"Duration of Fire Fights" Topic

Assuming you have a situation where you have two reasonably matched battalions, How long did they blast away at each other before the issue was decided? Long range (say 100yrds or greater) and short range (say 40 to 60 yards)

There are examples such as Auerstadt where the Prussian IR59 was involved in a 3-hour exchange of 'battle fire' (individual not volley fire) with French infantry. British infantry on the other hand normally waited and then fired a volley (or perhaps two) at as little as 20 or 30 paces and then charged, a prolonged firefight being seen as very unusual.

So anything between less-than-a-minute and a-few-hours (which probably isn't a very helpful answer).

I would suggest the Infantry Tactics section of Battle Tactics Of Napoleon And His Enemies by Brent Nosworthy if you want to get a feel for this period.

link

Nosworthy is not the best reference for tactics and techniques of the period. There are too many errors and wrong assumptions in the book to make it useful.

George Nafziger's is much more accurate and useful and makes much more sense.

Robert Quimby's The Background of Napoleonic Warfare is also an excellent reference and has an outstanding chapter on period tactics at the end of the book.

For background to the period, Christopher Duffy's The Military Experience in the Age of Reason clearly demonstrates the development of tactical theory before the French reform period (1763-1789) which was more extensive than the highly-touted Prussian reform period of 1807-1813.

Finally, there are two excellent chapters on tactics in Swords Around A Throne by John Elting which gives an accurate picture of how the armies fought during the period (II and XXVI).

I think a little common sense applied suggests that units couldn't fire at each other continually at short range for extended periods. I suspect historical examples of such are not cases where there was full, steady volley fire happening for hours on end.

As an aside, The Military Experience in the Age of Reason is a great book, providing a different kind of perspective on the period (18th century, not Nap). Duffy's best book, imo.

The question was about how long firefights lasted, not where to find background on the period.

Long firefights were not something desired by any of the combatants. It simply resulted in both sides beating each.

The firefight at Albuera between the French V Corps and two British brigades lasted about an hour. The British eyewitnesses/officers were horrified by the pointless carnage. They commented that it wasn't the way to wage war.

That was the view of the Prussians at Jena and Auerstadt.
Even the SYW Prussians didn't see the firefight as the winning approach. It had to be coupled with an advance or you simply ended up with a standoff. All the firefights I have studied end when one side or the other charges or is outflanked by supports. The firefight itself doesn't decide the engagement

Even the SYW Prussians didn't see the firefight as the winning approach. It had to be coupled with an advance or you simply ended up with a standoff. All the firefights I have studied end when one side or the other charges or is outflanked by supports. The firefight itself doesn't decide the engagement

Agreed, that is my understanding (as a rule of thumb). A firefight, at some point, would give the moral ascendancy to one side, at which point it would advance and the enemy would break before bayonets crossed; at least that was the general way of it.

How long does it take to drain the will of the enemy? How long is a piece of string?

The question was about how long firefights lasted, not where to find background on the period.

A volume was brought up which is not a good reference and that should be commented on.

Is there a rule on the forum that supporting or related topics cannot be brought into a thread? If so, please point it out for all of us.

Could you elaborate as to why it's not a good reference-?

Even a three hour firefight (presumably at long range) would be constrained by the 40 cartridges that each soldier usually carried in their cartridge box.

An account of a Continental soldier involved in a two hour combat at Hubbardton saw him use up 20 cartridges.

Could you elaborate as to why it's not a good reference-?

It has been a long time since I have read it, but there were too many errors in fact in the volume and the conclusions reached were not always, in my opinion, either correct or logical.

And the invented term, 'impulse tactics', doesn't help lend the book credibility. The following are some of the errors in the text:

-defines a division in an infantry battalion as a ‘fraction of a battalion' when it was two companies which should be common knowledge.

-implies that infantry of the period fought without wearing their knapsacks when French infantry were trained to fight wearing theirs.

-identifies a unit which did not exist, `The French Cuirassiers d'Espagne' and states that they were armed with lances-both statements being incorrect.

