GreenLeader | 27 Sep 2016 8:09 a.m. PST |
Was there ever really a chance of this happening and (if so) why didn't it? One would have thought that Franco's regime was a perfect fit for Germany and Italy and, given that they had helped him win the Civil War, surely they must have expected some sort of quid pro quo? Or was Spain still in such a mess after the Civil War that even the prospect of snatching Gibraltar was not enough to convince Franco that joining the Axis was a good idea? |
vtsaogames | 27 Sep 2016 8:22 a.m. PST |
Spain was indeed in a mess. Many cities in rubble, many soldiers and civilians dead. The Russians had carted off the gold reserves of the Republic as payment for their military aid. Franco owed the Italians for their aid. The Germans had locked down the proceeds from mineral wealth in northern Spain as their price for aid. Franco excelled at frustrating people who thought they could manipulate the grey man. First he out-smarted the various right wing factions backing him, each who thought him a cipher. He would go on to do the same with Hitler and Mussolini. Having just spent 3 years at war, he didn't relish getting into another one. |
Andy ONeill | 27 Sep 2016 8:27 a.m. PST |
Spain was poor, militarily weak and in no position to change that much. Franco was much more shrewd than Mussolini. The regime may have been a good fit but Spain had little resources and much to lose. As it was they sent 45000 volunteers and a fair bit of materiel. This was probably more valuable than what they could have contributed if they joined Axis in full. |
79thPA | 27 Sep 2016 8:28 a.m. PST |
Spain was still reeling from the civil war and economically, militarily and politically, it was still a mess. Spain and the Spanish people were not prepared for another war, nor was there anything of substance to be gained by doing so. |
Dogged | 27 Sep 2016 8:35 a.m. PST |
IIRC Franco wanted to grab the whole French north Africa, and Hitler did not want to (further) alienate the (Vichy) French who having been so could still be dangerous. A Free French north Africa in 1940 could have been much of a headache, too much territory to cover, easy landings for the Allies, not to talk about the Spanish mainland… Simply put, what Franco wanted made it a bad deal, not worth. Spain's army was not reliable to put it against the British (I'd say it rated far below the Italian because of its lack of means) and the results of the SCW were already alienating some in the victor's side (Carlists, disillusioned monarchists…). I guess Franco wanted so much to make up for the risk Spain would be taking if entering on Germany's side. |
Winston Smith | 27 Sep 2016 8:42 a.m. PST |
It's possible that Franco made such a high price deliberately, so Hitler would reject it. As said above, there were many mores reasons NOT to join the Axis than to join it. What did Machiavelli say about the "gratitude of Princes"? |
mwindsorfw | 27 Sep 2016 8:49 a.m. PST |
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79thPA | 27 Sep 2016 9:01 a.m. PST |
John, I tend to agree with that. Franco didn't want to give AH a flat out "no" but, rather, he made the ante too high, so AH passed on the deal. |
wminsing | 27 Sep 2016 9:04 a.m. PST |
Early in the war Spain was in no real position to help; as others have said, the Civil War was extremely destructive. Later in the war, the Spanish DID send a force (the 'Blue Division', technically volunteers) to fight against the Soviets, and there was other material aid. But even by 1942 Axis prospects were dimming, so Franco probably had second thoughts about going any further. -Will |
Winston Smith | 27 Sep 2016 9:09 a.m. PST |
The Blue Division was a perfect opportunity to ship off the politically fanatic element and get them out of Franco's hair. Hopefully they would get themselves killed in the bargain. Then, back home, honor them with impressive ceremonies. |
Timbo W | 27 Sep 2016 9:28 a.m. PST |
If I remember, Hitler said he'd prefer to have a tooth pulled out rather than negotiate with Franco again… |
Veteran Cosmic Rocker | 27 Sep 2016 9:44 a.m. PST |
I thought Churchill/British Govt paid Franco something in the order of £800.00 GBPm to stay out of the war…I seem to remember reading this only a few weeks ago…? That would have been a big incentive with the mess Spain was in. |
gunnerphil | 27 Sep 2016 10:06 a.m. PST |
Franco was not a fascist. He was a just nasty piece of work and used the fascist party to achieve his ends, he supported Franco and that it. So there was no gain for him in joining Axis powers. Blue Division was a good way to remove enemies on the right. |
VVV reply | 27 Sep 2016 10:23 a.m. PST |
Well not quite £800.00 GBPm, but its still an interesting story link |
robert piepenbrink | 27 Sep 2016 10:44 a.m. PST |
My reading is that Franco was brighter than Hitler or Mussolini--or Tojo, or a number of rulers our our side, come to that. You don't get to be the youngest non-royal general in Spanish history by backing losers, and he never did. |
