"1812 Russian musketry and artiĺlery " Topic

Russian infantry firing muskets and Russian artillery firing, do they deserve the negatives that some rulesets give them, Or were they just as good as everyone else?

I don't know what the answer is, but the evidence about the infantry seems to mainly be to do with the poor quality of Russian muskets and powder, particularly at the beginning of the period (see here for as good a summary as any: link )

The logic of this is that the average Russian musketry should improve over the course of the war, as the poor-quality old Russian muskets were swapped out.

As for the artillery…

You could have a look on this thread: link

and with a due sense of reluctance and foreboding: TMP link

and this:
TMP link

Muskets probably yes. According to Wilson, there were a number of different calibres in use, so I guess ammo supply might have been problematic at times. Live firing practice of muskets was strictly limited, so the average infantry man had little experience of firing his musket outside of a battle and the Russians were still to a large extent influenced by Suvurovian doctrine about the superiority of the bayonet.
As for artillery, from 1805 on the guns were well designed, plentiful in number and, if well managed, were as capable as most contemporary artillery arms, with the possible exception of the French. Russian artillery was very mobile, with strong draught horses capable of dragging guns through difficult terrain (one observer reckoned 6 of these horse coukd pull an artillery piece through a snowdrift, and that's a Russian snowdrift, not the feeble littke things we get in the UK. Any advantage the French had was probably down to the better training of their artillery officers. At Borodino there were problems because the reserve artillery was not brought into action because of the artillery commander (Kutaisov) becoming a casualty early on. I see no justification for downgrading Russian artillery after 1805. They should be allowed an excellent ratio of guns to infantry and fire as effectively as any other army, probably better than most.

from previous discussions on TMP etc, it seems that the Russian musketry was quite variable depending on the experience of the particular regiment. Some could be considered quite good, such as units that had recently fought in Finland, while other regiments must have had a large component of recent conscripts.

@Timbo W,

Absolutely true, but the experience factor was likely to be similar across armies, whereas the musket quality issue is a more distinctly "Russian" issue.

what musket quality issue?

