Blutarski | 18 Apr 2017 4:25 p.m. PST |
You are so anxious to respond. I'm impressed by your avidity. See my edit, which was in process while you sped off your reply. B |
mkenny | 18 Apr 2017 4:49 p.m. PST |
You are so anxious to respond. I'm impressed by your avidity. See my edit, which was in process while you sped off your reply. Your original post with the'false' 54 day refitting period for Rommel is date stamped 3:37
My post pointing out this fabrication is stamped 4:22 45 mins later. |
jdginaz | 18 Apr 2017 6:20 p.m. PST |
The force that fought at Kasserine was not in any way the same force that retreated from El Alamein. The fact that you post that belies your call for facts. |
Blutarski | 18 Apr 2017 8:03 p.m. PST |
mkenny – Can't help it if you refuse to believe me. OTOH, I'm not surprised. You obviously need some sort of excuse in order to avoid making any sort of real reply. Sad, really. B |
jdginaz | 18 Apr 2017 11:01 p.m. PST |
"Bradley lost control of Hodges and that Army was placed under Monty's command (by Eisenhower it must be stressed)in order to bring some discipline to it." You must be reading books by Robin Neillands the British version of Stephen E. Ambrose only even more jingoistic. Hodges wasn't transferred to Monty's command in order "to bring some discipline. You seem to have a problem with your apparent dislike of American is distorting your ability to understand the facts. |
christot | 18 Apr 2017 11:50 p.m. PST |
""He participated in the planning of the operation but didn't come up with it by himself" It was entirely his plan. Who else planned it? The original d-day plan called for 3 assault divisions, he said he wouldn't do it with fewer than 5. He was Army group commander. |
Fred Cartwright | 19 Apr 2017 3:03 a.m. PST |
I often find it strange that people hate Montgomery or (insert favourite allied leader) more than Rommel. He was an enemy general who's sole aim was to destroy allied troops at all opportunities. I've no doubt the next reply will be something along the lines of "he wasn't a real Nazi, he was a very nice man" Montgomery haters, remember what side your relatives fought for. German gamers reading this, it's ok to hate him! Why would anyone need to hate him or any other human being for that matter? Like all humans Rommel had his good and bad points and I am sure did his share of bad things. As far as German generals go Rommel had about the cleanest record you could get, largely due to fighting exclusively against the western allies, where the war was conducted in a much more civilised way by both sides. If you are suggesting he deserves to be hated because he fought against your countrymen you must have a long, long list of people you hate! |
Raimondo | 19 Apr 2017 3:22 a.m. PST |
[Q]Montgomery's 1200 mile pursuit reaches the Libya/Tunisia border 93 days after the Alamein breakthrough: 8th Army rate of advance approximately 13.3 miles per day. By comparison, the rate of advance of Rommel's 16 day 350 mile pursuit of 8th Army after PAK's breakthrough to the coast at Gazala on 15 Jun 42 and launching his attack upon Alam Halfa averaged about 22 miles per day. [/Q] You could actually do a like for like comparison. 8th Army entered Tobruk seven days after the pursuit from Alamein began, roughly 350 miles at 50 miles per day. A comparison of how fast 8th Army advanced the 1200 miles to the Tunisian border would be interesting. I am not sure any army advanced that far that fast before. Or, indeed, since. |
mkenny | 19 Apr 2017 5:07 a.m. PST |
The force that fought at Kasserine was not in any way the same force that retreated from El Alamein. The fact that you post that belies your call for facts. Yes we all know that only Monty fought against 'weakened or broken Armies' Now I have your attention again can you please provide the evidence I asked you for in an earlier post. The one where you claimed there are lots of threads where Monty is lauded. Where are the links or are you ignoring the request in the hope no one will remember your fabrication? |
mkenny | 19 Apr 2017 5:13 a.m. PST |
Can't help it if you refuse to believe me. OTOH, I'm not surprised. You obviously need some sort of excuse in order to avoid making any sort of real reply. Sad, really. It is sad. Sad that someone would falsely claim that the Germans had 54 days in which to rest, recover and re-equip before they attacked at Kasserine. Sad that someone would be that desperate to denigrate Monty they would turn a 15 day period into 54 days. |
foxweasel | 19 Apr 2017 5:19 a.m. PST |
Fred, I'm not suggesting that anyone needs to be hated, what I meant was that perhaps the spite and vitriol that people use to describe allied leaders that for some reason they dislike should be used on our enemies before our own. Even then it was 70 years ago. I'm getting a bit sick of this discussion, how many people here have been to staff college? I don't think Rommel, Montgomery, Clarke, Hodges, Patton etc would be that bothered by the opinions of people who play with toy soldiers and have read the odd book. |
mkenny | 19 Apr 2017 5:31 a.m. PST |