wminsing | 27 Sep 2016 10:49 a.m. PST |
Excellent points on the Blue Division being an excellent way to dispose of 'frenemies' in the Spanish government. -Will |
Tango01 | 27 Sep 2016 11:27 a.m. PST |
Franco ask for too much (French North Africa)… and he lost the oportunity of Gibraltar… Hitler also!… The Italian invation of Greece change Hitler plans… At the end… they have been more useful for the Axis as "neutrals"… It is said that Hitler scape throught Spain to Argentina!… (smile) Amicalement Armand
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Weasel | 27 Sep 2016 12:23 p.m. PST |
Franco was a terrible person but he wasn't dumb. The impression I've gotten from Spanish friends is that Franco's grip on power was nowhere near as tight as we tend to imagine, especially within a year or two of the war closing. A major commitment to a foreign war, when your country is in ruins is an excellent way for people to suddenly remember their anarchist ideals and where they buried those Mausers. |
Gaz0045 | 27 Sep 2016 12:38 p.m. PST |
There was active resistance against Franco and anti guerrilla patrols into the 1970's…..longer if you include ETA in the mix. |
Mark 1 | 27 Sep 2016 1:35 p.m. PST |
Gaz has added an issue that was not well reflected in most of the comments above. Yes, Spain was exhausted after the Civil War. Yes, Franco asked for too much, and in particular his territorial desires in North Africa conflicted with Hitler's interest in keeping Vichy France viable and as non-aligned (to the allies) as possible. Yes Spain was a poor country and industrially underdeveloped by 20th Century western European standards. But … as important as any of that was, we must also remember that Franco's hold on Spain was tenuous in 1940/41/42. His primary interest was in strengthening his own grip on Spain. The Spanish Civil War had MANY factions. It was a many sided affair, not a two sided affair. Even the factions that allied with Franco were not actual allies. So when his side won, he was still at risk from the other victors. Expanding Spanish territory, sharing in the spoils of victory, or beating back the Russians (a LONG way to go to find an enemy!) were all of relatively low interest compared with consolidating his position on the Iberian Peninsula. The Blue Division was indeed a useful tool to Franco. It allowed him to ship his most ardent (and dangerous) allies off to fight and die far away, to stir up a sense of nationalism at home, and to get economic concessions from Hitler all in one. Franco definitely got the best part of that deal. It's not at all clear if Spain would have been a benefit to Hitler if Franco did enter on the Axis side. Certainly taking, or even just neutralizing Gibralter would have helped the Axis cause. But Spain was unlikely to manage that on their own, and Germany was not exactly overflowing with un-engaged military resources to put on the task. Beyond the specific question of Gibralter, the Nazi regime was shockingly incompetent in managing coalition warfare. Most of Germany's allies were net drains on Germany's economy. The Nazis didn't any sort of coordinated approach to driving the manufacture of critical and useful warstuffs from suppliers in allied countries. And the manpower the allied countries provided was of significantly lower combat value, as the Nazis never managed to build enough of anything to adequately supply their own forces, much less the forces of their allies. -Mark (aka: Mk 1) |
freerangeegg | 27 Sep 2016 2:05 p.m. PST |
Franco was not convinced of Germany's ultimate victory and was well aware that if he came in on the side of the axis and allowed hitler to attack Gibralter from Spain, he would lose the Canary Islands and the Balearics and he deliberately demanded a price he knew Hitler would not pay to be able to back out gracefully.. |
Patrick R | 27 Sep 2016 2:08 p.m. PST |
1) Franco needed to consolidate power. There were still quite a few young wolves who thought the Caudillio wasn't quite up to their standards (most ended up as volunteers on the Eastern Front) as well as a strong resistance movement that needed to be taken out. 2) Franco wasn't a fascist, he was nominally Carlist, but above all he was a deeply conservative, anti-communist power grabber. Franco above all believed in himself and played everyone, including the Carlists and the church and was even able to charm some of the left to give up the struggle for "the common good" while those that refused got the old "teeth, meet rifle-butt" method. 3) Spain was an economic wasteland, it had been the sick man of Europe since the 18th century. The Civil War had decimated the population and ruined much of the infrastructure. You only need to look at places like Extremadura (lit. "Extreme hardship") which made the dustbowlers and the inhabitants of the Appalachians look like kings in comparison. 