"The Face of Roman Battle." Topic
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Tango01 | 04 Oct 2016 9:58 p.m. PST |
"Of the many books and articles published explaining the tactical mechanics of ancient and medieval warfare, none have influenced my views on the topic more than a short article by Philip Sabin titled "The Face of Roman Battle." In this article Sabin attempts to draw an accurate description of the way a Roman legion and its maniples actually worked on the battlefield. He is not the only one to attempt this feat. The clearest description of the pre-Marian armies is the account found in the eighteenth book of Polybius's Histories, and historians have been squabbling over just what Polybius's rather ambiguous report means for the better part of the last two centuries. I believe that Sabin's is the best of their efforts. What makes his description so convincing is the building blocks he uses to construct it. Sabin starts his reconstruction with a few general insights about the nature of ancient combat, especially the hand-to-hand sort. His most important insight is this: close combat is absolutely terrifying. When you realize just how terrifying it is much of what we find in the ancient and medieval source starts to make a lot more sense. Sabin's case study is the Roman legion. In his essay's first section Sabin surveys common features of battle narratives preserved in the extant histories and concludes that any description of Roman battle mechanics must be able to explain a few odd features of these accounts to be considered legitimate: Roman heavy infantry engagements possessed several clear characteristics which must be accounted for by any model of the combat mechanics involved. If not decided at the first clash, the contests often dragged on for an hour or more before one side finally broke and fled. The losers could suffer appalling casualties in the battle itself or in the ensuing pursuit, but the victors rarely suffered more than 5 per cent fatalities even in drawn-out engagements. The fighting lines could shift back and forth over hundreds of yards as one side withdrew or was pushed back by its opponents. Finally, the Romans had a practical system for the passage of lines, and preferred to reinforce or replace tired units with fresh ones rather than maximizing the depth of the initial fighting line…" More here link Amicalement Armand |
TKindred | 05 Oct 2016 3:57 a.m. PST |
I take exception to this part: We know from eighteenth- and nineteenth-century engagements that bayonets caused only a tiny proportion of battle casualties, but bayonet charges do seem to have been decisive in triggering routs. The explanation for this apparent paradox seems to be that cold steel held a unique terror for troops, over and above that caused by the more random and impersonal perils of shot and shell. The morale of opposed infantry formations appears to have been closely interlinked, such that if one side could nerve itself to launch a bayonet charge in the conviction that the enemy would not stand, the enemy did indeed break before contact. Conversely, if mutual deterrence was maintained, then the combat could bog down into a bloody close-range firefight between the opposing lines, often lasting for hours….There are striking parallels between the psychological role of bayonet charges in modern warfare and the way in which many ancient combats were decided at or before the first shock, with a charge by one side prompting its enemies to take flight at once. Hoplite engagements seem to have been particularly susceptible to such an early resolution, sometimes even producing 'tearless battles' when one side fled so soon that it outdistanced any pursuit. Goldsworthy claims that late Republican and early Imperial legionaries exploited their professionalism and esprit de corps by winning similar swift victories against less resolute opponents through a coordinated volley of pila followed by a fierce charge. This chimes exactly with Paddy Griffith's argument that the disciplined British infantry of the Napoleonic Wars beat the French not through winning prolonged firefights but through a single devastating musket volley followed by a charge with the bayonet. The premise that "We know from eighteenth- and nineteenth-century engagements that bayonets caused only a tiny proportion of battle casualties,…" Is false, and demonstrably so. The idea the author puts forth is based upon flawed research by other authors and historians who failed to understand the context of their source material. Bayonets didn't produce a tiny amount of casualties.They produced a large number of casualties because troops initially withstood the charge or closing of lines and only broke or withdrew as either casualties on their own side mounted, or the morale of those around them began to fail. However, the major thing to consider is that bayonet wounds were almost always fatal. The whole myth of the bayonet being rarely used and more of a morale weapon, came from post ACW research into the medical records of the two sides. The official records of the medical departments included lists of wounds treated in HOSPITALS. These show fewer than 1000 bayonet wounds treated, and the reason for that is because very few of those wounded ever made it to hospital. They died on the field. But researchers drew the wrong conclusion, taking their claims from the records, and refusing to consider the accounts of actual combatants who consistently spoke of coming to blows with their opponents, and that right through to the end of the war. By using the "bayonet myth"as the premise for his arguments about combat in the ancient world, one has to question the rest of his work. I'll read through it, but having just read that first statement, it will be with a more critical eye, and a long look at his sources. That is especially so when his sources include Paddy Griffith's civil war work, with which I disagree on about every point he makes. Griffith got it wrong, and if one of the sources is wrong, where does the rest of it come down. I could be easily convinced that the author read Griffith's work, and then started musing about whether Griffith's conclusions could be applied to the ancient period. YYMV, but that's my initial, knee-jerk take on the book, and that taken solely from the excerpts and review. |
Tango01 | 05 Oct 2016 10:35 a.m. PST |
Are you sure that bayonnets amount more casualties than fire arms?… even more than artillery?… Amicalement Armand |
TKindred | 05 Oct 2016 11:04 a.m. PST |
Armand said: Are you sure that bayonnets amount more casualties than fire arms?… even more than artillery?… Amicalement Armand