You must be reading books by Robin Neillands the British version of Stephen E. Ambrose only even more jingoistic. Hodges wasn't transferred to Monty's command in order "to bring some discipline. You seem to have a problem with your apparent dislike of American is distorting your ability to understand the facts. I know the facts. It is you who seems to be struggling. D'Este: Those who visited First Army HQ at Spa, and later after it displaced rearward to Chaudfontaine, returned disturbed by the chaotic conditions and the lack of leadership they encountered. The previous command post at Spa had been so hastily abandoned in utter panic that top secret maps were found still pinned to the walls, along with classified documents strewn on desks; even unopened Christmas presents had been left behind. Later, when the commander of the U.S. 7th Armored Division, Brig. Gen. Robert W. Hasbrouck, arrived seeking information about the situation at the front, he not only found the CP deserted, but that First Army had decamped without leaving a forwarding address. After the war tales abounded that Hodges played no role in the crucial first two days of the battle. What has been established, notes the official U.S. Army historian, is that "the First Army commander was incapacitated for at least two days and that [his chief of staff, Maj. Gen. William B.] Kean, in effect, operated as the commander of the First Army. Kean later stated that Hodges had been "confined to his bed, barely conscious with viral pneumonia, an account disputed by another member of the staff who reported that his commander "was sitting with his arms folded on his desk, his head in his arms." 2 Although the official historian records the various reasons for First Army's failure to predict the German counteroffensive, Eisenhower's chief of staff, Walter Bedell Smith, trod where official historians are not permitted: "First Army had a very bad staff," he said, and "Hodges [was] the weakest commander we had," he said. Brigadier General Tom Betts, the deputy SHAEF G-2, also visited First Army at its new headquarters at Chaudfontaine and brought back similar disturbing reports. "I found the place a terrible mess," he said, "they just didn't know what was going on. As far as fighting a war was concerned the 1st Army . . . seemed to have no plan at all for meeting this attack. And I couldn't see any orders going forth." Betts reported to his boss, Maj. Gen. Kenneth Strong, the G-2 and Smith to whom he took the unprecedented step of recommending the relief of Hodges……………….The First Army staff, already resentful of the change of command, is alleged to have been less than pleased to be under British command. Such resentments, and many seem to be of postwar creation, were not evident to James Gavin, the 82d Airborne commander, when he dined with Hodges and his staff several days later. "The staff spoke of Montgomery with amusement and respect. They obviously liked him and respected his professionalism." For his part, Gavin was impressed with Montgomery as a soldier. "I took a liking to him that has not diminished with the years." |
mkenny | 19 Apr 2017 5:42 a.m. PST |
You could actually do a like for like comparison. 8th Army entered Tobruk seven days after the pursuit from Alamein began, roughly 350 miles at 50 miles per day. A comparison of how fast 8th Army advanced the 1200 miles to the Tunisian border would be interesting. I am not sure any army advanced that far that fast before. Or, indeed, since. Obviously a comparison that gave the correct (actual) advance rate did not fit the writers agenda so in order to find a slower rate he deliberately included all the days when no advance took place. Its the usual lies and fabrication used to attack Montgomery. |
Fred Cartwright | 19 Apr 2017 10:38 a.m. PST |
I don't think Rommel, Montgomery, Clarke, Hodges, Patton etc would be that bothered by the opinions of people who play with toy soldiers and have read the odd book. Quite so, or the writings of hacks pushing an agenda of their own. Hindsight is always 20:20 vision and what we know now might not have been apparent to those making tough choices at the time. The assessment of a general is always subjective to some degree. Monty wasn't the greatest general ever, but he wasn't the worst by a long, long way. Sure he could be an annoying little *#%! at times and rubbed a lot of people up the wrong way, but he wasn't the only one to do that either! From what I have read of El Alamein it seems a sound decision to fight the battle. The 8th Army needed a victory to restore its self confidence, Britain needed a victory to boost morale, Rommel and Afrika Korps were still perceived as a real threat to the oil fields which it was felt needed to be dealt with. A battle against a well dug in tough Army with extensive minefields is always going to be a tough slugging match. Could it have been done better? Possibly, but it could have been done a lot worse. Monty knew it would be a tough fight and told his men so. For those who think it was a complete I would like to see an outline of how they would have done it better. There was no option for Monty to not fight. He had been ordered by Churchill to do it and that was that. The fact that he delayed until his troops were ready is to his credit. Something that his predecessors found difficult to do. |
jdginaz | 19 Apr 2017 2:03 p.m. PST |
Yes there weren't problems with 1st army HQ but that isn't why it was temporarily under 21st Army. It was done to ease command & control since there was a rather lot of Germans between it and the rest of 1st Army. |
