"Morgan, Murphy and Simon Fraser" Topic

This is the project that I've been working on for a while. It's in 3 parts and this is the first piece.
I'm not finished with this yet. I have a few more things to add, but it's about 90% finished.
Just a couple of finishing touches are needed.
The trees (and everything else) were built by me.
Figures are conversions of Battle Honors riflemen with KMM heads. Mounted officer is by F&D.

It October 7, 1777 and the battle at Bemis Heights rages on. A lone British officer is rallying his troops.
Colonel Danial Morgan realizes that the British officer is turning the battle. He orders a well know marksmen, Tim Murphy, to climb a tree and shoot that Officer. And thus it is, that Gereral Simon Fraser is killed
and the British never seem to recover.

I'm really happy with the way this is turning out. I've built several more trees to be planted on part 2 and 3.
Oh! figures painted by John Bryant as usual.

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This is piece number two. The basic groundwork is almost done. Once the trees and bushes are planted this will come to life. These are riflemen firing at the edge of the woods where the British muskets can't reach.
Officers are targets here and the damage was devastating.

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Part three. This is in the beginning stages. I envisioned this as Morgan's riflemen coming through and out of the woods to join the battle. Once all three pieces are finished it will ll make sense. I hope??
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Ahhhh… the timelock monster strikes again!!!!

Was Morgan mounted at Saratoga?

McBarron's painting of the action has him dismounted directing his troops.

Excellent work, however, and the trees are impressive and in scale.

Nice work. The Perry Brothers' Gallipoli diorama will soon have some competition.

"But it was on the 7th of October that the rifles settled the business. Me an my boys attacked a height that day, and drove Ackland and his grenadiers; but were hardly on the top when the British rallied and came on again with such a fury on a grey horse- a devilish brave fellow; so, when we took the height a second time, says I to one of my best shots, says I, you get up into that there tree, and single out him on the white horse. Dang it it was no sooner said than done. On came the British again with the grey horseman leading; but his career was short enough this time. I jist tuck my eyes off him for a moment, and when I turned them to the place where he had been- pooh, he was gone!"

Account of a conversation with Daniel Morgan in autumn 1782 from Traditions of the American War of Independence, x United Services Journal III, 1834 p.309,)

Was Morgan mounted at Saratoga?

I have no idea. But the mounted HS officer pointing, was just perfect for this. I was going to use the Perry Morgan figure, but this just fit better.

"But it was on the 7th of October that the rifles settled the business. Me an my boys attacked a height that day, and drove Ackland and his grenadiers; but were hardly on the top when the British rallied and came on again with such a fury on a grey horse- a devilish brave fellow; so, when we took the height a second time, says I to one of my best shots, says I, you get up into that there tree, and single out him on the white horse. Dang it it was no sooner said than done. On came the British again with the grey horseman leading; but his career was short enough this time. I jist tuck my eyes off him for a moment, and when I turned them to the place where he had been- pooh, he was gone!"
Account of a conversation with Daniel Morgan in autumn 1782 from Traditions of the American War of Independence, x United Services Journal III, 1834 p.309,)

Did Morgan say anything about the support he received from Dearborn's Light Infantry?

Riflemen were near-helpless against regular infantry armed with muskets and bayonets and had to be supported by musket and bayonet-armed infantry for protection.

Washington understood this and never wanted more than 1,000 riflemen with the army at any one time.

Yes, but if you read about the battle, Morgans men were positioned in the woods. Not only did they have cover if need be, but most of the British muskets could not reach them.
They just didn't have the range. And they could not charge them.

Several accounts point to the fact that the Riflemen decimated the enemy officer core beyond repair.
Acland and Fraser were both killed along with most of the entire Officers Core.

In some ways, Washington was slow to realize how to effectively use what he had at his disposal.

Morgan didn't. And Greene was quick to adapt.

Acland died in England in 1778; he caught a cold during a duel.

Yes, but if you read about the battle, Morgans men were positioned in the woods. Not only did they have cover if need be, but most of the British muskets could not reach them. They just didn't have the range. And they could not charge them. Several accounts point to the fact that the Riflemen decimated the enemy officer core beyond repair.
Acland and Fraser were both killed along with most of the entire Officers Core. In some ways, Washington was slow to realize how to effectively use what he had at his disposal.
Morgan didn't. And Greene was quick to adapt.

If you take a look at The Battles of Saratoga by John Elting, part of an excellent series of books published by the Philip Freneau Press for the US Bicentennial it will show that Dearborn's Light Infantry was brigaded with Morgan's riflemen, with Morgan as the overall commander. The two units worked very well together and the use of riflemen and musket and bayonet-armed regular infantry was a very useful idea. Too many times riflemen on their own didn't work too well. It should also be noted that from time to time during the campaign Morgan also had attached to his riflemen about 150 Oneida and Tuscarora Indians.