Not saying that. I'm saying that the premise that they caused only a tiny proportion of battle casualties is false. They caused a larger percentage than people realise, because their wounds were almost always fatal, and folks didn't go around noting who died from what when they buried the dead after a battle. The idea that melees weren't fought, that troops with bayonets advancing usually caused the other side to retreat before coming to blows, is false. The author takes faulty research from Paddy Griffith on combat in the ACW,and tries to extrapolate from that how he feels battle was conducted in ancient times. |
Tango01 | 05 Oct 2016 10:51 p.m. PST |
I have my doubts that a bullet cause less fatal casualties than a bayonnete… Larey, the most famous Napoleonic doctor, made a very interesting study about casualties in battlefields and he support the idea of the tiny proportion of arme blanche wounds/dead. Amicalement Armand |
Lewisgunner | 06 Oct 2016 11:05 a.m. PST |
I don't thnk that Tkindred can say that few casualtues being caused by the bayonet is "demonstrably wrong". To do that we would need, as he suggests a count of the actual dead and what killed them from the battlefields and we do not have that. However, even if we did have the numbers it would neither prove nor disprove the point. That is because bayonet armed troops are not equipped with sword and shield. If two lines of bayonets were to rush together it would be a bloodbath as it is a poor arm for parrying and the sodiers have no shields. No wonder the more uncertain side ran! The reason that bayonets are no example at all is that Ancient warriors have shields and often armour and thus a fair chance of surviving the combat. It is only when someone becomes exhausted that they become an easy mark because their ability to defend falters. This explains why casualties amongst fleeing troops are high, whereas the winning side might suffer 5% or less. |
TKindred | 06 Oct 2016 3:47 p.m. PST |
Lewisgunner wrote: That is because bayonet armed troops are not equipped with sword and shield. If two lines of bayonets were to rush together it would be a bloodbath as it is a poor arm for parrying and the sodiers have no shields. Actually, at the very least, French troops of the Napoleonic period and later were taught bayonet fencing. This included guards against infantry and cavalry, 4 positions each, parrying and lunges, thrusts and "thrust outs", etc. During the Crimean War, US Army observer Captain George McClellan watched French troops going through their bayonet drill and commented upon it's efficacy, and how, in combat, it had strengthened the troops morale and self-confidence. McClellan published a translation of the French manual in 1855 and the US Army adopted it and mandated it's use. During the ACW, both sides used McClellan's manual to train troops in bayonet fencing, which gave them confidence to assault and engage in hand-to-hand combat throughout the war. The idea that one side broke and ran or withdrew rather than engage in melee is false. There are, in the case of the ACW period, too many personal accounts of violent and bloody melee to ignore and claim that they didn't happen. There are at least two memoirs I have read from the Napoleonic period, written by enlisted men, who also speak of closing with the enemy and engaging in bayonet combat. The first is "A Soldier of the 71st" and the other escapes me at the moment, but was written by a German man. As I stated in my first comment in this thread, the idea that the bayonet wasn't used in combat, and that thus one side or the other failed morale and "skedaddled; comes from post was authors who took information from the "Medical and Surgical History of the WBTS" out of context. They misunderstood what they were reading, which were tables of types of wounds and injured treated and hospitals during the war. The tables showed fewer than 1K bayonet wounds were treated "in hospital". While that is a fact, it doesn't prove that bayonets weren't used just because of the low number of wounded in hospital. What it shows is that bayonet wounds were usually fatal, and that those wounded never made it to hospital to be treated. If the author of the study about ancient combat bases his theory on the concept that bayonets were used, then he is wrong and his results should be rightly questioned. I am suggesting that he likely didn't fully research the mater, and instead relied on post-ACW author's writing which, as I have shown, were in error. Respects, |
Lewisgunner | 12 Oct 2016 6:31 a.m. PST |
I remember being told by an old para sergeant that bayonets were fir frightening the opponent, but that their rule was always to have one up the spout. If anyone came at you with a bayonet shoot him, don't allow him close because you could both kill each other by accident. I rather think the press of nen behind you would be likely to push the advancing unit into intimate contact with an opponent who stood to receive. As I said, Ancient warfare is different, its the shield that makes it so because you can get close to the opponent in relative safety. |
TKindred | 12 Oct 2016 9:32 a.m. PST |
Concur regarding the shield. Regarding loaded weapons, that would depend upon the era being considered. In the 19th century, prior to the mass use of metallic cartridge weapons, or even breechloaders, it was common to fire prior to the assault. The idea was to have empty weapons so the men would stop to fire, and the assault bog down into a firefight at close range. Another variant of this was Upton's assault at Spotsylvania. He had the men load their weapons, but not prime them. That had the same effect of keeping them from getting into a firefight and not coming into contact. But yeah, the presence of the shield AND, I would add, armor and no concept of any missile weapons other than hand-thrown certainly makes for a different equation. |
catavar | 12 Oct 2016 2:11 p.m. PST |
I can't contribute to the bayonet discussion, but Sabin's idea of how ancient combat occured seems reasonable to me. |
4th Cuirassier | 25 Oct 2016 5:57 a.m. PST |
Sabin's argument that bayonets caused few injuries is correct if taken to mean "compared to muskets, artillery and cavalry attack". I struggle to think offhand of all that many battles in which bayonet fencing occurred. When if did occur, eg inside La Haye Sainte at Waterloo, the weaker side was indeed massacred by the bayonet. What was more normal was that once your troops stopped moving forward and started firing, that was what they would rather do, and was all they would do. Even the Old Guard did this at Plancenoit; there is a French account by a commander who led them forward but once they got among the buildings they wanted to skirmish so that was what they did and they didn't heed calls to form up. The thick clouds of skirmishers in front of Wellington's line at the same battle were line units reluctant to form up and close with the enemy. I don't see how one can conclude that bayonets killed a lot of people – how would you know, among the bayoneted dead of a battle, who had been wounded by fire and then finished off by a bayonet? |
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