-states that when Napoleon formed twelve of the heavy cavalry regiments into cuirassiers, there were only seven.

-states that French cuirassiers were only able to charge at the trot because they were ‘encumbered with their heavy appointments.'

-states that there were nine French horse artillery regiments of six companies each when there were six that averaged eight companies apiece, as of 1809, and this did not count the Guard Horse Artillery Regiment.

-tends to lump together the Valliere and Gribeauval artillery systems and does not demonstrate the great differences between the two.

-Does not understand the artillery's ability to inflict heavy losses, stating that an infantry battalion would inflict more casualties at close range than an artillery unit with the same frontage.

Does not understand the artillery doctrine of the period, used by the French, Austrians, and British, regarding counterbattery fire.

-states that artillery was ‘difficult to transport in the field' on campaign and in combat, which is definitely incorrect.

-states that French artillerymen ‘when hard-pressed' would abandon their pieces ‘with seeming unconcern' which is incorrect.

-states that carabiniers were armored in 1812, when it occurred in 1810.

-incorrectly names the elite company in a light infantry battalion after 1803 as ‘chasseurs a pied' when the light infantry elite companies were carabiniers and later voltigeurs.

-definies direct fire in artillery as `Any aimed fire where the target was beyond the second point blank primitive but still within the effective range of the piece.' All artillery fire of the period was direct fire in that the artillery target had to be seen to be engaged.

-stated that artillery `could defend itself by advancing its infantry supports in front of it.' Artillery defended itself with its guns.

-definies dragoons as ‘medium cavalry.' There were no ‘medium cavalry' in the period. In the French service, dragoons were ‘rated' as light cavalry, but were equipped as heavy cavalry and used as such.
-stated that ‘Dragoons were assigned the lion's share of housekeeping duties, such as outpost duties…' Light cavalry such as hussars and chasseurs a cheval were the usual units on outpost duties.

-defines a cavalry squadron as the organizational equivalent of an infantry company.

-definies the term ‘Voltigeur' as meaning ‘to flit about' when it means ‘vaulter.'

Having read your comments on the 'volume' I have decided to throw my copy in the bin.

Oh I would never do that. (Hence my overflowing bookshelves).

Nosworthy is entertaining, but Brechtel 198 has given an excellent critique here I also have Muir's "Tactics and Experience of Battle in the Age of Napoleon" which is again not beyond criticism, I even spotted a couple of howlers in Swords, one of the best books I have read in many a year!

But what book does not have errors?

I had better quickly exclude anything of a religious nature there!

I do agree that it is no harm to allow a thread to "develop". OK, we do not want to hijack the topic, but any conversation does "evolve"….that is the art of…….

As for blasting away at each other, often strikes me that some feature such as even a low wall, or just a hedge or ditch, although no real barrier or protection, could make quite a remarkable (psychological?) difference in steadying a defensive line.

There are always errors in books, historical or otherwise. However, the standard I try to use when evaluating source material is if it can be used as a source.

Both Swords and Rory Muir's books most certainly can. I do not believe that Nosworthy's can.

Regarding firefights, usually the side that is getting the worst of it will come apart, as the British did at Chippawa in 1814. Others stay and slug it out over a much longer period, as both sides did at Lundy's Lane a couple of weeks later.

By the way, what were the 'howlers' in Swords that you found?

Oh no…I knew you would ask that………

They were tiny details……

But they were wrong.

And did I write it down at the time? Ah, no. They were not "howlers" at all….but they were tiny details……. 100% wrong.

How I wish I had never said that, but I "know" I am right!

Must I read it again from cover to cover? Actually…it was so good…I just might!

You have challenged me now! Why do I say these things? Answer; I am Irish. It goes with the genes and the passport…..

Brechtel198, I read your review of Nosworthy with amusement and satisfaction. This was my impression exactly when I read his book. As a student of Napoleonic tactics myself, I was rather shocked at the liberties he took with historic research methods. Some of his assertions on the origins of the Napoleonic system would have been groundbreaking except for the fact that he provided no evidence whatsoever to back them up. At the time the book came out it was not well received by professional historians. It should be noted that Nosworthy is not a professionally trained historian.