And the riflemen were not always in the woods, either at Freeman's Farm and Bemis Heights. Morgan was smart enough to understand the limitations of his riflemen and his overall coordination of the riflemen and light infantry was the main reason for his success.

In the southern campaigns, specifically at Guilford Courthouse, Greene's two units of riflemen were brigaded with regular light infantry and light dragoons. Lynch and Campbell, the two rifle unit commanders, were brigaded with Lee's Legion on the American left flank and with Washington's Continental cavalry and Kirkwood's Delaware company (which was light infantry) on the US right flank.

Employing riflemen alone, who didn't have bayonets and armed with a slow-loading weapon (much slower than the musket) when they could not fight on even terms at close quarters with British regular infantry, was a recipe for disaster.

Regarding Fraser's death at Bemis Heights, it was Arnold who ordered Morgan that he be killed because of Fraser's presence and importance to the British effort and there is considerable doubt as to who actually fired the shot.

There is an excellent section, supported by primary source evidence, on the advantages and disadvantages of the American riflemen and their chosen weapon in The Book of the Continental Soldier by Harold Peterson, pages 38-44. Peterson's conclusion on the rifle, on page 44, reads, in part, '…supported by musketry and used in accordance with its special attributes, it was a very useful and deadly weapon.'

'The riflemen, however dexterous in the use of their arm, were by no means the most formidable of the rebel troops; their not being armed with bayonets, permitted their opponents to take liberties with them which otherwise would have been highly improper.'-John Graves Simcoe.

'Riflemen as riflemen only, are a very feeble foe and not to be trusted alone any distance from camp; and at the outposts they must ever be supported by regulars, or they will constantly be beaten in, and compelled to retire.'-British Colonel Hanger.

'…meeting a corps of riflemen, namely riflemen only. I would treat them the same as my friend Colonel Abercrombie…treated Morgan's riflemen. When Morgan's riflemen came down to Pennsylvania from Canada, flushed with success gained over Burgoyne's army, they marched to attack our light infantry, under Colonel Abercrombie. The moment they appeared before him he ordered his troops to charge them with the bayonet; not one man out of four, had time to fire, and those that did had no time given them to load again; the light infantry not only dispersed them instantly but drive them for miles over the country. They never attacked, or even looked at, our light infantry again, without a regular force to support them.'-British Colonel Hanger.

'What, then, was the usefulness of the American rifle as a military weapon? As has been noted, it had accuracy and range, but it was handicapped by its slowness and lack of a bayonet. Obviously it was useless as an arm for regular infantry, but its assets and the special skills of its users made it a fine weapon for certain troops, such as light infantry, scouts, snipers, and skirmishers supported by regular troops. Morgan himself recognized this…'-Harold Peterson.

"…Officers Core."

Officer corps.

Rifles are always a bit problematic--great supporting weapon, but need to be properly supported or bad things will happen.

Its' hardly new information that Riflemen had to be supported by bayonets.
That's making the most of what you have and understanding the limits of your troops capabilities.
Morgan and Greene did.
Washington never it.

Super I read the Acland was shot in both legs and later died of his wounds. Did the word "later" mean years later?
I thought it meant during the battle.

Washington never it.

'Washington worried about the lack of bayonets and for that reason ordered Morgan's men to carry spears. He also felt there were too many riflemen with the army.'-Harold Peterson, The Book of the Continental Solider, 43.

So, it appears that Washington did understand the limitations of the long rifle…

So, it appears that Washington did understand the limitations of the long rifle…

He understood. He just never comprehended their value.
Just imagine if Washington had the foresight to use militia and Riflemen as both Morgan and Greene did.
Having the sharpshooters kill most the Officers and then retreat behind Light Infantry would have changed the course of the war. As would have Greene's alignment at Guildford.
Instead, he stupidly wanted the Americans to stand toe to toe with the British.

Absolute madness!

Washington never used his resources properly.
His use of Riflemen, Light Infantry and Cavalry was abysmal.

By the way, Peterson is not the only source for AWI information. There are several good books on Saratoga.

I've already posted a source for Saratoga. Did you miss it?

And the Continentals did stand successfully toe to toe with British regulars, especially after Valley Forge and von Steuben.

Sometimes they won, sometimes the British won.

Monmouth is an excellent example, as are both Trenton and Princeton. Germantown is another example as are the battles of Saratoga. It was Continentals that performed so well at both Freeman's Farm and Bemis Heights. Stony Point is another in the northern theater.