he Armaments of Russian Infantry in 1812 June
By:Robert Woo <Send E-Mail>
Date: 2/24/2013, 3:25 am
The following tables are translated from appendix of Ulʹyanov '1812, Russian Infantry in Combat' (Ульянов И. Э. 1812. Русская пехота в бою.)
First Infantry Corps
5th Infantry Division
1st Brigade:
Sevsk Infantry Regiment; Севский пехотный полк; No details.
Kaluga Infantry Regiment; Калужский пехотный полк; M1808
2nd Brigade:
Perm Infantry Regiment; Пермский пехотный полк; M1808
Mogilev Infantry Regiment; Могилевский пехотный полк; M1808
3rd Brigade:
23rd Jaeger Regiment; M1808
24th Jaeger Regiment; M1808
14th Infantry Division:
1st Brigade:
Tula Infantry Regiment; Тульский пехотный полк; British Brown Bess
Navagin Infantry Regiment;Навагинский пехотный полк; British Brown Bess
2nd Brigade:
Estland Infantry Regiment; Эстляндский пехотный полк; British Brown Bess;
Tenge Infantry Regiment; Навагинский пехотный полк; British Brown Bess
3rd Brigade:
25th Jaeger Regiment; British Brown Bess
26th Jaeger Regiment; British Brown Bess
Second Infantry Corps:
4th Infantry Division:
1st Brigade:
Kremenchug Infantry Regiment; Кременчугский пехотный полк; M1808
Minsk Infantry Regiment; Минский пехотный полк; M1808
2nd Brigade:
Tobolsk Infantry Regiment; Тобольский пехотный полк; M1808
Volhynia Infantry Regiment; Волынский пехотный полк; British Brown Bess
3rd Brigade:
4th Jaeger Regiment; M1808
34th Jaeger Regiment; M1808
17th Infantry Division:
1st Brigade:
Riazan Infantry Regiment; Рязанский пехотный полк; M1808
Beloozero Infantry Regiment; Белозерский пехотный полк; M1808
2nd Brigade:
Willmanstrand Infantry Regiment; Вильманстрандский пехотный полк; M1808
Brest Infantry Regiment; Брестский пехотный полк; M1808
3rd Brigade:
30th Jaeger Regiment; M1808
48th Jaeger Regiment; M1808
Third Infantry Corps:
1st Grenadier Division:
1st Brigade:
Life Grenadier Regiment; Лейб-гренадерский полк; M1808
Count Arakcheev Grenadier Regiment; гренадерский Графа Аракчеева полк; M1808
2nd Brigade:
Pavlovsky Grenadier Regiment; Павловский гренадерский полк; M1808
Ekaterinoslav Grenadier Regiment; Екатеринославский гренадерский полк; M1808
3rd Brigade:
St Petersburg Grenadier Regiment; С.-Петербургский гренадерский полк; M1808
Tauride Grenadier Regiment; Таврический гренадерский полк; M1808
3rd Infantry Division:
1st Brigade:
Reval Infantry Regiment; Ревельский пехотный полк; British Brown Bess
Murom Infantry Regiment; Муромский пехотный полк; British Brown Bess
2nd Brigade:
Kopore Infantry Regiment; Копорский пехотный полк; British Brown Bess
Chernigov Infantry Regiment; Черниговский пехотный полк; British Brown Bess
3rd Brigade:
20th Jaeger Regiment; British Brown Bess
21st Jaeger Regiment; British Brown Bess
Fourth Infantry Corps:
11th Infantry Division:
1st Brigade:
Kexholm Infantry Regiment; Кексгольмский пехотный полк; M1808
Pernau Infantry Regiment; Перновский пехотный полк; M1808
2nd Brigade:
Polotsk Infantry Regiment; Полоцкий пехотный полк; M1808
Elets Infantry Regiment; Елецкий пехотный полк; M1808
3rd Brigade:
1st Jaeger Regiment; M1808
33rd Jaeger Regiment; M1808
23rd Infantry Division:
1st Brigade:
Rylsk Infantry Regiment; Рыльский пехотный полк; M1808
Ekaterinburg Infantry Regiment; Екатеринбургский пехотный полк; M1808
2nd Brigade:
Selenginsk Infantry Regiment; Селенгинский пехотный полк; M1808
18th Jaeger Regiment; M1808
2nd Combined Grenadier Brigade:
5 Combined Grenadier battalions
Fifth Reserve Corps:
Guards Infantry Division:
1st Brigade:
Preobrazhensky Guards Regiment; Лейб-гвардии Преображенский полк; M1808
Semenovsky Guards Regiment; Лейб-гвардии Семеновский полк; M1808
2nd Brigade: Colonel M. E. Khrapovitsky
Izmailovsky Guards Regiment; Лейб-гвардии Измайловский полк; M1808
Lithuania (Litovsky) Guards Regiment; Лейб-гвардии Литовский полк; M1808
3rd Brigade: Colonel K. I. Bistrom
Finland Guards Regiment; Лейб-гвардии Финляндский полк; No details.
Guards Jaeger Regiment; Лейб-гвардии Егерский полк; M1808
Guards Marines Battalion; Гвардейский экипаж; No details
Sixth Infantry Corps:
7th Infantry Division:
1st Brigade:
Pskov Infantry Regiment; Псковский пехотный полк; M1808
Moscow Infantry Regiment; Московский пехотный полк; M1808
2nd Brigade:
Libau Infantry Regiment; Либавский пехотный полк; No details.
Sofia Infantry Regiment; Софийский пехотный полк; Austrian (Цесарские)
3rd Brigade:
11th Jaeger Regiment; No details.
36th Jaeger Regiment; British Brown Bess
24th Infantry Division:
1st Brigade:
Ufa Infantry Regiment; Уфимский пехотный полк; M1808
Shirvan Infantry Regiment; Ширванский пехотный полк; No details.
2nd Brigade;
Butyrki Infantry Regiment; Бутырский пехотный полк; No details.
Tomsk Infantry Regiment; Томский пехотный полк; No details.
3rd Brigade:
19th Jaeger Regiment; No details.
40th Jaeger Regiment; British Brown Bess
Seventh Infantry Corps:
26th Infantry Division:
1st Brigade:
Ladoga Infantry Regiment; Ладожский пехотный полк; No details.
Poltava Infantry Regiment; Полтавский пехотный полк; No details.
2nd Brigade:
Nizhnii Novgorod Infantry Regiment; Нижегородский пехотный полк; No details.
Orel Infantry Regiment; Орловский пехотный полк; Austrian (Цесарские)
3rd Brigade:
5th Jaeger Regiment; British Brown Bess
42nd Jaeger Regiment; No details.
12th Infantry Division:
1st Brigade:
Smolensk Infantry Regiment; Смоленский пехотный полк; No details
Narva Infantry Regiment; Нарвский пехотный полк; No details.
2nd Brigade:
Aleksopol Infantry Regiment; Алексопольский пехотный полк; No details.
Novoingermanland Infantry Regiment; Новоингерманландский пехотный полк; No details.
3rd Brigade:
6th Jaeger Regiment; No details.
41st Jaeger Regiment; No details.
Eighth Infantry Corps:
2nd Grenadier Division:
1st Brigade:
Kiev Grenadier Regiment; Киевский гренадерский полк; British Brown Bess
Moscow Grenadier Regiment; Московский гренадерский полк; British Brown Bess
2nd Brigade:
Astrakhan Grenadier Regiment; Астраханский гренадерский полк; British Brown Bess
Fanagoria Grenadier Regiment; Фанагорийский гренадерский полк; British Brown Bess
3rd Brigade:
Siberia Grenadier Regiment; Сибирский гренадерский полк; British Brown Bess
Little Russia Grenadier Regiment; Малороссийский гренадерский полк; British Brown Bess
2nd Combined Grenadier Division:
1st Brigade: 4 Combined Grenadier battalions; No details.
2nd Brigade: 6 Combined Grenadier battalions; No details.
En route to Second Army:
27th Infantry Division:
1st Brigade:
Odessa Infantry Regiment; Одесский пехотный полк; No details.
Ternopol Infantry Regiment; Тарнопольский пехотный полк; No details.
2nd Brigade:
Vilna Infantry Regiment; Виленский пехотный полк; No details.
Simbirsk Infantry Regiment; Симбирский пехотный полк; No details.
3rd Brigade:
49th Jaeger Regiment; No details.
50th Jaeger Regiment; No details.
Corps of General S. M. Kamensky
18th Infantry Division:
1st Brigade:
Vladimir Infantry Regiment; Владимирский пехотный полк; British Brown Bess
Tambov Infantry Regiment; Тамбовский пехотный полк; No details.
2nd Brigade:
Kostroma Infantry Regiment; Костромской пехотный полк; No details.
Dnieper Infantry Regiment; Днепровский пехотный полк; No details.
3rd Brigade:
28th Jaeger Regiment; No details.
32nd Jaeger Regiment; No details.
Corps of Lieutenant-General E. I. Markov
15th Infantry Division:
1st Brigade:
Kozlov Infantry Regiment; Козловский пехотный полк; M1808
Kolyvan Infantry Regiment; Колыванский пехотный полк; No details.
2nd Brigade:
Kurin Infantry Regiment; Куринский пехотный полк; No details.
Vitebsk Infantry Regiment; Витебский пехотный полк; No details.
3rd Brigade:
13th Jaeger Regiment; No details.
14th Jaeger Regiment; No details.
9th Infantry Division:
1st Brigade:
Nasheburg Infantry Regiment; Нашебургский пехотный полк; No details.
Iakutsk Infantry Regiment; Якутский пехотный полк; British Brown Bess
2nd Brigade:
Apsheron Infantry Regiment; Апшеронский пехотный полк; No details.
Riazhsk Infantry Regiment; Ряжский пехотный полк; No details.
3rd Brigade:
10th Jaeger Regiment; No details.
38th Jaeger Regiment; M1808
Corps of General Count A. de Langeron
22nd Infantry Division:
1st Brigade:
Viatka Infantry Regiment; Вятский пехотный полк; No details.
Staroskol Infantry Regiment; Старооскольский пехотный полк; British Brown Bess.
2nd Brigade:
Vyborg Infantry Regiment; Выборгский пехотный полк; No details.
3rd Brigade:
29th Jaeger Regiment; No details.
45th Jaeger Regiment; No details.
Corps of Lieutenant-General P. K. von Essen
8th Infantry Division:
1st Brigade:
Archangel Infantry Regiment; Архангелогородский пехотный полк; British Brown Bess
Ukraine Infantry Regiment; Украинский пехотный полк; No details.
2nd Brigade:
Schlüsselberg Infantry Regiment; Шлиссельбургский пехотный полк; British Brown Bess
Staroingermanland Infantry Regiment; Староингерманландский пехотный полк; British Brown Bess
3rd Brigade:
37th Jaeger Regiment; British Brown Bess
Corps of Lieutenant-General A. L. Voinov
10th Infantry Division:
1st Brigade:
Belostok Infantry Regiment; Белостокский пехотный полк; No details.
Crimea Infantry Regiment; Крымский пехотный полк; M1808
2nd Brigade:
Kursk Infantry Regiment; Курский пехотный полк; No details.
3rd Brigade:
8th Jaeger Regiment; No details.
39th Jaeger Regiment; M1808
Corps of Lieutenant-General A. P. Zass
16th Infantry Division:
1st Brigade:
Okhotsk Infantry Regiment; Охотский пехотный полк; M1808
2nd Brigade:
Kamchatka Infantry Regiment; Камчатский пехотный полк; M1808
Mingrelia Infantry Regiment; Мингрельский пехотный полк; Austrian (Цесарские)
Danube Army reserve:
Olonets Infantry Regiment; Олонецкий пехотный полк; No details.
Iaroslavl Infantry Regiment; Ярославский пехотный полк; No details.
7th Jaeger Regiment; No details.
Detachment in Serbia:
16th Infantry Division:
1st Brigade:
Neishlot Infantry Regiment; Нейшлотский пехотный полк; No details.
3rd Brigade:
27th Jaeger Regiment; No details.
43rd Jaeger Regiment; No details.
Finland Corps:
6th Infantry Division:
1st Brigade:
Briansk Infantry Regiment; Брянский пехотный полк; No details.
Nizov Infantry Regiment; Низовский пехотный полк; M1808
3rd Brigade:
Azov Infantry Regiment; Азовский пехотный полк; British Brown Bess.
3rd Jaeger Regiment; British Brown Bess.
21st Infantry Division:
1st Brigade:
Petrovsk Infantry Regiment; Петровский пехотный полк; M1808
Podolia Infantry Regiment; Подольский пехотный полк; No details.
2nd Brigade:
Neva Infantry Regiment; Невский пехотный полк; M1808
Lithuania Infantry Regiment; Литовский пехотный полк; No details.
3rd Brigade:
2nd Jaeger Regiment; No details.
44th Jaeger Regiment; No details.
25th Infantry Division:
1st Brigade:
1st Marine Regiment; 1-й морской полк; No details.
2nd Marine Regiment; 2-й морской полк; No details.
2nd Brigade:
3rd Marine Regiment; 3-й морской полк; No details.
Voronezh Infantry Regiment; Воронежский пехотный полк; British Brown Bess
3rd Brigade:
31st Jager Regiment; Swedish
47th Jaeger Regiment; No details.
End.
Altogether, there were 32 regiments armed with British Brown Bess, 49 regiments armed with new Russian Model 1808, 3 regiments armed with Austrian muskets and 1 jaeger regiment armed with captured Swedish muskets. (And five more regiments were armed with M1808 but did not take combat in 1812: Kazan, Sevastopol, Uglich Infantry Regiment, 35th, 46th Jaeger Regiment)

so most units had first class muskets

Actually all Russian troops and ALL artillery was brought into action at Borodino. The myth, that reserve artillery was not commited, was cultivated later, to justify the terrible defeat.

