"For all you artillery experts out there" Topic

Recently reading (with a view to playing) a set of rules where Russian artillery is slightly downgraded in its effectiveness compared to the French, by means of giving them poorer to hit rolls. The reason given being that Russian powder was of much lower quality.
Thinking about this it strikes me as a lot of old Franco-phile ..
I watched a few re-enactment vids of pieces being loaded and was slightly surprised to see that even modern artillery black powder is not very fine in its consistency (if anything it resembles smoke-less fuel!).
Presumably poorer quality powder's (if indeed it actually was) main effect would be to reduce the ignition time of the charge.
Would this affect accuracy? Or range?
I assume it would result in faster fouling of the barrel which would reduce re-loading times, but would it be sufficient to make any tangible difference?
Any thoughts from you erudite gentlemen before I go and tell the writer his rules are rubbish?

Perhaps a review of the battle of Eylau, where Russian artillery destroyed an attacking corps of the Grande Armee might be of use?

Very fine powder isn't well suited to artillery, the explosion can be too violent and lead to burst barrels. Artillery used some form of corned powder from late medieval times – which may look like small clusters of coke.

Corning powder increases the time during which the burning powder generates gas. It reduces the top pressure reached but extends the time for which a lower pressure is present – which tends to be what you want in most long barrelled firearms.

Poor quality powder is more likely to be due to a weaker mixture of the usual components, poorly milled components (particularly the charcoal) or the presence of adulterants (which may have been due to corruption in the supply of the powder – the British Navy suffered that problem a few times).

More an issue with the battery command control and abilities of the officers leading their gunners than equipment. Brave men…tough in a brawl, but generally didn't have the military education and training which French battery commander typically had. We all know of the French schooling for officer candidates, the Russians had schools but the nobility deferred schoolwork.. and they became the commanders. Family connection, social rank played a larger part for filling the officers positions, a bit less then the cavalry or infantry, but still a major factor.

For the massed Russian batteries blowing away French divisions or even a corps…. Yep, the russians did… but how often? The French accounts read time after time of French artillery clearing the way for their assaults with far fewer cannon required. And when they massed the guard batteries…. the destruction before that grand battery was a battle winning moment. Can you say the same for any other nation on a regular basis?… especially if you leave out the 1813 battles which tend to be vast "batter the enemy before you" scenarios. Even then, the must reduced French artillery held their own, and gave a grand account of themselves" on many battlefields.

Perhaps a review of very recent TMP threads will result in discovering the answer to your question?

Very fine powder isn't well suited to artillery

Quite, artillery powder has far larger grains than that used in either muskets or pistols.

Firework lifting powder is coarser again.

the Russians had schools but the nobility deferred schoolwork.. and they became the commanders. Family connection, social rank played a larger part for filling the officers positions, a bit less then the cavalry or infantry, but still a major factor.

TMPwargamerabbit:

That's true, but that scenario also applied to every Allied army including the British. If it is a major factor [and I'm not saying it isn't], we should see the same issues with other nations' artillery performance.

That's true, but that scenario also applied to every Allied army including the British

Not so. The RA (and the RE) didn't have purchase of commissions. If you wanted a commission in the Royal Artillery, you went to Greenwich, stayed the course, graduated, and passed the examination. Of course, if you were in the top three in your class, you got to choose the Royal Engineers instead.

Most of European nations required serious education for their artillery officers, including the Russians. Yes, influence and family background mattered for promotion in the Russian artillery, but only after the applicant got past the school stage.

I read somewhere that the Russians had smaller crews per gun. Since muscle power was needed to run the heavy pieces back after every discharge, smaller crews might affect performance over time. On the other hand, they usually had more guns than other folks.

General de Brigade has Russian guns firing at a negative. My conclusions regarding this are pretty simple (and I think correct). Russian armies historically had a large number of guns (I think I am correct in this). If you follow historical OOBs and give Russians the guns they had, then it is more like a t WWI battlefield, not Napoleonic. So I assume that this negative is just a convention for playability -- with or without historical accuracy other than the wealth of guns. Am I wrong on the numbers? As I remember, at Borodino, there are more Russian guns then you can believe.

As far as I am aware artillery officers needed special training – as well as the artillery NCOs – artillery was a "technical" weapon – and science was necessary to command it and serve in responsible position.
In case artillery is so powerfull in wargaming, than it is much overrated.
The Grande Armée was at its best when it had the lowest ration of guns to infantry.

the Russians had schools but the nobility deferred schoolwork.. and they became the commanders. Family connection, social rank played a larger part for filling the officers positions, a bit less then the cavalry or infantry, but still a major factor.

Do you mean Major-General Alexander Kutaisov, the commander of the artillery of the 1st Army of the West in 1812? His father was captured by the Russians in Moldavia or in the Caucasus, and then became Tsar Paul's barber and valet. Well, Paul had made his valet a count, so Alexander Kutaisov can be considered as a nobleman, he was a colonel in the Guard when he was just 15. But he fought at Golymin, Eylau, and Freidland, and he liked schoolwork: he was well educated, was able to read and speak in several languages, in 1810-1811 he travelled across Europe and attended lectures on artillery and fortification in Wien and Paris. In 1812 he wrote his famous "General rules for the artillery in a day of battle" and was killed at Borodino.

The commander of the artillery of the 2nd Army of the West was Major-General Karl von Löwenstern. After the 1st and 2nd Armies were merged into one army in the Tarutino Camp, he was the commander of the artillery of the army. He was born in Württemberg, was brought to Russia when he was a child, and went to the Artillery and Engineer Cadet Corps. In 1806-1807 he fought at Jankowo, Lansberg, Eylau, Heilsberg, Friedland, in 1812 at Borodino, in 1813 at Dresden and Kulm, in 1814 at Bar-sur-Aube, Arcis-sur-Aube, Fère Champenoise, and Paris.

Dmitry Rezvoy, the commander of the Russian artillery at Eylau, was given nobility only in 1805, though he was already a major-general of artillery and the "chef" of the 2nd Artillery Regiment. He took part in the 1799 campaign in Italy and Switzerland, in 1806-1807 he fought at Jankowo, Lansberg, Wolfsdorf, Guttstadt, Eylau (wounded), Heilsberg, and Friedland, in 1812 he was in the 3rd Army of the West, in 1813 he fought at Lutzen, Bautzen, Dresden, and Leipzig.

Lev Yashvil (Levan Yashvili), was born in a noble family in Georgia (at Caucasus, not in USA). Graduated from the Artillery and Engineer Cadet Corps in 1786. Fought against the Poles in 1792-1795, in 1805 he was a colonel and the commander of a horse artillery company. In 1807 he fought at Guttstadt, Eylau, Heilsberg (the Order of St. George 3rd Class, two golden swords, and the Prussian Order "Pour le mérite"). In 1808 he was a major-general. In 1812 he was in Wittgenstein's corps, fought at Jakubovo, Klayastitsy, and Polotsk. In 1813 he was a lieutenant-general and the commander of the artillery of the Main Army, fought at Lutzen, Bautzen, and Leipzig.

For the massed Russian batteries blowing away French divisions or even a corps…. Yep, the russians did… but how often?

Never. At Eylau, Marshal Augereau's corps was defeated by Russian infantry and cavalry, not by Russian artillery, though the central Russian battery also played its role. At Friedland some Russian batteries fired in the right flank of the French from the eastern bank of the River Alle, inflicted heavy casualties and threw the French infantry in disorder, and that according to two French accounts (Marion C., Mémoire sur le lieutenant-général d'artillerie Baron Alexandre de Senarmont, Paris, 1846, p. 34-35; Marbot J.-B.-A.-M. de, Mémoires du général baron de Marbot, 4-me édition, Paris, 1891, t. 1, p. 366). Then the Russian infantry and cavalry attacked and drove the French back for some time.

The French accounts read time after time of French artillery clearing the way for their assaults with far fewer cannon required.

The French accounts of exploits of the French are often a bit exaggerated.

And when they massed the guard batteries…. the destruction before that grand battery was a battle winning moment.

Who and where? Senarmont at Friedland? As soon as General Bennigsen had learned that the main forces of Napoleon approached the battlefield, he ordered all battery (heavy) artillery to be brought back over the River Alle (Bennigsen L. A. von, Mémoires du Général Bennigsen, Paris, 1907, t. 2, p. 201). It was before Senarmont had formed his battery. So, when Senarmont's battery opened fire, the Russians had already removed their heavy artillery from the front and were preparing to retreat. The Russian Guard fought before the town only to slow down the advance of the French and to allow the other Russian troops to retreat safely through the streets of the town and across the bridges.

In addition to the reasons cited, I've also heard it claimed that Russian Napoleonic armies carried insufficient ammunition for the number of guns, and that poor administration kept Russian guns out of action disproportionately. In no case have I seen primary sources.

The argument always seems to boil down to (a) Napoleonic era Russian armies were much stronger in artillery than other armies of the period and (b) the battlefield results weren't consonant with that strength. If those are both true, then something was wrong with Russian artillery, and the rules should reflect this. But can anyone say from personal study that both a and b are true?

Not so. The RA (and the RE) didn't have purchase of commissions. If you wanted a commission in the Royal Artillery, you went to Greenwich, stayed the course, graduated, and passed the examination. Of course, if you were in the top three in your class, you got to choose the Royal Engineers instead.

Most of European nations required serious education for their artillery officers, including the Russians. Yes, influence and family background mattered for promotion in the Russian artillery, but only after the applicant got past the school stage.

TMPWR:
That isn't what I was saying. I didn't say anything about military education. I was responding to this observation:

the Russians had schools but the nobility deferred schoolwork.. and they became the commanders. Family connection, social rank played a larger part for filling the officers positions, a bit less then the cavalry or infantry, but still a major factor.

The upper classes avoided the artillery and engineers. You generally will find no nobility or wealthy sons from ANY Allied nation in the artillery. The British, for instance, had their artillery as a separate organization, the Ordinance Department which wasn't a part of the British army organization at all. The nobility and gentry did NOT go into the artillery service because it was:
1. Too Professional--it smacked of 'trade' and a gentleman didn't do that kind of work. '
2. Middle class [the professional class] would be found in the artillery and engineers. Not the social group the upper class wanted to be associated with. There is a reason Wellington surrounded himself with the sons of nobles and the upper class regarding his staff and associates.
3. Advancement was slow, strictly by seniority and the best you could do was the rank of colonel. [That was the commanding rank for the entire artillery service]
4. There were no artillery generals [unlike the Russians]
5. You couldn't buy a commission, you had to go to school and pass tests.

Like most European nations, for officers, artillery service was seen as being second class to infantry and cavalry. Not surprising when infantry and cavalry officers generally were nobility, upper class and wealthy. To become an officer in the army, you did not need any training or passing any tests. All you needed was to be 16 after 1795 and have 'the education of a gentleman.' That is where the phrase 'Officer and a Gentleman' came from. Being a 'gentleman' in England. It was a seen as social rank just below Knight at the time as much as a set of social behavioral expectations. Until the late 1700s it was a rank conferred on one by the King. The argument between Elizabeth Bennett and Darcy's Aunt in Pride and Prejudice is all about her social rank ["The daughter of a gentleman--independently wealthy and did not have to work] compared to the very wealthy Darcy, part of the gentry, so he too held the rank of 'gentleman', not having a title. [Gentry/gentleman] get it? ;-7

We some times forget the social world the military was a part of during the Napoleonic wars and what the French Revolution was against--and one reason why the Allied nations fought the French.

