"The Failure of Strategic Bombing and the ..." Topic

…Emergence of the Fighter as the Preiminent Weapon in Aerial Warfare.

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Amicalement
Armand

Ummmm, someone seems to have drawn the wrong conclusions from WWII.

I don't agree with all of this conclusions but it is a well researched and written article.

-Will

I don't think anyone can claim the WW2 strategic bombing offensives to have been anything but a qualified success.

The resources could probably have been better used elsewhere. I can certainly understand the forces at play to lead Britain and the US down that road but the dreams that it could end the war by itself has been soundly disproven.

One of the factors I consider important is if the Axis had been able to bomb the UK like the RAF/USAAF bombed Germany in 1944 then the UK would have been defeated without a ground invasion. This no doubt had an impact on Churchill's and Harris' decisions.

Britain was much more effected by the 1940 Blitz than all the stiff upper lippery suggests.

I read somewhere that without the strategic bombing campaign WWII would have lasted another 1-2 years. Anyone know where that conclusion came from? If this were true I would imagine that given two more years might have seen the Axis fielding an atomic bomb and all sorts of sophisticated weapons.

I suspect that conclusion came from partisan advocates of strategic bombing.

The heavy bombers did play a crucial role in the run up to D-Day – but that is not strategic bombing.

What we actually saw in WW2 was terror bombing. The idea was to break the will of the German [and later Japanese] people to fight. Well – that didn't seem to work. In fascist police states it doesn't much matte what the people want.

Perhaps the Oil Plan or the plan to destroy aircraft production had a impact but I think it's moot given the enormous cost of the air campaigns.

The allies had a surfeit of resources so could be profligate, though both the US and UK suffered a lack of manpower in infantry units later in the war. Hindsight is 20-20 of course and I can see why they tried what they did.

We know of course that the Axis and Japanese were way behind in atomic research so there was no danger of that – but maybe it was a real worry for the Allied commanders.

I don't think anyone can claim the WW2 strategic bombing offensives to have been anything but a qualified success.

Correct; they were massively expensive in men and machines and the actual strategic impact is debatable.

Perhaps the Oil Plan or the plan to destroy aircraft production had a impact but I think it's moot given the enormous cost of the air campaigns.

Per the Air Force's own post-war analysis the damage inflicted was significant but was not decisive during the war; if the war had last another couple of years the damage would have had much more impact on German production. The damage done to Japan had more impact but then Japan started with a smaller industrial base. I can dig up the report if you are interested.

-Will

If this were true I would imagine that given two more years might have seen the Axis fielding an atomic bomb and all sorts of sophisticated weapons.

Except the Allies would already have the bomb and would be producing equally sophisticated weapons.

-Will

But… the amount of production of german war material was highest as ever when the bombers increase their attacks…
There were also so many "mistakes" in bombing own troops by the Allied…

Are you sure the Aerial Bombing reduce so many time in WW2?…

Amicalement
Armand

The German war production increased after the start of the bombing offensive because Hitler finally gave in and ordered full industrial mobilization.

What this whole argument ignores is that the bombing offensive was effective enough to tie down the Luftwaffe to the defense of the Reich, allowing the Allies to establish aerial supremacy over the battlefields in Western Europe and aerial superiority over the Eastern Front.

But… the Lufwaffe lost moslty of their capacity in the East… when they tried to move to the West… it was an skeleton of what once was…"

Amicalement
Armand

It is true that LW fighter groups were withdrawn to counter the bombers and that they were decimated in so doing.

However, I suspect the same or better results could have been achieved by Allied fighters and tactical bombers over the and behind front lines.

Leaving aside the issue of German [and French, Polish, Dutch, Belgian etc.] civilians the cost of the bombing campaigns was enormous.

I think with hindsight few would follow the same strategy again.

Bottom line is that despite all of the bombing efforts, on VE-day the Germans still had plenty of aircraft sitting around waiting for action; but they had neither fuel nor pilots to fly them. And those effects were mostly due to the effects of Eastern Front attrition.

-Will

"…they had neither fuel nor pilots to fly them…"

Lack of targets too!… (smile)

Amicalement
Armand

Tango01,

"But… the amount of production of german war material was highest as ever when the bombers increase their attacks…
There were also so many "mistakes" in bombing own troops by the Allied…"

The enemy were now at their gates. Any human would try and work so much harder. Unfortunately, many of those who were working at the time were conquered people impressed into service as slave labor. I hope to never experience such a thing in my lifetime. Especially, as a German, if I were about to reap the whirlwind.

The story I remember best from the accounts of WW II was when a B-17 returned from a bombing mission with cannon projectiles within its fuel cells. The ground crew could not understand why they did not explode on contact and destroy the aircraft with all souls on-board.

The projectiles were cut open to check the explosive charge inside. Instead of an explosive charge they found a note from the slave laborers." We are sorry, but this is all we can do for now." God Bless them!

Recommend "Strategy for Defeat" by Williamson Murray: a well presented statistical analysis of the Luftwaffe's experience in WW2.

The LW was destroyed in the West, not in the East. IIRC, something like two-thirds of LW aircraft losses – even as early as the years 1942/1943 – occurred in the West. The contraction of the LW presence in the East was the result of a steady succession of both fighter and bomber (for conversion to fighters) units being withdrawn to reinforce air defense over the German homeland.

Also worthy of note, about one-third of all German artillery and ammunition production was consumed by the Flak arm in defense of Reich air space.

FWIW.

B

There is a generally accepted conclusion that one of the most important effects of the strategic bombing campaign was the men and material that had to be diverted to fight against it.