It should be noted that Nosworthy is not a professionally trained historian.

That hasn't stopped a number of folks from authoring historical studies, including Kevin. Any number of those folks have created some very good histories.

It isn't necessarily the training, professional or not, as much as I value the methods used in historiography. It is all in the quality of the work.

I did get my masters in military history… ;-)

And I don't believe that you have to be a trained historian to be a good one.

While I won't comment on the value of Nosworthy's book, some of the pedantic comments above are just hilarious:

Brechtel wrote:

defines a division in an infantry battalion as a ‘fraction of a battalion' when it was two companies which should be common knowledge.

When Henry Bunbury wrote the instruction for General Officers Commanding Brigades while serving under Sir John Moore in 1807, he included this order:

the corps are to march by divisions, never by files of any sort…

Bunbary recalls:

I drew up these instructions after having received the verbal orders of Sir J. Moore. When I carried the draft to him for approval, he smiled when he came to the words, "march by divisions". "What do you mean by divisions?" said the general. "Any complete part into which a brigade, battalion or company may be told off, " answered I. "Just so," replied Sir John, "that's it; you are right; but half of the blockheads will not understand what is meant by divisions."

So Brechtel, in the opinion of Sir John Moore, you would be in the camp of half of the blockheads who didn't understand.

The person who defined the 'division' as part of an infantry battalion incorrectly is the author in question. I corrected the error, stating that it was two companies in an infantry battalion.

So your last comment seems to be both mistaken as well as inaccurate.

The firefight itself doesn't decide the engagement

There are engagements, such as Chippawa in 1814 on the Niagara frontier, where the firefight most certainly does decide the engagement.

For all intents and purposes, that was the engagement.

I did get my masters in military history… ;-)

Me too. So does that make us trained and professional?

And I don't believe that you have to be a trained historian to be a good one.

Neither do I, but being a 'good one' will include using historiographical methods and producing history that meets particular standards…usually the same as those targeted by professional, trained historians.

At Chippawa in 1814, The British had been ordered to advance and fire one volley before charging, a fairly typical tactic, but the terrain slowed them. The Americans actually flanked the British at both ends of their line, putting them in a crossfire. After about a half hour, the British commander ordered a withdrawal, which was done in an orderly fashion.

As I said, something had to happen beyond just a straight-up firefight. In this case, it was the flanking movement.

Scott remarked that the British line dissolved 'like a rope of sand.' They lost the firefight and the casualties bear that out.

US Losses:

Total:
51 KIA
245 Wounded
9 Missing
Total: 305

Scott's Brigade:

41 KIA
221 Wounded
Total: 262

British Losses:

145 KIA
321 Wounded
46 Missing
Total:512

General Riall's command was quite literally shot to pieces. It is also doubtful that they left the field in good order. See the three accounts of the action by Donald Graves, Col Elting, and Robert Quimby.

I was at Chippawa this past summer. The terrain is flat and open where the main action occurred.

Flanked or not, the British were both outshot and outfought, and the American artillery support was superior to that of the British and caused significant loss to the British infantry.

…but being a 'good one' will include using historiographical methods and producing history that meets particular standards…usually the same as those targeted by professional, trained historians.

And your point is…?

They were tiny details……But they were wrong.

Col Elting acknowledged these small, few errors in an article in the now-defunct Napoleon magazine (if I recall the publication correctly). He remarked that finding errors in something you write is akin to finding a rattlesnake in your underwear drawer.

I have them marked somewhere, but cannot find them at present. One of them, however, was that the Flanquers-Chasseurs, not the Flanquer-Grenadiers of the Imperial Guard were organized in 1811, and not 1813.

I started his book again last night. I had forgotten just how good it is. Writing style is idiosyncratic but gripping. I vaguely remember there was something in Napoleon's Maison and the Restoration of Louis XVIII…….vaguely…….

