"Using Regulating in Pickett's Charge Rules" Topic

When I did my first impressions posting on the new "Pickett's Charge" rules one of my few gripes was that there was no provision to use Regulating Battalions in Movement. I said at the time I felt it was an opportunity missed to use the historical process, rather than a Command Radius but thought it was an easy add on for anyone who wanted to try it out.

My reason for this was firstly, I don't like Command Radius and secondly the rules champion moving by Brigade and keeping position in Line of Battle, so it seemed to be an opportunity to use the real evolution's that supported this.

The link below is a Plate from a page of Casey's Tactics, printed in 1862. I picked this primarily because of its clarity, although Hardee or the 1863 US Regulations no doubt have something similar, as there's little to choose between them unless you are a real re-enactment buff. (That's probably sacrilege, somewhere!)

In the Plate you will see a Brigade in Line of Battle advancing to do mortal damage to a clump of trees. The point to note is the dotted line extending from the third Regiment (counting from the right) at the bottom of the page up to almost the trees themselves.

This is to illustrate that this Regiment is the Regulating unit. We had some discussions a short while ago on Regulating but I'm not aware anyone showed it in a diagram, for those who had not heard of the principal – so here is one!

The link to game rules is that in the real world, a Brigade/Divisional commander would pick a point in the distance (not an enemy unit, they can move) line up his chosen Regulating unit, with the assistance of its Colonel directing the Colour Party's alignment, fixing a perpendicular line of approach which would then be
strictly observed by the rest of the Brigade.

Note I didn't say "followed" by the rest of the Brigade. They had no fixed bearing on the point of advance, all they had to do was keep pace and position with the one unit that did.

So in a game, all that's needed is to nominate your Regiment, pick a point of advance perpendicular to it and off you go! No Regiment may pass the Regulating Unit and anyone left behind has to be allowed to catch up by slowing the movement of the rest.

The advance must be directly ahead unless there is good reason to alter it, in which case the whole Brigade will wheel or its Regiments incline before heading straight on once more.

The process cuts down on tricky little moves and stealing of movement distance by players, encourages linear battle tactics and discourages Regimental wandering about for that tiny bit of advantage that players must find somewhere, just because they have to!

In doing so it fits right in with history, the ideas of "Pickett's Charge" and the way it plays. Now all I need is a historical twist that stops me rolling "1s" and "2s"!

Very illustrative. Thanks for posting the photo.

When you dig deep into the AAR's, as well as regimental histories, you find references to this time and time and time again. The drill manuals and tactical manuals were written for a reason. It was to give commanders at all levels, as well as the troops they commanded, a guide. This is how it's done, and this is what will work.

Having said that, commanders were free to react to the vagaries and unexpected situations that could arise. But always, unless the situation dictated otherwise, to fall back upon the manuals.

That's what they did. It's how they fought. It was, in reality, the only way they COULD do it. Both sides were busy raising and training and arming and clothing and fighting with armies that were unheard of in prior years. The only way they COULD do it was by setting the drill and maneuvering, the tactics, in stone, with the proviso that a commander COULD deviate from it, as long as he was victorious.

V/R

Absolutely right Tim, these guys had the practical problems and the solutions!

The thing that stands out in the manuals for the Civil War, Napoleonic & Seven Years wars where Brigade movement is concerned is the absolute instance on a perpendicular advance. Every aspect of the process as defined in regulations from all these periods is geared to a dead straight line from the start point to the target in as tight a formation as possible.

Pick your objective and go for it. No dancing around, you just go right at it. No cunning little flank moves by indvidual Regiments, these may happen when combat is joined but in the advance to contact if any flanks are to be turned the Brigade will be doing it!

Okay, from a practical point of view, what happens when a nice regulated line of four regiments comes to within 2-300 yards of the enemy and fire of all sorts gets too heavy to bear for long, and the third in line sees an "opening" (whether it was there or not), or just gets their dander up, and charges ahead of the line, breaking the formation? Or a regiment falters and doesn't keep pace? Or when a flanking unit falls back and refuses the flank of the formation due to a threat? Or all of those happen at once? All of these were of course common occurrences in battle. How do rules for regulating battalions handle those events?

I'm not being critical of the idea – it's just always seemed like something that would only work outside of engagement range.

I'm not being critical of the idea – it's just always seemed like something that would only work outside of engagement range.

