"Quality of Spanish Troops from 1808-1814" Topic

Black Powder recommends averting one's eyes when looking at the ratings for the Spanish infantry and Calvary but surely they must have improved after Wellington took overall command in the fall of 1812.

Has anyone an authoritative source, or any source for the matter, that discusses how the Spanish troops may have improved during the Peninsular war?

Oman notes improvement in many Spanish units. Certainly Spanish troops fought well in several of the later battles, such as Castalla and Vittoria. Not sure how much was due to Wellington taking command, since he had operational control, but not the full control he had over the Portuguese. So much depended on the unit and formation commanders' abilities, to train their troops, supply them, and provide inspirational leadership.

And Albuera. I think that like all armies of the period, some Spanish units did well and some didn't. With experience, they got better. The Spanish armies fought well in the Revolutionary Wars when well-led. They did well allied with the French. When the government fell apart [or was torn up] in 1808, so did a lot of the support structure for the armies… so they fell apart too. A lot had to do with the quality of the commanders, such as Ocana. The troops did just fine, but were badly led.

I do not think that any improvement in Spanish performance in battle was due to Wellington. Spanish armies may have been placed under his operational command, but he had no authority to discipline or reorganize Spanish troops. Such modest improvement as took place must have been due to increased experience and the winnowing out of the worst Spanish commanders, due to repeated disgraceful failures in the field. The Spanish army was in bad shape long before 1808, due to the corrupt and incompetent rule of Godoy, the Queen's favorite. The higher officers were all appointed on the basis of their social standing, regardless of any military qualifications. Troops were poorly trained and demoralized by irregular pay, poor supplies, lack of equipment, mounts for the cavalry, and most of all by unfair discipline and execrable leadership. There was no lack of good basic material or the Spanish would not have kept returning to the field after one defeat after another, but patriotism and hatred of the enemy is not enough to attain victory. When the Spanish troops were lucky enough to have a decent commander, they did well.

I will mention that the difficulty in keeping British battalions up to a decent field strength in the Peninsula eventually led to an extraordinary experiment. The enlistment of a proportion of Spaniards into British units was authorized, with a recommendation to their officers that they be treated with understanding and patience, while gradually bringing them into conformance with British ideas of discipline and training. Once this was achieved, they apparently served satisfactorily. I'm sorry, but I don't have the source for this at hand, but I am positive that this is a fair paraphrase of what it said.

Spanish gunners were very good; Spanish cavalry suffered from trying to operate in a climate mostly not well suited to horses, as did everyone else's. I agree with those who said the problem was pay, logistics, and leadership. In general the Spanish army of 1808-1814 was much like Napoleon's in 1796 and in comparable need of a Napoleon to command it.

At the beginning of the rebellion there was a drive to recruit new units in most regions. It was a source of patronage for the juntas. Local governments found useful to give commissions to local aristocrats and well-to-do peasants and burgeois in exchange for money or supplies -usually, cloth to make uniforms, leather for the furnitures or food-. Moreover new regiments served also to improve the standing of the local junta with other juntas, therefore making more credible its claim of being representatives of the popular will.

In June 1808 more than 100 battalions and squadrons were recruited. They were formed by volunteers mostly, sometimes with professional cadres. In Asturias, for example, cadres of officers and NCOs from one of the regular regiments in garrison in Oviedo were commissioned into volunteer battalions to provide them with a modicum of experience. Problem was that most volunteers had no military experience whatsoever. They didn't expect to leave their province either. I remember a letter sent by five captured deserters to the local authorities explaining that they weren't actual deserters, but that they had came back to their homes to protect them from the French. They didn't understand the notion of military discipline. There wasn't time, nor money, to train them either.

Side by side with this majority of volunteer units were the regular regiments of the Spanish army that hadn't been disarmed by the French. The main concentration of regular troops was in the Army of Andalucia, under Castaños. It is not by chance that it was this army the one who managed to defeat the French at Bailén.