About "Suvorov doctrine". One must ask, why Suvorov so much praised the bayonet. Ansver is simple.. Russian troops don't used the bayonet. Historically Russians always were trained to sit behind obstacles and fire. This was true "Russian doctrine". Majority of battles were fought in this way. So Suvorov's intent was to break this practice and rise the courage of his troops a little.

@von W

That return is from 1812 though. The charge FWIW relates to the earlier period.

here more, source -might be chuvak or un ami, when tmp was full of russian experts and not so very poor as we are now

Well, are Brown Bess good enogh?
By 1812, 110,000 Brown Bess equipped front line Russian forces and another 40,000 were being distributed during the early part of the campaign.
150,000-200,000 of the latest Russian M1808 musket were also issued, with more being produced. This was an excellent musket, trying to combine the best of the Brown Bess and French "Charleville".
In general, for front-line units, the muskets were common/identical per regiment by 1812.

Yes, Jäger in a division would get the new ones first. Also, the lower-numbered Jäger units might not have really turned in their almost new M1805 Russian Jäger rifles. But really, even the new units like 27th Division got great muskets.
Russians liked the Brown Bess and M1808 so much that they typically would issue captured French muskets only to rear-area or militia units. I have shot the good replica's of both the Brown Bess and M18108 -- they seem essentially very similar and quite workmanlike.
The idea of "bad Russian muskets" or "bad Russian powder" have specific historical sources : Sir Robert Wilson reporting what he saw in 1806 and a specific report of ~1808. These documents are then (i) over-emphasized even as to the situation of 1805-1807 (usually because the "historians" in the west think that Russian manufacturing and logistics worked like the French, which it didn't) and (ii) magically extended to apply to 1812-1814.
Actually, the review of small arms (for which the report of 1808 was created) led to fundamental changes by 1812.
But (allow snarky comment, please), when you're an "expert" but don't have any Russian, what are you going to be able to say about them?

In short, no. Every time I pick up General de Brigade, I find myself completely baffled by the interpretation of the Russian military of the period.

@vonW

But (allow snarky comment, please), when you're an "expert" but don't have any Russian, what are you going to be able to say about them?

We find ourselves in violent agreement about the importance of Russian sources and expertise (Alexandre, Chuvak, Un Ami et al). However, sometimes we must make do with what limited expertise we have.

I think, reading your post, we are saying much the same thing.

@Whirlwind

I agree – still a pity that those people left in disgust.

About Russian musketry, earlier period – I assume all those like me, who depend on translated material, would be foolish just to make a decisson based on a Wilson quote alone.

Just a reminder for all experts, in rank and file – close order firing it would not matter how excellent the muskets were, one couldn't aim, or point the guns anyway.

@ Von Winterfeldt.

I would never claim expertise in this field, I certainly do not speak or read Russian but perhaps you can explain how someone who is an expert, speaks/ reads 6 languages and has a DPhil from Oxford felt it was OK to write the following:
"The small arms factories at Sestrovetsk and Tulsa turned out between 150000 and 170000 weapons a year- clumsy pieces which were never reduced to a single system. In 1812 the Russians went to war with 28 different calibres of infantry muskets, and 11 kinds of short rifles……… .Sixty thousand fine English muskets were given to the most deserving soldiers as rewards, which only added to the diversity"
And " The Precepts for Infantry Officers on the Day of Battle, which came to the 2nd West Army in June 1812, stated that "in the bayonet charge the true place of the officer was at the head of his men"
The same source does suggest that some units my have been well- trained in musketry; when Barclay de Tolly came to office in 1810, he apparently emphasised musketry practice, even designing targets with horizontal lines on them to encourage an understanding of the the need to elevate or depress the musket, depending on range
The above are all taken from Christopher Duffy's " Borodino and the war of 1812", published in 1973. The book has an extensive bibliography, including a number of Russian language texts.
Your list refers to many divisions being equipped with the M1808 musket. I assume this was the musket produced in the factories Duffy refers to. Was it really a standardised weapon or was Duffy correct to refer to " clumsy pieces, never reduced to a single system"?

Thanks for all your interesting replies. I can see that having a minus factor for the infantry firing may be correct but the rules that give you a minus factor when using Artillery I think are wrong. I enjoy gaming with my Russians but can get a little miffed when rulesets dont do them justice.

I'd rate the Russians as the best army of the wars after the French. By 1814, I'd say they were better.

It has always been a Russian thing AIUI to have absolutely shedloads of the biggest possible guns. They are still at it today.

I also understand that the quality of Russian gunpowder was substandard but I can offer no source for that quickly – this would (if proven true) apply to both artillery and small arms.

I can see that having a minus factor for the infantry firing may be correct…

I'd only consider using this for the early war period. And even then, a lot would depend on the granularity of the individual rules you use.

Just a reminder for all experts, in rank and file – close order firing it would not matter how excellent the muskets were, one couldn't aim, or point the guns anyway.

Absolutely. Any effect would be seen in an increased number of misfires, I imagine.

@steamingdave47

"you can explain how someone who is an expert, speaks/ reads 6 languages and has a DPhil from Oxford felt it was OK to write the following:
"The small arms factories at Sestrovetsk and Tulsa turned out between 150000 and 170000 weapons a year- clumsy pieces which were never reduced to a single system. In 1812 the Russians went to war with 28 different calibres of infantry muskets, and 11 kinds of short rifles……… .Sixty thousand fine English muskets were given to the most deserving soldiers as rewards, which only added to the diversity"

I try to explain, first – Duffy wrote some excellent books, but also he is prone to errors and wrong judgement, but he is one of the few histrians who admits this – The Army of Fredrick the Great – Second edition

"have made me realise how ill – informed and uncharitable were some of my comments on Frederick's army"

This in fact prompted Duffy to write a new heavily revised second edition.

His Borodino book is about the battle and not a book about armament and tactics of the Russian infantry. It was written well before the iron curtain fell. Now a lot more Russian sources are available then were in the past.
And – also my experience – that a lot of fine historians fail when trying to describe tactics or arms performances.

Russian authors who did study uniforms – armament – and tactics seemingly come to a different conclusion as Duffy, as for example Ulianov.

You can see from the above information that whole regiments and not to most deserving soldiers (how should that work?) the Brown Bess musket – India pattern I presume – were issued.

Also I cannot agree with Duffys conclusion about the different calibres – as it is – at least clear for me – that at least within a regiment there was one – with the excption of the Jäger regiments where a proportion of Jäger were armed with a rifle.

The M 1808 had a single calibre – it escapes my immagination why they should be clumsy pieces. I read such arguments before about the Austrian musket, this did not prevent French units, especially in 1805 to discard their fusil d'infantry to exchange them against captured Austrian models.

What is a fine Brown Bess musket? It is nothing else than the India pattern – which could be easier mass produced for the mass armies and not the – in my opinion the more fine new land pattern musket.

As for the bayonet – or rather the charge with the bayonet, this is the usual philosophy shared by all generals to brake the stalemate created by the exchange of infantry fire, even Frederick advocated it – but had to paddle back after such victories like Prague.

I could provide statements – where Russian Jäger did not aim – and others where infantry under fire from Russian Jäger were so impressed that they thought they were sharpshooters.

Unfortunatly the uncritical use of statements such as Duffy or Wilson are used to stifle other opinons and seemingly new evidence which come to different conclusion compared to anglocentric literature.

Armies using different calibre muskets – like the Prussians in 1813 – caused crushing defeats to the French – like Groß Beeren, Dennewitz, Katzbach – so also this argument of a detrimental effect of calibres is overplayed for whatever reasons.