The Continental Army was Washington's creation. And without Washington the US would not have won.

The main problem with the Continentals is that there were never enough of them. The militia, which was usually worthless, drew off too many recruits, as did the State Lines.

I would suggest that your evaluation of Washington, the Continentals, and the problems with the long rifle might need a 'reevaluation.'

Listen I'm not knocking Washington as a great man and probably the most important man ever born on this Continent.

But he was no military genius. How many battles were lost because he failed to guard a ford or a road. Simple flanking mistakes that no Commander can afford to miss.

If GW had adopted Morgan and Greene's tactics from the outset, they would have done a lot better in the field.

Riflemen in front shooting officers. Two shots and retreat.

Militia behind them. Again 2 shots and retreat.
Reform behind the Continentals.

Now a leaderless, decimated British troop can face the sturdy Continental with the odds long against them. Why not soften up you enemy when you have the chance?

And let's have the Cavalry strike behind them and really muck things up.
Did GW ever use his cavalry effectively in any major battle?

Reformed Riflemen can fire from a distance into the British
and the Militia can fire from the flanks as was done at Cowpens.

Washington felt betrayed by both Riflemen and Militia, because they ran on him. And that was because he misused them as Regulars, when they were not. Nobody wanted to get bayonetted to death. GW should have know that and accounted for it.
But, he was British trained and refused to adapt.

Neither Morgan or Greene had any sort of British Military training and therefore thought for themselves. Without the burden of British/European form of warfare

Had he used what he had at his disposal, as Greene and Morgan did, his won lost record would have been a lot better.

"…Officers Core."
VA Tory, I could say I was using the current President's pronunciation, but I wasn't. I meant "core" as in core of an apple. Core as in backbone. The Line Officers were the
strength of the British Army. Without them, the troops floundered.

I took a lot of information from this article and followed many of the sources. For me the best came from Morgan's own
account of the shooting told to his lifelong friend.

Check it out.

link

When discussing rifles I think you need to draw distinctions between the northern and southern campaigns.

Like almost anything the effectiveness of AWI rifles depended on the men that were using them and the circumstances under which they were used. On a typical 18th century battlefield like you saw in the northern campaigns the slow loading speed and lack of bayonet of rifles put them at a disadvantage to regular infantry. The haze of gunpowder could offset the advantages of their longer range. Teaming rifles up with well trained musket troops could minimize some of the disadvantages, but it was probably easier to simply send the rifles to the flanks, use them as skirmishers or simply do away with them, especially when the individualistic nature of riflemen might undermine the discipline you are trying to instill in the rest of the army.

I would say whether Washington comprehended the value of rifles or not, they didn't fit the type of army that he was trying to raise and the type of battles he was trying to fight.

In the south you had smaller battles, smaller armies composed of fewer regulars and with much higher percentages of rifle armed troops. The smaller number of regulars in the south caused American commanders there even more than Washington to face up to the real problem of the army, namely that the new United States simply could not afford to raise, equip and maintain sufficient continental forces needed to meet their needs. Minimizing or doing away with rifle troops wasn't an option. So instead you see regular officers such as Morgan and militia officers such as Campbell figuring out new ways to make rifles work. Cowpens and Guilford Courthouse show two different ways of integrating rifles into the battle.

I took a lot of information from this article and followed many of the sources…

You might want to take a large salt pill when reading any of Higginbotham's works. In his 'opinion' Morgan should be credited with winning the war.

I had the dubious 'honor' of having Higginbotham as an instructor my senior year in college. I found him 'unpleasant' to say the least and he favored the militia as 'war-winners' instead of the Continentals. In short, he wasn't always accurate.

He and I had a run-in over school policy which had an interesting outcome.

Anyways, he isn't the best historian of the War of the Revolution and some of his work cannot be relied on as source material.

In the south you had smaller battles, smaller armies composed of fewer regulars and with much higher percentages of rifle armed troops. The smaller number of regulars in the south caused American commanders there even more than Washington to face up to the real problem of the army, namely that the new United States simply could not afford to raise, equip and maintain sufficient continental forces needed to meet their needs. Minimizing or doing away with rifle troops wasn't an option. So instead you see regular officers such as Morgan and militia officers such as Campbell figuring out new ways to make rifles work. Cowpens and Guilford Courthouse show two different ways of integrating rifles into the battle.

The problem in the south regarding Continentals was the same as in the north-there were never enough of them. And the reasons for that have already been explained.

The American effort in the south under Greene would not have been possible without the hardcore of the southern army being made up of veteran Continentals, such as Kirkwood's Delaware Battalion and the 1st Maryland. These were the survivors of Camden, where the Maryland Division distinguished itself.