mkenny | 19 Apr 2017 2:22 p.m. PST |
Yes there weren't problems with 1st army HQ but that isn't why it was temporarily under 21st Army. It was done to ease command & control since there was a rather lot of Germans between it and the rest of 1st Army. D'este again: With the exception of Patton, Montgomery was the only senior commander to regularly visit his troops at the Ardennes front. Montgomery's presence and his decisions to reassign responsibilities and realign units of both First and Ninth Armies was precisely the fitting remedy. For American commanders, to cede ground was considered sinful, however, after visiting St. Vith and determining that if the 7th Armored remained it would be annihilated, Montgomery decreed that further defense of the town was futile and, with Hodges's concurrence, ordered what was left of the division to withdraw to new positions on December 22. The 7th Armored's brilliantly orchestrated defense of St. Vith against near-impossible odds had stemmed the advance of Manteuffel's Fifth Panzer Army until December 23, when the last elements evacuated the shattered town. The defense of St. Vith was a key factor in the German failure in the Ardennes. The official U.S Army historian wrote that Montgomery's decision reflected his "ability to honor the fighting man which had endeared him to the hearts of the Desert Rats [of the British 7th Armored Division] in North Africa: ‘They can come back with all honor. They come back to the more secure positions. They put up a wonderful show.'" The defenders of St. Vith were unambiguous about their feelings toward the field marshal. "Montgomery saved the 7th Armored Division," said Robert Hasbrouck. The German view: The German commander of the 5th Panzer Army, Hasso von Manteuffel said of Montgomery's leadership: The operations of the American 1st Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough Now for the third time can I ask you to reference one of your earlier claims. Can you please provide the evidence I asked you for in an earlier post. The one where you claimed there are lots of threads where Monty is lauded. Where are the links or are you ignoring the request in the hope no one will remember your fabrication? Is your inability to respond a tacit admission you made it up? |
jdginaz | 19 Apr 2017 11:20 p.m. PST |
None of that shows that 1st Army was placed under the command of 21st Army to bring some discipline to it. No I don't have the time nor the inclination to search back though old TMP posts looking for Monty threads especially with the inadequate search tool here. BTW where are you getting the D'Este quotes? |
Fred Cartwright | 20 Apr 2017 3:08 a.m. PST |
None of that shows that 1st Army was placed under the command of 21st Army to bring some discipline to it. Maybe discipline is the wrong word. Perhaps it would be better to say 1st Army were placed under 21st Army group because their response to the German offensive was incompetent and they needed a higher command to straighten things out and Bradley was unable, for various reasons, to do that. |
mkenny | 20 Apr 2017 5:59 a.m. PST |
No I don't have the time nor the inclination to search back though old TMP posts looking for Monty threads especially with the inadequate search tool here. You might actually believe that but I can assure you there are no Monty-promoting threads anywhere. I know because I have been actively seeking them for years. The automatic retort of anyone who is challenged for their anti-Monty bile is that they are only trying to bring some balance to an otherwise completely uncritical review of the man. Not so. 90% of the timer Monty is introduced in a thread the intent is to belittle and denigrate him. Given that most of the criticism is complete fiction it is fairly easy for someone with a good understanding of the facts to run rings around the critics. It really is the case that Hollywood is 'The' source of most of their facts.
BTW where are you getting the D'Este quotes? link Note the single comment on the article where a bewildered US poster is astonished at even the title of the article! |
4th Cuirassier | 20 Apr 2017 9:16 a.m. PST |
especially with the inadequate search tool here. The search tool is indeed dire. The best way to find any discussion on TMP is to put the key phrases into Google and add +site:theminiaturespage.com/boards to the search string. This will bring back all instances of the phrase just from these boards. Eg "king Tiger" +site:theminiaturespage.com took 0.5 seconds to bring back 304 results. Using the search tool took 4 minutes to bring back one thread of 6 posts. Even when the results come back they're threads not messages so you have to plough through them all to find the actual references. |
jdginaz | 20 Apr 2017 9:19 a.m. PST |
Thank yo for the link, I'll give it a read when I get a chance. |
Blutarski | 21 Apr 2017 6:43 a.m. PST |
An interesting study document, "In Pursuit: Montgomery after Alaein", that discusses the nuts and bolts of 8th Army's pursuit after Alamein can be accessed here - PDF link Worth a read. Draw your own conclusions. B |
Fred Cartwright | 21 Apr 2017 7:54 a.m. PST |