It probably did take five years to train a drummer and, if it did not, I can live with that!………. packed with information

When I first read it when it came out, I had to stop about every five chapters because of information overload.

The real treat for me, however, was discussing the book with Col Elting when we visited him from time to time.

The material used and referenced from the old La Sabretache is the first time it was used in English, I think. He told me he worked on that book for thirty years…

With respect to the original question I would respectfully suggest that at close range, i.e. under fifty yards the effect of a battalion discharging in what ever controlled fire selected, the effects would be devastating.

Adkin quotes Maitlands Guardsmen of approximately 1400 men bringing down 20% of their French opponents [ 200 plus] with one volley.

David Chandler states that Prussian field tests showed that at 75yards 60% of shots fired hit a canvass target representing an enemy battalion. Whilst a real target would have a lot of gaps the reality of short range fire is easily appreciated.

Losses of that magnitude would be unbearable for any length of time. Indeed the British tactic of a loud hurrah and bayonet charge after the volley and it's disorganising effect, reminded the French that they had an urgent appointment elsewhere.

Any lengthy standoff type of shooting would be limited by ammunition supply and the muskets tendency to foul up with constant use.

Happy modelling.

Chris

And your point is…?

Missed that, did you?

It is also doubtful that they left the field in good order.

While the 2100 British were 'shot to pieces' by the 3,500 Americans… not surprising, there are some questions about the actual casualty lists.** The British lost around 25% of their force, the Americans 9%. As for the withdrawal, See Graves, Donald E. Red Coats & Grey Jackets: The Battle of Chippawa. Toronto & Oxford: Dundurn Press. The flanking movements [only possible because the British were heavily outnumbered, better than 3:2] as well as the casualties, convinced Riall to withdraw. It was an ordered withdrawal, with units covering the retreat. Graves does not call it 'disorderly' regardless of the casualties.

**

The official casualty return gave 148 killed, 321 wounded and 46 missing.[2] However, 20th century research by Canadian archivist Douglas Hendry has demonstrated that the British casualty return for Chippawa marked down many men as killed who had in fact been captured, and that of 136 British regulars who were supposed to have been killed, only 74 actually died. The official return gave 12 Canadian militiamen killed but Donald Graves has determined that 18 actually died. A U.S. Army document signed by Assistant Inspector-General Azariah Horne states the Americans had captured 3 officers and 72 "rank and file" of the British regulars who were wounded and 9 British regulars, 1 "captain of the Indians", 1 Indian chief and 4 Indian warriors who were not wounded. Two British officers, Captains Bird and Wilson, appear in the official casualty list in the "wounded" category with additional information that they have also been taken prisoner. The actual British loss at Chippawa therefore appears to have been 74 regulars, 18 Canadian militiamen and 16 Indian warriors killed; 303 British regulars (not including Captains Bird and Wilson, who come under the 'wounded prisoners' category), 16 Canadian militiamen and an unknown number of Indian warriors wounded; 75 British regulars (including Captains Bird and Wilson) wounded and captured by the Americans; 9 British regulars, one officer of the British Indian Department and 5 Indian warriors taken prisoner unwounded. A further 9 British soldiers and 9 Canadian militiamen appear to have deserted. This gives a grand total of 108 killed, 319 wounded, 75 wounded prisoners, 15 unwounded prisoners and 18 missing.

Answering a question with a question? I would suggest that isn't appropriate…

I listed three authors who have all written excellent books, or chapters in books, on the Niagara campaign of 1814.

I would suggest that all three, if not more, should be used when determining what actually happened on the field at Chippawa.

The bottom line is the British were badly defeated by an equal force of American regulars. Only Scott's brigade was fully engaged in the action, and the numbers were about even.

So, any hyperbole really isn't necessary. And it should be noted that the British were not 'heavily outnumbered.' Riall may have claimed to have been, as Drummond would later claim about Lundy's Lane, but that just isn't the case.

I have, and have read, all of Don Graves' books on the Niagara campaign, and I would like to see you show where he states that the British were 'heavily outnumbered.'

Perhaps you should take to heart your comments on historiography.

