Tango01 | 02 Jan 2017 11:31 a.m. PST |
…Killers. "On a freezing January day in 1809, rifleman Thomas Plunkett of the British 95th Rifles was flat on his back in the snow outside of the Spanish town of Cacabelos. Some might say that was no place for an Irishman, but this was the waning days of the Battle of Cacabelos during the Peninsular Campaign of the Napoleonic Wars. Plunkett knew exactly what he was doing. The French Général de Brigade Auguste-Marie-François Colbert was doing his best to lead French cavalry in a rearguard attack that could place the British Army at his mercy…" Main page link Amicalement Armand
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McLaddie | 02 Jan 2017 11:41 a.m. PST |
Armand: Rifled muskets had been around for almost sixty years when Pluckett won his prize for killing Colbert. However, the statement Plunkett wanted Colbert dead — and Colbert was more than 600 yards away. is wrong. It is one of those fish stories that grew with the telling. The distance was at best half that, probably around 250 yards. Still quite a feat at the time, but no 600 yards. |
Tango01 | 02 Jan 2017 11:48 a.m. PST |
Thanks for the info my friend!. (smile) Amicalement Armand
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matthewgreen | 02 Jan 2017 12:00 p.m. PST |
Nice writing, but I don't think it catches the historical perspective well. There were two problems with the Napoleonic rifle, Baker included. First it was hard to load. Tests carried out by Scharnhorst showed that the slow rate of fire negated the advantage of accuracy in general fire. Second it was costly and slow to manufacture, so could only be produced in small numbers. It was not until these two problems were solved half a century later that the rifle came into its own as a standard infantry weapon. But as a sniper weapon – a different matter. |
Northern Monkey | 02 Jan 2017 12:33 p.m. PST |
"No place for an Irishman"? Sounds like a perfect place for an Irishman, serving with Scotsmen, Welshmen and Englishman. It's worked pretty well to date. |
Brechtel198 | 02 Jan 2017 1:34 p.m. PST |
Nice writing, but I don't think it catches the historical perspective well. There were two problems with the Napoleonic rifle, Baker included. First it was hard to load. Tests carried out by Scharnhorst showed that the slow rate of fire negated the advantage of accuracy in general fire. Second it was costly and slow to manufacture, so could only be produced in small numbers. It was not until these two problems were solved half a century later that the rifle came into its own as a standard infantry weapon. But as a sniper weapon – a different matter. Excellent posting-very well done. |
thorr666 | 02 Jan 2017 2:42 p.m. PST |
Everyone knows the place of an Irishman is to be firmly entrenched in a pub singing and drinking, as God intended |
dibble | 02 Jan 2017 3:36 p.m. PST |
600 yards? For a dfinitive history of Plunkett look no further than… Thomas Plunkett Of The 95th Rifles: Hero, Villain, Fact or Fiction? By George Caldwell. link In fact all the exploits of the 95th in the Peninsula and Waterloo (the Crimea too) are best covered by this author and his co-author, Robert Cooper. buglehorn.co.uk Paul :) |
deadhead | 03 Jan 2017 3:05 a.m. PST |
Always wondered how some battalions of the 95th coped with having to fight in line or square at Waterloo, considering the obvious limitations of their Baker…………. They were not all at the sandpit, nor out skirmishing |
4th Cuirassier | 03 Jan 2017 4:27 a.m. PST |
@ deadhead It is a little-known fact that at Waterloo, most of the Allied light infantry spent their day not skirmishing in extended order, but in square. The 95th were in the line just east of Hougoumont and were charged by, among others, the carabinier brigade. As most wargamers know, you can't have skirmishers out skirmishing when the enemy has cavalry superiority. At Waterloo, most of the 95th did most of its fighting in close order as line infantry. You do raise a question that has always interested me, though. Most accounts of Waterloo stress the terrible punishment taken by Wellington's squares from artillery and from swarms of French skirmishers. The allied artillery always seems to be silent, and of course no Allied skirmishers because cavalry. Then suddenly the battle ends and it's the French formations who have been