4) Franco did consider joining the Axis, but he wanted to make sure he'd get as much as possible for it in return, demands that might antagonize Vichy and Rome, whom Hitler still regarded as more suitable allies. On the Allied side, Spain depended strongly on US oil imports and antagonizing the British would be counter-productive. If he went to war, he'd need guarantees that would compensate for the loss of trade with Allied nations. 5) The Spanish military was even worse off than the Romanians and Hungarians. Franco demobilized most of the army after the Civil War, what was left lacked modern equipment. Getting the Spanish into fighting condition would have been a drain on Axis resources at best. All things considered, Spain's contributions would have had very little effect on WWII. The only real benefit for the Axis would be passage to attack Gibraltar. Franco was probably very keenly aware that if he threw in his lot with Berlin and Rome, he'd never survive an Allied victory, even if the Allies never invaded Spain, they would simply be squeezed into submission. Franco was a survivor, and he probably was the most successful European dictator of the 20th century. |
robert piepenbrink | 27 Sep 2016 3:06 p.m. PST |
Tango, ask yourself where Franco would have wound up if he'd taken the Gibraltar "opportunity." The word in English for attractive things which will kill you is usually "trap" or "poison." If there had been no anti-Franco resistance, and if the Spanish army had been up for another war, it wasn't nearly enough to tilt WWII toward the Axis once Hitler and Tojo had managed to bring Russia and America in on the Allied side. Rewards of the sort Hitler was offering aren't worth anything when you can see that even if Hitler's word was good, he'd never live to pay you off. |
Mark 1 | 27 Sep 2016 6:26 p.m. PST |
(T)he Spanish army … wasn't nearly enough to tilt WWII toward the Axis once Hitler and Tojo had managed to bring Russia and America in on the Allied side. Rewards of the sort Hitler was offering aren't worth anything when you can see that … he'd never live to pay you off. Quite agree that the Spanish Army was hardly a game changer. Also as other posters have suggested, Spain was in a fairly vulnerable position, with the Royal Navy steaming about un-contested on it's Atlantic coast, with only the Italians to protect it's Mediterranean coast, while the national economy desperately needed the import of resources and manufactured goods. But the second perspective offered above benefits too greatly from hindsight. The issue of Spanish entry was decided in October of 1940, at the meeting between Hitler and Franco at the Hendaye train station in Southern France. (BTW I've been to that train station … it's not much of a place for heads of state to meet!) That moment it time was only 4 months after the fall of France. Britain had survived the critical period of the Battle of Britain, but no one outside of Hitler's inner-most circle understood at that time that the question of a German invasion of Britain had been settled. The entry of America into the war against the Axis was more than a year away. Hitler had already given his military instructions to draft a plan for invading the Soviet Union in July, but did not see the first draft of that plan until the first week of December ("Operation Otto"), and did not actually issue written instructions ("Fuehrer Directive 21") for the invasion until December 18 of 1940. Did he tip his hand to Franco at Hendaye? I have never seen evidence on this one way or the other, and I suppose it is possible, but I doubt it. So Franco would have had to be pretty prescient to base his decision on Hitler's ultimate defeat. I don't suggest he didn't perceive the risk … I expect he did. But he most likely perceived a risk in terms of taking real pasting EVEN IF Germany won, and an even bigger pasting if Germany settled for anything less than full victory over Britain. Very few leaders, anywhere in the world, would have looked at the scene in October of 1940 and said "Hitler's going to lose this." Maybe he said "What's in it for me?", but I don't think he said "Hitler's going to lose this." -Mark (aka: Mk 1) |
vtsaogames | 27 Sep 2016 6:55 p.m. PST |
The negotiations were carried on by Franco's brother-in-law and Foreign minister Ramon Serrano Suner, a distant relative. He proposed the Blue Division project. He was also head of the Falange Youth Movement, though he was no youth. He was forced to resign as foreign minister after an incident involving grenades between Falange and Carlists in Bilbao in 1942. He proposed letting exiled intellectuals return to Spain. This surprised me since he was a confirmed Fascist and a fan of Mussolini. Franco laughed the idea off. Franco's regime continued executing foes by the thousand after the war ended. I heard this at a seminar by Prof. Kennedy, a founding member of the New York Military Affairs Symposium. I forget the number of executions, but it was at least 35,000, maybe a lot more. |
Ottoathome | 27 Sep 2016 7:27 p.m. PST |