I was under the impression that if a Napoleonic unit stopped to shoot more than a single volley, it was very difficult to get the troops moving again to close in.

I was under the impression that if a Napoleonic unit stopped to shoot more than a single volley, it was very difficult to get the troops moving again to close in.

With the noise and smoke, falling into 'battle fire' or individual shooting, yes. That is the case.

The bottom line is the British were badly defeated by an equal force of American regulars. Only Scott's brigade was fully engaged in the action, and the numbers were about even.

Not what I have read…depending on what you feel constitutes 'fully engaged.' The Americans had enough more troops to envelop both British flanks while both were deployed in two rank lines.

As far as the thread question, from what I have read, a firefight seldom lasted more than 30 minutes, longer being a rarity like Albuera… as the comments by observers state. As I said, usually something else happened to resolve the firefight, a charge or flank attack. Even at the Battle of Mollwitz in 1741, a grand firefight saw the disciplined Prussians advancing as they fired, the Austrians retreating when the Prussians came close. Point being that other actions apart from just volley fire contributed to the victory.

Not what I have read…depending on what you feel constitutes 'fully engaged.' The Americans had enough more troops to envelop both British flanks while both were deployed in two rank lines.

Source?

'Feel' has nothing at all to do with it. Both sides in the main action had between 1300-1500 all ranks and the casualties have already been given.

If you would like more detailed information, please let me know.

Do we not often read that units attacking were sometimes expressly discouraged from engaging in a firefight….such that muskets were actually ensured to be unloaded before the assault? Once halted hard to regain that impetus.

Guards at Plancenoit is one obvious example I think.

There was not a "firefight" model per se. What existed were different types of firefights, from those between formed troops at short ranges, which were relatively short affairs, to firefights between skirmish screens that were being steadily reinforced from the rear, and that could last hours before a decision was reached or one of the contestants decided to try their luck and close with the bayonet. The lack of trained skirmishers at battalion level was a major problem for the Spanish in 1808-1809, as they found difficult to reinforce the skirmish screen and were put at a disadvantage by the French again and again, even before the main assault began.

Memories and journals are particularly difficult to interpret, especially because the writer was trying to convey from memory what was a very confusing and very stressful experience, in most cases also limited to a small part of the battlefield.

That is absolutely correct-very well done and thought-out.

At Chippawa in 1814, The British had been ordered to advance and fire one volley before charging, a fairly typical tactic, but the terrain slowed them. The Americans actually flanked the British at both ends of their line, putting them in a crossfire. After about a half hour, the British commander ordered a withdrawal, which was done in an orderly fashion. As I said, something had to happen beyond just a straight-up firefight. In this case, it was the flanking movement.

Using the reference you metioned, Graves' Red Coats and Grey Jackets, the map on pages 106 and 120 does not show the US troops ‘flanking the British at both ends of their line.' The American right flank and the British left flank were both on the River Road next to the Niagara River, so there could not have been any flanking movements there. And the American 9th/22d Infantry on the American right flank did not maneuver for a flanking movement during the action.

The US 11th Infantry did maneuver obliquely to take the 1st Foot in flanking fire, and the US 25th Infantry did maneuver to the left to chase off Pearson's light infantry and ended up on the flank of the 8th Foot which had moved up to face the 11th Infantry. With the exception of these minor maneuvers, there was no flanking movement of the British position.

While the 2100 British were 'shot to pieces' by the 3,500 Americans… not surprising, there are some questions about the actual casualty lists.** The British lost around 25% of their force, the Americans 9%. As for the withdrawal, See Graves, Donald E. Red Coats & Grey Jackets: The Battle of Chippawa. Toronto & Oxford: Dundurn Press. The flanking movements [only possible because the British were heavily outnumbered, better than 3:2] as well as the casualties, convinced Riall to withdraw. It was an ordered withdrawal, with units covering the retreat. Graves does not call it 'disorderly' regardless of the casualties.

The British did believe that they were outnumbered at Chippawa, but that just wasn't the case. Both sides had roughly the same amount of regulars in the field that fought the main action-about 1300 each, not counting artillery, militia, or Indians.