Actually that's not being critical at all (in case anyone thought otherwise) that's how its supposed to work! :o)

The whole idea is just to get the Brigade into engagement range in one lump, so as to get the whole weight against the enemy line at the required point.

I guess the problem is seeing it on the table top, its difficult to really come to terms with the practical problems of just how hard it is to get 1000 – 1500 individuals to arrive together in the same area.

We pick up stands and move them 10 or 12 inches, roll a couple of dice and job done. Marching in formation over open fields (at best) is a lot harder than that! Chuck in crops, fences and walls, let alone trees and its a challenge indeed.

Of course I know you know that but the more I read and the more I hear from re-enactment guys on TMP, I'm convinced that acceptance of the fact and any real idea of just how hard it was, are way apart.

If you sit down and read something like Casey the shear amount of words dedicated to doing this one task are ridiculous! So either these guys were particularly fond of writing, or it was really bloody difficult!

So, yes you are right, the Brigadier had to judge when it was better to just forget it and let the whole thing end without any corrective input from him or his staff.

The Regulations are full of how to manage units getting peeled off and how to do "in flight" corrections. Slowing down the advance is one option, sending out staff to manage the realignment is another but the whole thing is written like a drowning man and a life belt. You absolutely, positively, do not let go!

Possibly the most difficult thing for wargames is the point of abandonment. We are used to a definite rule in order to prevent cheating. A form of words that defines all activity, some thing that doesn't always exist in the real world.

The Regulations, as far as I recall don't have this, as life's not like that.

However the concentration on movement is accompanied by fire control, so I would personally look to a situation that says once the line halts to give fire, either of its own volition or in response to being shot at, then all bets are off and the Regiments can do their own thing.

Another thing that gamers don't see much of is movement by columns. Usually it's columns of companies in line, but sometimes it's moving by the flank or in columns of divisions.

For the uninitiated, this is how regiments and brigades and sometimes even divisions move around the battlefield, until they reach their deployment area.

One example is Colonel Moses Lakeman's AAR for the 3rd Maine on 2 July at Gettysburg. After their engagement in Pitzers Woods (where they approached initially in column before deploying the entire 310 man regiment as skirmishers) The 3rd retired to the Peach Orchard.

Lakeman reports seeing Hood's division marching in column across the Emmitsburg Pike and calling for artillery to shell them. A battery came up and it's fire forced the column to move further south,out of range.

However, most of our games start with the forces already deployed, so many of the rules give short shrift to column movements, when in fact it was the formation that I would argue the troops were most familiar with.

But it was extremely easy and quite fast, surprisingly, to deploy from a column marching by the flank, to a column of companies in line (mere seconds, really) and from thence to a line of battle (less than a minute, normally). I can attest to this having been both adjutant and Major of an 800 man battalion. True enough, it was only reenactors, but with only minimal training as a large unit, the troops could do passably well in such evolutions. Imagine, then, how quickly formations could ploy and deploy,and how well they could maintain their line of advance when they were, in real life, drilled an average of 6 hours a day in both company, battalion, and brigade evolution.

Our rules, I believe, should be given a rather serious rethinking in regard to the actual costs when ploying and deploying upon the table top.

"However the concentration on movement is accompanied by fire control, so I would personally look to a situation that says once the line halts to give fire, either of its own volition or in response to being shot at, then all bets are off and the Regiments can do their own thing."

That's the key. It was not simply a movement (most times), it was part of a battle or attack plan. That would normally include when & where to fire (if at all), attack, formations, etc. Every regimental or battalion commander would be told what is expected of them. Units on the flanks would have the additional roll as flank guards. Obviously every plan could be different but the movement itself was "regulated".

Sadly most of our wargame rules are void of these rules. I rarely play rules that don't have some form of regulation. The most popular sets that have them and don't advertise them are the Polemos series by Baccus. They are hidden in the movement structure. Units are encouraged to move together in formation to avoid extra movement cost. Very low key but effective.

Obviously every plan could be different but the movement itself was "regulated".

I think this is also lost on players and certainly in most game rules. Regulating wasn't just for battalions and brigades. It was the basic method for moving divisions and corps too.

If you review the orders given and described for the confederate attack on the 2nd day of Gettysburg, it is easy to find the orders for:

Mclaws division to regulate on the right of Hood's division, which had Anderson regulating on the right of Mclaws division, which was supposed to have Pender's division regulating on them… but Pender was killed moving to the right to implement the order.

