"Gettysburg-The Last Invasion Guelzo - ?" Topic

I just started reading this book and was struck by two paragraphs and would like to get members reactions to same:

1. Page 37:

"…because orders had to be delivered personally, through couriers or aides, a process which could require up to an hour between army headquarters and corps headquarters, another thirty minutes from corp to division, and another twenty from division to the fundamental unit of Civil War combat, the brigade."

I can't recall seeing a breakdown (for order transmission) like that in any other work I've read. It's not footnoted and I'm wondering how accurate it is.

2. Page 38:

"What ran up the Civil War's enormous casualty lists was not expert marksmanship or highly refined weapons, but the inability of poorly trained officers to get their poorly trained volunteers to charge forward and send the enemy flying before the bayonet, instead of standing up and blazing away for an hour or two in close range firefights where the sheer volume of lead in the air killed enough people to be noticed."

The above is footnoted with reference to numerous published works.

Comments – ?

I don't think either is really that correct for DURING the battle. For the delivered messages, yes, that is possible BEFORE the battle, not during.

The second one is an over simplification of the CW.

Don

Folks I know (historians and authors) do not think much of Guelzo. Looks like you have found a couple of examples of why they are not fond of his "scholarship."

Regarding (1), a lot would depend on the distances involved, and if the recipients of the orders were where they were expected to be. Often, a bit of searching was required before the recipient could be located so those times frames could be supportable.

Regarding (2), I'm tossing a flag on it. A poorly led and trained regiment standing it's ground "blazing away for an hour or two in a close range firefight?" That's far more than many veteran regiments could do.

Joes Shop,

I would agree that the time taken was heavily dependent on distance, terrain and the chances of every messenger finding the officer concerned at the first time of asking.

However, it is attributed on Page 492 in the notes, so I'm already wondering what you are reading.

The quote on shooting, on the same page in the notes, is attributed to Colonel Edward E. Cross who fought in The Peninsular, at Antietam, Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, before getting himself killed leading a Brigade at Gettysburg. As such he probably knew what he was talking about.

However, he did work as a journalist pre war so he may have been venting some frustration in this description.

The are 117 pages of notes in Guelzo's work, the kind of detail that's usually taken as a mark of an author who knows what he's doing. There's a dozen publications noted for the readers guidance on that shooting comment alone.

I'd like to hear some more precise comments from Buckeye's "historians and authors" to see what their concerns might be. Outside of the fact that regardless of his other Civil War related books he's written, this is the only military one.

On the first comment I respond "Yeah so what? This we knew but we also know that the people on the line frequently did not wait for orders from above but often used their heads on the field. Hooker at Antietam managed his corps in action as he saw fit from his perspective and did not rely on messages from MacClellan to do so.

As to the second comment I find it highly dubious and not a little startling.

" the inability of poorly trained officers to get their poorly trained volunteers to charge forward and send the enemy flying before the bayonet, instead of standing up and blazing away for an hour or two in close range firefights where the sheer volume of lead in the air killed enough people to be noticed."

"poorly trained?" "Standing up and blazing away for an hour or two in close range????" There seems to be an enormous oxymoron taking shape here. If such troops are poorly trained, and will stand for an hour or two in such fighting then their motivation is not in question and the fact that they stood at all is a miracle to behold.

I recall the epigram of the Prince DeLigne a famous Austrian General in the Seven years War, where the troops were anything but poorly trained and led, who spoke of facing up to a first volley of unbroken and formed troops.

"Anyone who says he stood for the first volley is a hero. Anyone who said he stood for a second one is a liar."

Granted a neat epigram but with a huge amount of truth in it.

Trajanus: really, you're wondering what I'm reading? Did you read what I wrote-? I have no argument with the author; again, I literally just started reading the book.

Again, the first paragraph listed is not footnoted in my copy: First Vintage Books Edition, February, 2014.

Yes, as I stated, the second paragraph is footnoted and heavily referenced: I've never read an author who formed that conclusion from those sources (and I have all of them except for three in my personal library) which is why I listed it in the first place.

I'm simply interested in what others think.

I found it both entertaining and informative and thats' more than I can say for some books on the subject. Thanks, John Miller

Guelzo is very critical of Meade. Unfairly so IMHO

"…because orders had to be delivered personally, through couriers or aides, a process which could require up to an hour between army headquarters and corps headquarters, another thirty minutes from corp to division, and another twenty from division to the fundamental unit of Civil War combat, the brigade."

I honestly don't know what situation he is talking about. Horses traveled 10 to 12 mph at a trot, so how far away where these corps from the Army HQ and the commander?