Zhmodikov…and others making interesting and great reading points on this subject.

Agree that those named ranking artillery commanders had excellent service records…. but they ordered the batteries to a position but didn't oversee the long term actual brutal work of directing the battery commanders how and where to direct the bombardment. It was the actual battery commander…. in most cases a captain rank who directed the artillery bombardment. May have gone to artillery school, maybe not, but very likely not a person of noble birth. So his movements and tactic experience would be hampered by the "nobility commanding the nearby infantry or cavalry regiments…. 1) )like stay out of the way, 2) move over there, 3) shell them… 4) stop bombardment, we want to cross your front… overriding the battery commander in many cases. Being a lowly artillery captain… you going to "discuss" the situation with a high ranking noble standing before you"… nope… you follow his directive. Only the British RA/RHA and the French army could an artillery commander "stand his ground" so to speak. The RA/RHA took no "crap" from British line officers (different management team, chain of command above them, board of Ordnance etc) and the French officer rank meant alot… a major of artillery was equal rank to a major of infantry etc…. Napoleon himself would say directly. So my basic thought … social rank mattered and the schooling one received maybe was a gift for the lower "professional" class of artillery officers… but for nobility rank, it was the social scene outside of the classroom, if you even bothered to attend, and not any schooling which set your commission path of awarded advancement.

Battle experience…. The French here had covered. Imperial era battery artillery officers generally had lots of actual battlefield experience under senior commanders who knew how to use artillery. That experience and leadership magnified the French artillery capabilities on the battlefield…. actual bombardment direction, movement on the battlefield, where to set up the battery, foretelling enemy deployments and actions… and the knowledge that the senior commanders knew what they were doing during the early imperial years rubbed off on the lower battery captain.
RA/RHA was a great organization… but it was small in number compared to the large european armies of the period…. with the exception of Waterloo… Wellington had lots of cannon under his command.

Eylau the Russian cannon materially affected the French battalions advance… plus the blizzard blowing snow caused loss of direction. The depleted battalions then were hit by the Russian infantry and cavalry, completing the work started by the artillery.

Wagram…. the converged guard artillery battery, plus several line batteries did a number on the Austrian korps before them, causing severe losses.

Hanau…. French guard batteries held up the Bavarian advance.

Freidland…. the artillery reduced the Russian guard. Granted it wasn't coming out of Frieldand, holding their ground… but it was the cannon doing the work and directed by a capable French artillery commander

Even Waterloo…. when exposed to the French grand battery….Wellington knew better and pulled back to sheltered ground.

Helisberg 1807. Smolensk 1812, most of the 1813 larger battles had large grouped batteries firing along a frontal arc of the battle front lines.

These are all named textbook battles above…. but the smaller actions, the initiative for French battery commanders, and RA/RHA commanders, to change positions, find the perfect firing location, support the assault, discuss future action with the nearby infantry /cavalry brigade commanders with acceptance of "rank", says a lot more than having more cannon present on the battlefield.

Battery fire control…. Russian batteries tended to be larger than most nationalities… 12 cannon vs. 8 or 6.
The typical Russian battery frontage would be 150 yards or could be easily much more…. that means the battery commander has at least 75 yards to shout or more likely ride and change his position via travel to the end cannon of his battery. And if he did go to the battery end cannon… it was now 150 yards or more to the other end. With six cannon… the distances are halved for better senior battery control, direction of fire, and watchful eye of events on the battlefield… if you could see anything in the smoke. Takes a lot longer to have 12 cannon come on battery compared to just six …. another reason why the late war batteries tended to grow smaller towards six cannon in many nations. Changing position… six cannon can find the opening in the battle line… while twelve cannon take up a larger footprint thus restricting the entire batteries transfer to another position. Sort of like a small compact car vs. a large limo… parking spaces are easy to find for the smaller car. Love to find actual accounts of large Russian 12 cannon batteries shifting position to position outside of a "horse battery", which.. I tend to assume for now still had the above mentioned issues like a very organic line 12 cannon foot battery.

For most artillery commanders…. tell me where to unlimber per orders… where the ammo train is… to seek resupply, avoid issues with the nearby infantry or cavalry commanders… movements, blocked LOS etc, and spend the entire battle in same place, having fired off numerous rounds of shot… was a good day.

"4. There were no artillery generals [unlike the Russians]"

Not necessarily true, in the Ancien Regime it could be that artillery or infantry or cavalry Generals just did not exist as such, only just Generals – and there existed Generals who came out of the artillery

Battery fire control…. Russian batteries tended to be larger than most nationalities… 12 cannon vs. 8 or 6.

But didn't these batteries operate as two six-piece units?

And wasn't it normal doctrine for at least one third of a battery (or half battery) to act as a reserve to the main firing division?

So only four pieces per (half) battery to direct?

Allan

One has to lock very closely, often 2 guns or more were detached, it is imperative to read the eye witness accounts of artillery subaltern officers or of NCOS who describe how artillery really fought.

I am slowly working to add guns to my Russians from the usual 3 models to 4 so one can break batteries into 2 even units. Also in the Napoleoic wars as well as later it seems to me its the higher authority that is the key to how they were used. If a Division attachment they are under that, if a seperate artillery unit it is directed by that officer.

Thanks Zhmodikov for injecting some fact into "I thought I heard" and "I remember someone saying."

Who and where? Senarmont at Friedland? As soon as General Bennigsen had learned that the main forces of Napoleon approached the battlefield, he ordered all battery (heavy) artillery to be brought back over the River Alle (Bennigsen L. A. von, Mémoires du Général Bennigsen, Paris, 1907, t. 2, p. 201). It was before Senarmont had formed his battery. So, when Senarmont's battery opened fire, the Russians had already removed their heavy artillery from the front and were preparing to retreat. The Russian Guard fought before the town only to slow down the advance of the French and to allow the other Russian troops to retreat safely through the streets of the town and across the bridges.

Bennigsen may or may not have ordered the Russian troops back over the Alle, but when he saw Napoleon was present and preparing to attack, if he had ordered with withdrawal that order had to be countermanded as if the Russians were caught in the act of withdrawing through the town to the bridges, that would have been a disaster waiting to happen.
It should also be noted that Bennigsen's after-action reports (some of which are reproduced in Wilson's memoir of the 1806-1807 campaigns) are unreliable. He liked to claim ‘glorious' victories when he had not won them, and soft-peddle his failures, such as Friedland. One Russian diplomat remarked on the last stage of Eylau in that ‘It was a complete rout, no order, no leadership.'

Napoleon gave Senarmont full credit for his destruction of the Russian center and his subsequent advance on the town of Friedland, saying to Senarmont that the general had ‘made my success.'

Senarmont's letter to his brother after the battle stated that ‘The position of the enemy showed 4,000 dead on this spot alone. I lost the chief of my staff, Colonel Forno, killed by a ball at the end of the action. I have had three officers and sixty-two gunners hors de combat, and a charming horse wounded under me; I fear I shall not be able to save him.'

The Russians were forced into Friedland, which was in part set on fire by Senarmont's artillery fire. The bridges were set on fire both by the French and by the Russians while they were still full of Russians attempting to get back across the river.

And it should be noted that the bridges the Russians threw across the Alle were badly sited and led into the bottleneck that was Friedland.

Russian artillery batteries across the river which had initially helped defeat Ney's first attack and then later took Senarmont under fire (which he ignored) were gradually silenced by French counterbattery fire.

The bottom line is that the Russians stood and fought, and were badly defeated with very heavy losses. Bagration's command was the one that was attacked by Senarmont and then Ney (after his initial repulse) and were routed and herded into Friedland. Gortschakoff's command was driven back to the river by Lannes and Mortier and a good portion of it was driven into the river. Some escaped to the north.
It was as resounding a French victory as Austerlitz and Jena had been. The Russians suffered at least twice as many casualties as the French.

Never. At Eylau, Marshal Augereau's corps was defeated by Russian infantry and cavalry, not by Russian artillery, though the central Russian battery also played its role. At Friedland some Russian batteries fired in the right flank of the French from the eastern bank of the River Alle, inflicted heavy casualties and threw the French infantry in disorder, and that according to two French accounts (Marion C., Mémoire sur le lieutenant-général d'artillerie Baron Alexandre de Senarmont, Paris, 1846, p. 34-35; Marbot J.-B.-A.-M. de, Mémoires du général baron de Marbot, 4-me édition, Paris, 1891, t. 1, p. 366). Then the Russian infantry and cavalry attacked and drove the French back for some time.

Augereau was attacked by Russian infantry and cavalry after the Russian artillery had done its job ruining Augereau's corps and stopping its attack.

Augereau attacked in a snowstorm and he veered to his right, bringing his corps into range of the Russian artillery. And he also took fire from the French artillery to his rear which was maintaining a blind bombardment during the snowstorm.

There were three large Russian artillery batteries on the field: one of 70 guns directly across from the village of Eylau; one of 60 guns to the first battery's right, and another, smaller battery of 40 guns to the first battery's left.

To sum up, Bennigsen is not a reliable witness and Marbot tended to 'remember with advantages.'

Not necessarily true, in the Ancien Regime it could be that artillery or infantry or cavalry Generals just did not exist as such, only just Generals – and there existed Generals who came out of the artillery.

vW: It happened, but not often and they were never 'generals of artillery', but rather infantry or cavalry as a rank.

But there were general officers who were artillerymen.

Brechtel198 wrote:

Napoleon gave Senarmont full credit for his destruction of the Russian center and his subsequent advance on the town of Friedland, saying to Senarmont that the general had ‘made my success.'

Napoleon won the battle of Friedland simply because he had concentrated more troops at the battlefield than Bennigsen had. There were hundreds of guns at the battlefield. How could anyone believe that the battle was won by a battery of 36 guns?

Senarmont's letter to his brother after the battle stated that ‘The position of the enemy showed 4,000 dead on this spot alone.

If we even believe in the figure, it is important to remember that the battle lasted almost the whole day, the Russian troops occupied that place for several hours.

The Russians were forced into Friedland, which was in part set on fire by Senarmont's artillery fire. The bridges were set on fire both by the French and by the Russians while they were still full of Russians attempting to get back across the river.

Another French source, Jacques Marquet de Montbreton de Norvins, says that the Russian foot Guard was defeated before Friedland in a fierce bayonet fight by the French infantry of Marshal Ney and General Dupont. He also says that two hours later he personally saw the dead bodies of the Russian guardsmen, all pierced by bayonets in their chest (Norvins J. М. de, Lanzac de Laborie L. de, Souvenirs d'un historien de Napoléon: Mémorial de J. de Norvins. Paris, 1897, vol. 3, p. 205–206). His story is quoted by David Chandler in his "The Campaigns of Napoleon". Whom do you believe more, Senarmont or Norvins?

The bottom line is that the Russians stood and fought, and were badly defeated with very heavy losses. Bagration's command was the one that was attacked by Senarmont and then Ney (after his initial repulse) and were routed and herded into Friedland. Gortschakoff's command was driven back to the river by Lannes and Mortier and a good portion of it was driven into the river. Some escaped to the north.
It was as resounding a French victory as Austerlitz and Jena had been. The Russians suffered at least twice as many casualties as the French.

