"Firefights: how long until decisive result usually?" Topic

"sorry, don't understand. Are you saying that the problem is being in close order? That does make some of the actual results of certain toe-to-toe musket fights between formed regiments perplexing. It also invalidates the practice of a couple hundred years, which is to get more volume of fire out into a more concentrated area so that one can get more hits and therefore discourage the enemy from sticking around at all."

Yes indeed elbow to elbow – tallest men in front rank, explosion of the pan (see photos) – prevented to show the hitting power of the smoothbore – in contrast to skirmishers, this quote in my view explains it very well.

"This source is form Demian an Austrian officer who published a three volume work for his officers, a sort of handbook about arms, tactics, how to produce arms, black powder etc.
Though not everything can be applied for the French soldier the trend would be the same.

Demian : Anleitung zum Selbst-Studium der militärischen Wissenschaft. Für Offiziere der k.k. österreichischen Armee, Erster Theil : Waffenlehre, Wien 1807

„ If one is looking into the usual instruction of the firing and its true purpose, which should be to hit an hostile item, one finds that these instructions are teaching precisely the non hitting, because :

1. Up to now the line infantry was not trained to fire at an aim. And still aiming is an art, which like others has to be learned and practised; if this is not the case then hitting would be at random. The line infantry man therefore must be taught and must practise when his shots should hit.
2. One is aiming (technically joue, schlagt an, in English maybe arm) always at the half man, without taking into account the different distances and terrain, despite according to the closer or farer distances, also the difference in terrain, demands a higher or lower aiming.
3. The man is pushed for quickness. One has tried to increase with the number of shots also the effect of the fire, and one was giving a lot effort to make the soldier fire seven to ten times per minute. However the experience teaches us that the soldier is shooting worse the quicker he loads, and that all speed and skill in loading is useless without proper aiming. Because not the skill [in loading] but the hitting makes the firing effective. The push for speed at aiming means to train them and use them to shot in the air. And to that already wrong instruction for firing one has to add the natural fear of the man, by which aiming in the heat of battle is almost impossible. Who was in a fire fight without noticing that in this moment the soldier is acting as a machine, that means he loads his gun, shots in the air, loads again and thinks less to damage the enemy than more to distract himself by the work to ban all thought of fear which are surrounding him in this moment. As soon as the soldier is seeing the enemy he wants to start to shoot being afraid that the other will overtake him in that and only few officers have the power to restrain their soldiers, or when they are able to do this they have not the knowledge about the shooting distance of the gun or to judge the distances. In case however the soldier is not lacking in cold blood and deliberation in a serious fire fight, and he is not acting as a machine, so alone because of the disorder and pushing for quickness, which is usual in a fire fight, is preventing to let him think about aiming. The experience teaches that the soldier is hardly listening at the commands of his officer in this critical moment and that every body as soon as he finished loading wants to shoot. When one is closing the pan, the other is working with the ramrod, the third is making ready, the forth is arming and the fifth pulls the trigger. Is one taking into account the disorder which is caused by the falling of the dead, and the retreat of the wounded, as the quite dense smoke of powder which is enveloping the men, so it is impossible to expect that a sure shot can happen. Yes, even the best Jäger (marksmen, sharp shooters expert to hit with a shot, so to speak Hessian, Austrian, Prussian Jäger units) as soon as they would have to fire in rank and file, they would not hit better by the ruling constriction and disorder than the usual line infantry man."

Demian page 34 to 37
"

Just some comments, about the rate of fire, Demian mentions seven to ten shots per minute. These are no actual shots but made on the drill ground not using black powder and just doing the manuals. The old Austrian pre 1801 model of musket had a self priming pan and a cylindrical ramrod, so the loading was simplified and could be fairly quick when not using powder.

This could very well be true for the Austrians (and would help explain why they continually lost in the period he is writing )but remember this (like many works) is meant to enhance the reputation and status of the writer . Very much like publish or perish in academia. Writing a work does not make it real /
Also it is important to realize when?
a treatise is written not just why .
This was written just after a whole series of very embarrassing Austrian defeats . Better to blame the soldier and the system than the commanders.

Why would the French army be similar -very different training, leadership, tactics, and muskets. Leaving aside the fact that they trounced the Austrians (among others )
But tarring everyone with the same brush is not

this analysation explains perfectly why the hitting when being in rank and file performed so badly compared to the shooting test.

The French army was continously defeated as well – but that is another story.

For a demonstration of hitting a target with a musket, check out this video at the 12:00 minute mark. This ex-marine shoots from the 200, 100, 75 & 50 yard line. His shot placement is all over the place and he's shooting with a rested musket under perfect conditions. They then conduct the same course of fire but with a small volley fire. In the video at the 18:20 minute mark they break down the accuracy in percentages at the different ranges.
YouTube link

V.W.
His treatise explains what he wants it to explain – Why its the fault of the soldier and not the officers (a group to which he belongs )
Rather than just blindly accepting a paper /theory try to understand WHY it was written
The same thing happens in the modern world with weapon systems and post event justification.
Actually the French army was not continuously defeated in the period we are writing about: this is the 3rd and 4th coalition .
What French sources do you have to back up your conjectures?
or British ,or Russian or Spanish or Dutch ?

@grtbrt

I provide the source, I draw my conclusion, you draw your conclusion.
It is better to provide quotes and sources than nothing other than pure speculation.
Demians analysation fits very well into the context of the experience of 7YW – and here also particularly Frederick the Great – that musketry fire was not that effective and that brake throughs had to be achieved by bayonet attacks.
After the 7YW – a lot of officers who shared this experience – tried to find out how to improve the hitting power, what kind of fire fight was best (read Guibert to see the French kind of experience) – this also lead to changes in the drill regulations as well.
I am looking forward to read your sources backing up your theories.
When you say we – you mean you – I mean 1756 – 1815 – tons of French defeats.
I move on
Happy Christmas

VW :

You still haven't really answered anything I (or others ) asked .
Merely regurgitated the same thing few quotes .

Actually the "tests" you quote show the exact opposite of what you say above
21%+ hits at 1000 feet -will stop almost any unit of men.
lets assume 100 paces per minute -battlefield movement rate (faster than the Prussians -but an average )
1 pace = 30"
so 275 feet per minute
so around 3.5 minutes to reach our firing regiment
lets assume a fire rate of 2 per minute (slow )
so w have a regiments of 500 men being attacked by 2 regiments of 500 each.
according to your statistics -at 1000 the defenders will inflict 105 hits
after
1st minute : 3 volleys (initial and 2 @ min. ) 315 hits
2nd minute : 2 volleys 210 hits(525 total) – so 50% casualties so far and they are still 450 feet away
3rd minute : 2 volleys 210 hits ( 735 total ) and they are 175 feet away .

and that is assuming that hit percentages do not increase (which they do ) as the range gets closer

As to the years – I was merely taking your quoted writer as talking about the period he was writing about .

Merry Christmas to you as well

"How else do the British stop the Old Guard at Waterloo?"

Colborne's brigade shooting the sh*t out of their flank helped.

I'll maintain against all comers that, despite a few tiny inaccuracies, the entire movie of Barry Lyndon is dam' near perfect.

If you have Spring's 'With Zeal and Bayonets only', then you should try Babits' books on Guilford Courthouse and Cowpens. They go into detail about the firing methods used, and how (at Cowpens) other factors such as fatigue and surprise could affect the length of an engagement.