"Help me understand AWI tactics" Topic

I have not picked up "With Bayonets and Zeal Only" in a couple of weeks, I am sure the answer is in there, but I wanted to get opinions, trying to figure out how to model this.

It appears that it was common for both sides, particularly in the south, to deploy battalions in multiple lines. I can visualize how this would work for the Continental army defending, but how did multiple lines of battalions work for the British in the attack?

A) Did one battalion pass through another as the lead battalions became fatigued or disordered? Most everyone was in loose files so this is not impossible.

B) The battalions were spaced far enough that the second line could move forward as needed into the gaps between the front line battalions.

C) The lead battalion breaks completely / is combat ineffective and the following battalion moves forward to take its place on the line

D) Something else entirely?

Thanks!

Not quite as simple as that. While battalions in brigades were sometimes deployed in support of each other, sometimes they weren't and were simply deployed in one brigade line. It is really hard to generalize as often each battle was unique for tactical dispositions.

As to open files, there is some thought that the extended front allowed them to flank a defender. A battalion in open files could also close files as it advanced to come to close order.

These were not Roman legions, with tired soldiers stepping aside to be replace by fresh ones. The follow-up evening battle of Brandywine shows that in many cases, brigade and sometimes battalion formations broke down yet units still moved forward to attack, or rallied to defend, regardless of brigade integrity.

Also, I think in the south the only British "multiple lines" were a second reserve line.

So how did the reserve line work? How did they deploy? Through the front line battalions, into gaps, or something else? Just figuring out how to best represent it on the table.

While in the second line, it is combat power you cannot use on the attack, but must have been useful somehow. Or was t just an insurance policy in case your front battalions did fail and break?

Supporting lines of troops would be some distance away (100 yards?) as you don't want them getting tangled up in each other. They need room to maneuver. I think it was SM (???) who pointed out that the American deployment at Camden left them no room to move and contributed to the debacle there.

While you can pass battalions through each other if in open order, it is not ideal – at least from my experience actually doing it.

So for the attack on Birmingham Hill, the attacking battalions were all deployed in single lines (two ranks, we are taking battalions here, not ranks). They were supported by the German grenadier battalions, also in line, and supporting hat battalions behind the first line – though not particularly close.

It is hard to compare the big battles of the north to the smaller battles of the south.

The fought out battalion, if not retreating, would simply stay in place and the advancing ones would pass it. Only in wargames are brigade frontages all neat and solid. In the real war gaps appeared and units fell behind, etc, and supporting units could move through them.

in many cases, brigade and sometimes battalion formations broke down yet units still moved forward to attack, or rallied to defend, regardless of brigade integrity.

So if I understand correctly the troops kept fighting even though the command had broken down. This was something I found happened in the ACW. During the AWI though, with the exception of Princeton I've only read about militia doing this. Was it fairly common, or was Brandywine an unusual situation?

It was more common for troops attacking/advancing as opposed to standing there and fighting. I think it was fairly common, and was a bigger issue on broken terrain, such as Guilford.

It is only wargame tables that the lines look all neat. :-)

Remember, I commander can only exercise command over what he can see and convey orders to.

The most famous "pass through" was at Cowpens where Morgan had pre-planned for it. Of course, the plans didn't really work in real time, but they did manage to pull it off.
There are plenty of resources on the web that will illustrate it for you.

Morgan had pre-planned for it

I find accounts of passage of lines in the AWI and for that matter, the ACW, work when there has been pre-planning. When done on the spur of the moment it may well lead to disorder.

Also, a supporting line gave comfort to the first line. If all went wrong, the supports could well stop enemy pursuit and give a place to rally. If all went well, the supports could chase a beaten enemy, or come up and tip the balance of a close fight.

comfort to the first line

Or in game terms,a plus for "rear support".

I saw in the movies

From which we also learned that every cavalry charge throughout history was launched at full gallop,with total disregard for order.

I think Spring quotes a memorandum from Maj Gen Phillips (the only artillery officer ever to lead regulars during the 18thC I think) who talks about battalions dividing into two wings, one leading in some form of extended order and launching the attack, the other in close order and in two, three or even four ranks, to provide a rallying point if the front line was defeated, or some extra punch if it stalled.

I think it became an essential tenet that in any skirmishing formation half the unit remained formed to act in support of the troops fighting in open order. I'm not sure how that applied to the general principle of fighting in two ranks. As history gamer has described, one of the clearest examples of how British battalions manoeuvred on a good day, was in the main flanking attack at Brandywine Creek.

I think it became an essential tenet that in any skirmishing formation half the unit remained formed to act in support of the troops fighting in open order.

Ah, but what you have to bear in mind here is that these were not "skirmishing" formations, these were assault formations – the essential difference from the later French Revolution and Napoleonic periods. In any event, tactics for that sort of fighting (ie skirmishing) were still in their infancy anyway (eg Townshend's memo on skirmishing and pairing men off, from 1771). Phillips' memo was describing assault formations.

Yes, indeed. I was unaware of the Phillips memo. The question in my mind was where the skirmishing formation as it was evolving in the 1770s left off and the open order tactics, adapted by British infantry battalions in America, began.

By 1788, Dundas in Principles of Military Movements, seemed to take as a given that troops fighting in open order should always maintain that depth of formation.

It occurs to me to ask, did the two-rank formation ordered for troops in America circa 1758 stand alone or did it include a similar support formation? I think Wolfe did so more or less at Quebec in 1759, though that might be open to interpretation.

Did Wolfe do what? You cited two different options.

Talking nonsense. Delete that thought.

I understand. I'm good at that too. :-)

Off topic – I did find a reference about three ranks being used at Quebec, though it was not the one I was looking for. Will post later, or perhaps on another thread – whichever is more helpful. :-)

The book I will cite also talks about Lights at Quebec, noting that many were used to secure the rear and guard some roads, but they were not used in front as skirmishers – though there were Brit Lights off to the flank fighting with Canadians and Indians.

I posted a passage from the 71st Orderly book here a while ago that does reference skirmishers out front being directed to take cover and aim at the enemy they run into.