In the middle period of the war (1808-1811), most of the problems explained above were compounded by almost a constant lack of regular supplies, low morale due to the defeats at the hands of the French in 1809, and endemic desertion. Some units were brave and professional, but there was a dwindling supply of veterans as they were being killed, wounded, fell prisoners into the hands of the French or simply absconded, sick of being commanded by fools. One Spanish "confidente" (unofficial spy) sent a report to the Regencia in January 1810 explaining how he had met a Spanish deserter in Burgos; the deserter didn't denounce him but invited him to drink some wine in a tavern; while they were drinking the deserter explained to him that he was conviced that the French would win the war, not only because they were better organized but because their generals knew their bussiness, contrary to what happened with the Spanish generals. It is just an anecdotic evidence, of course, but when compared with other documents it becomes very suggestive: there was a lack of trust from the rank and file towards their officers, particularly towards the high command. Which is surprising is not that the Spanish army of that period was riddled by desertion, but that so many soldiers decided NOT to desert and continue in the fight, or that volunteered to replace regiments that had been destroyed or made prisoner in their totality in some of the multiple disasters that met the Spanish armies (Valencia, Tarragona, Badajoz, to mention the most notorious)

Apparently, many of those problems started to be solved after Wellington was put in command. Supplies were slightly better and more regular; soldiers received their pay; and they had uniforms and weapons that were more or less standarized. Together with the conviction of being in the winning side after 1813 and the improved control over recruitment and desertion, the Spanish soldiers fought better than in earlier years. At San Marcial, Second Castalla, Vittoria and Toulouse, the Spanish troops present fought well.

(As an aside: the Spanish troops engaged at San Marcial that defeated the French assaults were, mostly, former 7th Army units, i.e the troops formed from partisan bands and volunteer militias that coalesced into regular units from late 1809 onwards)

The automatic bad rating for Spanish in some rules is just plain wrong. Regular infantry and artillery are decent, if not very nimble. They did win on their own from time to time. When well led they could be quite good. Zayas' division at Albuera held off twice their number of French infantry, weathered the storm of the Vistula Legion charge that decimated Colborne's brigade, stood up to "friendly" fire from British reinforcements and finally fell back through those reinforcements in good order when their ammunition was exhausted. Such a performance by any other nation's troops would earn accolades.

Lack of willingness in even the "bad" troops for a set piece fight, was the very thing that made them great "guerilleros"

Agreed, the Albuera performance was top rate and makes you wonder what kind of potential these troops had.

Who was it who said there were no bad regiments, only bad officers?

I agree with the entries above, and that the Spaniards certainly did not make bad soldiers – look at in other eras. I think Wellington authorised up to 20 per company, which is a lot when you think of it.
A fw other relevant issues.
Rate of fire: Spanish pre-war did not have a fully standardised method of loading and firing (regts did it three different ways I think) and only managed 2 shots per minute as opposed to 3 for the French and a theoretical 4 for crack British units (before fouling through use etc etc, impossible to maintain. Spanish also tended to start firing far earlier than British. BUT
Bayonet: Like British, traditional tactics copied Frederickian Prussians: line volleys and bayonet charge. Were reknowned for the latter and did NOT go out of control pursuing too far like British (Guards at Talavera, Light Div at Busaco). Aggressive, successful bayonet attacks at most sieges, especially Gerona, at Median del Rio Seco, Ocana, San Marcial (just from memory).
Spanish were well aware of these deficiencies and had their Shornclife training camp around 1805-6 with José de Zayas as drillmaster. Many of the regular units were rotated through this, learning French columnar as well as linear tactics, stadardsing drill etc. This happened in the camp before ibraltar – so most of the Army of Andalucia will have gone through this.
The artillery was good because Godoy's reforms were not blocked there. Godoy was a quite effective reformer, (and therefore very unpopular, especially with the grandees, who loathed him) reformer not some corrupt layabout.
tbc.

The Army of Andalucia did well because, although regiments were filled up with recruits (veterans passing on hat and jacket to recruit – or waistcoat and forage cap – can't remember), not only had these regiments mostly been through the training camp, but Castaonos was careful to let them build up experience, confidence and cohesion in a series of actions before Baylen. The other big concentration was the Army of Galicia (from Ferrol & La Coruna). Their regulars were not filled up with recruits and performance at Median del Rio Seco (July) and Espinosa (Nov) was good; they were let down by a raw Asturian division.
The Army of Estremadura was scratched together, smashed completely twice before Talavera and therefore had low morale and effectiveness. By 1812 this was true of all the Spanish armies. There were still over 100,000 under arms, but they were no longer effectively in the field. When Wellington was finally given command, he could influence (a) recruitment (many of the 1813 soldeiers being stated to be very young), (b) generals (because he was now boss) and (c) uniforms and equipment (from England). What he could not do was replicate he supply system he had built up for the Anglo-Portuguese – over several years; that he couldn't conjure out of nothing.
Hence those Spanish divisions operating with British troops and so also FED by the British did well (e.g, Whittingham's Division at Castalla, Morillo's Division). For the 1814 campaign, Wellington did something about it – and all the Spanish did well at Toulouse (suffering terrible casualties – tragic as peace had been signed beforehand)

