"About Tactics in the ACW" Topic

"Tactics is the military art of maneuvering troops on the field of battle to achieve victory in combat. 'Offensive tactics" seek success through attacking; "defensive tactics" aim at defeating enemy attacks.

In Civil War tactics, the principal combat arm was infantry. Its most common deployment was a long "line of battle," 2 ranks deep. More massed was the "column," varying from 1 to 10 or more companies wide and from 8 to 20 or more ranks deep. Less compact than column or line was "open-order" deployment: a strung-out, irregular single line.

Battle lines delivered the most firepower defensively and offensively. Offensive firepower alone would not ensure success. Attackers had to charge, and massed columns, with their greater depth, were often preferable to battle lines for making frontal assaults. Better yet were flank attacks, to "roll up" thin battle lines lengthwise. Offensive tacticians sought opportunity for such effective flank attacks; defensive tacticians countered by "refusing" these flanks on impassable barriers. In either posture, tacticians attempted to coordinate all their troops to deliver maximum force and firepower and to avoid being beaten "in detail" (piecemeal). Throughout, they relied on open-order deployment to cover their front and flanks with skirmishers, who developed the enemy position and screened their own troops.

Open order, moreover, was best suited for moving through the wooded countryside of America. That wooded terrain, so different from Europe's open fields, for which tactical doctrine was aimed, also affected tactical control. Army commanders, even corps commanders, could not control large, far-flung forces. Instead, army commanders concentrated on strategy. And corps commanders handled "grand tactics": the medium for translating theater strategy into battlefield tactics, the art of maneuvering large forces just outside the battlefield and bringing them onto that field. Once on the field, corps commanders provided overall tactical direction, but their largest practical units of tactical maneuver were divisions. More often, brigades, even regiments, formed those maneuver elements. Essentially, brigades did the fighting in the Civil War…"
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"…Cavalry so infrequently undertook such pursuits chiefly because defeated armies were rarely routed…"

Is this true?… or they didn't know how managed with Cavalry before their enemy were routed?…

Amicalement
Armand

Let's see, when did armies rout? Bull Run. First time the Rebels collapsed from winning and could not chase anyone. Second time some parts of the Union army were still in order.

The next time an army (rather than a smaller force) routed that I can think of is Missionary Ridge. The cavalry had been sent away because the horses couldn't be fed in Chattanooga.

After that, Nashville. Wilson's cavalry did pursue. I guess just not letting the Rebels rest induced many to desert.

The smaller battles in the Shenandoah saw some routs and I assume some cavalry pursuit.

Also, both sides had no tradition of massed cavalry. The rebels came to it more easily. By 1863-64 both sides were using larger formations, along with a lot of dismounted troopers.

Also, the Civil War armies had a much smaller proportion of cavalry than European armies. In most ACW armies cavalry usually made up less than 10% of the whole (at First Bull Run, it was much smaller than that, just a couple of regiments on each side). In European armies the percentage was often much greater. So in the ACW the pursuing force would be much smaller than the pursued in most cases.

And rifled muskets were effective at a much greater distance than the Napoleonic era smoothbore muskets were.

One could ask how many army routs were caused by pursuing cavalry during the Crimean War and the various European conflicts through the Franco-Prussian War.

Lack of training in how to use a black powder rifle at long ranges combined with an overall lack of experience with by commanders and soldiers resulted in most ACW firefights being conducted at 150 yards and less. Yes, the new guns were able to shoot further, but the men were not drilled and trained to do so. My understanding is there's some debate as to whether or not the losses of engaged units were really heavier during the ACW than in many Napoleonic battles.

Good points Tom! Yes, while the theoretical effective range of the rifle-musket was much greater than a smoothbore, the actual effective range wasn't all that more. And the % of casualties in SWY and Napoleonic battles were actually greater than ACW battles in most cases.

And I would add that most federal cavalry, from 1863 onward, was used, in the main, as mounted infantry, doing their fighting dismounted with carbines rather than mounted with sword and pistol.

true, there were still some mounted engagements, even to the end of the war. Federal cavalry charged at High bridge during Lee's retreat that ended at Appomattox, and also pursued Gordon's II Corps after Saylor's Creek, though many stopped pursuing when they got among the baggage trains and started looting, instead.

Even out west, both Wilder's and Forrest's men, and Wilson's cavalry, did much of their fighting on foot.

Quite interesting points boys.

Amicalement
Armand

Were there any larger charges by cavalry than that at Opequon Creek in 1864? Was not that charge decisive, causing the route of Early's army? Thanks in advance for any comments anyone may care to make. John Miller John Miller

many stopped pursuing when they got among the baggage trains and started looting, instead

As cavalry has done time and again in other wars.

They had to, it was on their job discription!

Were there any larger charges by cavalry than that at Opequon Creek in 1864?

A few cavalry vs. cavalry fights were larger, but as a single charge, the 5 brigades of Union cavalry charging at that battle is probably the largest, especially of mounted cavalry charging infantry. And, yes, it did lead directly to the rout of Early's army.

donlowry: Thanks for getting back to me. I thought that was the case, but wasn't sure. I couldn't remember any bigger one vs. infantry, however I am clueless when it comes to western battles and what research I have been able to do hasn't revealed anything bigger out there. Wert mentions it in his book, which I enjoyed very much. It seems to me that this action was similar to the classic use of cavalry by European armies at a time when the conventional modern wisdom assumes that these kinds of charges were a thing of the past. This is a pet subject of mine so I appreciate any thing I can learn about it. Thanks, John Miller

Wasn't it Opequon Creek where George Patton's grandfather was killed?

Yup. It was a hard battle on senior officers, several generals being killed and a bunch more being wounded.

ACW cavalry was in the light cavalry and dragoon traditions, not that European dragoons and light cav might not make the occasional mounted charge, but European armies of the Napoleonic wars had heavy cavalry for that role.

donlowry; OK, Thanks John Miller

The US didn't really have a battle cavalry tradition at all. That is one reason the US had cavalry, not the many flavors found in Europe. It is also why there weren't the grand cavalry charges seen there.

And how often did cavalry pursue 'broken' or retreating armies, even during the Napoleonic wars?

The original mounted units of the U.S. Army were the 1st Dragoons, 2nd Dragoons, and the Mounted Rifles. In the 1850s (I think when Jeff Davis was Secretary of War) the 1st Cavalry and 2nd Cavalry were added, presumably more in the light cavalry tradition. (Incidentally, the arm-of-service colors were orange for dragoons, green for mounted rifles, and yellow for cavalry.) At the start of the ACW, those five regiments were renamed 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th Cavalry, in order of seniority, and a new 6th Cavalry was raised. The 7th and higher numbers weren't added until after the war. Lee had been Lt. Col. of the original 2nd (later 5th) Cav.