Where did you come up with the numbers you have posted?

Not what I have read…depending on what you feel constitutes 'fully engaged.' The Americans had enough more troops to envelop both British flanks while both were deployed in two rank lines.

What would you consider fully engaged? Scott's Brigade, the only regular American infantry unit to fight at Chippawa, was fully engaged against three British infantry regiments. And as the numbers of regulars on the field were roughly equal (about 1300 on each side) the Americans did not have enough troops to envelop both British flanks, which was a physical impossibility as explained above.
Your version of the action does not exist in any volume that I have read, which includes all of Graves' works, Elliott's book on Winfield Scott, Quimby's two-volume work on the US Army in the War of 1812 as well as Col Elting's work on the war.

brech on a crusade again?
Any good answers of the ops original question?
In contrast to the esteemed deadhead I regard Swords as a bad book, badly sourced and lacking quotes, intransparent – more a novel.

About fire fights – how long they lasted – it is difficult to say, some contemporaries had the impression – that whenever they started the units went out of control and emptied their cartridge boxes before they had to stop.
The British seemingly had a much better fire control and could well combine fire power with movement.

The soldiers has a strong tendency to fire much and quickly, and when a so called Placker Feuer (fire at will) is established, so it is very difficult to stop this. The unit is unable to get an impulse for a decisive move and the commander has to wait for a chance by random. The fire at will, or the Bataillenfeuer (feux de bataille) where each soldier is shooting as soon as he has loaded is therefore to used with care and the fire according to commands will be mostly advantageous.
(Valentini, page 66)

An old Prussian Officer writes about the Prussians in the 7YW :

One started to fire with pelotons, two, three fired well, but then a common burning started and the usual fire where each who finished loading pulls the trigger, files and ranks are intermingling, the front rank is not even able to kneel down, even if they intended to, and the officers from below up to the generals cannot do anything any longer with this mass, but have to wait till they will move forward or backwards.
(Jany, page 47)

Tempelhoff another veteran writes :

The Bataillenfeuer (feux de bataille) as the fire at will was typically was called replaced in the hitherto battle in the end the drilled art. Then everybody fired who could fire and wanted to and everybody as often as he was capable without giving a damn about his neighbour or front man.

A British officer wrote about the 1st Foots Guards at Dettingen,

They were under no command by way of Hide Park firing, but the whole three ranks made a running fire of their own accord. … The French fired the same manner, without waiting for words of command and Lord Sinclair [the allied commander] did often say he had never seen many a battle, and never saw the infantry engage in any other manner."
Muir page 77

There was not a "firefight" model per se. What existed were different types of firefights, from those between formed troops at short ranges, which were relatively short affairs, to firefights between skirmish screens that were being steadily reinforced from the rear.

If we are looking how the contemporaries viewed this, two close-formed forces involved in an exchange of volleys or 'battle fire' was often termed a "firefight", [see accounts of Albuera] which were usually short affairs as you say. The fire between skirmish screens were not characterized as 'firefights', regardless of how long they lasted. It was almost universally referred to as 'skirmishing.'

Look at all the accounts of skirmishing that Rory Muir provides in his chapter on Light Infantry in his Tactics and the Experience of Battle in the Age of Napoleon. Not once are the exchanges of fire called a 'firefight' or described like a stand up exchange of musketry like formed troops , even when the fire was heavy. Such firing is called skirmishing and in one instance, 'an insistent 'tiraillade'. The point being that, while I agree that there were a variety of types of exchanges of musketry between opposing troops, the notion of a 'firefight' was a model for close formed troops and discussed and trained as such by military men of the period. Within that model questions of when to fire, the number of volleys to be attempted before charging, withholding fire or just avoiding firing altogether etc. certainly were practiced.