How many guns did the Russians lose at Friedland?

Brechtel198 wrote:

Augereau was attacked by Russian infantry and cavalry after the Russian artillery had done its job ruining Augereau's corps and stopping its attack.

Augereau attacked in a snowstorm and he veered to his right, bringing his corps into range of the Russian artillery. And he also took fire from the French artillery to his rear which was maintaining a blind bombardment during the snowstorm.

The Russian artillery played their role in the defeat of Augereau's corps, but the defeat was completed by Russian infantry and cavalry. If the Russian infantry had not attacked, Augereau's infantry would had overcome their confusion, and would had either attacked or retreated in order.
Some French infatry columns missed the central Russian battery. Pavel Grabbe, an artillery officer, who was standing with two 6-pdr guns in the interval between two battalions of the Vladimir Musketeer Regiment, says that after the snowfall had suddenly ceased, the French infantry columns were only 30 paces away of the first Russian infantry line. He fired cannister, but the French charged and broke through the Russian battalion to the left of Grabbe's guns. Soon some French infantrymen ran into Grabbe's small battery from the rear, being pursued by Russian infantry. Probably those French infantrymen who broke through the Russian first line were driven back by some other Russian infantry standing behind the two battalions of the Vladimir Regiment, possibly by the third battalion of the same regiment.

Here from Alexandre who alas left the forum

"Alexandre
15 Feb 2014 11:11 a.m. PST

If we are to be "using all of the source material", would that not include Russian sources?
For example, the after-action report of the Russian Horse Guards, quoted at length in their regimental histories is rather explicit:
- fresh columns of French advanced from previously hidden positions – with infantry, cavalry and a large battery of no less than 30 guns – Dupont's division was the most threatening
- prince Bagration ordered up the Life-Guards Ismaylovskiy, Semyonoskiy and Konnyy (Horse) regiments
- the Horse Guards advanced very rapidly against French cavalry – assumedly La Houssaye's dragoon division attached to Victor's corps – and this compelled them to turn back despite their larger numbers – which indicates to me that the dragoons were about to get taken by a flank
- the Horse Guards then opened up their formation (from column of half-squadorns or column of squadrons to two divisions I would think, likely operating separately) and took on a French infantry column in co-ordination with bayonet counter-attacks being delivered by the Sankt-Peterburgskiy and Pavlovskiy Grenadiers
- the counter-attacks seemed to be going pretty well, but the Horse Guards received Benigsen's order for the army to withdraw and re-formed to cover this
- they never charged the French guns, and – as their officer casulaties are individually described – only about 1/3 of their casualties were from artillery fire
- these casualties from artillery are listed as contusions and impact wounds from parts of shells – the 4th squadron being the hardest hit – from which I would say that the French howitsers that would be typically posted on the flanks of a French gun line did fire shell at the the Horse Guards as they went in to attack the French infantry, getting some degree of enfilade penetration on the nearest Russian squadron
- the total casualites for the Horse Guards in the battle were rather typical for a major engagement : 3 offcers and 52 other ranks killed or mortally wounded, 13 officers an 64 other ranks wounded, 28 other ranks missing (tpyically un-horsed and captured) – total 160 all ranks all casaualties, about 20-25%
The Ismaylovets saw more of the French battery, and recorded more substantial artillery casuallities. The Semyonoskiy regiment appears to have been behind their colleagues and did not get much engaged before the order to withdraw.
Interestingly, total Russian casulaties as reported in Russian sources, both primary and secondary (and these to include Imperial, Soviet and modern writers) are rather lower than as reported in French sources – the number of killed or mortally wounded for the whole battle is more like 4000 men.
So, if we are to believe that some 4000 men and several Russian units were "destroyed" (however defined) by artillery fire from general de Sénarmont's guns, may I please ask that someone say which Russian units these were? Upon a quick scan of Russian sources, I just could not find any reports which could be readily thus interpreted. But I would be happy to look some more.
Amicalement,
- Alexandre

Napoleon won the battle of Friedland simply because he had concentrated more troops at the battlefield than Bennigsen had. There were hundreds of guns at the battlefield. How could anyone believe that the battle was won by a battery of 36 guns?

Actually, it was 30. Six were in reserve and were not employed in Senarmont's attack on Bagration. Senarmont¡¯s action, which was not planned by Napoleon and Senarmont undertook on his own initiative, was the decisive action of the battle moving into slingshot range (120 yards) of Bagration¡¯s infantry and knocking over 4,000 of them in twenty-five minutes. Senarmont used two principles of war, mass and maneuver, to destroy the Russian center.

Yermelov remarks on the effectiveness of Senarmont's action and the heavy losses it caused.

Napoleon won the battle because of the expert employment of mass and economy of force. Bennigsen had foolishly attempted to destroy Lannes outnumbered corps on the west bank of the Alle by massing against it and attacking. Lannes expertly delayed the Russians awaiting for Napoleon to arrive with the French main body. Napoleon's battle began around 1700.

The Russian placement of their pontoon bridges was badly chosen, and while Bennigsen had decided to wait for night and to withdraw, he had unwittingly put his army in a trap from which they barely escaped. The French won because they fought well, Senarmont employed new artillery tactics, and Friedland proved a bottleneck for the retreating Russians after Bagration's defeat.

Senarmont also moved towards Friedland setting fire to both the town and the Russian bridges.

If we even believe in the figure, it is important to remember that the battle lasted almost the whole day, the Russian troops occupied that place for several hours.

Before Napoleon's arrival and Ney's initial attack the fighting was between Lannes' corps, which was waging a delaying action and the Russian forces on the west bank of the Alle. The fighting centered mainly around and in the Forest of Sortlack and Heinrichsdorf to the north, commanded by Grouchy.

Senarmont's action was in a different place and it is very easy to discern artillery wounds from musket and bayonet wounds. Artillery, both roundshot and canister, tend to dismember bodies and the result of Senarmont¡¯s action would be quite easy to identify. It was the same reason that the British when collecting their dead and wounded after the battle of New Orleans in 1815 that they discovered that most of the dead and wounded were hit by artillery fire, which was the decisive killer on that battlefield.

Another French source, Jacques Marquet de Montbreton de Norvins, says that the Russian foot Guard was defeated before Friedland in a fierce bayonet fight by the French infantry of Marshal Ney and General Dupont. He also says that two hours later he personally saw the dead bodies of the Russian guardsmen, all pierced by bayonets in their chest (Norvins J. §®. de, Lanzac de Laborie L. de, Souvenirs d'un historien de Napol¨¦on: M¨¦morial de J. de Norvins. Paris, 1897, vol. 3, p. 205¨C206). His story is quoted by David Chandler in his "The Campaigns of Napoleon". Whom do you believe more, Senarmont or Norvins?

I believe them both. Dupont met and broke the Russian Guard infantry which was not part of Bagration¡¯s command. Senarmont destroyed part of Bagration¡¯s command and Ney finished it with his second attack after he had rallied his corps after its initial defeat. Dupont did his part and so did Senarmont.

Senarmont also bloodily defeated the Russian Guard cavalry who attempted to overrun his left flank and lost to rapid artillery fire (canister)

How many guns did the Russians lose at Friedland?

The Russians admitted 13, the French claimed 80. The actual number is probably somewhere in the middle.

The Russian artillery played their role in the defeat of Augereau's corps, but the defeat was completed by Russian infantry and cavalry. If the Russian infantry had not attacked, Augereau's infantry would had overcome their confusion, and would had either attacked or retreated in order. Some French infatry columns missed the central Russian battery. Pavel Grabbe, an artillery officer, who was standing with two 6-pdr guns in the interval between two battalions of the Vladimir Musketeer Regiment, says that after the snowfall had suddenly ceased, the French infantry columns were only 30 paces away of the first Russian infantry line. He fired cannister, but the French charged and broke through the Russian battalion to the left of Grabbe's guns. Soon some French infantrymen ran into Grabbe's small battery from the rear, being pursued by Russian infantry. Probably those French infantrymen who broke through the Russian first line were driven back by some other Russian infantry standing behind the two battalions of the Vladimir Regiment, possibly by the third battalion of the same regiment.

Grabbe's account is interesting but it should also be noted that he was with a gun section attached to the Russian infantry, not in any of the three large Russian batteries. I agree with you that Russian infantry and cavalry engaged Augereau's broken corps but that was after the Russian artillery ruined the French VII Corps. It has to be taken in context with the entire action and other first-hand accounts.

Dear Chris
The design of the M1805 Russian Guns were newer and superior to the Gribeauval Designs. The Unicorn being a long howitzer was adopted by nearly all combatants c1820s. the weight of pieces was lower than the antiquated Gribeauval Designs. The gun tube production improvements was the work of Gascoigne, formerly of the Caron Company, Scotland. The Gunpowder plants were also improved.
Stephen

The Russian field pieces were indeed newer than the Gribeauval designs, but were not superior to them. They were apparently modeled on the older (ca 1753 Liechtenstein System) and had longer gun carriages than the Gribeauval designs and used the Austrian screw quoin, which was a Prussian design from the 1740s. It was not as efficient as the elevating screw used by the French or British.

The Gribeauval System was not 'antiquated' and a good reference for the technical data on the Gribeauval System is Howard Rosen's The Systeme Gribeauval.

The unicorn was a gun-howitzer which was an excellent field piece and those captured by the French were prized and were placed in the army artillery parc in 1812. However, the unicorn could not be elevated to the same degree as the howitzer and was therefore unable to hit targets that a howitzer could.

And there was no designation during the period with the designation 'M'. That is a current label that is inaccurate historically.

Brechtel198 wrote:

Senarmont's action, which was not planned by Napoleon and Senarmont undertook on his own initiative, was the decisive action of the battle moving into slingshot range (120 yards) of Bagration's infantry and knocking over 4,000 of them in twenty-five minutes. Senarmont used two principles of war, mass and maneuver, to destroy the Russian center.

He also used another important principle of war: "Always exaggerate the quantity of the enemies that you killed." This principle was used by Caesar, Napoleon, and many other great captains. Their subordinates followed their example.

Napoleon won the battle because of the expert employment of mass and economy of force. Bennigsen had foolishly attempted to destroy Lannes outnumbered corps on the west bank of the Alle by massing against it and attacking. Lannes expertly delayed the Russians awaiting for Napoleon to arrive with the French main body. Napoleon's battle began around 1700.

Bennigsen was careless indeed, but the only thing he could have done is retreating in the right moment, so he would had lost the battle anyway.

Before Napoleon's arrival and Ney's initial attack the fighting was between Lannes' corps, which was waging a delaying action and the Russian forces on the west bank of the Alle. The fighting centered mainly around and in the Forest of Sortlack and Heinrichsdorf to the north, commanded by Grouchy.
Senarmont's action was in a different place and it is very easy to discern artillery wounds from musket and bayonet wounds.