At Guilford Courthouse it was the Continentals of the 3d Line of Defense which inflicted the heavy losses on at least two British battalions (33d Foot and 2d Guards Battalion). The one Continental unit that did poorly, the 2d Maryland, was a new outfit that had no experience and was raised and assigned to the southern army after Camden.

Lynch's and Campbell's rifle battalions numbered about 150 and 80-100, respectively and there was also North Carolina rifle battalion of between 50-60.

Greene's army numbered between 4,000 and 4,400 and his Continentals between 1900 and 2200, which included the rookie 2d Maryland.

The rest were militia from North Carolina, who performed poorly, and Virginia, who performed well.

@nevinsrip

I know nothing about the historical event so all I have to say is lovely diorama :)

I really like the flowering grasses and the trees – any tips ?

Thanks

John

We are way off topic Kevin so I will keep this to one more post.

There is a school that likes to argue the problem was there weren't enough Continentals, and quite often likes to blame this in part on state troops and militia. What they don't acknowledge is that state troops and militia were as much a result of as they were a cause of the shortage of Continentals. When the British seized Newport in 1776 or landed to raid Danbury in 1777 there was no Continental force to oppose them By 1777 Virginia had raised 15 regiments of infantry, plus horse and artillery for the Continental army. None of those troops were in Virginia to deal with raids, to garrison key points, to deal with local unrest or to protect the Kentucky frontier. This is why militia and state troops were important, and why they were able to get resources.

You can argue that a larger Continental force MIGHT be able to win the war quicker, and that it would be better in the long run to maximize the resources to the Continental army even if local interests had to suffer. Whether such a policy would work in the context of a revolution where those local interests might be willing to return to their former allegiance in return for protection of their interests is debatable. However it isn't realistic to expect colonies to raise and equip Continental forces to serve elsewhere when they are under attack.

The same school likes to point out that maintaining state and militia forces drained Continental resources. The opposite is also true. The initial Continental army was raised from militia units. At different points militia equipment including weapons were used to equip Continental troops. Militia units were culled out for drafts for Continental units, and at various times state units were either transferred to or deployed to serve along side Continental forces.

All of this comes back to the argument I mentioned, that the U.S. could not afford to raise, equip and maintain a Continental army of sufficient size. For an extreme example, when British forces landed to attack Savannah Georgia they were confronted by a few severely under strength Georgia Continental units and a few companies of South Carolina Continentals. Even if Georgia had devoted all of its resources to raising, equipping and maintaining Continentals, it is unlikely there would have been more than two full strength regiments. When you exclude women, the young and old, slaves, loyalists and others who could not be spared for long term service in the Continentals, there wasn't enough manpower. Georgia had to recruit from as far as North Carolina, Virginia and Pennsylvania to field what units it could raise.

As for Guilford Courthouse your views do not match Babits conclusions, and I tend to side with Babits. Also at Guilford not all rifle armed troops were in rifle units.

Just reading 'Fatal Sunday' – Mark Lender and Gary Wheeler's new look at Monmouth Courthouse. As I write the Jersey Milita in combination with a New Jersey line regiment, seem to be giving good account of themselves harassing Clinton's columns (They didn't hold them up much in the end but not for want of trying. A lot of shooting but not a lot of targets down). Also, the Jersey militia made lief difficult in the so-called 'Forage war' of the winter and spring of 1777. So not entirely worthless. This was the role in which Lee thought they would be best used.

As for Guilford Courthouse your views do not match Babits conclusions, and I tend to side with Babits. Also at Guilford not all rifle armed troops were in rifle units.

The information on numbers and units I took from Babits and Howard (remember that there were co-authors on the Guilford book).

And, yes, some of the militia from both North Carolina and Virginia were armed with rifles. However, they were not rifle units and the North Carolina militia failed to do their assigned mission and ran early. The Virginia militia did well, but they were fighting in the woods usually at close range which negated any advantage rifle-armed troops would have.

As for your views on the Continentals, militia and state troops, the bottom line is that without the Continentals the war was over, plain and simple. That isn't a 'school' but an assessment that combines facts with common sense.

The myth that came out of the Revolution was that the militia won the war and that the rifle was a war-winner. Both are false and cannot be supported factually. The militia, as Washington stated, was a broken reed and it took another war in 1812-1815 to finally convince people of that myth.

An excellent book on the subject is Citizens in Arms by Lawrence Cress.

The nickname given the militia as a group by the Continentals was 'longfaces' because of their attitude when called up for service. And a good number didn't come armed as they were supposed to and had to be armed and equipped from Continental stores, which many did not return when released from service when their time was up.