I agree that my statements are opinon based as well, but I won't ignore the few translations of Russian sources I fortunatley have at hand.

In case – to aquire a sound knowledge about Russian tactics and armament one would have to learn Russian and read numerous Russian books on that subject to be able to learn more than the usual sweeping coments.

Which I will, maybe starting next year, as might be living in Moscow full time. Foraging for players too…

From my repeated stays there, I feel Russians are often a bit nationalistic/ protective about their history – " performance(?)" or either deprecatory about it.
Not sure using the right words.
If I remember in Lieven " Russia against N" it says the 1813 armistice was used to replace muskets and put some kind of order in the mess. Won't look for right words- too lazy- but that was the idea.
Maybe it became a mess everywhere?
Up to what point do troops mould their own bullets and roll their own cardridges?
And it is obvious to have a cleared idea of things one needs to read Russian for them, German( and maybe Czech too?) etc. Not to rely on the ever repeated / copied stuff from the past. Italian memoirs any?

To be back in game terms: I would put Russian Musketry except for the good Jäger a bit lower, ( after all they still were obviously so in 1854!) if granulity of the system can, artillery too before 1809. That they improve with campaigns would not be surprising.
But again, in game terms it is comparative. How well did the non skirmisher French units fare at shooting in 1812-13?
We here had a thread from " Ivan" (?) who was also a well of knowledge on the period, showing the various possible qualities and origins of the Jäger rgts.
From what I read in Russia, corruption, sloppy jobs etc. did not help state procurement.
Thanks to the head of Frederick's secret cabinet to provide so much good infos, thanks for your efforts!

"Up to what point do troops mould their own bullets and roll their own cardridges?"

Rifled units aside, cartridges were usually manufactured by the artillery.

It Russians feel nationalistic – they are in the same boat as all other nations.

Why should Russian musketry be lower, any decent reason? Other than the entrenched believe in anglocentric history and the supremacy of the west?

From an Handbook for Austrian officers

"As soon as the soldier is seeing the enemy he wants to start to shoot being afraid that the other will overtake him in that and only few officers have the power to restrain their soldiers, or when they are able to do this they have not the knowledge about the shooting distance of the gun or to judge the distances. In case however the soldier is not lacking in cold blood and deliberation in a serious fire fight, and he is not acting as a machine, so alone because of the disorder and pushing for quickness, which is usual in a fire fight, is preventing to let him think about aiming. The experience teaches that the soldier is hardly listening at the commands of his officer in this critical moment and that every body as soon as he finished loading wants to shot. When one is closing the pan, the other is working with the ramrod, the third is making ready, the forth is arming and the fifth pulls the trigger. Is one taking into account the disorder which is caused by the falling of the dead, and the retreat of the wounded, as the quite dense smoke of powder which is enveloping the men, so it is impossible to expect that a sure shot can happen. Yes, even the best Jäger (marksmen, sharp shooters expert to hit with a shot, so to speak Hessian, Austrian, Prussian Jäger units) as soon as they would have to fire in rank and file, they would not hit better by the ruling constriction and disorder than the usual line infantry man."

Consequences, as long as fighting in rank and file it doesn't matter what kind of muskets are used neither the training of the soldier, different for skirmishers though.

I have always seen game rules (Empire)cutting down Russian musketry a grade and their artillery has their own tables. Butnever did the downgrade for infantry as I play solo and don't want a lopsided game. Artillery doesn't bother me as the Russians have so much more of it.

In, "Tactics of the Russian Army…," the Zhmodikovs discuss the training and doctrinal issues underlying Russian infantry's firing performance in the field, through the Friedland campaign. It seems reasonable to mark the line infantry down a bit. From 1812 forward, I am unaware of any justification for treating them any differently than the French. There is anecdotal evidence to show that different regiments of Jagers, for example, could perform with widely varying degrees of skill, but I haven't seen any indication yet that would point to the French units in 1812 and on not suffering from the same disparities.

I would also be tempted to rate Russian Jagers in the pre-1812 period as poorer in shooting, and more vulnerable to enemy fire (I'm not sure how you would do this in our typical 28-36 figure battalion games, but…) However, taking a look through Mikaberidze's "Eyewitness Accounts…1807," there are examples of Jagers performing quite well, thank you, in woods and towns (their primary function (Zhm)). So, even then to portray them accurately is not at all as simple as -1 on a D6.

I believe the musket and powder issues to be canards.

@von Winterfeldt.
Thank you for your comments.
You seem to accept, perhaps rather uncritically, the opinions voiced in Russian documents, whilst dismissing as "anglocentric history" the opinions of someone like Wilson (who was actually there, was an admirer of the Russian army and was a trained military observer) and Duffy, a renowned military historian, with the grace to admit when he got it wrong. I note that the list you gave has a number of units with "no details", suggesting that there may have been a significant number of infantry units who had a mix of weapons, not all of which were as effective as the Brown Bess and 1808 pattern.
Personally, I would be a little wary of relying on some Russian sources. It is a fact that, particularly during and after WW2 the Stalinist state was at pains to use the 1812 campaign as an inspiring example of Russia at its most glorious, resisting the invading western hordes,which were, once more, in the shape of Nazi Germany, threatening the Motherland.
Given the wholesale purges of personnel from Soviet military and academic circles which took place in the 1930s to 1950s, it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that documentary sources, which presented the Russian contribution to the Napoleonic Wars as anything other than glorious and efficient, were purged in a similarly ruthless manner. There would certainly have been great incentives for surviving academics, archivists etc to support the Party line, even if it meant compromising academic integrity.
As I wrote at the beginnig of my last piece " I would never claim expertise in this field", but I do feel there may be some validity in downgrading Russian musketry (in relation to that of the French) up to the second half of 1812, but I will happily play rules which treat all armies the same and those which attempt to be more "realistic" by taking account of " national characteristics". My main Napoleonic wargaming army is, as it has been for 45 years, a Russian one and, win or lose, I enjoy playing with it. At the end if the day, that is the most important issue.

"Winterfeld"
Nowadays most europeans at least show very little nationalism and even less in academics.
And you are right, why if we don't get decent proof, would globally a Russian line of 500 shoot significanly worse than a line of Württemburgers?
If not significant, it be best off game rules.

I remember a looong time ago a telephone conversation with a renowned rules author, asking why this unit or this one was better, ending stating that maybe if they had a few good dice, and wrote memoirs!
Musketry efficiency might have more to do with troops morale and control, the best being less nervous and more say at it properly.
A bit like it is commonly admitted for the ACW.

"…Musketry efficiency might have more to do with troops morale and control," I would venture to guess that those factors would more than counterbalance any deficiencies in live fire training. (At least for this period).

For an excellent view of Russian tactics and problems of the period, including artillery, I would highly recommend the Zhmodikovs' The Tactics of the Russian Army in the Napoleonic Wars, two volumes, The Naafziger Collection, West Chester Ohio, 2003.

The Russian artillery had quite a few problems and had to play catchup to the French which they themselves recognized after their failures in 1805-1807. They worked hard to improve their artillery arm and progressed well through 1814.

Wilson makes some interesting comments on the lack of education of the Russian officer corps, as did Langeron as well as Mikaberidze in his book on the Russian officer corps.

Artillery and engineer officers need a good education in order to be effective, and in that category, the Russians had a ways to go during the period.

"Musketry efficiency might have more to do with troops morale and control, the best being less nervous and more say at it properly.
A bit like it is commonly admitted for the ACW."

I am not disagreeing

In the thread about Leggiere there is a link to a lecture he gave when promoting his Russia book. One of the small take-aways from that is that Russian cartridge paper was much thicker than that of other nations, leading to reduced accuracy. I'm no musketry expert, but that sound plausible.

thicker cartridge paper could increase accurary – by reducing windage – so not plausible at all for me.