I think that is a fairly accurate picture of the problems faced by 8th Army. It was not the same superbly trained force that had defeated the Italians in 1940. As the saying goes "There are old soldiers and bold soldiers, but there are no old bold soldiers." However I think he over estimates the chances for the pursuit given all the problems 8th Army faced. He also fails to consider the view from the other side of the hill and consider the skill of the Germans in the conduction of mobile operations, which was significantly greater than the British at the time. I think this had a significant impact on the 8th Army at all levels. Too often in the past 8th Army tanks had set of in pursuit of what they thought was a defeated Afrika Korps only to come to grief. As far as Monty is concerned he is largely right the set piece battle was his forte and mobile operations were not his comfort zone. Given that, the inherent problems of the 8th Army (something it would have been impossible to correct in the time he had available) and the weather he did about as good as could have been expected. It is also worth remembering that when the boot was on the other foot Rommel failed to destroy 8th Army in the pursuit to the El Alamein despite having a commander who was skilled in mobile warfare and an experienced skilled Army with which to conduct that pursuit. Finally it amused me that although he admits at the start that speculations about what might have happened had the pursuit been more successful are debatable he can't resist concluding that the war would have been shortened by 3 months and that D-Day would have been brought forward to 1943 something which I doubt very much given all the other factors involved. |
Raimondo | 21 Apr 2017 9:14 a.m. PST |
From the British Official History "The strengths of the principal German formations on or about 10th November were recorded as follows: 90th Light Division: 1,000 all ranks; 10 anti-tank guns; 2 troops field artillery. 15th Panzer Division: 1,177 all ranks; 5 anti-tank guns; 11 field guns; no tanks. 21st Panzer Division: 1,009 all ranks; 5 anti-tank guns; 6 field guns; 11 tanks. Ramcke Parachute Brigade: 700 all ranks; 5 anti-tank guns; 2 field guns 19th Flak Division: 24 heavy (8.8cm) and 40 light (2-cm) anti-aircraft guns. 164th Light Division: (on 17th November) about 2 battalions and 2 troops field artillery. The Italians were in even worse shape, the X Corpo d'Armata reported its strength on 18th November as 2,872 men – about one-tenth of what they had four weeks earlier. That the German-Italian Tank Army 'escaped' is somewhat of a myth. |
mkenny | 21 Apr 2017 10:57 a.m. PST |
Not forgetting that Rommel took all the Italian transport at gunpoint and simply left them their fate as he bolted for safety. It is very difficult to outrun a man fleeing for his life. |
mkenny | 21 Apr 2017 2:37 p.m. PST |
I wonder why no one takes into account that there was no pressing reason for Monty to plan for 'cutting off' and surrounding DAK. After all he knew about the up-coming TORCH Landings and that an Army was being landed that was going to take Tripoli from the west. All Monty had to do was play the anvil as the new sledgehammer walloped Rommel….oh wait, I forgot. TORCH failed to achieve its pre-landing objectives and in the end Monty came to help them take Tunis instead of them cutting Rommel off from Tripoli. |
Mark 1 | 21 Apr 2017 3:12 p.m. PST |
Hmmm. Can't say as I much care to wade in to this Bash Monty / Defend Monty tit-for-tat, but I think it is rather gratuitous to label Torch as a failure for not achieving "it's pre-landing objectives". We should not forget that Torch was planned to land in Rommel's rear, not in von Arnim's face. Even though the French in Algeria and Morocco had not yet been vanquished, Torch forces started advancing in to Tunisia by 11 November. When they set out, the French were considered the only opposition. Within 2 days there were 15,000 Axis troops in their path. By the end of that month the Axis had already moved 5 fresh divisions (3 German, including 10th Panzer, and 2 Italian) into Tunisia. All of these divisions were reasonably complete and fully equipped, not the battered remnants that Monty was facing. The force that Anderson's 1st Army wound up facing by the end of November was larger and better equipped than what Monty's 8th Army was facing at that same time. Anderson was working from a supply base that had been built up over less than 3 weeks, while Monty had had more than 6 months to build up his supply base. This is not a criticism of Monty's performance. It is only a bit of context -- the Torch force faced a force that none of the planning had anticipated. If Rommel had received 5 fresh and reasonably well supplied and equipped divisions in that same timeframe, I don't expect Monty would have achieved quite as much against his pre-attack planning timeline either. -Mark (aka: Mk 1) |
mkenny | 21 Apr 2017 3:38 p.m. PST |
That is hindsight. TORCH plans were to attack Tripoli and cut Rommel off from his supply base. True events moved far quicker than the Allies expected and an entirely new set of facts were created from nothing. Monty knew the TORCH objectives and was expecting Tripoli to be attacked from the West. So why should he make some speculative wide-sweep in order to cut Rommel off when he knew another Army was 'going' to do that? Also can I also highlight that the Germans pulled a rabbit from the hat in Tunisia and stymied TORCH. They could have done the same if they decided to rescue Rommel sans TORCH caught any outflanking force sent by Montgomery and destroyed it. The problem with the moaners is they live only in a world of what happened and not could have happened. Monty knew that to win for certain he just had to stay focused and advance on a broad front that could not be flanked. What moaners are saying is cast all caution aside and gamble without taking into account the consequences of a losing gamble. |