mysteriously eviscerated, despite the apparently one-sided nature of the encounter. Eg on the 22nd June, Guyot's Guard heavy cavalry division mustered 53% of its pre-battle strength. This figure bespeaks a lower strength still on the evening of 18th June, because if 47% of the horses and 47% of the men were lost, there was a good chance that on the day the 53% uninjured men were not on the 53% uninjured horses. The division's effective strength at that time could easily have been zero, with half the men having no horse and half the horses having no rider. So one is left wondering who inflicted all these French losses – not just on the cavalry but generally. It wasn't the Prussians because they only faced 10,000 French in Plancenoit, and most of the Prussian I and II Corps spent the day doing a d'Erlon anyway, i.e. marching between two battlefields without fighting at either. So where did the 20 to 25,000 French battlefield casualties come from? Clearly the majority were inflicted by Wellington's army. Blucher lost 7,000 so if we say the French lost the same in defence of Plancenoit, that leaves Wellington inflicting between 13,000 and 18,000 casualties. I would be interested to get hold of a reliable unit-by-unit tally of what losses the French suffered. By analysing this against where the unit was, it should be possible to work it out. |
von Winterfeldt | 03 Jan 2017 4:32 a.m. PST |
a complex story, riflemen or Jäger – had along with the rifle an excellent "sniping" weapon who could pick up individual targets – but additional to the patch and ball – individual powder charge and special powder to prime the pan, they had cartridges as well, some intermediate to give a good fit – and the usual undersized cartidge to enable fast fire, they even carried additional cartridge boxes for that. |
matthewgreen | 03 Jan 2017 4:46 a.m. PST |
I have sometimes wondered whether the slow rate of fire was a bit of a blessing sometimes. It meant that it would have taken the men longer to exhaust their ammunition – which perhaps enabled them to outlast smoothbore opponents, or that the skirmish line required less frequent refreshing. Since skirmish combats were often a matter of stamina, this may have helped… |
von Winterfeldt | 03 Jan 2017 5:06 a.m. PST |
they could fire fast as well, in case I remember correctly Kincaid did carry an extra box of 80 rounds – also in a lot of units only a third or a half was armed with rifles. A slow rate of fire was essential to keep a steady hand. A rifle unit would beat enemy skirmishers with smooth bore muskets hands down, they had the better weapon and were better trained and better recruited (like game keepers). But there was much more behind those units than just shooting accuratly at long distances. There is a good discussion in the article of Harman "They decide not, nor are they chiefly relied upon in battle". British Rifles and Light Infantry in the Peninsular War. In A History of the Peninsular War, Volume IX, edited by Paddy Griffith |
deadhead | 03 Jan 2017 7:38 a.m. PST |
4th Cuirassier is undoubtedly right, that the bulk of the Light regiments served as Line soldiers would have expected to, on The Big Day. I suspect more time in columns than in square or line though, unless directly threatened by cavalry, during the period of massed charges. von W makes the point that I had forgotten and that is very rarely mentioned. Sacrificing accuracy for rate of fire, riflemen with a Baker were equipped to and could indeed reload far more rapidly. Add a "sword bayonet" and the lads in green could have held their own en masse on the ridge. Thanks for that reminder! Funny though. We get whole books about how the 52nd beat Boney single handed (two within 12 months) fighting in conventional lines. We see the 71st often portrayed in contemporary prints fighting line or turning a cannon. But I have never read any account of the 95th's role other than the sandpit. |
von Winterfeldt | 03 Jan 2017 9:10 a.m. PST |
deadhead, buy the book – edited by Paddy Griffith, a lot of very intersting articles by different usual competent authors – a rare thing – you will enjoy it. typically any light infsntry unit could fight well in close order – there they were armed usually with an infantry musket |
Camcleod | 03 Jan 2017 9:25 a.m. PST |