When Barksdale leaves the line, actually impetuously changing the regulating battalion from the 21st Virg on the right to the center, he isolates the 21st, and breaks the line to hit Humphreys in the flank, opening a gap that Longstreet has to fill with Wofford.

The idea that commanders, depending on the situation, would 'throw out' the manual if deemed necessary, suggests it happened often… However, it didn't. And usually, when it did, such as Barksdale's move, it screws up the works.

It is like a large marching band who have practiced a routine for halftime. What would be the result if the horn section decided to 'throw out the routine' and do something else?

So, as far as Picketts Charge is concerned. Entire brigades and divisions regulating on each other should also be part of the process, depending on the battle plan.

Actually, I wonder if in rules we don't pay enough attention to things going wrong, in as much as most rules treat a failure to obey orders as inactivity rather than "going rogue".

Now that can take more than one form obviously and it used to be a favourite in Ancients for the "uncontrolled charge" but there were plenty of genuine foul ups.

The misheard order that wrecked Kershaw's formation at Gettysburg or the confusion that lead to the abandonment of the Bloody Lane at Antietam, that kind of thing.

Maybe it's asking to much or maybe rules throw enough curve balls in other ways but I was just reminded of it when Chris mentioned the idea about units close to the enemy abandoning Regulating without instruction.

Actually, I wonder if in rules we don't pay enough attention to things going wrong, in as much as most rules treat a failure to obey orders as inactivity rather than "going rogue".

Can't agree with you more Trajanus.

That's one of the reasons I love Sam Mustafa's Maurice or Longstreet. There's a good chance that you can move one of your opponent's units however you wish during his turn, which nicely simulates what you just mentioned at Gettysburg or Antietam.

The misheard order that wrecked Kershaw's formation at Gettysburg.

Trajanus:

Misread? Kershaw understood his orders, they were to keep regulating on Hoods division while keeping his left flank on Emmitsburg Road. In his effort to do that, he was stretched apart [and divided his brigade into wings] in an effort to carry out the order. The problem was Hood. He moved his division too far east because he wanted to have his right flank resting on Big Round Top [And thus sort of obey Longstreet's order, but sort of do what he wanted to in the first place]. That effort stretched Robertson apart too. Two 'rogue' movements, partly in response to the new Federal positions, partly rogue behavior. It did confuse and weaken the Confederate attack.

No Bill, You "misread", I said "misheard", :o)

As it happens this gives me the opportunity to post this from the OR which nicely illustrates a lot of the problems a Brigade could meet.

Under my instructions, I determined to move upon the stony hill, so as to strike it with my center, and thus attack the orchard on its left rear. Accordingly, about 4 o'clock, when I received orders to advance, I moved at once in this direction, gradually changing front to the left. The numerous fences in the way, the stone building and barn, and the morass, and a raking fire of grape and canister, rendered it difficult to retain the line in good order; but, notwithstanding these obstacles, I brought my center to the point intended. In order to restore the line of the directing battalion (the Seventh South Carolina), as soon as we reached the cover of the hill, I moved it a few paces by the right flank. Unfortunately, this order given only to Colonel [D. Wyatt] Aiken, was extended along the left of the line, and checked its advance.

It's the last part I was referring to.

Oh, an order Kershaw GAVE, not was given.

Remember that Kershaw's brigade was already split and
the left heard an order meant for just the right wing which Kershaw was commanding. As giving the order down the whole line… so in some ways the order wasn't 'misheard' but 'overheard' unintentionally.

Yeah "overheard" kind of works, even if it does make it sound like Drawing Room gossip ! :o)

There are some reports that officers within the Regiments concerned took it upon themselves to shift on seeing gaps appearing. It occurs to me that these may have been the individuals posted to monitor relative positions under the Regulating method, reacting in the heat of the moment rather than advising their Colonels. Who knows?

There are some reports that officers within the Regiments concerned took it upon themselves to shift on seeing gaps appearing. It occurs to me that these may have been the individuals posted to monitor relative positions under the Regulating method, reacting in the heat of the moment rather than advising their Colonels. Who knows?

I agree, but those individuals would have fairly strict parameters of what they could and couldn't do… so to mention it in an official report leads me to believe it was Okay, and probably seen as 'we were doing the job and making things work/we're veterans' kind of inclusion.