Mark 1 | 21 Apr 2017 6:32 p.m. PST |
mkenny I am afraid you are boxing with your own shadow. I am not a "moaner". I offered no criticism of Monty, nor do I offer any such criticism now. I only suggest that you might look elsewhere than Torch for your opportunity to paint Monty in whatever positive light you wish to paint him. Focus on Monty's activities, not on some imagined scenario where he had to rescue another British general from what might otherwise have been a failure. Torch was not a failure. It achieve all that was intended of it. It made Rommel's position untenable. There was no turning back to snap at his pursuers, because Rommel knew after November 11 (the date that both Monty's 8th Army secured the Egyptian border, and that Anderson's 1st Army began forays into Tunisia) that he could not hold any position he might establish at Tobruk, or Gazala, or even Benghazi. Rommel was racing to Tunisia, whether Monty chased him or not. TORCH plans were to attack Tripoli and cut Rommel off from his supply base. I would be interested in any reputable source you could provide to indicate that this was ever a stated, distributed, agreed objective of Torch. I can find none. Having looked through most of the back-and-forth between Churchill and Roosevelt that led to the Torch invasion, I can find no mention in either party's correspondences with each other, or directives to their respective chiefs of staff, nor in the planning documents circulated by Eisenhower, nor in Marshall's responses, that make ANY mention of Tripoli, or even Libya, as an objective. Rather, it seems pretty clear that the operational objectives of Torch were Morocco and Algeria, with a following rapid advance into Tunisia. Full stop. Much gnashing of teeth took place over strategic options of landing only in Morocco, vs. landing only in Algeria, vs. landing as far East as Phillipeville and Bone (in Algeria), all with reference to how long it might take to advance on Tunisia. As the U.S. Army history (the "Green Books") describe it, in Chapter 7: The Decision to Invade North Africa (TORCH), on pg. 196:
The scope and direction of the landings were now decided; the "transatlantic essay contest" was over. Only the date of the invasion remained to be settled. The planning staffs in both Washington and London, after six weeks of frustrating uncertainty, could now breathe a sigh of relief and proceed with definite operational and logistical preparation without the harassing fear that the work of one day would be upset by a new development in strategy the next.The final decision represented a compromise on the conflicting strategic concepts of Washington and London. It sought to minimize the risks to the line of communications involved in putting the full strength of the Allied effort inside the Mediterranean without giving up hope of gaining Tunisia quickly. The plan to make initial landings east of Algiers at Philippeville and Bone, advocated by the British, was abandoned but the assault on Algiers was retained at the expense of the forces operating against Casablanca and Oran. The political desirability of an all-American assault, though probably still valid, was compromised to the extent that British forces were to be used at Algiers in the immediate follow-up and for the eastward push into Tunisia after a lodgment had been attained.
No mentions of Libya at all, much less of Tripoli, are in sight. No debating, no examination of contingency, nothing. If Monty expected Anderson to beat him to Tripoli, he was suffering from a fantasy of his own making. It was not in the objectives or timelines given to Anderson. -Mark (aka: Mk 1) |
mkenny | 21 Apr 2017 7:14 p.m. PST |
mkenny I am afraid you are boxing with your own shadow. I am not a "moaner" living in a world of what happened and not what could have happened. The title is self-selecting. If you don't moan you are not a moaner. In short if you haven't moaned then you are not being addressed. For instance the factual statement than the bulk of unreasonable Monty criticism comes from American authors has been taken as blanket criticism of all American authors when it clearly is no such thing. Is it not possible to criticise a section of American society without it being taking it as a personal attack on the entire nation? American Troop were in the minority during the Tunisian Campaign so my saying they were stymied of failed to perform to timetable is not a disguised anti-American sentiment. I can only repeat my earlier quote from Macdonald: link between 477-478 The Allied plan to defeat Rommel by converging attacks having been foiled, General Eisenhower had no choice but to dig in to defend in the Tunisian mountains until he could accumulate enough strength to attack in conjunction with a renewed strike by Montgomery against the Mareth Line The object was to threaten/deny Rommel the use of Tripoli and no one expected the speed of the German reaction or the fight for Tunisia.
