monk2002uk | 30 Dec 2016 6:14 a.m. PST |
Earlier this year, we put on a commemorative display for the northern half of the Somme battlefield. The venue was the Joy of Six Show in Sheffield. The photos and AAR are here: link Robert |
Old Wolfman | 30 Dec 2016 7:54 a.m. PST |
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Big Red | 30 Dec 2016 8:59 a.m. PST |
Wow! Yes impressive indeed. |
wrgmr1 | 30 Dec 2016 9:16 a.m. PST |
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steamingdave47 | 30 Dec 2016 11:51 a.m. PST |
Excellent effort. The " diversionary" attack at Gommecourt is worthy of being presented in its own right. It was ill- conceived, badly supported in terms of artillery preparation, used relatively untrained troops and resulted in a large number of totally unnecessary casualties, as troops attacked what was described in The Official History of the War: Operations in France and Belgium as " a small modern fortress. It required siege operations….. ". 2 of the 46th Division's battalions suffered 80% casualties on that single day. To crown it all, the troops of the 46th (North Midland) Division were described as showing "a lack of offensive spirit" by the Corps commander Lt Gen, Sir Thomas D'Oyly Snow who was responsible, along with Allenby and Haig, for this fiasco. This same division stormed the Hindenburg Line in 1918, I hope D'Oyly Snow ate his own words then. I have family links to two of the regiments that were involved in this battle; my grandfather was in the Lincolnshire Regiment (1/5th battalion, a Territorial battalion) from 1915 to 1919, and my father began his military career in the Sherwood Foresters in WW2, so I have particularly strong feelings about the "donkeys" who conceived and planned this operation and then denigrated the brave men who tried to carry it out. If you are interested in a detailed account, read Alan MacDonald's book "A Lack of Offensive Spirit" |
monk2002uk | 30 Dec 2016 1:28 p.m. PST |
Gommecourt had a very profound effect on the battle as a whole. This is not evident if you just focus on the local action, as MacDonald has done in his excellent book. Haig was definitely responsible for the decision. The plan was to make the attack frontage as wide as possible (lessons learned from Neuve Chapelle and other 1915 battles). Preparatory work was also carried out by divisions further up the line from Snow's Corps but there weren't enough guns and ammunition to support any more attacks. The effect was to fool von Falkenhayn into thinking that the major attack would come from Arras. He refused to release any reserves to the German commander in the Somme area. Given the perceived threat to Gommecourt and the central importance of Thičpval, the Germans moved local resources up to the Gommecourt area. The front line was weakened to the south of Thičpval, both infantry and artillery. This played a central role in the success in the Montauban area and the whole of the French attack south of the Somme. The sacrifices of the 46th Division were not in vain. Robert |
steamingdave47 | 31 Dec 2016 4:15 a.m. PST |
Not sure that von Falkenhayn was fooled. An 8 day preliminary bombardment along the Somme front would have been a pretty big indicator that something was brewing, not to mention the reports from spies. Rawlinson was not in favour of the Gommecourt " diversion"; even Allenby and Snow were initially trying to persuade Haig to hit a softer sector, rather than what was one of the best prepared bits of the German line. The fact that the operation was entrusted to two relatively untested divisions, who had also done a lot of the labouring work in the area, and could not be supported by a sufficient weight of artillery also has to be considered. |
monk2002uk | 31 Dec 2016 5:37 a.m. PST |
As you rightly say, there was no shortage of information about the forthcoming offensive on the Somme. The problem for von Falkenayn was that there was no shortage of information from the sectors to the north as well, Gommecourt included. If you can't hide the obvious then the next best thing is to make lots of other things obvious as well. It wasn't that von Falkenhayn did not think there would be an attack on the Somme. It is that he thought there would be an even bigger attack in the strategically more important area of Arras. The fact that Gommecourt was 'one of the best prepared bits of the German line' is testament to its tactical importance. By threatening this area, as well as the other tactically important defensive Schwerpunkt of Thičpval, Haig ensured that the maximum diversion of German reinforcements took place. The failure of the attack to take and hold Gommecourt was not just due to the relatively untested divisions. The German heavy artillery had been significantly reinforced in the area. There was more infantry reserves for the counter-attacks too. In order to achieve the necessary breadth of attack, decisions had to be taken across the Army boundaries. Neither Allenby nor Rawlinson were in a position to take these decisions. Their views were important but could not trump the C-in-C who was aware of the broader picture. Note that the deceptions applied to fool von Falkenhayn worked in reverse for the German 1918 offensive known as Operation Michael. The extensive German preparations for attacks along the Western Front led to confusion and misinterpretation of the full extent of the first major offensive on March 21st 1918. Robert |
monk2002uk | 01 Jan 2017 3:25 a.m. PST |
Thank you very much for the feedback about the layout. It has taken a few years to get everything together but now it is possible to recreate most battlefields from the same kit. It was more that 10 years ago when I made my first terrain boards of the area around Delville Wood. The boards came out ok but I vowed never again as they are not reusable. Robert |
steamingdave47 | 01 Jan 2017 6:21 a.m. PST |
Robert, thanks for taking the time to present the additional information re the context in which Gommecourt was attacked. I am a relative newcomer to the study of WW1, my major interests being centred on 1680 to 1815, so I do appreciate being presented with different viewpoints on issues. I repeat my appreciation of the game you presented. I have attended Joy of Six in the past, but missed it last year and obviously missed a very impressive piece of work; look forward to seeing more in the future. Dave |
KTravlos | 01 Jan 2017 6:54 a.m. PST |
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monk2002uk | 01 Jan 2017 8:47 a.m. PST |
No problem, Dave. Keep your eye open for Jack Sheldon's next book. It covers off the German high command issues around the Somme. Thank you for your appreciation too. See you at the next show? I am hoping to put on Messines for the 100th Anniversary of that battle. Robert |
steamingdave47 | 02 Jan 2017 6:48 a.m. PST |
Messines? Look forward to seeing how you model the mines!!!! |
monk2002uk | 02 Jan 2017 3:13 p.m. PST |
I will be using the 28mm Litko explosion markers ;-) No sound effects though. My Grandfather remembered the mines going up. He was in the NZ Division, waiting to go over the top. His biggest impression though was the massive artillery barrage. Robert |