I rather put it down to Franco knew when to get up from the table. He had won all he wanted. There was not much else he could get, especially from the Axis. There was not much else he could get from the Allies, or that he wanted, except maybe to be left alone, and the allies were quite willing to do that. Oh to be sure, Hitler would have "given him" French North Africa, if Franco took it on his own. As I said, Franco knew when to get up from the table and cash in his chips. Hitler and Mussolini never did. |
lapatrie88 | 27 Sep 2016 10:14 p.m. PST |
Did the Germans (or British) prefer a neutral Spain where their intelligence forces could intrigue against each other? |
Winston Smith | 27 Sep 2016 10:20 p.m. PST |
I doubt it. That would be too much "playing the game". You would much rather have Spain on your side, even if it might turn into a liability. |
Weasel | 28 Sep 2016 10:08 a.m. PST |
Even if Franco jumped in, good will doesn't conjure up weaponry and I doubt anyone would fancy facing Shermans in a Panzer I :) |
Tango01 | 28 Sep 2016 11:14 a.m. PST |
Imho German prefer Spain neutral… for their submarines… Amicalement Armand
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Mobius | 28 Sep 2016 11:33 a.m. PST |
Follow the money. The Allies out bid the Germans. True Spanish had been ravaged by their Civil War. They had half the swine as before the war and 30% less cattle. Their wheat fields had decreased by 25%. They even let the Allies buy the lions share of their tungsten which Germany was desperate to have. They made a killing on those sales though where tungsten export income went from $700,000 USD a year to $60 USD million in gold. BTW, those lovable Russians took the Spanish gold reserves for their payment in equipment and helping the anti-Franco side in the Civil war. Finally to push the deal the Allies cut off oil to Spain. Spain had no oil for 4 months. How are you going to have a war with no oil or gas or money? |
Old Contemptibles | 28 Sep 2016 3:37 p.m. PST |
I don't think Franco had any territorial ambitions other than maybe Gibraltar. As it turn out it was a very smart move. |
Old Contemptibles | 28 Sep 2016 3:38 p.m. PST |
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piper909 | 28 Sep 2016 10:43 p.m. PST |
Interesting discussion! All I know is that when I play the Germans in Axis & Allies, I sometimes think, "I should conquer Spain and then push on to Gibraltar via the land route, simpler than maintaining a naval attack or isolating a garrison there, to assist in blocking the Allies from the Med. and help Italy's National Objectives." And then I remember how having to garrison both Spain AND France AND Algeria against Anglo-American invasions is an impossibility, and I thank fate that neutral Spain helps guard Germany's hold on Western Europe. |
Mobius | 29 Sep 2016 9:48 a.m. PST |
And then I remember how having to garrison both Spain AND France AND Algeria against Anglo-American invasions is an impossibility, I haven't played A$A in a while but isn't any side able to invade a neutral as long as they pay 3? |
Tango01 | 29 Sep 2016 12:32 p.m. PST |
If you have the two entry points of the Mediterranean… it wouldn't be easy for the Allied to invade North Africa… they ought to invade one of both first… so you have to put an strong garrison on those two points first… in one side with Spanish/German troops… in the other with French/Morocco/German troops… No convoys for the 8th Army untill that… Amicalement Armand |
piper909 | 29 Sep 2016 1:02 p.m. PST |
The more recent editions of A&A make it either prohibitively counter-productive or flat-out illegal to invade neutrals. It's not like the earlier versions. Algeria (or Gibraltar, in games where that's a feature) can be reached in one move from the eastern US in almost every edition I've played (if not every edition), unlike France, so it's very often an early target of an American ampibious assault. Unlike France, it's not usually heavily garrisoned either, so an instant foothold for the Allies at the edge of the Med that can be expanded in various directions. |
Weasel | 29 Sep 2016 4:07 p.m. PST |
In the original version, its 3 resources but I think that changed later on. I'll be honest, I think I saw it happen maybe once in all of our games. |
Mobius | 29 Sep 2016 4:19 p.m. PST |
The more recent editions of A&A make it either prohibitively counter-productive or flat-out illegal to invade neutrals. It's not like the earlier versions. One wonders how Norway, Greece, Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Brazil .. etc. came to be part of any side in the first place, if it was illegal to invade neutrals. :) |
Winston Smith | 29 Sep 2016 5:46 p.m. PST |
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Weasel | 30 Sep 2016 10:05 a.m. PST |
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Mark 1 | 30 Sep 2016 1:28 p.m. PST |