|
mkenny | 21 Apr 2017 7:36 p.m. PST |
If Monty expected Anderson to beat him to Tripoli, he was suffering from a fantasy of his own making. It was not in the objectives or timelines given to Anderson. Just as Anderson would be suffering from a fantasy of his own making if he thought Monty would be fighting in Tunisia. Tunisia was not in any of Monty's objectives or timelines up to Jan 1943 |
Blutarski | 21 Apr 2017 9:06 p.m. PST |
Hi Fred, ….. I think we pretty much concur here. There is an old saying that I have always kept close to mind – "to every complicated question there is a simple answer ….. and it is usually wrong". In the case of 8th Army's laggardly Alamein pursuit, the underlying causes were to my mind manifold indeed. While I do believe that Montgomery was by personality innately over-cautious and risk-averse, I do not think that these traits were the dominant factors in the slow pace of pursuit. 8th Army was not a well developed or smoothly functioning tool in all respects and Montgomery clearly mistrusted the capabilities of his armored formations in mobile combat to the degree that he kept them on a rather short command leash. One can also point to the logistics and staff foul-ups and the lack of a pursuit plan, but I think it fair to say that Montgomery simply had too much on his plate and too little time from August 1942 to tackle everything. He focused on the battle and made sure to win it. As far as the author's speculations as to the consequences of the slow pursuit go ….. It is impossible to say how close to or far from the mark he might have been: speculations are impossible to nail down. I am however personally skeptical that a Normandy landing in 1943 was ever in the cards, irrespective of the outcome of the Tunisian campaign. B |
jdginaz | 21 Apr 2017 11:34 p.m. PST |
"Given that, the inherent problems of the 8th Army (something it would have been impossible to correct in the time he had available) and the weather he did about as good as could have been expected" The weather effected the DAK just as much as the 8th. "I wonder why no one takes into account that there was no pressing reason for Monty to plan for 'cutting off' and surrounding DAK. After all he knew about the up-coming TORCH Landings and that an Army was being landed that was going to take Tripoli from the west. All Monty had to do was play the anvil as the new sledgehammer walloped Rommel.." Earlier it was necessary to attack the DAK to eliminate the threat to the canal even though they presented no threat of offensive action and TORCH was about to happen but now it's ok for Monty to not pursue the DAK to destroy it because TORCH is about to happen? Kind of contradictory arguments there. |
mkenny | 22 Apr 2017 4:39 a.m. PST |
Kind of contradictory arguments there A bit like Monty spending days reducing DAK to a rump of 40 tanks and then being castigated for 'not beating an army of 40 tanks'. One can only wonder why DAK was reduced to 40 tanks. Who reduced it to 40 tanks and why an Army that had a great deal more than 40 tanks is not given its proper title of 'the defeated Army' This is the same defeated Army that reduced the first Allied Unit it came across to an army of considerably less that 40 tanks! |
number4 | 22 Apr 2017 6:21 p.m. PST |
""He participated in the planning of the operation but didn't come up with it by himself"It was entirely his plan. Who else planned it? March 1943: Anglo-American staff is formed under the command of British Lieutenant General Morgan. He is given the title of COSSAC (Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Commander). The Supreme Allied Commander has not yet been appointed. Montgomery doesn't enter the picture (as commander, 21st AG) until December 1943 |
jdginaz | 22 Apr 2017 9:45 p.m. PST |
"A bit like Monty spending days reducing DAK to a rump of 40 tanks and then being castigated for 'not beating an army of 40 tanks'." I never posted anything of the kind. |
Whirlwind | 23 Apr 2017 10:47 a.m. PST |
Just a minor point wrt Hodges and the 1st Army: Bradley apparently stated that he insisted that the US 9th Army went to 21st Army Group rather than US 1st Army (which might have appeared more logical, since it had been part of 21st Army Group in Normandy) and he didn't want Montgomery/the Brits to get their hands on the veteran 1st Army! It seems odd he would do this if he thought that either Hodges or the 1st Army was no good. |
Blutarski | 23 Apr 2017 11:20 a.m. PST |
"I never posted anything of the kind." Such things appear not to be a matter of any consequence to mkenny. B |
christot | 23 Apr 2017 11:46 a.m. PST |
"March 1943: Anglo-American staff is formed under the command of British Lieutenant General Morgan. He is given the title of COSSAC (Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Commander). The Supreme Allied Commander has not yet been appointed. Montgomery doesn't enter the picture (as commander, 21st AG) until December 1943" Correct. Why did you not quote the rest of my post? As soon as Monty WAS appointed he threw Morgan's plan out and refused to undertake the operation unless HIS wholesale modifications were made. The eventual D-Day plan bears little resemblance to COSSAC's original (which probably would have failed). |
mkenny | 23 Apr 2017 6:09 p.m. PST |
"I never posted anything of the kind." Such things appear not to be a matter of any consequence to mkenny. So unlike those who when corrected on errors of fact simply go back and edit out the errors. |
mkenny | 23 Apr 2017 6:17 p.m. PST |
