Interesting thread here…
"…"The grand assault delivered by Grant's army group in the Wilderness at 5 a.m. is one of the significant operations of modern history."
Not just the Overland campaign. Not just the CW. But "modern history".
As Steere points out, Grant wanted to use most of the V & VI corps to hold Ewell's three divisions in place, while the Union II corps, plus a VI corps division, plus Wadsworth from the V corps, and at least two of the IX corps divisions, would annihilate Hill and his puny two divisions. Seven Union infantry divisions were to attack two of Hill's …. With two more divisions (Barlow's – on the lookout for Longstreet…plus a third IX corps division) available – if necessary – to finish off Hill's already battered divisions.
A sub issue is that Grant wanted to attack at 4:30 and that Meade et al wanted to wait until 6:00….Grant understood that Anderson (of Hill's corps) and Longstreet's two divisions (although Grant had to assume that Pickett was still with Longstreet) were coming up….and he wanted to destroy Hill's two already broken divisions before Longstreet and Anderson could come to their rescue. Certainly, Meade had to understand the potential prize that awaited a successful 4:30 attack….and yet he (and I assume his senior officers) still voted to wait until 6:00 a.m. No wonder Grant felt he had to "ride herd" on the AoP.
Just how different would the Overland campaign – and the CW in general – have been had Grant's plan played out as it could have and perhaps should have? Lee was already outnumbered 2:1. Could the ANV have "survived" the destruction of most of Hill's corps, and still be able to have kept Grant/Meade at bay for the next eleven months??…"
More here
link
Amicalement
Armand
bases them up.