Tighter fit is better and should it make a higher velocity.

Agreed with vonW and 14Bore.

My mistake the lecture was by Leiven not Leggiere.

Brechtel198 wrote:
"Wilson makes some interesting comments on the lack of education of the Russian officer corps, as did Langeron as well as Mikaberidze in his book on the Russian officer corps."

Actually, Wilson says the following:
"The artillery-men are of the best description, and the non-coomissioned officers equal, but the artillery officers of inferior rank have not the same title to estimation as in the other European services, for their education is not formed with the same care, and their service does not receive the same encouragement."

Wilson, R., Brief Remarks on the Character and Composition of the Russian Army and a Sketch of the Campaigns in Poland in the Years 1806 and 1807, London, 1810, p. 22.

So, he doesn't say "lack of education", he says that the Russian artillery officers were educated, but not to the same high level as the European artillery officers were. But he is not a good expert, since he was not an artillery officer, and he didn't know the Russian language.

Langeron wrote about low level of education among the Russian officers on the average and in general. His comments on the typical Russian officer careers clearly show that he means the infantry and cavalry officers (joined either a regiment or the retunue of a general commanding a field army). Concerning the Russian artillery at Austerlitz Langeron wrote:

"Dans cette malheureuse journée, l'artillerie russe se distingua par sa bravoure et son adresse dans le tir, et se montra supérieure à l'artillerie française, qui était loin d'être alors au point de perfection où elle était avant la Révolution. Tous les anciens officiers d'artillerie avaient émigré, avaient été tués ou avancés, et on ne pouvait en former de nouveaux."

"Mémoires du comte de Langeron. Austerlitz (2 décembre 1805)." // Nouvelle revue rétrospective. Deuxième semestre (Janvier-Juin 1895). Paris, 1895, p. 312-313.

My translation:
"In that unhappy day, the Russian artillery distinguished itself with their bravery and their skill in firing, and proved itself superior over the French artillery, which was far below the state of perfection in which it was before the revolution. All old artillery officers either emigrated, either were killed, or were promoted, and they had been unable to form new ones."

I think that Langeron is also not a good expert, since he served in infantry before he was promoted general, though in 1805 and later he commanded various columns or corps, which included artillery. And he had learned the Russian language in the 1790s.

That adds up, I think, to a less well-educated officer and Duffy and Keep also make the comment on the overall education of the Russian officer corps, if I remember correctly.

The bottom line is that they did not have the level of education regarding artillery, et al, that the French, British, and Austrian artillery officers did.

And Langeron in this case is mistaken if he is referring to the French artillery in 1805. The Russians didn't do too well at Austerlitz and they lost over 100 guns.

Brechtel198 wrote:
"That adds up, I think, to a less well-educated officer and Duffy and Keep also make the comment on the overall education of the Russian officer corps, if I remember correctly."

I think that the overall education of the Russian officer corps has no direct relation to the education of the Russian artillery officers.

"The bottom line is that they did not have the level of education regarding artillery, et al, that the French, British, and Austrian artillery officers did."

It is possible that the Russian artillery officers did not have the same level of education regarding artillery as the European artillery officers did, as Wilson says. But to say that the Russian artillery officers had no education regarding artillery at all is not correct. As far as I know, no English-speaking historian had either studied the question seriously enough or cited any modern Russian-language studies on the subject.

"And Langeron in this case is mistaken if he is referring to the French artillery in 1805. The Russians didn't do too well at Austerlitz and they lost over 100 guns."

The Russians lost 130 guns at Austerlitz not because the Russian artillerists didn't do too well, but because the Russian infantry and cavalry didn't cooperate well with the artillery. Langeron speaks only about bravery and skill in firing of the Russian artillerists (sa bravoure et son adresse dans le tir). He also says that Lieutenant-Colonel Ermolov, the commander of a horse artillery company, covered retreat of some Russian cavalry with good mind and bravery, and that he lost 9 guns out of 12, but with honor. He also says that two battery (heavy) companies (24 guns) under Count Siewers repulsed an attack of a large French cavalry mass at General Buxhowden's troops, and that these artillery companies maneuvered like at exercises (manoeuvraient comme à l'exercice).

But to say that the Russian artillery officers had no education regarding artillery at all is not correct.

I didn't say that. The term I used was 'a lack of education.' That isn't the same thing.

Didn't you write in your book on Russian tactics that there was no formal artillery education in the Russian army for the years 1800-1808 because artillery training was abolished in the relevant Cadet Corps? That denotes a lack of education, does it not.

And, again, both Keep and Duffy remark on the lack of general education of Russian officers before the Napoleonic period.

And I do believe that the first permanent Russian artillery school dates from 1821.

Artillery and engineer officers need a thorough specialized education. The French developed the first military technical schools, the first being established in 1679. The British and the Austrians developed their schools at Woolwich and Budweis based on the French model. Gribeauval overhauled the French artillery schools in the 1760s and began artillery schools for the arm's NCOs.

What was the Russian equivalent?

Losing 130 guns does not speak well overall for the Russian artillery arm in 1805. And the Russian artillery reforms for the period were initiated by Arakcheev which resulted in the 1805 artillery system, which basically copied what the Austrians had.

I would rate the Russian artillery arm the most improved during the period, but they had myriad problems prior to 1807 and were only beginning to improve in the area of command and control, which was critical in employing large numbers of guns. And Russian artillery commanders used artillery defensively, not offensively as the French did.

Losing 130 guns does not speak well overall for the Russian artillery arm in 1805.

Whatever one may think of the overall Russian artillery performance, this is illogical. One may as well conclude that the French artillery arm was grossly inferior to the Allies because of the number of guns it lost after Waterloo, for example (c.130 on the battlefield, 203 for the campaign to the Sambre), or during the 1812-14 campaigns. Artillery losses in this era are a consequence of overall defeat, not the inferiority of tha particular arm.

indeed very poor logic.

Artillery losses may be also due how artillery is used in the first case, now when you have battalion guns – they are more prone to be taken when the infantry is defeated – because they are stuck out in the front, then instead position artillery.

Another old pet subject – creeping up in a eternal circles over the years, a search on the archives might help, it is deja vu all over.

If you combine the losses at Austerlitz with a deficiency in skill level and employment, then it does not speak well of the Russian artillery arm. And they usually employed more artillery than the French did and employed it with less skill.

They did improve after 1807 when the actually took the lessons they had learned to heart and began to study the problems and search for solutions.

If you combine the losses at Austerlitz with a deficiency in skill level and employment, then it does not speak well of the Russian artillery arm.

Okay Kevin, have it your way. The awesome losses of the French artillery arm from 1812-15 prove how rubbish they were. The negligible losses of the British artillery arm from 1808-1815 prove that they, not the much vaunted French, were by far the superior artillerists of the age. Along with the Portuguese.

Or you could just admit that you are wrong and that artillery losses prove nothing for or against the competence of the artillerymen in a given army.

One aspect of the respective artillery arms you are overlooking is that the French were willing to lose artillery to gain an advantage on the battlefield.

The Russians were not.

And since you have admitted that you haven't read the references posted perhaps you should rethink your position instead of making silly comments.

insteadmof bricole dogma – here what I pasted and copied on "discussions" ages ago on TMP – so it starts in German – most of the text is in English

"Der Russische Soldat im Felde 1806.

Zu Beginn des Jahres 1806 erstatteten mehrere preußische Offiziere Berichte über russische Truppen, denen sie bei ihrem Durchmarsch durch preußisches Gebiet als Kolonnenführer beigegeben gewesen waren.

„Stabscapitain v. Kyckpusch schreibt :

Fußartillerie. Die Vorzüge der Russischen Artillerie sind: 1. dass sie ganz vortrefflich gedrungene, nicht zu große Pferde hat, welche sehr gut und reichlich gefüttert werden. Auch scheint die Art Anspannens, welche von unserer Art wesentlich abweicht, sehr gut; das Sielenzeug ist vortrefflich.