And divisions were @six miles from their Corp commander? As for the orders getting to the brigades… it didn't require any twenty minutes unless the orders were 'initial orders' and/or very complicated.

On the first comment I respond "Yeah so what? This we knew but we also know that the people on the line frequently did not wait for orders from above but often used their heads on the field. Hooker at Antietam managed his corps in action as he saw fit from his perspective and did not rely on messages from MacClellan to do so.

Otto: I seriously doubt that 'frequently' is accurate, but even so, the statement was about how much time it required to get orders out… not how frequently commanders did or didn't wait for them.

I found Guelzo to be very interesting and thought-provoking and his book to be perhaps the best one I've read on the Gettysburg campaign. Is it perfect? No, of course not. But he asks and answers many questions which other historians do not. His explanation of just how the 2nd day's battle came about, what was intended, what went wrong, and what happened makes more sense than any other account I've read. His background on the dissension in the ranks of the Union generals is also fascinating. He picks up a lot of details that others miss. I've always wondered why, during Pickett's Charge, the Confederates didn't send pioneers forward ahead of the main assault to take down the fences along the Emmitsburg road which caused so much trouble. Answer: they did, but Union skirmishers drove them back until it was too late. Makes perfect sense, but no other account I've read mentions this. All-in-all this is a good book.

Joes Shop,

Trajanus: really, you're wondering what I'm reading?

Yes, absolutely. However, not in an aggressive way, sorry if it came across like that.

Again, the first paragraph listed is not footnoted in my copy: First Vintage Books Edition, February, 2014.

OK now we have established that we are actually "on the same page" of the same book, I think I can see where the difference lies.

If you turn to Page 37 and go right the bottom of the page, go up two lines from the bottom and there's the word "battlefield" with the footnote marker #10.

This applies to the whole paragraph/section starting from "Another limitation on the impact of" (just over half way down) right the way down, past your quote, to the word "battlefield", as mentioned above.

As I said previously, there is a corresponding entry on Page 492.

If these don't appear in your copy there is something weird going on! :o)

As for comments, Scott has posted something that could have been written by me word for word.

In the nicest possible way, I suggest you give Guelzo a break and keep reading!

Trajanus: understood. I took your comment as sarcasm.

I purchased the book at a used book store two days ago. There is some foxing on that page (37) and the number 10 does not appear.

However, I just checked the notes section again and you are correct: a corresponding footnote is listed for that paragraph.

My original post was not intended to be a negative against the author.

I had never read anything remotely similar to the order breakdown and I was surprised by the authors conclusion regarding casualties.

I'm enjoying the book.

Joes Shop,

Cool, glad we cleared that up!

I think that part of the problem for authors when writing a general history of a battle, or campaign, is trying to be all things to all readers, regardless of how much they might know of the subject in advance.

The casualties thing falls into that area for me.

Anyone who has read a book or two will know about firefights in the Civil War and no doubt, like me, will still be amazed at the courage, stoicism, or just plain stupidity, of men standing the length of the local Walmart apart and blazing away at each other until both sides were shot to pieces!

As mentioned, Cross had plenty of experience of that nonsense, until it cost him his life, and I think Guelzo was just trying to emphasise how dumb it seemed to someone who was actually there.

That said, it might have been a better choice if he hadn't picked a quote that could be read so literally.

What I am encouraged by is that at least Guelzo references someone like Hess, who has done studies of what actually went on at the sharp end of things, for people to read later, without all the detail that has to be crammed in to tell the tale of a particular battle.

Good to hear you are enjoying the book!

The two paragraphs sound like simplifications/exaggerations, but are not "wrong."

As for the delivery of messages, of course it all depends on distances -- or much does. But there certainly was that element of time lag to confound the best of plans.

As for the fire-fight -- there is much truth in that statement. I've read more than one Confederate complaint (no I can't cite one off-hand) that the "Yankees" would stand and fire with you all day and the only way to move them was to charge. I imagine the same was true of the Rebels.

Disclaimer: I haven't read Geulzo

Upton seems to agree with point 2. He had several suggestions for improvement – some were heeded, some were not.

I liked Guelzo's book. It well compliments Sears.

I liked Guelzo's analysis of the factions in the Army of the Potomac high command.

As for the first point, about delays in delivering orders: I remember a case in the Wilderness, when Grant got word that Lee was moving his way not trying to get away: He told Meade to probe to the west to see what was out there; Meade told Warren; Warren told a division commander; the division commander told a brigade commander; and the brigade commander told a regiment to send out a couple of companies as skirmishers. Total elapsed time well over an hour, maybe two (don't remember exactly). And all commanders were within a few hundred yards of each other.

Don: interesting, thanks for posting that!