"If we are looking how the contemporaries viewed this, two close-formed forces involved in an exchange of volleys or 'battle fire' was often termed a "firefight", [see accounts of Albuera] which were usually short affairs as you say. The fire between skirmish screens were not characterized as 'firefights', regardless of how long they lasted. It was almost universally referred to as 'skirmishing.' "

I come to a different conclusion, fire was opened ( and I cannot speak about British infantry in the Peninsular War) at longer ranges than usual immagined – and in case two formed units were engaged in such a fire fight, usually it ended into a fire at will – as well as it lasted as long as the cartridge box was empty – reserves had to be brought up to brake this tactical stalemate to regain the tactical initiative.

some examples – provided my Major Snort of past discussions

"That fire was on occasion delivered at longer ranges is beyond doubt, even by well disciplined units, and although the British had considerable success with short bursts of fire followed by a charge, particularly in an initial encounter with French infantry, there were many occasions on which this was not possible and the very act of charging made the chargers very vulnerable to counterattack.
An example of this long range fire occurred at Quatre Bras where James Anton of the 42nd regiment noted that after the initial encounters with French infantry and cavalry, the regiment fired at a French line at 2 furlongs (440 yards) distance, and that the fire delivered by his unit during the day probably had little effect:
We had wasted a deal of ammunition that day, and surely to very little effect, otherwise every one of our adversaries must have bled to death. Our commanding officer cautioned us against this useless expenditure, and we became a little more economical
"

"Regarding the British, the effective range of musketry was generally considered to be "point blank range" which as far as the British were concerned was the approximate distance that a musket ball would travel before hitting the ground if the BORE of the musket was level and held 54" above the ground, as if levelled by an infantryman. This distance is variously stated as being between 160 and 200 yards.
Here are a few quotes from serving officers or manuals:
Captain James:
Platoons have sometimes commenced firing at 3 or 400 yards: but though the firelock will kill at a much greater distance, yet it is well known that the fire of infantry has but little effect beyond 150 or 180 yards.
Colonel C. Field:
We have been hitherto in the habit of allowing from 250 to 300 yards as the range of a common soldiers musket in action.
Lieutenant J. Russell:
Fire of a line of infantry can have effect at seldom more than 160 yards.
Captain J. Whitman:
Range of a musket is 160 yards point blank. The effect of musketry is generally much less than is generally supposed, and seldom much use at greater than 80 yards.
Major J. Cuninghame:
At about 150 yards, round shot is exchanged for grape, and the musketry begins.
Captain J. Coke:
A musket, beyond 200 yards is useless except as a chance shot
The Handbook for Field Service:
The effective range (of the 1842 pattern percussion smoothbore) is 200 yards.
Chatham Trials Report [for the percussion smoothbore]:
It is only under peculiar circumstances, such as where it may be desirable to bring fire to bear on field artillery, where there is no other means of replying to it, that it ought ever to be thought of using the musket at such distances as 400 yards.
Lieutenant Blakiston [This is the famous incident at Arcangues]:
Some guns made their appearance, and opened on the church. These were soon silenced by the fire of the 43rd [armed with smoothbore muskets], although at a distance of 3 or 400 yards – a sure proof of the goodness of our powder.
"

In contrast to the esteemed deadhead I regard Swords as a bad book, badly sourced and lacking quotes, intransparent – more a novel.

Then provide examples of errors in the book and of the author being in error, instead of merely once again denigrating a valuable volume on the period by a recognized authority on the Grande Armee.

There are over 700 footnotes in the volume and there are numerous references in the text that are sourcing information without a foot or endnote, which is perfectly acceptable.

Swords is the first book in English that I know of, that used extensive material from the old La Sabretache volumes as references, and those 25 volumes are rich in Napoleonic primary material, and I have been studying the period since 1965.

Perhaps you could write a better volume?

Unfortunately, Col Elting was planning a Swords II when he passed away and I was fortunate enough to be given his notes by his kind wife.

…Look at all the accounts of skirmishing that Rory Muir provides in his chapter on Light Infantry in his Tactics and the Experience of Battle in the Age of Napoleon. Not once are the exchanges of fire called a 'firefight' or described like a stand up exchange of musketry like formed troops , even when the fire was heavy. Such firing is called skirmishing and in one instance, 'an insistent 'tiraillade'.