The most interesting time is 1811 with 3 types of Spanish troops:
a) The Cadiz Expeditionary Corps: 2 divisions: Lardizabal (usually 5 batts) & Joseé de Zayas (usually 8 batts – wth 2-3 of them Guard) , trained by the latter. We also know many of their uniforms.These were well clothed, well, equipped, excellent troops. They were mostly units of the old Army of Estremadura, including some "new" units who had run away at Talavera – but got better. They fought at Albuera, Barrosa and Sagunto in 1811.
b) Effective "irregular" divisions operating behind enemy lines – Longa, Mina etc. However these were not all ex-guerrillas, the best being Ballersteros' division, ranging between the Serrania de Ronda (mountains between Malaga, Sevilla, Cordoba), hiding when necessary under the guns of Gibraltar. They were topped up with units from Cadiz now and then, but the nucleus was the same Asturians who had let the side down at Espinosa – but got better too. They fought several divisional actions as well as small scale stuff. They were at Albuera too.
c) The remnants of the old Armies. Basically the old Army of Galicia in two halves, one in Galicia, one (that under Romana had wintered in the lines of Torres Vedras – and so been fed. They operated in Estremadura, had a succession of commanders, screwed up massively at Gamonal and Alba de Tormes, as in previous years, having learnt little. The survivors – 3 or 4 battalions – were Carlos D'Espagna's famously useless brigade. They were at Albuera too.

So all three types were at Albuhera
a) the heroes (e.g. 1st Brigade of Zayas, 1800 men, holding 5th Corps – 8400 men – for well over an hour, whilst being shot in the back by adavncing British etc, etc, – retired thugh "passng of the lines" in excellnet order.
b) the "irregulars": Ballersteros's division operated mainly as a heavy screen of skirmishers, one brigade against Godinot's attack on village, the other into the flank of 5th Corps standing in front of Zayas
c) the "remnants" – who famously refused to advance, even when Beresford tried pulling a colonel (or two?) by the collar. (Not entirely fair because the light battalion of the brigade did go forward as ordered, to the right of Zayas' brigade, firing into the left flank of the French (at least before the British arrived to replace them).

So what does all that mean?
- a penalty for firing
- a plus for bayonet charges (and defending cover while we are at it)
- VERY different combat effectiveness/morale grades depending on which Spanish one is talking about

@TeodoroReding,

You provided some excellent detailed information. I recognize the Reding name from the Swiss regiments at Bailen, so I can't help wondering if you are connected by ancestry or just use it as a nome de guerre?

Sorry to disappoint, Attila, but it's a nom de guerre – like your own I hope! I'm British, but have been addicted to the Peninsula War for over 50 years, lived in Switzerland for over 25 years, …

What I forgot to mention about the Spanish is that their main weakness – and Wellington's main complaint e.g. after Albuera – is that they seemed not to be able to manoeuvre. (That's not true of the Cuerpo Expedicionario, of course). He said they will stand, like stocks, but that that is all they can do. Unfair and ungracious after the behaviour of the Reales Guardias Espanoles (RGE) in the battle, but more than a kernel of truth. I have penalties for wheeling, especially in line, in my rules.

I have a large Spanish army, nearly 3000 infantry, 25mm Minifigs – built up mainly since the 80s but with some 240 Minifig "S" Range from early 70s. I started with doing some "S" range French, there were no British in stovepipes, so I did Spanish (using mainly converted "S" range AWI British at first). And I got hooked. The names. The colours. Nearly every unit different.

The 80s (to now) Minifigs are mostly conversions (one can cover just about all Spanish infantry and cavalry types in the Minifigs range with head swaps). I know they are unfashionable (and some a little frog like – including the "official" Spanish 1805 regulars, but the "French" figures in march attack added towards the end of the range (of which I have a lot) are very good as – as are the Peninsula British – anatomically more believable that many modern figures.

c) the "remnants" – who famously refused to advance, even when Beresford tried pulling a colonel (or two?) by the collar. (Not entirely fair because the light battalion of the brigade did go forward as ordered, to the right of Zayas' brigade, firing into the left flank of the French (at least before the British arrived to replace them).