2. Sind die Canoniers ein sehr robuster, starker, ziemlich großer junger vortrefflicher Schlag Leute und sie scheinen wie in der französischen Armee den Kern derselben auszumachen, und von den einzustellenden Recruten des Gouvernements werden die vorzüglichsten für die Artillerie ausgewählt.

3. Haben sie gar keine Knechte, sondern der Chef der Compagnie sucht diejenigen Canoniers aus, welche am besten fahren und am besten mit Pferden umzugehen verstehen, und diese fahren Canons und Vorrathswagen. Diese Einrichtung scheint unendlich vorteilhaft zu sein, denn wie schwer hält es, zumal bei schnellen Märschen und rasch ausbrechenden Kriegen, die Knechte gehörig zu dressieren und die Manöver der Batterie beizubringen. Auch sind die Knechte nicht so discipliniert wie die Canoniers, jagen vielleicht gar des Feuers ungewöhnt davon.

4. Wird eine Batterie von einer Compagnie bedient, welche also nie zerissen wird. Officiers und Leute kennen sich schon genau in Friedenszeiten. In Friedenszeiten bleiben sämtliche Canons, Einhörner und ein Pulverkarren bespannt, sodaß eine schwere Batterie 121 Pferde und eine 6 pfündige Batterie ungefähr 80 Pferde auch in Friedenszeiten behält. Auch ist dies ein sehr großer Vorzug, jedoch sehr kostspielig.

Die Lafetten sind von sehr guten Holz gebaut, sind leicht und hellgrün angestrichen. Das Metall zu deren Geschützen ist sehr schön.

Die Russen haben gar keine Regts. Artilleristen. Wird ein Inf. Bat. Detachiert, so bekommt es einige leichte Piecen von einer 6 pfündigen Batterie unter Commando eines Artillerie-Officiers mit, im Fall, wenn man nämlich glaubt, dass es dem bedürftig ist. Die leichten Einhörner (3 pfündige Haubitzen) werden von deren Batterie zu deren Jäger – Regt. detachiert.
(…)
Reitende Artillerie. Jede Compagnie bedient 12 Canons. Die Canons sind leichte 6 pfünder, jedes hat 2 Pulverkarren mit 3 Pferden bespannt. Die Kanone selbst ist nur mit 4 Pferden bespannt, welches für reitende Artillerie zu wenig scheint. Die Zugpferde sind klein und gedrungen. Die Pferde, worauf die Artilleristen reiten, sind groß. Auch hier fahren Artilleristen, und sind keine Knechte da.

Das Kasket, Heft 5, 6, 7, Jahrgang 1925

Kevin,
You wrote:
"I'm sure the Russians are going to put in writing that they can't hit a bull in the butt with a bass fiddle when it comes to artillery and let everyone else know about it. The Russian armed forces, as well as their governments, are traditionally that open-handed about their internal problems. Russia has always been an open book to the West."
There is a lot of military history literature in Russian. Anyone can learn the Russian language, and now anyone can visit the main Russian libraries or order photocopies from them and read about anything he wishes. I understand that it is not easy, but it is possible.
You wrote:
"Officer education was lacking, and both French emigre General Langeron and Sir Robert Wilson agreed on that point."
Both these gentlemen wrote about the Russian officers in general, not specifically about the artillery officers. And both these gentlemen were quite ingnorant in artillery: in 1796, when he was writing his notes on the Russian army, Langeron commanded an infantry regiment – Malorossiskii (Little Russia) Grenadier Regiment. Any nobleman who was able to read and write in Russian could become an infantry or cavalry officer in the Russian army after a short period of service as a NCO. But to become an artillery officer in was necessary to pass an exam at the special commission later called the Artillery Committee. Most commanders of artillery companies in 1805-1814 were graduated from the Land Cadet Corps (later called the First Cadet Corps) or Artillery and Engineer Cadet Corps (later called the Second Cadet Corps), and many of them were among the best cadets.
You wrote:
"Realistic artillery training was almost nonexistent at the beginning of the period"
What do you mean under the term "realistic artillery training"? Paul I organized intensive training in firing, and Alexander I continued it. The Russian artillerymen were not well trained in tactics and maneuvers, and many of them had no experience of battle before 1805, but they were trained in firing well enough. The organization at higher levels was still inadequate in 1805, but it was significantly improved by 1812.
You wrote:
"Russian gunnery has never been known for its accuracy, but it has been known for its mass. For example, the Russians massed at least 170 guns against Augereau's VII Corps at Eylau. Their bombardment of Soult's IV Corps caused casualties mainly because there was so much of it. Boulart, a Guard artilleryman, mentions the inaccuracy of Russian artillery fire."
Maybe you will be surprised, but there are several comments of Russian officers on the inaccuracy of the French artillery fire (cannonballs flew high, shells exploded high in the air or did not explode at all). At the same time there are comments of other officers on high effectiveness of the French artillery fire. Such comments are not more than subjective impressions from personal experience in various circumstances.
Best wishes,
ALexander

Brechtel wrote:
"Langeron and Wilson both remarked that the Russian officers, especially the artillery officers, were not well educated."
Well, …. not so much.
Let's look at what they said, and about what they were speaking.
Wilson's entire "critique" of Russian artillery officer education is found in the following, written in 1807 :
"The Russian artillery is of the most powerful description. No other army moves with so many guns, and with no other army is it in a better state of equipment, or is more gallantly served. The piece is well formed, and the carraige solid, without being heavy. The harness and rope-tackling is of the best quality for service. …. The artillery-men are of the best description, and the non-commissioned offices equal, but the artillery officiers of inferior rank have not the same title to estimation as in other European services, for their education is not formed with the same care, and their service does not receive the same encouragement. To them is toil and responsibility, but the honour is by no means assured them. Some favorite officer, completely ignorant of the science and practise of the artillery, is frequently in the day of action appointed for the day to command the batteries, and the credit is in the dispatches given to him. …. The horse artillery is no less well appointed, and the mounted detachments that accompany the guns ride excellent powerful horses, and form both in real character and appearance, a corps not inferior to any in the European services."
Comments :
(i) Wilson was not an atillery officer
(ii) Wilson had little/no idea about the training curriculum for Russian artillery officers
(iii) His comment is mostly that the artillery officers are not held in a high regard as an "elite" branch of service in the Russian army and that there are not senior officers of artillery in tactical control during battles. However ….
-- The reforms of Graf Arakcheev from 1805 included the granting of an elite status to artillery officers, up to colonel, – one step higher in seniority than regular Army officers in both military and nobilary rank. For example, the artillery company commander billet was changed from captain to lieutenant colonel, and this officer would have the seniority as a ful colonel in the Army infantry. This reform coincided with a greater effort to promote non-noble artillery enlisted personnel and other technical government employees to officer candidate rank, based on superior scores in entrance examinations for thier admittance into the various "Cadet Corps" as higher Russian military academies were then called.
-- As part of the same reforms, the prior artillery regiments were re-formed into brigades permanently attached to Infantry divisions, but with all the guns under the control of senior artillery officers (really quite the same as the French system). Later, this system was expanded to include reserve and replacement brigades attached at the Army (and occassionally the Corps) level of command.
(iv) Whether or not one will take Wilson as an informed and accurate source, in is extremely brief little comment, for an overal impression of the Russian artillery education, one must note ….
-- The comments support a overall positive view of the Russian artillery arm in comparison to that of other nations
-- The comments have nothign to do with the period 1808-1815.
Langeron's "critique" of the Russian artillery is even more off-point to a discussion of the Napoleonic era. I believe that Brechtel is relying pon this passage from the work of the Zhmodikov's:
"A serving officer in the Russian service, the French emigre Langeron wrote that most officers were not well educated and trained and that the three cadet corps were too small to provide the number of junior officers needed for the army. He also mentioned in the 1790s that Russian artillery pieces were too heavy and that the artillerymen were not well-trained in aimed fire, but could shoot rapidly."
Comments :
(i) Actually only the first sentence of the above is from Langeron. The second sentence is actually from Kosciusko. Both pertain to the late 1780's and early 1790's.
(ii) Langeron was actually full of praise for the Russian artillery in his "Memoires de Langeron, general d'infanterie dans l'armee russe. Campagnes de 1812, 1813, 1814". A sample follows, describig the artillery of his corps in 1813 (my translation) :
"General Blücher always gave me evidence of his satisfaction with the material perfection of my artillery and the intrepidy of the artillerists. Never did they show a more brilliant bravery and such great talent than on that memorable day [at Leipsig]. The company commanders [named] acquired the most justly deserved right to the greatest praise in my view. General Veszeliski (who throughout the campaign had commanded my artillery and whose zeal and care had contributed so effectively to bringing it to a state of perfection), despite substantial losses that had been suffered, merits also the same praises for his personnel courage and his talent in placing the batteries. During the four days of the battle of Leipsig, my 175 canons had fired 12,500 rounds and I had lost 400 artillery horses."
Brechtel, I fear you are not too well informed about Russian artillery. I suppose the language barrier is a problem.