The Russian Foot Guard was standing in their place before Friedland long before Senarmont started his actions. Some cannonballs reached them. Félix Jean Marie Girod de l'Ain, an officer in the 9th Légère (Dupont's division) in 1807, wrote in his memoirs that he was in the 1st battalion of the regiment, this battalion supported Senarmont's battery, they gradually advanced, and finally they arrived at a place, where some Russian troops fought a part of the day. He wrote that the lines, along which the Russians had stood before, were marked with the bodied of dead and wounded Russian soldiers. One of the wounded Rusians had his leg torn off. Nevertheless, he incessantly loaded his musket and fired at the French battalion (Girod de l'Ain F. J. M., Dix ans de mes souvenirs militaires (de 1805 à 1815), Paris, 1873, p. 57–58):

En avançant, nous occupâmes le terrain où des corps russes avaient combattu une partie de la journée ; leurs lignes étaient encore marquées par les morts et les blessés qu'ils avaient abandonnés en se retirant; parmi ces derniers, plusieurs nous étonnèrent par leur inflexible courage : l'un d'entre eux gisait à une centaine de pas de notre carré ; il avait une cuisse emportée, ce qui ne l'empêchait pas de charger son fusil et de le décharger sur nous sans relâche.

Brechtel198 wrote:

I believe them both. Dupont met and broke the Russian Guard infantry which was not part of Bagration's command. Senarmont destroyed part of Bagration's command and Ney finished it with his second attack after he had rallied his corps after its initial defeat. Dupont did his part and so did Senarmont.

According to the Russian sources, Bagration took command of the Russain Guard as well as some other troops at the end of the day. Norvins saw the infantry fighting at a long distance: he served in the so called "gendarmerie d'ordonnance" attached to the Guard Chasseurs à Cheval, who were standing near Napoleon. Norvins wrote that only two hours later he rode across the place where the infantry fought, and saw all the bodies of the Russian guardsmen pierced by bayonets at a level of the breast. It is clear that Norvins had not examined all the bodies of the dead Russians, so his words are just his guess.

The Russians admitted 13, the French claimed 80. The actual number is probably somewhere in the middle.

The Russians admitted 14 guns lost at Friedland. The French exaggerated the number of the captured enemy guns, as they usually did. The 18th bulletin says that at Borodino the French captured 60 guns and 5,000 prisoners, while they actually captured 13 to 15 guns and 700 to 800 prisoners.

He also used another important principle of war: "Always exaggerate the quantity of the enemies that you killed." This principle was used by Caesar, Napoleon, and many other great captains. Their subordinates followed their example.

That's not a principle of war.

The Principles of War were first formulated by Henry Lloyd in the middle of the 18th century and have been developed and refined since then. Those of the United States, Great Britain and Russia are similar, the latter two differing from that of the United States in one or two areas.

Neither of those areas is the above.

The US principles of war are: Objective, Offensive, Unity of Command, Mass, Economy of Force, Maneuver, Surprise, Security and Simplicity. The British also have Maintenance of Morale and Administration. The Russians also have Annihilation as one of their principles.

The Principles of War are taught to cadets early on at West Point.

Bennigsen was careless indeed, but the only thing he could have done is retreating in the right moment, so he would had lost the battle anyway.

That isn't the point. The point is in how he lost it, which was disastrous. And Senarmont's action was the main reason why he lost the battle. If nothing else, Senarmont initiated the tactical avalanche that engulfed Bennigsen's army.

Yermelov mentions in his memoirs that the French deployed a battery of 40 guns and ‘a fierce cannonade began.' Mikhailovshy-Danilevsky remarked that ‘The Russian gunners were surprised by the sudden appearance of the French 36-gun battery.'

Yermelov also stated that ‘Because of the range, the [French] artillery fire was direct and our rearguard's cavalry greatly suffered from it. The rearguard was soon retreating as well. The army soon began withdrawing to the bridges. The only way to reach the main bridge was through the city itself. Chaos reigned in the narrow streets and this was further increased by the enemy artillery. Based on the direction of the enemy columns, it was obvious that they intended to cut us off at the crossing; to delay them, the Life Guard Ismailovsk and the Pavlovsk Grenadier regiments made an attack, but that same ghastly battery halted their gallant assault and the regiments turned back.'

The Russian Foot Guard was standing in their place before Friedland long before Senarmont started his actions. Some cannonballs reached them. Félix Jean Marie Girod de l'Ain, an officer in the 9th Légère (Dupont's division) in 1807, wrote in his memoirs that he was in the 1st battalion of the regiment, this battalion supported Senarmont's battery, they gradually advanced, and finally they arrived at a place, where some Russian troops fought a part of the day. He wrote that the lines, along which the Russians had stood before, were marked with the bodied of dead and wounded Russian soldiers. One of the wounded Rusians had his leg torn off. Nevertheless, he incessantly loaded his musket and fired at the French battalion (Girod de l'Ain F. J. M., Dix ans de mes souvenirs militaires (de 1805 à 1815), Paris, 1873, p. 57–58):

En avançant, nous occupâmes le terrain où des corps russes avaient combattu une partie de la journée ; leurs lignes étaient encore marquées par les morts et les blessés qu'ils avaient abandonnés en se retirant; parmi ces derniers, plusieurs nous étonnèrent par leur inflexible courage : l'un d'entre eux gisait à une centaine de pas de notre carré ; il avait une cuisse emportée, ce qui ne l'empêchait pas de charger son fusil et de le décharger sur nous sans relâche.

Dupont advanced on Senarmont's left and that was how he engaged the Russian Guard infantry. Senarmont engaged the Russian Guard Cavalry and quite literally blew them off the battlefield. Both Senarmont and Dupont then advanced upon Friedland and the Russian bridges along with Ney. And Senarmont began and executed his attack on Bagration before Dupont met, and broke, the Russian Guard infantry.

According to the Russian sources, Bagration took command of the Russain Guard as well as some other troops at the end of the day. Norvins saw the infantry fighting at a long distance: he served in the so called "gendarmerie d'ordonnance" attached to the Guard Chasseurs à Cheval, who were standing near Napoleon. Norvins wrote that only two hours later he rode across the place where the infantry fought, and saw all the bodies of the Russian guardsmen pierced by bayonets at a level of the breast. It is clear that Norvins had not examined all the bodies of the dead Russians, so his words are just his guess.

The Russian Guard infantry had already been defeated by Dupont when Bennigsen took command of them. This was undoubtedly after Bagration's center had been destroyed.
Senarmont's large battery fired 2,600 rounds of artillery ammunition, 400 of them canister. Senarmont's account and after-action report, along with the letter to his brother can be confirmed by Major Boulart, an officer of the French Guard artillery. His memoirs are a valuable source. He was an eyewitness to Senarmont's action.

The Russians admitted 14 guns lost at Friedland. The French exaggerated the number of the captured enemy guns, as they usually did. The 18th bulletin says that at Borodino the French captured 60 guns and 5,000 prisoners, while they actually captured 13 to 15 guns and 700 to 800 prisoners.

One thing that has to be remembered about the Bulletins-they were never intended by Napoleon as history.

From Swords Around A Throne by John Elting, 601-602:

‘The Bulletins were after-action reports, directed as much at civilians as at the Grande Armee. On the whole they were fairly accurate; the Twenty-Ninth Bulletin, issued on his return from Russia, made no bones about the Grande Armee's immense losses, though it did blame them on the weather. But they usually exaggerated enemy losses and understated French casualties; also, they sometimes failed to give credit to various officers and units who felt they should have received honorable mention. In time a soldier who trifled with the truth might be said to lie like a Bulletin. Napoleon, however, never intended them as history.'

I do find it interesting that you believe Russian sources and not the French (the Bulletins not being used as source material). Bennigsen's and Wittgenstein's after-action reports were as bad, if not worse than the Bulletins, but Boulart, Senarmont, Victor, had no reason to lie about the actions they had fought. And the results at Friedland prove them to be correct.

very convincing arguments by Zhmodikov, thanks for providing them – fortunately I am not deaf ;-))

Boulart on Friedland link . Interestingly, Boulart explicitly says that he didn't see what went on:

At about five o'clock in the afternoon, the army was formed, everyone at his post, and a strong cannonade announced that the action had begun. Soon came a rolling fire of musketry and it wasn't until eight o'clock that this rumbling thunder ceased. Both sides made incredible efforts: there was a horrible butchery, particularly in the centre of the Russian line which was covering the town; a battery of 30 guns, commanded by General Senarmont, contributed powerfully to its disordering. Finally this line was pushed in, chopped up and pushed back into the city and thrown back beyond the bridge, and the right of the Russian army, separated from the rest of the army by this manoeuvre, was later destroyed in spite of the incredible efforts it made to reach the bridge and recross the river. The attack was so impetuous and success so uncontested that the artillery of the Guard was not called upon to contribute. The dispositions were such that they did no permit us to see anything of what was happening and so satisfy our impatient curiousity.

This was a decisive affair: Benningsen lost 30,000 men killed, wounded and prisoner and his rout was complete: never was a victory more signal, and it took no longer than three hours to perform these prodigies! The army was suffering from fatigue before it entered the line (of battle)! Attacked in its cantonments on 5th June, the army had advanced 50 or so leagues,in ten days, fighting almost every day, winning a most bloody battle and destroying the Russian army! Such activity, such fatigue, such courage! The Emperor was also a redoubtable adversary, terrible for an enemy in retreat. His inspirations were prompt, sudden and the execution which followed was rapid in its prodigious activity…

Brechtel198 wrote:

That's not a principle of war.

It was a joke. Whatever you call it, this principle was widely used by many great captains, and their subordinates followed their example.

And Senarmont's action was the main reason why he lost the battle. If nothing else, Senarmont initiated the tactical avalanche that engulfed Bennigsen's army.

I think that this statement is wrong. The main reasons why Bennigsen lost the battle of Friedland is that he allowed the majority of his troops to cross the River Alle at Friedland, and that Napoleon had concentrated much more troops by the evening. The Russian suffered heavy losses during their retreat, because they were forced to retreat through the town and across the river through a few bridges.

Yermelov mentions in his memoirs that the French deployed a battery of 40 guns and ‘a fierce cannonade began.' Mikhailovshy-Danilevsky remarked that ‘The Russian gunners were surprised by the sudden appearance of the French 36-gun battery.'

Yermolov and Mikhailovshy-Danilevsky don't say that Senarmont's battery played a decisive role. At Borodino, the cannonade was also fierce, and the batteries were larger, and some French batteries appeared suddenly to the Russians, for example, the battery of 60 guns of the Guard artillery mentioned by Lejeune (Lejeune L. F., Mémoires du Général Lejeune. Paris, 1895, vol. 2, p. 213–214), but the Russians remained at the battlefield until the cannonade ceased.

Yermelov also stated that ‘Because of the range, the [French] artillery fire was direct and our rearguard's cavalry greatly suffered from it. The rearguard was soon retreating as well. The army soon began withdrawing to the bridges. The only way to reach the main bridge was through the city itself. Chaos reigned in the narrow streets and this was further increased by the enemy artillery. Based on the direction of the enemy columns, it was obvious that they intended to cut us off at the crossing; to delay them, the Life Guard Ismailovsk and the Pavlovsk Grenadier regiments made an attack, but that same ghastly battery halted their gallant assault and the regiments turned back.'

A little earlier Yermolov speaks about fighting for the Sortlack Forest, and mentions that the Life-Guard Izmailovsky Regiment took part in the fighting, and then this regiment was relieved by other troops, and marched back in the rear. Then Yermolov says: «At last, we had given up to the evidently superior force [of the enemy].» What do you think, why does Yermolov speak about rearguard? There should be no rearguard at the battlefield until the battle is over. The rearguard was formed, because the Russian army was preparing to retreat. The French artillery inflicted heavy casualties to the Russians, but it happened during the retreat of the Russian army to the town, and then through the town and the bridges.