Can anyone provide me with an example of a German Army beaten in the West that was surrounded and forced to capitulate? A German Army that was cut-off and blocked and not a garrison or other unit that was penned against the sea. An Army that was 'headed off at the pass' so to speak in the way critics claim Montgomery should have done to Rommel after Alamein? Perhaps we could discuss why the Germans in The Bulge were not surrounded first and then bagged. You know like the way Monty should have cut-off and bagged Rommel. |
number4 | 23 Apr 2017 9:47 p.m. PST |
Because a hell of a lot of work was done in 1943 by Lt. Gen. Morgan and his staff, work that was not just thrown into the waste basket. The logistics, the three large scale deceptive operations and the security of the whole Overlord plan wasn't scribbled on the back of an envelope (despite what the Daily Mail would have you believe), it involved many months of hard work by the people behind the scenes who don't get to ride around in funny hats getting their name in the papers. Gen. Morgan's plan had originally been limited by the availability of landing craft, (hardly his fault?) but Montgomery insisted it would require more men attacking over a wider front. Ultimately, more landing craft were obtained and the invasion was scaled up to Montgomery's satisfaction, at the cost of a month's delay and a reduction in the Southern France operation. However, all the key features of Morgan's plan remained; the choice of Normandy as the assault area, the use of Mulberry harbors, the deployment of American forces on the right and British on the left, the use of airborne troops to cover the flanks, and some form of diversionary operation in Southern France. |
Raimondo | 24 Apr 2017 2:15 a.m. PST |
Torch was not a failure. It achieve all that was intended of it. It made Rommel's position untenable. There was no turning back to snap at his pursuers, because Rommel knew after November 11 (the date that both Monty's 8th Army secured the Egyptian border, and that Anderson's 1st Army began forays into Tunisia) that he could not hold any position he might establish at Tobruk, or Gazala, or even Benghazi. Rommel was racing to Tunisia, whether Monty chased him or not. Rommel was racing back to Tunisia against orders, and probably unwisely. Mersa Brega, Buerat and Tarhouna-Homs were all excellent defensive positions. Against an unbalanced pursuit Rommel was too good a commander not to snap. |
Mark 1 | 24 Apr 2017 10:25 a.m. PST |
Rommel was racing back to Tunisia against orders, and probably unwisely. Mersa Brega, Buerat and Tarhouna-Homs were all excellent defensive positions. The success of the Torch landings, the turning of the Vichy French forces to active participation on the allied side, and the presence in Tunisia of an ever growing joint Anglo-American-French force, meant that Rommel's position was entirely untenable. He knew that. He understood that a divided Axis in North Africa, with 500 – 1,000km separating his force from von Arnim's force, in an environment where his adversaries had mastery of the logistics flow, would lead to nothing but disaster. He believed that the only possibility for success, or even stalemate, was to combine the Axis forces while the allies were still separated. He believed that he could get to Tunisia fast enough to refit and re-equip his panzer formations, launch a joint (with von Arnim) attack against the Americans, and give them a drumming, all long before Monty was ready to interfere. In this he was correct. He thought such an attack, using the tempo of operations and maneuver that had so frequently dislocated his enemies, would lead to a long term disruption of activities in Tunisia, allowing von Arnim to grow his command while he (Rommel) set up a solid defense along the old fortifications of the Mareth Line. In this he was also partly correct, although the dislocation caused by his attack was far shorter-lived than he had expected. However, if he had not attacked about where and when he did, he would have been at great risk of being cut off from von Arnim, if not taken in the rear, by the American forces which were within striking distance of the coast road south of von Arnim's defenses at Tunis and Bizerta. He had no choice. His position was untenable. If he had not won his race to Tunisia for any reason (such as turning to snap at his pursuers), he would have had to split his own already depleted force into two to defend from Americans on one side and Brits on the other. -Mark (aka: Mk 1) |
mkenny | 24 Apr 2017 2:29 p.m. PST |
Any Allied force going into Libya into Rommels rear was a near certain bet to be going to be cut off by a German advance from unconquered Tunis. |
Mark 1 | 24 Apr 2017 3:22 p.m. PST |
Any Allied force going into Libya into Rommels rear was a near certain bet to be going to be cut off by a German advance from unconquered Tunis. This seems a bit fanciful. Don't you think perhaps von Arnim was a bit busy with all those British blokes trying to dislodge him from Bizerte and Tunis to go chasing off to save Rommel? Facing orders from Kesselring to take Madjez el Bab, knowing that he also had to sieze, secure and protect the reservoir at Barrage de l'Oued Kebir, near the north end of the Ousseltia Valley, to ensure a source of water for Tunis as soon as winter ended, and with French forces pushing the Italian Superga Division out of 3 strategic mountain passes protecting the coast road, he's now expected to send a strike force on a road march to Libya? Are you kidding? If he had moved his armor several hundred km south and east from Tunis, he would have placed them in as vulnerable of a position as Rommel would have been in.
