"Why Arnhem? " Topic

"Operation Market-Garden, the largest airborne operation in history, is a well known failure because of the inability to capture a bridge over the Rhine River, and the resulting destruction of the British 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem. Many opinions of the Battle of Arnhem were established by Cornelius Ryan in his book A Bridge Too Far which became an epic 1977 movie by Joseph Levine and Richard Attenborough. These works provided readers and movie goers an understanding of the defeat that Allies suffered. However, these works fail in answering the basic question of how events on the Western Front influenced the decision of choosing Arnhem as the objective for such a daring and risky operation to force a crossing of the Rhine?

The ultimate decision to make Arnhem the objective, like so many decisions during war, is a complex and multifaceted process that often defy a simple explanation. The decision to attack Arnhem was no different. As the Western Allies were planning the invasion of France and the defeat of Germany they acknowledged they would need to cross the Rhine River, but could not foresee how events would unfold during their campaign. Allied planners, though not citing it, could appreciate the truths of Clausewitz and the role of "friction" in war would prevent that type of foresight in detailed planning. Only as the pursuit of August 1944 developed did the Allied commanders start contemplating specific battles on the German frontier, and how best to proceed with such an endeavor. This is when Arnhem was considered as part of a greater debate over strategy and command.

The first reason why Arnhem took on such importance was not the city itself, but the Allied objective of the Ruhr industrial region and its strategic importance to the German war effort. The directive of the Allied Combined Chiefs of Staff, that ordered the invasion of the Continent, stated that the invasion's objective was the destruction of the enemy armed forces and to aim for the heart of Germany. General Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander, interpreted this to include key areas of supply and communications as valid objectives of the Allied invasion…"
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Amicalement
Armand

Never mind the strategy; wargame scenarios and men in Dennison smocks waving umbrellas…that's what it was about/

"It's all about the bridges"

I printed this out the last time it was posted here. Good article

You drop the paras on one end of a long table, you start the armour at the other end and they have to link up before time runs out. What's not to love about that scenario?

I've often said that Arnhem was an odd choice, since it's impossible to reach the Ruhr area from there withouit havong to cross the (swollen im Autumn) river IJssel – Arnhem is on the wrong side of it. We all know the troubles the Germans had bringinging their armour across that river, and the Allies would have had to do the same, but under fire.

Landings a bit more to the East, at Velp, would have put the Allies within easy reach of both IJssel and Rhine bridges.

Probably a political choice, but a very poor tactical one.

Probably a political choice, but a very poor tactical one

Does any know of any political reasons why Arnhem was chosen? I don't remember reading that there was that much discussion at the time of whether Arnhem was the correct objective for such an operation.

The LZs & DZs were the only ones acceptable to the RAF, so that pretty much defined the axis of advance.

But the LZs and DZs were picked on the basis of Arnhem being the objective. I don't remember reading any discussion of an alternative objective being desirable but RAF requirements forcing Arnhem as the objective. I'd imagine the operation would have been cancelled in those cirucumstances.

The allies had a number of airborne divisions sitting around eating rations and bored. The problem of supply was rearing its ugly head, particularly fuel. The decision to give Monty's idea was a political one as Patton was advancing fast but needed to rest and refit his tired, worn out divisions. Trying to get a fast track into Germany and the Ruhr was foremost in the minds of allied planners, as they wished to end the war by Christmas with winter sitting in. Anyone who has wargamed this scenario will attest it is a tough go for allies.

Patton was advancing fast

Not by the start of September he wasn't. He'd slowed right down (some sources say stopped) as the German forces in Lorraine were able to get back on an effective defensive footing. And Patton would shortly (end of September) be mired in the battles for Metz. Similarly, Bradley was getting bogged down in Hurtgen Forest, where he'd stay until '45.

So the mythology that Market-Garden stole the impetus from Patton and/or Bradley doesn't stand up to the facts. Metz and Hurtgen would still be tying up troops in December and February, long after M-G had obviously failed, so the idea that M-G stalled the US armies' advances is just a bit agricultural.

In reality by September the Allies were over-stretched, over-tired and out of ideas to meet Roosevelt's and Churchill's pushing for an end "by Christmas". M-G, for all it's problems, provided the only (near im-)possible line of advance that may see the Allies at least in Germany by 01Jan45, if not racing for Berlin. Blocking the German XVth Army from escaping the sack at the Scheldt, little bit of luck, the correct tuning crystals in the ground-to-air radios and some better decisions in all the airborne divisions and XXX Corps would probably have seen the Allies still short a bridge, as Gungnir says. You can only get so far on fumes and swearing when the tank is empty, after all.

Cheers.