Dupont advanced on Senarmont's left and that was how he engaged the Russian Guard infantry. Senarmont engaged the Russian Guard Cavalry and quite literally blew them off the battlefield. Both Senarmont and Dupont then advanced upon Friedland and the Russian bridges along with Ney. And Senarmont began and executed his attack on Bagration before Dupont met, and broke, the Russian Guard infantry.

Girod de l'Ain (9th Léger Regiment, Dupont's division) tells us:

Suddenly, we saw some disorder in the first lines. It was the corps of Marshal Ney, who, after suffering heavy losses, gave ground to the enemy; he had in front of him the Russian Imperial Guard that Alexander was moving in the hope of a decisive blow. Marshal Ney, desperate to stop the backward movement of his troops, rushed at full gallop to meet our second battalion coming to take position on our left, raised the cry of "Vive l'Empereur!" and rushed at the enemy. This battalion, after having driven back the first column heads he met, passed a deep ravine that cut this part of the battlefield, and was greeted, on the other side, by a fire of grape and musketry, which in a few moments took nearly 300 men and fifteen officers; seeing itself not supported, he was obliged to recross the ravine, but his good conduct had given Ney time to rally and restore the corps to fight at this point.
The first battalion to which I belonged had always remained in position near the battery it protected, content to follow its movements when it was advancing; we suffered little musketry, but cannonballs sometimes removed whole files .

So, Senarmont's battery, Ney's corps, and Dupont's division fought in the same period of time.

Brechtel198 wrote:

The Russian Guard infantry had already been defeated by Dupont when Bennigsen took command of them.

Bennigsen didn't take any active part in the battle: as I have said, he was seriously sick and remained in Friedland until the end of the battle. General Gortchakov commanded the Russian army.

Senarmont's account and after-action report, along with the letter to his brother can be confirmed by Major Boulart, an officer of the French Guard artillery. His memoirs are a valuable source. He was an eyewitness to Senarmont's action.

I read Boulart's memoirs (Boulart J.-F., Mémoires militaires du général Baron Boulart sur les guerres de la république et de l'empire. Paris, 1892), he says that Senarmont's battery strongly contributed into disordering of the Russian line before the town (contribua puissamment à l'ébrainler: p. 167). Boulart doesn't affirm that Senarmont's battery had done the whole job.

I do find it interesting that you believe Russian sources and not the French

I think you don't understand me. I believe those French memoirists who wrote about what they actually saw closely by their own eyes, except what they wrote about their own exploits. I treat all accounts critically. I try to find and compare as many accounts of any event as possible. I use the same approach to the Russian sources as well. For example, I don't believe Yermolov completely when he speaks about his own exploits, I think that he overestimates a bit the importance and results of his actions. This can be shown in the cases when we have other sources. For example, he exaggerates his role in the famous counterattack at the Raevsky Battery at Borodino. Other participants mention Yermolov, but they say that he was not the only one and not even the first one who lead the Russian troops to the counterattack.

So, I believe Norvins when he speaks about what he actually saw. He saw infantry fighting at a distance of about 1.5 km. At such a long distance he couldn't clearly see whether there was bayonet fighting or not. He tells us that two hours later he crossed the place of the fighting in the ravine before Friedland (probably the same ravine mentioned by Girod de l'Ain). Norvins was on horseback, probably he rode in the ranks of his squadron. He says that their horses dive in blood by their knees. This is a clear exaggeration, a literary hyperbole (this part of Norvins' story is omitted by David Chandler). I think that it is possible that Norvins really saw several bodies of dead Russian infantrymen. I also think that it is possible that some of the bodied beared marks of bayonet thrusts. But even if this was so, this doesn't necessarily mean that those Russians were killed in bayonet fighting. The French often killed the wounded Russians lying on the ground, they believed that the wounded Russians would fire at them if they would leave them alive. Girod de l'Ain says that they killed that wounded Russian soldier who fired at the 1st battalion of the 9th Léger Regiment. And I think it is clear that Norvins didn't examine all the corpses of the dead Russians to find out whether all of them were killed by bayonet or not – he was on horseback, and he had not enough time to do it. Many officers say that massed bayonet fighting in the open place was a very rare event in the Napoleonic wars. I know no other memoirist who say that there was massed bayonet fighting between the French infantry of Ney's corps or Dupont's division against Russian infantry at Friedland. So, I don't believe Norvins' story about the bayonet fighting at Friedland.

Boulart, Senarmont, Victor, had no reason to lie about the actions they had fought. And the results at Friedland prove them to be correct.

Boulart does not lie, but he doesn't say that Senarmont's battery had done the whole job. Senarmont praises himself, this is quite normal for an ambitious officer. He doesn't lie, he just overestimates the results of his actions in general and exaggerates the quantity of the enemies killed by his battery in particular.

It was a joke. Whatever you call it, this principle was widely used by many great captains, and their subordinates followed their example.

First, it isn't a principle.

Second making sweeping, all encompassing statements is usually, if not always, an inaccurate road to take.
Third, I believe you're making a guess here that is unsupportable, unless you have evidence to support the supposition.

I think that this statement is wrong. The main reasons why Bennigsen lost the battle of Friedland is that he allowed the majority of his troops to cross the River Alle at Friedland, and that Napoleon had concentrated much more troops by the evening. The Russian suffered heavy losses during their retreat, because they were forced to retreat through the town and across the river through a few bridges.

The Russians suffered heavy losses before their retreat. The retreat which turned into a rout, was caused by (1) Senarmont's artillery attack, (2) Ney's second attack against Bagration, and (3) Dupont's defeat of the Russian Guard infantry.

Bennigsen didn't ‘allow' his troops to cross to the west bank of the Alle, they were ordered across in an attempt to destroy Lannes. Napoleon's arrival with the main body precluded any Russian attempt to withdraw. In short, they were forced to fight and not retreat until they were forced to withdraw.

Additionally, when the French main body arrived, the Russians hustled more troops across the Alle as they were forced to fight as has already been mentioned.

Yermolov and Mikhailovshy-Danilevsky don't say that Senarmont's battery played a decisive role. At Borodino, the cannonade was also fierce, and the batteries were larger, and some French batteries appeared suddenly to the Russians, for example, the battery of 60 guns of the Guard artillery mentioned by Lejeune (Lejeune L. F., Mémoires du Général Lejeune. Paris, 1895, vol. 2, p. 213–214), but the Russians remained at the battlefield until the cannonade ceased.

We're not discussing Borodino. What is decisive about Senarmont's action is not only a massed battery of 30 guns, but the range of the engagement, which in Senarmont's case was as close as 120 yards. The decisive maneuver was Senarmont's artillery attack which allowed the success of Ney's second attack as well as Dupont's attack to the left of Senarmont's battery.

Yermelov's referring to Senarmont's artillery as 'that ghastly battery' is the indicator that Senarmont was causing much damage to Bagration's command.

Senarmont's cannonade ‘ceased' when he accomplished his mission of destroying the Russian center. He then advanced his artillery to support Dupont and Ney who continued their attacks herding the Russians into Friedland. Senarmont's artillery fire also helped to set Friedland on fire as well as firing on the Russian bridges in the congested mess that Friedland became.

A little earlier Yermolov speaks about fighting for the Sortlack Forest, and mentions that the Life-Guard Izmailovsky Regiment took part in the fighting, and then this regiment was relieved by other troops, and marched back in the rear. Then Yermolov says: «At last, we had given up to the evidently superior force [of the enemy].» What do you think, why does Yermolov speak about rearguard? There should be no rearguard at the battlefield until the battle is over. The rearguard was formed, because the Russian army was preparing to retreat. The French artillery inflicted heavy casualties to the Russians, but it happened during the retreat of the Russian army to the town, and then through the town and the bridges.

Rear guards, or what might pass for them, are formed for various missions. And the terms used might be misleading. The Russians were not retreating until Bagration's command was slaughtered and was driven from the field. The Russian units trying to stop Ney, Dupont, and Senarmont from attacking after the Russians ran could be termed a 'rear guard' because they were trying to protect those going for the bridges and stuck in the giant traffic jam in Friedland. The Russian retreat didn't begin until Bagration was driven from the field.

The fighting in the Forest of Sortlach occurred during Lannes' delaying action. The Forest of Sortlack was the location of Ney's corps before it's first attack. It was the French staging area.

Girod de l'Ain (9th Léger Regiment, Dupont's division) tells us:
Suddenly, we saw some disorder in the first lines. It was the corps of Marshal Ney, who, after suffering heavy losses, gave ground to the enemy; he had in front of him the Russian Imperial Guard that Alexander was moving in the hope of a decisive blow. Marshal Ney, desperate to stop the backward movement of his troops, rushed at full gallop to meet our second battalion coming to take position on our left, raised the cry of "Vive l'Empereur!" and rushed at the enemy. This battalion, after having driven back the first column heads he met, passed a deep ravine that cut this part of the battlefield, and was greeted, on the other side, by a fire of grape and musketry, which in a few moments took nearly 300 men and fifteen officers; seeing itself not supported, he was obliged to recross the ravine, but his good conduct had given Ney time to rally and restore the corps to fight at this point.
The first battalion to which I belonged had always remained in position near the battery it protected, content to follow its movements when it was advancing; we suffered little musketry, but cannonballs sometimes removed whole files .
So, Senarmont's battery, Ney's corps, and Dupont's division fought in the same period of time.

There is a sequence of events. Ney's VI Corps was designated as the main attack. That attack was defeated and thrown back into the Wood of Sortlack.

Then Dupont advanced with his supporting artillery on his own initiative. Senarmont was with this initial advance. It was then that Senarmont decided to use the entire I Corps artillery to attack the Russian center.

Ney's second attack occurred either during the period when Senarmont was demolishing the Russian center or at the end of that twenty-five minute action.

Dupont met and broke the Russian Guard infantry during Senarmont's fight and then Senarmont changed front to defeat the Russian Guard cavalry. Then both Dupont and Senarmont advanced to Friedland supported by Ney and drove the Russian left (Bagration) into the town and either slaughtered them there or drove them into the river as both French artillery fire and the Russians burned the bridges while they were still crowded with retreating Russians.

The Russian Guard infantry had already been defeated by Dupont when Bennigsen took command of them.

That is a mistake/typo on my part. What I meant to say was Bagration, not Bennigsen.

Bennigsen didn't take any active part in the battle: as I have said, he was seriously sick and remained in Friedland until the end of the battle. General Gortchakov commanded the Russian army.

Wasn't Gortchkov commanding the Russian right flank and Bagration the left and center?

I read Boulart's memoirs (Boulart J.-F., Mémoires militaires du général Baron Boulart sur les guerres de la république et de l'empire. Paris, 1892), he says that Senarmont's battery strongly contributed into disordering of the Russian line before the town (contribua puissamment à l'ébrainler: p. 167). Boulart doesn't affirm that Senarmont's battery had done the whole job.

No one is saying that Senarmont ‘had done the whole job.' The point is that Senarmont's artillery attack was the decisive action of the battle and the concentrated fire from it destroyed the Russian center. Ney's second attack took place either after or during Senarmont's cannonade and completed the rout of Bagration.