Of course, the Spanish officer refused to advance at Beresford's command:

1. Beresford was not someone known by sight by the Spanish, who had arrived just the night before, and

2. Beresford was not the Spanish commander-in-chief, Blake was. Would a British Regiment have done as ordered if Blake had shown up and ordered them to move contrary to previous orders from Beresford?

Beresford's frustration was that he commanded a polygot army that had just formed up the night before.

There was in my opinion nothing wrong with the Spanish soldier that couldn't have been solved with…

* Better officers
* Much better generals
* Much much better administration (supply, pay, etc.)

The cavalry suffered from a lack of good horses (just like the Portugese and to a lesser extent the French and British).

The Spanish fought better togther with the British because Wellington addressed their administrative problems, and had competent Spanish generals commanding them.

Fully agree, Keith.

You may have something there, McLaddie. Command and control was certainly complicated, especially at this point in both time and that part of the battlefield. Beresford was trying to get individual battalions in line, and Castanos was also somewhere trying to bring up new troops (his penchant: as at Tudela). But surely they must have known Beresford was their CinC? After all, D'Espagne's brigade was part of Castanos army, the survivor's of the Gebora debacle, actually operating with the British I think. All three Spanish commands (Blake's, Ballestros's & Castanos') were put under Blake as Castanos, though senior general, conceded to Blake. Whether Castanos with D'Espagne (ie the battalions in question: Rey, Zamora, Voluntarios de Navarra (the light unit in the front line to the right of Zayas' Irlanda) marched south with Beresford, or united with Blake marching up from the south, before the latter joined Beresford or not I can't remember. I'm away from home – can't look things up. (But the historyofwas.org site does say: "Beresford had then been given the task of recaptured Badajoz, beginning the first British siege of Badajoz (6-12 May 1811). His force consisted of 10,500 British troops, 10,000 Portuguese troops, and 2,500 Spanish troops under General Castaños, the survivors of the crushing Spanish defeat at the Gebora on 19 February 1811." In any case, Zamora and Rey each refused to advance, much as the 4th Walloon Guards had refused to make a suicidal advance at Barrosa – whilst Irlanda advanced with and then stood alongside the Guards holding the French 5th Corps. Much variation in behaviour.

Picking up on what Keith says, personally, I'd put down the poor performance of Carlos D'Espagne's troops down to his loathsome character. His real name was Roger Bernard Charles d'Espagnac de Ramefort, he was a royalist emigré so fanatical and cruel that he got on well with Fernando VII – but came to a rum end in the Carlist wars (as a Carlist, of course).

But surely they must have known Beresford was their CinC? After all, D'Espagne's brigade was part of Castanos army, the survivor's of the Gebora debacle, actually operating with the British I think. All three Spanish commands (Blake's, Ballestros's & Castanos') were put under Blake as Castanos, though senior general, conceded to Blake.

TR: Why? The entire force had arrived the night before under the command of Blake and Castanos. It is only first Castanos' concession to Blake and then Blake's concession Beresford early in the morning of the battle that established between the commanders was CinC. Whether that was communicated to the sleeping Spaniards is another question altogether. Convention dictated that Blake command [Higher rank than Beresford and the National army was on National soil] During the battle, Blake is the one who continued to issue orders to the Spanish divisions.

Having said that, it is certainly possible that the Spanish colonel did know Beresford by sight AND knew he was the Allied CinC, but it isn't necessarily so.

But why not Macladdie?
I think you yourself have the command structure mixed up.
As I said I'm travelling so can't check things properly, but a reputable web source history.org supports my memory that D'Espagne's brigade was part of Beresford's force for the siege of Badajoz – one of 10 brigades, one of two independent brigades and three divisions = 5 command units. That was the force Soult expected to meet.
D'Espagne's brigade certainly had nothing to do with Blake's Spanish relief force, so there is no reason why they would have arrived with Blake the night before. They were coming from the North, whilst Blake and Ballasteros (part of the same army: Blake's) was coming from the South.
Then all the Spanish were put under Blake for the battle. A recipe for confusion. On a confused battlefield. (Spanish divisions stopped acting as neat formations; battalions were detached ad hoc, joining other formations – as Vol de Navarra effectively joined Zayas 1st brigade on right of Irlanda).
Anyway, I guess we will never know for sure what happened.