deadhead See the following for a brief account of the exploits of the 2nd and 3rd Bn. Rifles at Waterloo p. 204-205: link |
Marc the plastics fan | 03 Jan 2017 10:39 a.m. PST |
Smoke and poor visibility would prevent the rifle being the game changer most Brit fans and rules writers of the past would suggest The 2015 reenactment was noted for smoke obscuring everyone's view of the battle |
McLaddie | 03 Jan 2017 10:47 a.m. PST |
It is a little-known fact that at Waterloo, most of the Allied light infantry spent their day not skirmishing in extended order, but in square. Most of their day?? So Wellington really didn't need to order them to square when he saw the French Cavalry forming? Keegan called Waterloo an eight hour skirmish punctuated by here and there by 2 hours of formed combat. |
DeRuyter | 03 Jan 2017 11:02 a.m. PST |
Both sides had an extended skirmish line running pretty much along the whole of the line at the outset of the battle. Certainly they were called in during the big attacks but just as likely skirmishers were sent back out during the periods of relative inactivity. Yes there was a lot of smoke in 2015 and that was only from about one division of infantry! |
Lord Ashram | 03 Jan 2017 11:54 a.m. PST |
Where do people get the information that the shot was at 250 yards? Everything I've seen shows it to be longer. |
4th Cuirassier | 03 Jan 2017 12:00 p.m. PST |
@ De Ruyter You'd think so, but I know of no source that describes this happening. If there is a reliable account that says skirmishers peeled off and followed the withdrawing cavalry, I'd be interested to know of it. Apart from in response to d'Erlon's attack, the light battalions – both the converged and the dedicated variety – simply formed part of the close-order line. The only exceptions that I can recall would be the KGL light troops who were in La Haye Sainte, and the Nassau light infantry defending Hougoumont. The majority of the combat Wellington's other light infantry experienced would thus have been when French cavalry overran the ridge and they formed square. |
deadhead | 03 Jan 2017 12:11 p.m. PST |
Now that is a good point and I now see what 4th C meant. We all seem agreed that Light Infantry Regiments (not light companies of Line) largely experienced Waterloo fighting in the traditional columns/ranks/lines. Remembering where Adam's lot were (Allied Right, behind the ridge) they would have been shot at by Artillery, but face to face combat…..nothing……… until the French cavalry arrived. OK Colborne then did that wheeling thing, right at the very end of a long day. Fighting in line, firing, taking heavy fire, bayonet charge….probably their first encounter with enemy infantry all day. However exaggerated its significance (so many books this last year are suggesting any one unit won the battle)and it was either brave or foolhardy, twas well done! and largely by folk not using rifles…… Thanks for the links above too, which do give some mention of 95th acting in support for this famous manoeuvre. |
dibble | 03 Jan 2017 2:01 p.m. PST |
All part of a Rifleman's training was to be flexible. Not only to be able to fight and think in the skirmish mode but also how to fight as line infantry. So nothing unusual in the respect of being able to fight in close order, line infantry formations. And as I have posted above. The best books on the subject are those that I have linked to. The sandpit being just a part of the drama during the Waterloo campaign, the battles in the Pyrenees are excellent. The peninsular campaign under Moore, the battalion of detachments at Talavera, and an excellent account of the Coa combat with a critical account of Craufurd's command during the fighting retreat. Those are just some of the many well known highlights but they also tell of many 'lesser' known actions and some incidents that many have not heard of before. They also name all the individual casualties and those who took part in the actions and battles, from Rifleman to officer and have colour plates and many 'text- page' black and white sketches of incidents by James Dann. The books may be a bit pricy but they really are the best. |
Musketier | 03 Jan 2017 2:44 p.m. PST |
- All we need now is for Alan Perry to come up with a six-pack of riflemen standing with swords fixed… Although, not having done them for the bicentennial, I don't know whether there'd be a big market for them now… |