If you have the two entry points of the Mediterranean… it wouldn't be easy for the Allied to invade North Africa… they ought to invade one of both first… so you have to put an strong garrison on those two points first… in one side with Spanish/German troops… in the other with French/Morocco/German troops…
Hmmm. Not quite. There were no French troops on the southern shore of the Straits of Gibraltar. The southern shore was Spanish Morocco, not French Morocco. French Morocco was further southwest, on the Atlantic shore, accessible by (vulnerable to) direct approach from the U.S. or the U.K. But even in the case of French Morocco, the Germans did not have a mechanism available to have French/Moroccan AND German troops available to garrison anything. Any place they put German troops, they would lose the French and French-Moroccan troops. Vichy France was not an ally of Germany, it was a neutral country (that was dominated by Germany, to be sure, but politically dominated, not occupied). There were NO Vichy troops in the occupied northern portion of France, and NO German troops in the un-occupied Vichy portion of France, and NO German troops in French North Africa. When German troops arrived in French North Africa (Tunisia), the French garrison withdrew to the mountains, and established blocking positions in the key passes that proved to be critical to the Anglo-American advance into Tunisia. When German troops rolled over the border from Occupied France into Vichy France, the paltry Army forces (basically a paramilitary police force) remained in barracks (no cooperation with the Germans) while the French Navy scuttled the fleet. So no, there is no basis for anticipating a French/Morocco/German force to garrison anything. And the only path Franco made available to Hitler for having Spanish AND German troops on the northern side of the straits was a path that would remove the French troops from the southern side. His price to Hitler for entering the conflict was French North Africa, something Germany did not possess. It would have required seizing the vast areas of French Morocco, French Algeria and French Tunisia first, and then seeing those territories adequately garrissoned to not just defend the very exposed coastlines but also to control a reasonably troublesome local population. This second point is not be be underestimated. In almost all colonial empires, the most important role of the colonial army is controlling the local population, with resisting foreign invasion being a distant second. This was a drain of manpower Germany could ill-afford. No convoys for the 8th Army untill that…
Spain had two ports in position to control or contest any force entering or exiting the Med through the Straits of Gibraltar. Cadiz on the north of the Straits, and Ceuto on the south of the Straits, were significant Spanish ports. The problem was neither Spain nor Germany had a fleet to put in those ports to contest the RN control of the Straits. Only the French and Italians had fleets that were large enough to manage that, and as much as the British enraged the French, the Vichy regime would not enter the war against them. If Hitler had moved against French North Africa while major elements of the French fleet were still there, or even after they had moved to Toulon, it was always more likely that the result would be a French fleet supporting the Allies than a French fleet supporting the Axis. Hitler knew this, even if the British didn't. That leaves only the Italian navy. It makes an interesting "what-if" to ponder how things might have transpired at the entrance to the Med if the Italian fleet had full access to and support from the Spanish ports. As it was, even without a fleet to contest the RN control of the Straits, the interdiction of 8th Army supply convoys sailing through the Med was a very real danger. So real that they didn't run the convoys for the 8th Army through the Med, they ran them south around the Horn and up to the Red Sea ports. Given the length of the Med and the presence of naval and air assets along it's length, and the ease of tracking convoys once they were spotted, VERY few convoys even tried to run the Med. So Gibraltar, whether the port or the Straits, had little to do with 8th Army supplies. But it had much to do with Malta's supplies, and much to do with the eventual Anglo/American invasion of French Algeria (1/2 of Operation Torch). Malta and Algeria were not about strengthening the British position in the Western Dessert so much as weakening the Italian/German position in Libya. Gibraltar was a pivot point for attacking the Axis in Africa. Given Franco's conditions for joining the Axis side, Spain would probably have made the German position even MORE vulnerable, rather than less. But there sure are a lot of aspects to this what-if to ponder … -Mark (aka: Mk 1) |
Mobius | 01 Oct 2016 7:00 a.m. PST |
Still there is the tungsten issue. German needed it and it was very limited by the Spanish. And then there was the possibility of submarine bases with a greater exposure to the Atlantic. |