Let us look at the geography involved. Look at the map of the actual positions in early February of 1943. Now remove Rommel from this map, and place him some 600 – 800km further to the east, at some appropriate position in Libya giving battle to Monty. Tell me again how you expect von Arnim to support him? Look at the distances that the Allies would need to cover to cut the coast road. Look at the distance from Pichon to Sousse, or from Sidi bou Zid to Sfax, or from El Guettar to Gabes. Remember, that in this scenario there is no Rommel on the map, so Sfax, El Hamma, Gabes, Mareth are all effectively undefended! Then look at the length of the flank that von Arnim would need to protect, if he WERE able drive from Tunis to Mareth to threaten any US force on the SE side. How many divisions do you think he had, that he could protect a 150km long flank WHILE defending Bizerte and Tunis AND attacking into Libya?? The only reason that the Allies took as long as they did to evict the Axis from North Africa was BECAUSE Rommel put himself on this map, when he did. Take him off of this map, put him somewhere on a map of Libya, and the Axis forces are separated, isolated, assaulted from multiple directions, and strangled of supplies, each in detail. Perhaps you can't see this. But Rommel could. -Mark (aka: Mk 1) |
mkenny | 24 Apr 2017 5:12 p.m. PST |
What amazes me is the number of reasons that can be found to excuse the inaction/failures of any other General but in Montgomery's case it is always because he is timid/slow/pick your favourite insult. An Allied thrust into Libya would be too much of a temptation to any German commander and believing it is not a possibility is the same as believing the Germans would never land an Army in Tunisia. A frontal attack by Rommel combined with a thrust into the invading Allied Army's rear would be a real threat. Given Rommel's nature I would say it was a certainty. I asked this earlier with no reply so I will ask again. Where can I see an example of an Allied Army breaking a Germany Army and then surrounding and destroying it. The claim is Monty threw away the chance to do just that so I am looking to find where any German Army was cut-off and captured by this method. Why did it not happen that the Bulge shoulders were closed and the German troops inside captured? If it was so easy why did it never happen? |
mkenny | 24 Apr 2017 5:22 p.m. PST |
Tell me again how you expect von Arnim to support him?………he's now expected to send a strike force on a road march to Libya? Are you kidding?. The landings in Tunisia were in support of Rommel. Just by being in Tunis they prevented any sortie into Libya. Any Allied force that ventured into Libya did not have to have a following German Army just a German army astride its supply routes. And I repeat Monty came to Tunisia and it was not the TORCH Armies that came to Tripoli. You will not find any TORCH Plans that have Montgomery fighting his way into Tunis. |
Mark 1 | 24 Apr 2017 6:16 p.m. PST |
What amazes me is the number of reasons that can be found to excuse the inaction/failures of any other General but in Montgomery's case it is always because he is timid/slow/pick your favourite insult. Again, you are boxing with shadows. I have offered no insult. I offer no insult. I have offered no opinion at of Montgomery at all to this point. It is not an insult to say that Rommel believed he could get back to Tunisia, refit and re-equip his force, attack the Americans, and still have time to build up his defenses on the Mareth Line before Montgomery would interfere with his operations. It is simply a statement of fact. That is what Rommel believed, that is how Rommel behaved. The claim is Monty threw away the chance to do just that so I am looking to find where any German Army was cut-off and captured by this method. I have made no such claim. I will make no such claim. Please read my lips: I am not criticizing Montgomery. I stayed out of this thread up to the point where I felt it appropriate to respond to your rather peculiar claim that Montgomery's behaviors during the post-Alamein pursuit were in some part due to his knowledge that the forces landed during Torch were going to seize Tripoli. I do not criticize Montgomery for his pursuit. I do not criticize Montgomery for being methodical, or for focusing on maximizing all of the conditions under his control that could contribute to ultimate victory rather than taking a quick roll of the dice. I would suggest that if you want to understand or explain Montgomery and his post-Alamein pursuit, you should examine Montgomery's realities at that time, not fabricate some excuse about Torch failing to achieve something it was never intended to achieve. You are welcome to go off and defend Monty as much as you like. But when you respond to statements in MY posts, please distinguish between the things I have said, and things I have not said. Any Allied force that ventured into Libya did not have to have a following German Army just a German army astride its supply routes. It is reasonable to suggest that a German Army astride it's supply lines would have stopped any American force. However it is highly dubious to suggest that von Arnim could have played that role. The American supply lines traced back from Tebessa to Constantine. Von Arnim was not in a position to threaten the American supply lines until/unless they reached Gabes. To threaten the supply lines of any American force in Libya he would have to get south of Sfax, and to cut the supply lines he would have to get to Gabes. You are suggesting that von Arnim assemble some reasonably powerful mobile striking force, pull it's components from the area of the primary threat to his position, and expose a 250km flank from Tunis to Gabes, to use them to strike at an American flank of about 40km from Gabes west onto the Maknassay road. Given that the American force was nearly 100% motorized/mechanized, does this seem reasonable to you? Most of his German force was infantry, fighting Allfrey in the mountains from Mateur to Medjez el Bab. He had all of one panzer division, which was faced off against the British 6th Armoured in the north. Superga was having trouble dealing with the French. So what force is he expected to send on a 200km road march to attack the Americans? There is good reason von Arnim never ventured much further south than Ousseltia in his own initiatives, and only allowed his panzers as far as Sidi bou Zid within the context of a cooperative effort with Rommel that was forced upon him against his objections, and was limited to less than 1 week's time. Only Rommel, after he reached Tunisia, was in a position to threaten the American supply lines. And to do that he had to go through the American FRONT lines first. -Mark (aka: Mk 1) |
mkenny | 24 Apr 2017 6:41 p.m. PST |
I made an observation. No allowance is every made for any outside factor when Monty is criticised. Yet whenever any other General is criticised someone usualy start tabulating reasons why any mistakes are beyond the control of the General.No one is being blamed. It simply shows the attitude of the bulk of posters. |