tell us exactly what regiment it was that fell apart after Plattesburgh?

Paul :)

Many thanks for your interesting response Whirlwind.

'Under these circumstances, many irregularities and excesses were committed by the men in the course of their march, many of whom took to marauding for the purpose of obtaining food, whilst others from exhaustion or indifference lagged behind and fell into the hands of the enemy. Lord Wellington on his arrival at headquarters wrote a letter, severely censuring the commanders of the different brigades and regiments, which produced a powerful effect…On 18 November, the headquarters of Lord Wellington were at Ciudad Rodrigo, and on the two following days, we crossed the Agueda, and were distributed into cantonments, where we were suffered to enjoy the repose necessary to prepare us for the toils of the succeeding campaign.'-Sgt Anthony Hamilton.

So if the army had 'fallen apart' how come they were together enough to be distributed to their allotted cantonments?

Brechtel posted this:

The village in whose vicinity we had last encamped, contained a great quantity of new-made wine; and as many of the inhabitants had left their houses, our soldiers drank of it to excess. The effects of which, we found in this day's march, for it was with great difficulty the men who had thus indulged themselves could keep up with their regiments.'-George Burroughs.

Another drinking session. Perhaps you could tell us what proportion of the army were at this drinking binge?

And if drink was such a problem, why didn't the Duke list it as such in his diatribe?

Surgeon George Burroughs of the 24th also wrote this:

"But we had an enemy, who's armies were numerous and well commanded – an army, who by rapid series of successes, during a course of 20 years, had awakened feelings of terror and admiration in every mans busom; yet the British army retired with ranks unbroken and troops undismayed; they felt not the hardships attending a retreat, except that of hunger; the severity of the weather it was not in human power to controul (sic)"

Even Oman, though he calls the retreat a disaster, never says that the army 'fell apart'. In fact on page 182 of his Peninsular War volume VI. he states "But clearly the only movement to be thought of at present was that of getting the Divisions into comfortable winter quarters. Accordingly the army broke up a few days after reaching Ciudad Rodrigo, and spread itself out into dispositions not unlike those of December previous…"

So in order for Oman to write that the army was to be "broken up" it must follow that he did not see the army as 'fallen apart'. In order to be broken up, the object first has to be whole.

Paul :)

More on the retreat from Burgos:

'Before long the dismounted far exceeded the mounted men in number, and these were sent off every morning under a subaltern an hour before the rest of the regiment. Further, although the army marched no more than four leagues a day, yet night had always fallen before the cavalry reached their allotted bivouacs…At each bivouac there was little to be done but tie each poor horse to some tree, and lie down in the mud, while the melancholy sky continued to discharge its rain. The men hardly had heart to light fires and, when they did, the glow of the still smouldering embers in the early morning would reveal the pale faces of comrades who had died during the night.'-Journal of the 1st (Royal) Dragoons.

'I had placed him under Sir Edward Paget, in the 1sr Division; and on the night after poor Paget was taken, he and certain other General officers commanding divisions (new comers) held a council of war to decide whether they should obey my orders to march by a particular road. He, at the head, decided he would not: they marched by a road leading they did not know where, and when I found them in the morning they were in the utmost confusion, not knowing where to go or what to do. This with the enemy close to them, and with the knowledge that, owing to the state of the roads and the weather, I felt the greatest anxiety respecting the movement.'-Wellington to Colonel Torrens, regarding General Stewart.

'…the enemy was either not up in force today, or did not choose to press-for the greatest confusion prevailed throughout. The principal columns of the army went astray without any cavalry to cover it, and 'tis difficult to imagine the extent of the evil that might, and probably would, have ensued from a vigorous and well-directed attack.'-Benjamin d'Urban.

'…the weather being very unfavorable, raining as hard as it could pour, the soil being clay, and the roads at the best of times not very good, the marches were very distressing. Add to this on a retreat it is seldom prudent to have baggage with you, so that after being drench'd all day with rain, we had but the wet ground to sleep on at night. Neither ourselves nor our horses had much to eat, and both men and officers three days without bread. Our loss had been very severe, many men exhausted by fatigue, and want, died on the road; others were left with their legs in a state of mortification from cold and wet.'-George Bingham.

'To give you an impression of the miseries of out retreat would be impossible unless I had you here to talk it over. Suffice to say that nothing could have been worse conducted. We commenced our march on the 14th November and it never ceased raining until our arrival at Alamandilla on the 21st, therefore you may suppose the state of the country was in for the poor men and horses. I am unacquianited with the number of each we have lost, but it must be prodigiously great. You can easily imagine this when I tell you that the enemy were pushing us hard the whole way and that I saw some hundreds of men, women, and children stuck in the mud, and unable to move from hunger and sickness. In a great many instances our poor wounded men had only the alternative either of being left behind and falling into the hands of the enemy, or being dragged along by two men of their regiment. You may judge of my feelings on being obliged to refuse applications to carry these unfortunate being on our gun carriages. Many of them, to excite compassion, would pull their clothes aside to show their wounds, but we were obliged to turn a deaf ear to them or risk the loss of our guns by overloading the horses.'-Thomas Dyneley.

'Many men who had been under General Moore, during the disastrous retreat to Corunna, avowed they had undergone more fatigue, and suffered greater privations on the retreat from Madrid, than they had ever done the whole of their lives.'-William Brown.

Brown also remarked that what they had gone through were 'unparalleled and unheard of hardships.'

'…the Corunna retreat, from what I experienced of it, and the opinion that I have heard given by those officers who were on both, will bear no comparison with this.'-George Wood.

'The difficulties, privations, and hardships we encountered, were probably almost as severe as those endured in the retreat of the French from Moscow, with the exception of the distance; and, for myself, I certainly should prefer marching through frost and snow, to rain and mire. I do not think that I exaggerate greatly, in saying that we lost nearly as great a number of men, in proportion, as the ill-fated host of fugitives from Russia.'-George Wood.