Quite right Whirlwind; I should have been more clear. Arnhem was the chosen objective and the LZs/DZs were chosen accordingly. really I was thinking about how unsuitable they were for the airborne troops…way too far from the bridge.
Dal raises a good point about (at least) the British airborne. The initial plan (Lathbury's) for getting to the bridge on D1 was at best, weak, but Urquhart was relatively new to command and had been off sick a lot and he deferred to Lathbury on the grounds of his greater experience.

"Does any know of any political reasons why Arnhem was chosen?"

Montgomery and Dempsey actually wanted to cross the Rhine at Wesel via teh Aachen Gap (where they did eventually cross in 1945), but it would have meant shifting army boundaries around etc and giving Monty his '40 division full blooded thrust'.

The Ijssel is not an obstacle one the same scale as either the Rhine or the Maas. The Germans problem was ferrying tanks across the Rhine, not the Ijssel.

I've only read three books about Market-Garden, the Ryan, the Middlebrook and the one from the German perspective whose name escapes me. From what I know, once Arnhem was chosen, the landing grounds picked were the only ones that made sense. The area south of the river was thought to be marginally suitable but too exposed to anti-air, so that the troops would lose heavily going on. This turned out to be an accurate assessment, because when the Poles dropped there, they did indeed suffer.

The second big obstacle to success was the inability to execute a drop of that size in one go. It seems almost like a wargamer's mistake: buying lots of para minis and air-portable artillery models, but not enough gliders. As a result the scale could be argued to be twice the maximum size that should have been entertained.

These two together meant that the paratrooper's main advantage was squandered. There is little surprise left when you drop 8 miles from the objective and have to get there via Shanks' pony four hours later. For the majority of your force that arrives on subsequent days, there is of course none at all.

Finally there was the ill-advised dismissal of the evidence that an SS Panzer Corps was refitting in the area. Either it was understood that it was there and the threat not grasped, or it was not believed to be the whole formation in which case commanders should have asked where the rest of it was.

So the operation could and possibly could have been cancelled before it started.

"Finally there was the ill-advised dismissal of the evidence that an SS Panzer Corps was refitting in the area. "

The problem was more that IInd SS was mislocated further south, so the poor old 82nd was left waiting for a massive counterattack out of the Reichswald which never happened – and in turn it messed up their force allocation priorities so they didn't take Nijmegen Bridge until Guard Armoured rolled up.

1st Airborne did of course manage to take their Day 1 objective, despite the poor LZs, and held it for longer than planned.

Anyway, it is all water under the bridge now.

"Anyway, it is all water under the bridge now."

LOL, I see what you did there.

It was one of the few cities in the area that the Alllied Command could pronounce.

You drop the paras on one end of a long table, you start the armour at the other end and they have to link up before time runs out. What's not to love about that scenario?

No, no, no. You set up a really long table and drop paras all along the route that the tanks have to then link up. Multi-day battle! W00t!

I can dream, can't I?

- Ix

So, the priority of supplies for Montgomery to the detriment of Bradley / Patton was a myth? This is the first time I read something like this. It figure in many documents that the amount of equipments / gasoline etc provided to the Operation Market Garden was determinant …

Amicalement
Armand

Yes, it is rubbish and has been extensively debunked. But it makes for a good story…

Yup: Martin is quite right.

So, the priority of supplies for Montgomery to the detriment of Bradley / Patton was a myth?

Yes, Armand. The Allied advances had run out of petrol- literally. Patton would shortly (20 September) be stopped at Metz, and would remain there until December. Bradley was fighting his way into the Hurtgen Forest campaign, which would trap him until February. And Monty had run out of steam in Belgium, not even being able to close the trap on the retreating XV Army.

The myth that Monty slowed down the American armies seems to be a product of big egos "remembering to advantage" in the case of Bradley and some Third Army senior officers. Just as Monty's claim that with extra petrol and supplies that were "wrongly" sent to the US armies, Monty would have captured Antwerp, cleared the Scheldt and got to Arnhem on time. It's another self-serving twisting of events.

It's not surprising. If you have the ambition to reach general ranks then you almost certainly will have a well developed ego.

Cheers.

Yes, I agree that the 'Monty took Patton's supplies' story is a myth. The US Army's official history of the war ("The Green Books") says so, too. At the start of September EVERYONE was out of gas- Monty, Bradley, and Patton. The great pursuit from Normandy was over, but no one realized it-or wanted to admit it. It only took a few days to get everyone-including Patton- resupplied, but that was enough for the Germans to halt their retreat, bring up reserves, and form a new defense line. It was all hard slogging for everyone after that.

Agree with the above, everyone had run out and there was much finger pointing at senior levels blaming each other.

ok

Good to know it.

Amicalement
Armand