After your 'misinterpretation' of the source material for Chippawa, I would be very careful with your 'use' of any source material.

It doesn't matter what a firefight is called, it is still a firefight, whether or not troops are in formation or deployed in open order.

The engagement between Grawert's division at Jena and Lannes' infantry was a firefight between troops in close formation and those deployed in open order and under cover.

French commanders sometimes would form their infantry in a heavy skirmish line when fighting formed troops, and that is still a firefight.

Playing the semantics game doesn't prove anything useful.

Bas is absolutely correct in his posting, which is common sense and insightful.

howlers – need of training time for a drummer – 5 years

What the passage actually states is: '…it took approximately five years to produce a drummer capable of beating all the different signals (batteries) correctly, day or night, under the stress of combat…'

That's just a little more than 'need of training time for a drummer-five years.'

And, again, if you don't agree, then produce evidence to the contrary. You haven't done that.

'…it took approximately five years to produce a drummer capable of beating all the different signals (batteries) correctly, day or night, under the stress of combat…'

What was the specific source for this?

Deadhead is in love with Swords – do I have to have a feud with him because I have this opinion?

"@dibble
Thanks for that interesting information. In my view, pure opinion – Elting cannot be used as reference, there he is not transparent providing sources and – as you prooved – using out of date sources.
There brech seemingly regards Elting's swords as tablets of stone – there is no use in discussing with him such subjects – regardless what arguments and solid sources you will bring up – they are ignored.
In case, seemingly also, the learning curve of brech – is linear – or better parallel to the y – axle."

Also I share the view of

Scharnachthal 26 Jul 2016 8:48 a.m. PST

Gazzola

It's not about single missing footnotes, it's about research methods and how results are being conveyed.

I just want to see statements resulting from solid basic research and I want to see recognizable lines of argument I can trace back to contemporary sources. Can't get enough annotations which serve this purpose. And I also do not mind at all if someone tried but wasn't successful – and just admits it. In short, I want academic honesty. No cheap copy and paste, no suppression of results – both positive and negative -, no vain claims and opinions, etc. Instead, meticulous research, openness and transparency.

Not everybody's cup of tea but I really don't care for those who feel different and surely it's not anybody else's business to tell me to be satisfied with lower standards.

Thanks

Sorry – it did not help with fire fights.

I found "Swords" entirely by accident in my favourite second-hand books shop in York. I almost rejected it, despite knowing the name so well, convinced it was the tale of Napoleon's Marshallate! It is a great read, I think, even if there is many a modern US military phrase which can jar sometimes, as anachronistic. I was drawn by the chapter coverage of such topics as Remounts and Replacements, Law and Order, Discipline and Disciplinary units, Logistics, which are rarely tackled in print. There is the best coverage of Napoleon's Household that I have read (though Pawly's Imperial HQ in two volumes add to it). The Restoration(s) and the effect on the Army and Maison du Roi are again topics rarely consigned to print. We expect uniforms, campaigns and analysis of weapons.

Elting did something different. I simply "know" I found one or two minor errors…….but can I now find them? For each chapter he does give an extensive bibliography, but without direct reference to chapter content. His footnotes do however contain references…some……… but not as many as I had imagined, more they serve as explanatory text. At random, I went to the footnotes for Chapter X (PBI). 28 footnotes…….but only six contain references.. Chapter XXXVIII Les Cents Jours. 25 footnotes but only 11 references.

I am an amateur at history. My two younger sons are heading to be professionals at this, pursuing postgrad degrees now. I am impressed by the scope of coverage ("never mind the quality, feel the width") and would bet 95-99% of his "facts" are "right" (or as close as we are ever likely to get 200 years later). That margin of error does not bother me unduly, when the book is so simply………. entertaining, I guess.

Personally, I find this spin off from the firefight topic really interesting and welcome the exchange of views. Some very thought provoking points have emerged, I feel. I cannot contribute significantly to the academic debate, but am following it with enthusiasm!