I am gald you think Langeron is such a good source for the Russian artillery. Unlike Wilson, he did have ong active service in the Russian Army. You would do well to understand when he speaks of the problems of ca. 1790 and compare this to his priase of the Russian artillery in 1812-1815. But, somehow I think you will continue to cherry pick his comments, providing others with a confused view that the issues of 1790 had not be remedied at all in the next 25 years.

Seroga
"The Prussian, Russian, and Austrian gun carriages were an older design, as was the rechtsmachine they all used."
- The Russians tested the French style elevating system and decided it was not robust and reliable enough. Similar to the question of metal axles, which were are tested and found lacking, I believe the Russians were more concerned about field repairability and operations in extreme cold temperature than were the French.
- The Russians made redesigns of the carriages from 1796 and again from 1805. The latter was fully in use for 1810-1815. They were thus not "older" than the French. As the were lighter than the French carriages, more standardized and exceedingly reliable, I do not know how one could think of them as not as useful, unless one just assumes "French=Better" and does not care to look further.
"Further, French gun sights were simpler, easier to use, and remained on the gun tube during firing."
- Russian guns 1810-1815 were equipped with 2 sights : a basic one that could remain on the gun when firing (essentially the same as the French, and in use since before 1800), the other for high-accuracy shots (introduced after 1807, it compensated for un-level ground beneath the piece). You could adapt from one to the other in about 90 seconds (3 rather large screws were used to bolt on the base of the more accurate sight – the mobile part of which was removed for firing). Both sights were stored in little compartments in the brackets of the carriage. You can tell pieces adapted for the pair of sights because the top the cascabel has been flattened to receive the bases of the sites and there are the three rather large screw holes above that flattened area, in back of the breech ring.
Seroga
"A lack of Russian artillery generals was also a problem"
- There were about 60 billets for Russian general officers of artillery during the period 1812-1815. This corresponded to, in essence, 1 general officer for each brigade of Guard Artillery (2), Army Field Artillery (27), Reserve Field Artillery (10), Replacment Field Artillery (4) – a total of 43 artillery brigades – plus additional general officers for Seige artillery, major artillery Manufactures and Arsenals, serving on higher level staffs (Corps, Army, the Emperor's Suite), and the war Ministry.
- It is sometimes confusing since most of these general officer billets were ranked for colonels of artillery until 1811 (then with nobilary Class V, as per major generals in the Army infantry and cavalry) and then re-designated for major generals (still class V nobilary rank). So, if you look at the pre-war list of "artillery generals" it will be smaller. However, since 1807, the personal authority of these colonels had been expanded to be much the same as a French général de brigade d'artillerie, and the changes in 1811 were in some sense no more than administrative in nature.
See : history.scps.ru/cadet/061.htm and history.scps.ru/cadet/062.htm
- Looking at the État militarie d'artillerie for 1811, I see for the French a total of 24 actual active billets for généraux d'artillerie (page 52), and in the état nominatif (from page 91), a total of 31 general officers (including some in non-activité, some on assignment outside of the artillery, etc.).
- I do not undestand how the lack of general officers of artillerie could be a problem for the Russians when they had roughly 3 times as many such oficers as had the French.
I think we could all agree that the French of 1805 were in some ways superior to their opponents, whom they defeated. However, it is hard to argue with reference to facts about their continued superiority in 1812, when the French army was destroyed by the Russians.
Seroga
19 Feb 2013 4:34 a.m. PST

Dr. Summerfield,
I think we are most interested in the senior years' classes in the Cadet Corps, especially the 2nd Cadet Corps, which accounted for about 70% of the cadet corps graduates that entered the artillery. The senior classes were 3 years of study, commencing upon successful examination and personal reccomedations, beginning at age 17, 18 or 19. Some students had been either 2 or 4 years in junior classes at these schools. Others entered only for the senior years.
The senior years' course of study was 12 months per year, 6 days per week and 12 hours per day. Of the 12 hours, 8 were devoted to academic study and 4 to military drill and practice. After Divine Serivces, the cadets were given "free time" on Sundays. The classes were small, typically about 8 cadets in each, to allow personal attention to each student. Note that the cadet graduate needed also to serve for 2 years as a non-commissioned officer before gaining his officers' commission.
For the academic instruction's details, I found a beakdown of the curriculum from after the peace, but it seems representative. For the 3 years of higher education :
-- religion : 3 units
-- French : 7 units
-- German : 7 units
-- Russian language & literature : 7 units
-- mathematics : 9 units
-- physical science : 6 units
-- geography & statistics : 6 units
-- political history : 9 units
-- law & jurisprudence : 3 units
-- engineering drawing : 3 units
-- military science & theory : 15 units
Total : 76 units
The textbooks were usually in their original language, so that in the "Fortifications" unit, the students were required to read Vauban in German. The "Artillery Practise" textbook from 1806 was actually as compilation of design information from Graf Arakcheev's design team, numerical look-up tables tables, and practical notes from recent battlefield experience.
Of course, there was also the addtional 4 hours/day of practical military activities while in school, not to mention the 2 years' service as an artillery NCO, and then passing the commissioning examination with the Artillery Committee.
Overall, the whole thing looks alot like the course of study at the US Military Academy at West Point, where the specific unit to which the students are assigned is also called the Corps of Cadets.
The AIShKK/2nd KK sent an average of about 55 graduates/year to the artillery and engineers over the years 1797-1825. The peak years were 1811 and 1812 with 75-80 graduates to the artillery and engineers, when selected students were graduated 1 year early. Because of this, there were no graduates in 1813. The other Cadet Coprs sent and average of about 25 graduates/year inot hte atillery and engineers.
Counting graduates of the other Cadet Corps, at the beginning of 1812 some artillery brigades had only about 55% of their officers having graduated from a Cadet Corps (incidentally, this included the Guard brigades). In some brigades, all the officers were Cadet Corps graduates. Overall, about 75% of artillery officers were Cadet Corps graduates. The remaining 25% were composed mostly of long-service officers that gained their commissions before the reign of Emperor Pavel and the wave of artillery reform in 1797 plus a tranche of long-service non-noble NCO's that had been granted commissions (and hence personal nobility) in the years 1808-1811.
history.scps.ru/cadet/04.htm
history.scps.ru/cadet/063.htm

Zhmodikov

According to the recommendations of theorists, artillerists moved their pieces when they were under heavy enemy fire, Radzhitskii writes, in his memoirs, that in the combat of Ostrovno (13 / 25 July 1812) he started a firefight against three enemy pieces with two guns, and managed to destroy one of the enemy guns. When he noticed that enemy cannonballs fell close to his guns and one of them killed one of his artillerists, he moved his guns a bit forward (he says ten pages, but it seems to be too short), and then most enemy cannon balls flew over their heads. Cdxc"
Z. p.74
Upon an agreement with the commanding officer of the regiment, they moved together about 70 sazhen (about 140 m) forward and he fired canister at the enemy cavalry, which stopped, to the Russian' surprise. Meshetich writes that, because of the cavalry was no longer threatening them he chose to save his canister and, in order to save the infantry from further casualties, shifted his fire to the French artillery, firing round shot. In addition, he states that his foreward movement confused the French artillery and because thy had shifted positions, the French artillery fire flew above them. Cdxci
Z. p. 74

Hope that helps

One aspect of the respective artillery arms you are overlooking is that the French were willing to lose artillery to gain an advantage on the battlefield.