I think you don't understand me. I believe those French memoirists who wrote about what they actually saw closely by their own eyes, except what they wrote about their own exploits. I treat all accounts critically. I try to find and compare as many accounts of any event as possible. I use the same approach to the Russian sources as well. For example, I don't believe Yermolov completely when he speaks about his own exploits, I think that he overestimates a bit the importance and results of his actions. This can be shown in the cases when we have other sources. For example, he exaggerates his role in the famous counterattack at the Raevsky Battery at Borodino. Other participants mention Yermolov, but they say that he was not the only one and not even the first one who lead the Russian troops to the counterattack.

I agree on your approach to what you find in primary sources. I don't agree with your conclusions on Friedland, especially what you have stated regarding Senarmont.

So, I believe Norvins when he speaks about what he actually saw. He saw infantry fighting at a distance of about 1.5 km. At such a long distance he couldn't clearly see whether there was bayonet fighting or not. He tells us that two hours later he crossed the place of the fighting in the ravine before Friedland (probably the same ravine mentioned by Girod de l'Ain). Norvins was on horseback, probably he rode in the ranks of his squadron. He says that their horses dive in blood by their knees. This is a clear exaggeration, a literary hyperbole (this part of Norvins' story is omitted by David Chandler). I think that it is possible that Norvins really saw several bodies of dead Russian infantrymen. I also think that it is possible that some of the bodied beared marks of bayonet thrusts. But even if this was so, this doesn't necessarily mean that those Russians were killed in bayonet fighting. The French often killed the wounded Russians lying on the ground, they believed that the wounded Russians would fire at them if they would leave them alive. Girod de l'Ain says that they killed that wounded Russian soldier who fired at the 1st battalion of the 9th Léger Regiment. And I think it is clear that Norvins didn't examine all the corpses of the dead Russians to find out whether all of them were killed by bayonet or not – he was on horseback, and he had not enough time to do it. Many officers say that massed bayonet fighting in the open place was a very rare event in the Napoleonic wars. I know no other memoirist who say that there was massed bayonet fighting between the French infantry of Ney's corps or Dupont's division against Russian infantry at Friedland. So, I don't believe Norvins' story about the bayonet fighting at Friedland.

You brought Norvin's up. And I do believe that the story of a bayonet fight is credible.

Boulart does not lie, but he doesn't say that Senarmont's battery had done the whole job. Senarmont praises himself, this is quite normal for an ambitious officer. He doesn't lie, he just overestimates the results of his actions in general and exaggerates the quantity of the enemies killed by his battery in particular.

Where is the evidence that Senarmont exaggerated his estimate of the Russians killed by his artillery? Who argued the point. Napoleon made the comment both praising Senarmont and giving him credit for what he and his gunners accomplished. He walked the ground after the action and saw the destruction caused by his large battery.

I don't interpret Senarmont's after-action report, the letter to his brother, or the I Corps after-action report as either exaggeration or self-praise. He does understand what he accomplished and the accuracy of the 2,600 rounds he fired at slingshot range. There is a difference. And that difference was the destruction of the Russian center that led to the destruction of Bagration's command.

Boulart does not lie, but he doesn't say that Senarmont's battery had done the whole job.

But furthermore, he explicitly says that he didn't see what happened…Boulart simply cannot be used as a corroborating eye-witness for the actions of I Corps at Friedland.

What is decisive about Senarmont's action is not only a massed battery of 30 guns, but the range of the engagement, which in Senarmont's case was as close as 120 yards.

The only person that I am aware of who said that Senarmont's artillery got that close is Senarmont. I suggest a certain healthy scepticism here: "Extraordinary claims require extraordinary proof". Senarmont's own reported casualties seem extremely unlikely if he was that close and under musket fire. The whole thing becomes much more likely if Senarmont was twice that distance away. Modern studies have shown just how much fear changes one's perception of range in combat troops.

Note however that scepticism about these details doesn't necessarily invalidate the rest of the paragraph. As Kevin alludes to, it is clear that Senarmont's performance was remarkable (since Napoleon and Victor did remark upon it).

The decisive maneuver was Senarmont's artillery attack which allowed the success of Ney's second attack as well as Dupont's attack to the left of Senarmont's battery.

Yermelov's referring to Senarmont's artillery as 'that ghastly battery' is the indicator that Senarmont was causing much damage to Bagration's command.

On the other hand:

Where is the evidence that Senarmont exaggerated his estimate of the Russians killed by his artillery? Who argued the point.

Didn't Senarmont make the claim in a letter to his brother? I don't think it is in the combat report. Who then would have argued it, if no one at the time knew he claimed it?

Furthermore, it isn't even clear that Senarmont was necessarily claiming that his guns had done all the killing – his words are that "at their location, after the combat, there were about four thousand dead on this point alone." Whatever, combat claims are notoriously inaccurate at the best of times.

However, as I mentioned above, the argument that Senarmont won the battle – or even that he used artillery in a new way – aren't dependent on the accuracy of the specifics of his claims.

If you don't agree, then provide supporting evidence to support your ideas. Enough evidence has been supplied to support the particulars of Senarmont's action at Friedland.

You can read Senarmont's reports in Grand Artilleurs by Maurice Girod de l'Ain, 224-226.

If you don't agree, then provide supporting evidence to support your ideas. Enough evidence has been supplied to support the particulars of Senarmont's action at Friedland.

No, it hasn't. The only evidence so far is Senarmont's own, as pointed out above.

That isn't correct, but have it your way.

However, where is your evidence to the contrary?

That isn't correct, but have it your way.

I showed you where you had made the mistake with Boulart, so you are again in error.

However, where is your evidence to the contrary?

No – if you want to make an extraordinary claim, you show the evidence.

…if you want to make an extraordinary claim, you show the evidence.

The 'claim' is not 'extraordinary.' It is historic fact. And I've provided the evidence.

If you believe it wrong, then supply evidence that supports your point of view.

If you cannot or will not, then we're done.

The 'claim' is not 'extraordinary.' It is historic fact. And I've provided the evidence.

No, you haven't. You were shown this. You seem unwilling or unable to, so I guess we are done.

I would suggest one asks Dr. Summerfield what he thinks- as he is a real expert. Failing that, I believe your thread may continue to unravel forever :0)

Doing once? Doing twice? DONE.

Brechtel198 wrote:

First, it isn't a principle.

Call it a habit, a custom, call it how you wish, but it was a very frequent feature in reports and memoirs.

Second making sweeping, all encompassing statements is usually, if not always, an inaccurate road to take.

Believing everything that is written in the sources is usually also an inaccurate road to take.

The Russians suffered heavy losses before their retreat. The retreat which turned into a rout, was caused by (1) Senarmont's artillery attack, (2) Ney's second attack against Bagration, and (3) Dupont's defeat of the Russian Guard infantry.

Such are the French claims. The Russian sources say that the Russian troops first retreated from the Sortlack Forest at a distance of about half-gunshot. Yakov Otroshchenko, a staff-captain and company commander in the 7th Jaeger Regiment:

After sunrise cannonade sounded, enemy cannonballs flew above us and fell into the river; several companies of our regiment were ordered to march forward into battle, including my one. We came up to the wood; we were met with battle fire; we rushed all together forward with bayonet, drove the French into a marsh and captured 200 guardsmen and one colonel; but then the French, having rallied, overthrew us and drove us out of the wood; we also got reinforcements, advanced into the wood, but should yield to the superiority of the enemy, [we] went out of the wood, deployed in skirmish order in the open field and remained there…

Otroshchenko Y. O., Zapiski generala Otroshchenko. (1800-1830 gg) (Memoirs of General Otroshchenko), Moscow, 2006, p. 34.
The same in Russkiy Vestnik, 1877, vol. 131, p. 177:
PDF link

Right before both Ney's attack and Senarmont's cannonade started, the Russians were preparing to retreat back over the River Alle. The battery artillery was ordered to retreat first (Bennigsen's memoirs, t. 2, p. 201). The artillerymen of the Guard Battery Artillery Company were limbering their guns when Senarmont's battery opened fire (Ratch V. F., "Publichnye lektsii, chitannye pri gvardeiskoi artillerii polkovnikom Ratchem." (Public lectures given to Guard artillery by Colonel Ratch.) // Artilleriiskii Zhurnal (Artillery Journal), 1861, No. 1, part 3, p. 74-75). Ratch describes the positions of the Guard artillery in such detail, that it is obvious that he had a detailed source. He probably used documents from Arakcheyev's archive, he mentions this archive in other places, and says that Arakcheyev interviewed artillery officers after the 1807 campaign. Ratch also personally knew some Guard artillery officers who were still alive in 1850s. Ratch didn't know the reason why the Guard Battery Artillery Company was limbering in that moment, because Bennigsen's memoirs were published only in 1900.

Ivan Zhirkevich, an officer in the 2nd Guard Light Artillery Company, says that after noon all Guard artillery was brought forward and fired a few shots, and the French answered with a few shots, one gun carriage was broken. General Kaspersky sent Zhirkevich back over the River Alle to bring a spare carriage from the artillery park, and said him that all other artillery material should remain there (i.e. on the eastern side of the river). When Zhirkevich brought the spare carriage to the battery, he didn't find General Kaspersky there. He was told that the general went back across the river. Zhirkevich went there and found the general, who said him that he was ordered to find a position for the battery, and that soon all Guard would march to that road. It was at 5 or 6 p.m. Zhirkevich says that riding through the town he saw many Guard officers sitting in the houses, while the soldiers were standing almost near the town's wall. He concluded that nobody expected any serious fighting, and that the officers were waiting for their regiments to march through the town. But at 7 p. m. a cannonade started around the town, and very soon two bridges over the Alle were set on fire. (Zhirkevich I. S., Zapiski Ivana Stepanovicha Zhirkevicha 1789-1848 (Memoirs of Ivan Stepanovich Zhirkevich), Moscow, 2009, p. 39-40). Ratch was not aware of Zhirkevich's memoirs, they were published in 1874 (Russkaya Starina, 1874, vol. IX, p. 233-234).

PDF link

Brechtel198 wrote:

Bennigsen didn't ‘allow' his troops to cross to the west bank of the Alle, they were ordered across in an attempt to destroy Lannes.

There were no such attempt. Read Yermolov's memoirs carefully: it was just his supposition that Bennigsen had the intention to destroy an isolated enemy corps. But, instead of that, the Russian troops busied themselves with a worthless firefight and uselessly lost much time, and then the enemy cavalry arrived at the right flank and the enemy infantry filled the woods before the Russian rearguard (the Sortlack Forest).