The Russians were not.

French losses prove their competence, Russian losses prove their incompetence? Wow, you really bring bias to a whole new level…

And since you have admitted that you haven't read the references posted perhaps you should rethink your position instead of making silly comments.

Only one person round here has been shown, yet again, to be making the silly, absurd claims – you. Sigh.

Brechtel198 wrote:

I didn't say that. The term I used was 'a lack of education.' That isn't the same thing.

You referred to Wilson. Wilson speaks of the Russian artillery officers. Do you mean any other Wilson's words?

Didn't you write in your book on Russian tactics that there was no formal artillery education in the Russian army for the years 1800-1808 because artillery training was abolished in the relevant Cadet Corps? That denotes a lack of education, does it not.

In my 2003 book I wrote the following:

Paul reorganized the Artillery and Engineer Cadet Corps into the Second Cadet Corps, which now gave no special artillery education, its program of education became similar to that of the Land Cadet Corps (renamed into the First Cadet Corps).

and:

The military educational establishments in 1800-08 did not provide any special artillery training.

Such was my opinion then, but I gave no reference, I didn't know of any special studies on the subject, and I had not studied the subject myself. It is possible that my statement was too categorical. But anyway, many artillery generals and company commanders in 1805-1814 graduated from the Artillery and Engineer Cadet Corps before Paul renamed it into the Second Cadet Corps in 1800.

And, again, both Keep and Duffy remark on the lack of general education of Russian officers before the Napoleonic period.

I read Duffy's books, but haven't read Keep. I know that there is evidence that the Russian officers in the line infantry and cavalry regiments were not well educated in general, but I think that this has no relation to the level of education of the Russian artillery officers. The author of one study says that by 1812 about 60% of Russian artillery officers had got military education, while among the Russian infantry and cavalry officers only about 25% and 11% respectively had got any military education.

Tselorungo, D. G., "Military Educational Institutions of Russia and Level of Education of the Russian Officer Corps in the Epoch of 1812 Patriotic War." // 1812 Patriotic War. Abstracts of the Conference. Borodino, 1991, p. 44-46.

PDF link

And I do believe that the first permanent Russian artillery school dates from 1821.
Artillery and engineer officers need a thorough specialized education. The French developed the first military technical schools, the first being established in 1679. The British and the Austrians developed their schools at Woolwich and Budweis based on the French model. Gribeauval overhauled the French artillery schools in the 1760s and began artillery schools for the arm's NCOs.
What was the Russian equivalent?

The first Russian military technical school was established in 1701 by Tsar Peter I in Moscow. The first special artillery school was established in 1712. Two other artillery schools were established in 1721 and 1735 in St. Petersburg. The St. Petersburg Artillery School and St. Petersburg Engineer School were merged together in 1758 by Count Shuvalov and called the Artillery and Engineer School. In 1762 the School was renamed as the Artillery and Engineer Cadet Corps, with its "seniority" since 1712.

Losing 130 guns does not speak well overall for the Russian artillery arm in 1805.

I think that losing 130 guns speaks almost nothing about the Russian artillery arm in 1805. There were much more important reasons. The artillery horses were exhausted by long marches from Russia to Austria, the weather was bad. The Russian infantry and cavalry didn't protect the artillery, the army was defeated. By the way, in 1812 Napoleon lost about 120 guns at Krasny and about 200 on the Berezina.

And the Russian artillery reforms for the period were initiated by Arakcheev which resulted in the 1805 artillery system, which basically copied what the Austrians had.

I see significant differences in design and dimensions of the Russian and Austrian guns. In that period, the Russian army was much more influenced by various Prussian things than by the Austrian ones. But the Prussian guns were much heavier than the Russian 1805 guns.

I would rate the Russian artillery arm the most improved during the period, but they had myriad problems prior to 1807 and were only beginning to improve in the area of command and control, which was critical in employing large numbers of guns.

I agree that the organization and control at higher levels was the main problem of the Russian artillery up to 1812 and even later.

And Russian artillery commanders used artillery defensively, not offensively as the French did.

I think that the offensive use wasn't the main advantage of the French artillery, and that the defensive use wasn't the main problem of the Russian artillery. I have studied the use of the French and Russian artillery more thoroughly and hope to write about it in English with more details than in my 2003 book.

As I'm working on my Russian artillery just being a fly on the wall. Please continue gentleman.

Hm – what about the French – those superbly and schooled gunners in contrast to all those poor rest of the world?

"Le premier inspecteur avait remis au ministre, en 1801, un mémoire sur la situation de l'artillerie, où il montrait la nécessité d'une réforme :
« Le corps de l'artillerie renferme aujourd'hui, disait-il, les éléments le plus contraires. Il possède tous les moyens de prospérité comme aussi tous les germes de destruction. Malheureusement, ceux-ci sont les plus nombreux, et, si le gouvernement ne se hâte d'y apporter remède, le corps de l'artillerie, qui a déjà beaucoup déchu, tombera dans une entière décadence.
Les régiments d'artillerie ont été disséminés pendent le temps de la guerre ; en conséquence, l'instruction s'est perdue. (…) sur 1408 officiers, 375 seulement sortent de l'école et 1033 de sous-officiers. »
(…)
Apres avoir fait les calculs les plus rigoureux sur le personnel du corps, il est démontré que, sur 57 chefs de brigade, il en existe 15 mauvais ; que sur 87 chefs de bataillon, il en existe 27 mauvais, et qu'enfin sur 948 capitaines ou lieutenants sortis des sous-officiers, 208 doivent être placés ailleurs. »

Alombert & Colin, volume I, p. 188 – 189
"

French losses prove their competence, Russian losses prove their incompetence? Wow, you really bring bias to a whole new level…

There is a great difference between being 'risking loss to gain an advantage' that just the term 'losses.'

Misrepresenting what someone else has said for your own benefit is, at best, intellectually dishonest. Your 'interpretation' is selective to say the least. And if you wish to talk of bias, I suggest you be somewhat introspective.

Kevin,

The only intellectual dishonesty, yet again, is your own. You wrote:

Losing 130 guns does not speak well overall for the Russian artillery arm in 1805.

You were called out on this and now you are trying to make the case that French losses were as a result of "risking losses to gain advantage" but Russian losses show their incompetence.

Misrepresenting what someone else has said for your own benefit is, at best, intellectually dishonest. Your 'interpretation' is selective to say the least. And if you wish to talk of bias, I suggest you be somewhat introspective.

Again, it is you who have been caught out misrepresenting, in intellectually dishonesty, being selective and biased. This waffle above won't distract anyone from this fact. I find it hilarious that your own bias and illogic undermines your own positions more thoroughly than any opponent could. You have entirely discredited Colonel Elting and the entire French artillery by your own words in the last fortnight!

"Again, it is you who have been caught out misrepresenting, in intellectually dishonesty, being selective and biased. This waffle above won't distract anyone from this fact. I find it hilarious that your own bias and illogic undermines your own positions more thoroughly than any opponent could. You have entirely discredited Colonel Elting and the entire French artillery by your own words in the last fortnight!"

Fully agree on that.