Before noon, the Russian troops crossed the river by parts (regiment by regiment, as Zhirkevich says) only in order to push the French some distance from the town, where Bennigsen wished to have some rest. Alexander Obolensky, an ADC to General Dokhturov, says that in the second half of the day Dokhturov sent him to Bennigsen for orders. Obolensky arrived and said to Bennigsen that it was impossible to stay at that position, because the Russian troops had come up to a wood (he probably means the Sortlack Forest), and that the enemy had brought their artillery and fired at the Russian troops from this wood, killing many soldiers. Obolensky says that Bennigsen replied: "Pass on to General Dokhturov from me: don't annoy the enemy, because I am sure that he had no intention to give a battle." Obolensky says that in the moment he was leaving Bennigsen, Sir Robert Wilson arrived and informed Bennigsen that strong enemy columns with artillery advanced at the center of the Russian army (Obolensky A. P., Khronika nedavnei stariny. Iz arkhiva knyazya Obolenskogo-Neledinskogo-Meletskogo. (Chronicle of recent times. From the archive of Prince Obolensky-Neledinsky-Meletsky). St.Petersburg, 1876, p. 95-96).

simlib.ru/handle/123456789/559

Memoirs of Otroshchenko, Zhirkevich, and Obolensky on the 1807 campaign are translated into English and published by Alexander Mikaberidze:
Russian Eyewiness Accounts of the Campaign of 1807.

link

What is decisive about Senarmont's action is not only a massed battery of 30 guns, but the range of the engagement, which in Senarmont's case was as close as 120 yards.

The range of 60 toises is just Senarmont's claim. Girod de l'Ain didn't mention such close range actions of Senarmont's battery. Senarmont says that his battery fired 2516 shots, 362 of them cannister. It is not very much, 83 or 84 shots per gun on the average, if only 30 guns fired. Firing at the normal rate of two shots in one minute, this would take only 41 to 42 minutes. At Borodino, Napoleon's artillery fired about 60,000 rounds, or more than 102 shots per gun on the average (587 guns). The cannonade was not equal in intensity over the whole front and during the whole day. This means that some guns fired less than 102 rounds, but some other fired more than 102 rounds. Several Russian artillery officers mention in their memoirs that at Borodino they had spent all ammunition from the caissons of their artillery companies (110 to 120 rounds per gun, the incendiary shells were probably not used), and received additional ammunition from the artillery park.

Yermelov's referring to Senarmont's artillery as 'that ghastly battery' is the indicator that Senarmont was causing much damage to Bagration's command.

Such expressions as "ghastly battery" or "fierce cannonade" are absolutely meaningless, if we have nothing to compare with. Any enemy battery would seem ghastly to anyone, who is under its fire, and any enemy artillery fire would seem fierce to anyone, who is under this fire. If we have something to compare with, we can get meaningful expressions, such as "the battery was ghastlier than that well known battery", and "the cannonade was fiercer than that well known cannonade".

Senarmont's cannonade ‘ceased' when he accomplished his mission of destroying the Russian center. He then advanced his artillery to support Dupont and Ney who continued their attacks herding the Russians into Friedland. Senarmont's artillery fire also helped to set Friedland on fire as well as firing on the Russian bridges in the congested mess that Friedland became.

So, Senarmont's cannonade hadn't ceased when the Russian center was driven back, Senarmont continued firing at the retreating Russian troops. This was the normal French practice, see such examples at Austerlitz:

Meanwhile, the enemy had advanced his artillery, and vigorously plied it in cannonading the allies during their retreat, which put the finishing stroke to the disorder they were in.

Stutterheim, A detailed account of the battle of Austerlitz. London, 1807, p. 106).

And at Bautzen:

The battle was fought in a most clear and beautiful day of spring … it was finished at 5 or 6 p. m. Fortunately to us, the French had no light cavalry, otherwise we might had suffered huge losses during our retreat, but their artillery pursued us in the most dreadful manner.

Zhirkevich I. S., Zapiski, Moscow, 2009, p. 109; Russkaya Starina, 1874, vol. XI, p. 426.

Brechtel198 wrote:

Rear guards, or what might pass for them, are formed for various missions. And the terms used might be misleading.

Actually, the formation of a rearguard at a battlefield means only one thing: the army is preparing to retreat.

The Russians were not retreating until Bagration's command was slaughtered and was driven from the field. The Russian units trying to stop Ney, Dupont, and Senarmont from attacking after the Russians ran could be termed a 'rear guard' because they were trying to protect those going for the bridges and stuck in the giant traffic jam in Friedland. The Russian retreat didn't begin until Bagration was driven from the field.

Yes, the Russian Guard infantry and cavalry, as well as some other Russian troops, tried to stop or even to push back Ney's and Victor's infantry, but they were doing it only in order to buy time for the other Russian troops, who were retreating to the town.

The fighting in the Forest of Sortlach occurred during Lannes' delaying action. The Forest of Sortlack was the location of Ney's corps before it's first attack. It was the French staging area.

The Russians had given up the fighting for the Sortlack Forest and retreated at a distance of half-gunshot from it long before Ney started his main attack.

There is a sequence of events. Ney's VI Corps was designated as the main attack. That attack was defeated and thrown back into the Wood of Sortlack.
Then Dupont advanced with his supporting artillery on his own initiative. Senarmont was with this initial advance. It was then that Senarmont decided to use the entire I Corps artillery to attack the Russian center.

The "Journal d'operations du 1er corps de la Grande Armée" says that Senarmont received an order from General Victor to gather all artillery of the corps and to take a position before the front of the infantry:

Le général Senarmont, ayant reçu du général Victor l'ordre de réunir l'artillerie et de la porter en avant sur le front de la ligne …

Carnet de la Sabretache, 1897, p. 325.

What is interesting, Norvins doesn't mention Senarmont's battery at all. He wrote at least two accounts of the battle of Friedland, a very brief one in his "Histoire de Napoléon" first published in 1827, and a longer one in his memoirs written 40 years later (Souvenirs d'un historien de Napoléon: Mémorial de J. de Norvins), and in both accounts he doesn't mention Senarmont's battery.

Brechtel198 wrote:

Wasn't Gortchkov commanding the Russian right flank and Bagration the left and center?

General Gortchakov actually commanded the whole army at Friedland as well as at Heilsberg.

No one is saying that Senarmont ‘had done the whole job.' The point is that Senarmont's artillery attack was the decisive action of the battle and the concentrated fire from it destroyed the Russian center.

Boulart doesn't support this. He says literally that Senarmont's battery powerfully contributed into the disordering of the Russian center, and nothing more. The artillery of those days was not powerful enough to be able to destroy troops in battle formation. The artillery was able to throw the enemy troops in confusion and even in disorder, but only temporarily. Then a timely attack by either infantry or cavalry was required to force the disordered enemy to retreat or to put the enemy to flight.

I agree on your approach to what you find in primary sources. I don't agree with your conclusions on Friedland, especially what you have stated regarding Senarmont. … And I do believe that the story of a bayonet fight is credible.

Do you really believe that Norvins could clearly distinguish, whether there was bayonet fighting or not, at a distance of about 1.5 km and in the gunpowder smoke? Do you really believe that Norvins' horse sank into blood up to her knees? Do you really believe that Norvins managed to inspect all the bodies of the dead Russian Guard infantrymen to be sure that they all were killed by bayonets, while he was riding on horseback in his squadron formation in the evening twilight? If yes, then your approach to the sources is quite different from my approach. As I have said, many officers say that a massed bayonet fight in the open was a very rare event, including several French generals, such as Chambray and Lejeune, and several generals of the Russian army, such as Langeron, Eugen von Württemberg, and many others (some officers say that they had never seen such fights in their whole career). So, when I see a bayonet fight mentioned in a source, I don't believe it, until I find another independent source, in which this bayonet fight is also mentioned. In some cases I found other sources, in which the events are described that occurred in the same time at the same place, but usually there is no another mention of a bayonet fight. So I conclude that either the author of the first source is mistaken, or he gave too much freedom to his imagination, or he repeats someone's tales, and in fact there were no bayonet fighting in this time at this place. I think that Norvins gave too much freedom to his imagination. He wrote this account 40 years after the battle. In 1807 Norvins was an inexperienced cavalryman, and he had never gained any military experience later, because the "gendarmerie d'ordonnance" was raised in 1806 and disbanded in July 1807, Norvins quitted military service and started a civilian career.

Where is the evidence that Senarmont exaggerated his estimate of the Russians killed by his artillery?

I think this is an incorrect question. The correct question in this: "Is there any source supporting claims on the number of the Russians killed by Senarmont's artillery?"

Napoleon made the comment both praising Senarmont and giving him credit for what he and his gunners accomplished. He walked the ground after the action and saw the destruction caused by his large battery.
I don't interpret Senarmont's after-action report, the letter to his brother, or the I Corps after-action report as either exaggeration or self-praise. He does understand what he accomplished and the accuracy of the 2,600 rounds he fired at slingshot range.

According to various estimates, at Friedland the Russian army lost 18 to 25 thousand men killed and wounded. If we believe that Senarmont's battery killed 4,000 Russians, there should have been at least the same number of wounded. So, Senarmont's battery should have killed or wounded about 8,000 men. This means that it inflicted from a third to almost a half of the whole losses of the Russian army at Friedland. I think this is incredible, to say the least.

Brechtel198 wrote:
First, it isn't a principle.

Call it a habit, a custom, call it how you wish, but it was a very frequent feature in reports and memoirs.

Second making sweeping, all encompassing statements is usually, if not always, an inaccurate road to take.

Believing everything that is written in the sources is usually also an inaccurate road to take.

The Russians suffered heavy losses before their retreat. The retreat which turned into a rout, was caused by (1) Senarmont's artillery attack, (2) Ney's second attack against Bagration, and (3) Dupont's defeat of the Russian Guard infantry.

Such are the French claims. The Russian sources say that the Russian troops first retreated from the Sortlack Forest at a distance of about half-gunshot. Yakov Otroshchenko, a staff-captain and company commander in the 7th Jaeger Regiment:

After sunrise cannonade sounded, enemy cannonballs flew above us and fell into the river; several companies of our regiment were ordered to march forward into battle, including my one. We came up to the wood; we were met with battle fire; we rushed all together forward with bayonet, drove the French into a marsh and captured 200 guardsmen and one colonel; but then the French, having rallied, overthrew us and drove us out of the wood; we also got reinforcements, advanced into the wood, but should yield to the superiority of the enemy, [we] went out of the wood, deployed in skirmish order in the open field and remained there…

Otroshchenko Y. O., Zapiski generala Otroshchenko. (1800-1830 gg) (Memoirs of General Otroshchenko), Moscow, 2006, p. 34.
The same in Russkiy Vestnik, 1877, vol. 131, p. 177:
PDF link

Right before both Ney's attack and Senarmont's cannonade started, the Russians were preparing to retreat back over the River Alle. The battery artillery was ordered to retreat first (Bennigsen's memoirs, t. 2, p. 201). The artillerymen of the Guard Battery Artillery Company were limbering their guns when Senarmont's battery opened fire (Ratch V. F., "Publichnye lektsii, chitannye pri gvardeiskoi artillerii polkovnikom Ratchem." (Public lectures given to Guard artillery by Colonel Ratch.) // Artilleriiskii Zhurnal (Artillery Journal), 1861, No. 1, part 3, p. 74-75). Ratch describes the positions of the Guard artillery in such detail, that it is obvious that he had a detailed source. He probably used documents from Arakcheyev's archive, he mentions this archive in other places, and says that Arakcheyev interviewed artillery officers after the 1807 campaign. Ratch also personally knew some Guard artillery officers who were still alive in 1850s. Ratch didn't know the reason why the Guard Battery Artillery Company was limbering in that moment, because Bennigsen's memoirs were published only in 1900.

Ivan Zhirkevich, an officer in the 2nd Guard Light Artillery Company, says that after noon all Guard artillery was brought forward and fired a few shots, and the French answered with a few shots, one gun carriage was broken. General Kaspersky sent Zhirkevich back over the River Alle to bring a spare carriage from the artillery park, and said him that all other artillery material should remain there (i.e. on the eastern side of the river). When Zhirkevich brought the spare carriage to the battery, he didn't find General Kaspersky there. He was told that the general went back across the river. Zhirkevich went there and found the general, who said him that he was ordered to find a position for the battery, and that soon all Guard would march to that road. It was at 5 or 6 p.m. Zhirkevich says that riding through the town he saw many Guard officers sitting in the houses, while the soldiers were standing almost near the town's wall. He concluded that nobody expected any serious fighting, and that the officers were waiting for their regiments to march through the town. But at 7 p. m. a cannonade started around the town, and very soon two bridges over the Alle were set on fire. (Zhirkevich I. S., Zapiski Ivana Stepanovicha Zhirkevicha 1789-1848 (Memoirs of Ivan Stepanovich Zhirkevich), Moscow, 2009, p. 39-40). Ratch was not aware of Zhirkevich's memoirs, they were published in 1874 (Russkaya Starina, 1874, vol. IX, p. 233-234).

PDF link

Brechtel198 wrote:

Bennigsen didn't ‘allow' his troops to cross to the west bank of the Alle, they were ordered across in an attempt to destroy Lannes.

There were no such attempt. Read Yermolov's memoirs carefully: it was just his supposition that Bennigsen had the intention to destroy an isolated enemy corps. But, instead of that, the Russian troops busied themselves with a worthless firefight and uselessly lost much time, and then the enemy cavalry arrived at the right flank and the enemy infantry filled the woods before the Russian rearguard (the Sortlack Forest).

Before noon, the Russian troops crossed the river by parts (regiment by regiment, as Zhirkevich says) only in order to push the French some distance from the town, where Bennigsen wished to have some rest. Alexander Obolensky, an ADC to General Dokhturov, says that in the second half of the day Dokhturov sent him to Bennigsen for orders. Obolensky arrived and said to Bennigsen that it was impossible to stay at that position, because the Russian troops had come up to a wood (he probably means the Sortlack Forest), and that the enemy had brought their artillery and fired at the Russian troops from this wood, killing many soldiers. Obolensky says that Bennigsen replied: "Pass on to General Dokhturov from me: don't annoy the enemy, because I am sure that he had no intention to give a battle." Obolensky says that in the moment he was leaving Bennigsen, Sir Robert Wilson arrived and informed Bennigsen that strong enemy columns with artillery advanced at the center of the Russian army (Obolensky A. P., Khronika nedavnei stariny. Iz arkhiva knyazya Obolenskogo-Neledinskogo-Meletskogo. (Chronicle of recent times. From the archive of Prince Obolensky-Neledinsky-Meletsky). St.Petersburg, 1876, p. 95-96).

simlib.ru/handle/123456789/559

Memoirs of Otroshchenko, Zhirkevich, and Obolensky on the 1807 campaign are translated into English and published by Alexander Mikaberidze:
Russian Eyewitness Accounts of the Campaign of 1807.

link

What is decisive about Senarmont's action is not only a massed battery of 30 guns, but the range of the engagement, which in Senarmont's case was as close as 120 yards.

The range of 60 toises is just Senarmont's claim. Girod de l'Ain didn't mention such close range actions of Senarmont's battery. Senarmont says that his battery fired 2516 shots, 362 of them cannister. It is not very much, 83 or 84 shots per gun on the average, if only 30 guns fired. Firing at the normal rate of two shots in one minute, this would take only 41 to 42 minutes. At Borodino, Napoleon's artillery fired about 60,000 rounds, or more than 102 shots per gun on the average (587 guns). The cannonade was not equal in intensity over the whole front and during the whole day. This means that some guns fired less than 102 rounds, but some other fired more than 102 rounds. Several Russian artillery officers mention in their memoirs that at Borodino they had spent all ammunition from the caissons of their artillery companies (110 to 120 rounds per gun, the incendiary shells were probably not used), and received additional ammunition from the artillery park.

Yermelov's referring to Senarmont's artillery as 'that ghastly battery' is the indicator that Senarmont was causing much damage to Bagration's command.

Such expressions as "ghastly battery" or "fierce cannonade" are absolutely meaningless, if we have nothing to compare with. Any enemy battery would seem ghastly to anyone, who is under its fire, and any enemy artillery fire would seem fierce to anyone, who is under this fire. If we have something to compare with, we can get meaningful expressions, such as "the battery was ghastlier than that well known battery", and "the cannonade was fiercer than that well known cannonade".

Senarmont's cannonade ‘ceased' when he accomplished his mission of destroying the Russian center. He then advanced his artillery to support Dupont and Ney who continued their attacks herding the Russians into Friedland. Senarmont's artillery fire also helped to set Friedland on fire as well as firing on the Russian bridges in the congested mess that Friedland became.

So, Senarmont's cannonade hadn't ceased when the Russian center was driven back, Senarmont continued firing at the retreating Russian troops. This was the normal French practice, see such examples at Austerlitz:

Meanwhile, the enemy had advanced his artillery, and vigorously plied it in cannonading the allies during their retreat, which put the finishing stroke to the disorder they were in.

Stutterheim, A detailed account of the battle of Austerlitz. London, 1807, p. 106).

And at Bautzen:

The battle was fought in a most clear and beautiful day of spring … it was finished at 5 or 6 p. m. Fortunately to us, the French had no light cavalry, otherwise we might had suffered huge losses during our retreat, but their artillery pursued us in the most dreadful manner.

Zhirkevich I. S., Zapiski, Moscow, 2009, p. 109; Russkaya Starina, 1874, vol. XI, p. 426.

Brechtel198 wrote:

Rear guards, or what might pass for them, are formed for various missions. And the terms used might be misleading.

Actually, the formation of a rearguard at a battlefield means only one thing: the army is preparing to retreat.

The Russians were not retreating until Bagration's command was slaughtered and was driven from the field. The Russian units trying to stop Ney, Dupont, and Senarmont from attacking after the Russians ran could be termed a 'rear guard' because they were trying to protect those going for the bridges and stuck in the giant traffic jam in Friedland. The Russian retreat didn't begin until Bagration was driven from the field.

Yes, the Russian Guard infantry and cavalry, as well as some other Russian troops, tried to stop or even to push back Ney's and Victor's infantry, but they were doing it only in order to buy time for the other Russian troops, who were retreating to the town.

The fighting in the Forest of Sortlach occurred during Lannes' delaying action. The Forest of Sortlack was the location of Ney's corps before it's first attack. It was the French staging area.

The Russians had given up the fighting for the Sortlack Forest and retreated at a distance of half-gunshot from it long before Ney started his main attack.

There is a sequence of events. Ney's VI Corps was designated as the main attack. That attack was defeated and thrown back into the Wood of Sortlack.
Then Dupont advanced with his supporting artillery on his own initiative. Senarmont was with this initial advance. It was then that Senarmont decided to use the entire I Corps artillery to attack the Russian center.

The "Journal d'operations du 1er corps de la Grande Armée" says that Senarmont received an order from General Victor to gather all artillery of the corps and to take a position before the front of the infantry:

Le général Senarmont, ayant reçu du général Victor l'ordre de réunir l'artillerie et de la porter en avant sur le front de la ligne …

Carnet de la Sabretache, 1897, p. 325.

What is interesting, Norvins doesn't mention Senarmont's battery at all. He wrote at least two accounts of the battle of Friedland, a very brief one in his "Histoire de Napoléon" first published in 1827, and a longer one in his memoirs written 40 years later (Souvenirs d'un historien de Napoléon: Mémorial de J. de Norvins), and in both accounts he doesn't mention Senarmont's battery.

Brechtel198 wrote:

Wasn't Gortchkov commanding the Russian right flank and Bagration the left and center?

General Gortchakov actually commanded the whole army at Friedland as well as at Heilsberg.

No one is saying that Senarmont ‘had done the whole job.' The point is that Senarmont's artillery attack was the decisive action of the battle and the concentrated fire from it destroyed the Russian center.

Boulart doesn't support this. He says literally that Senarmont's battery powerfully contributed into the disordering of the Russian center, and nothing more. The artillery of those days was not powerful enough to be able to destroy troops in battle formation. The artillery was able to throw the enemy troops in confusion and even in disorder, but only temporarily. Then a timely attack by either infantry or cavalry was required to force the disordered enemy to retreat or to put the enemy to flight.

I agree on your approach to what you find in primary sources. I don't agree with your conclusions on Friedland, especially what you have stated regarding Senarmont. … And I do believe that the story of a bayonet fight is credible.

Do you really believe that Norvins could clearly distinguish, whether there was bayonet fighting or not, at a distance of about 1.5 km and in the gunpowder smoke? Do you really believe that Norvins' horse sank into blood up to her knees? Do you really believe that Norvins managed to inspect all the bodies of the dead Russian Guard infantrymen to be sure that they all were killed by bayonets, while he was riding on horseback in his squadron formation in the evening twilight? If yes, then your approach to the sources is quite different from my approach. As I have said, many officers say that a massed bayonet fight in the open was a very rare event, including several French generals, such as Chambray and Lejeune, and several generals of the Russian army, such as Langeron, Eugen von Württemberg, and many others (some officers say that they had never seen such fights in their whole career). So, when I see a bayonet fight mentioned in a source, I don't believe it, until I find another independent source, in which this bayonet fight is also mentioned. In some cases I found other sources, in which the events are described that occurred in the same time at the same place, but usually there is no another mention of a bayonet fight. So I conclude that either the author of the first source is mistaken, or he gave too much freedom to his imagination, or he repeats someone's tales, and in fact there were no bayonet fighting in this time at this place. I think that Norvins gave too much freedom to his imagination. He wrote this account 40 years after the battle. In 1807 Norvins was an inexperienced cavalryman, and he had never gained any military experience later, because the "gendarmerie d'ordonnance" was raised in 1806 and disbanded in July 1807, Norvins quitted military service and started a civilian career.

Where is the evidence that Senarmont exaggerated his estimate of the Russians killed by his artillery?

I think this is an incorrect question. The correct question in this: "Is there any source supporting claims on the number of the Russians killed by Senarmont's artillery?"

Napoleon made the comment both praising Senarmont and giving him credit for what he and his gunners accomplished. He walked the ground after the action and saw the destruction caused by his large battery.
I don't interpret Senarmont's after-action report, the letter to his brother, or the I Corps after-action report as either exaggeration or self-praise. He does understand what he accomplished and the accuracy of the 2,600 rounds he fired at slingshot range.

According to various estimates, at Friedland the Russian army lost 18 to 25 thousand men killed and wounded. If we believe that Senarmont's battery killed 4,000 Russians, there should have been at least the same number of wounded. So, Senarmont's battery should have killed or wounded about 8,000 men. This means that it inflicted from a third to almost a half of the whole losses of the Russian army at Friedland. I think this is incredible, to say the least.

great posting job done – but I fear that all this great effort will only fall on deaf ears.

von Winterfeldt wrote:

great posting job done – but I fear that all this great effort will only fall on deaf ears.

Anyone has the right to believe the sources to the letter. I just try to explain my opinion on the subject.

Remember- It is never about the number of guns- It is about the concentration of firepower at the critical moment.