"Artillery having to unlimber in the face of enemy artillery" Topic

Hey all,

A friend of mine and I were playtesting some Napoleonic rules yesterday and we stumbled upon an interesting point. I had set up a small force being the defender, and he deployed as the attacker. I told him to just set up his artillery deployed within range (at the start of the game), seeing as how it be less tedious than actually having to move his guns up into position from the board edge on turn 1. His question to me was along the lines of, "well isn't that unrealistic, as they have to take at least some hits from fire during deployment?"

So that got me thinking…in actual Napoleonic set piece battles, would the attacking force have to deploy their artillery and receive counter-battery fire in the process? Or was there skirmishing in the middle of the field, giving the guns time to deploy?

Thanks,
J

" seeing as how it be less tedious than actually having to move his guns up into position from the board edge on turn 1 "
In the process of moving into position, if the artillery can be seen by the firing artillery and the firing artillery is not already firing at another target they should be fired at as a moving target while they deploy. However, if the firing artillery is already firing at something changing targets depends on your rules. I've often wondered why fake artillery units were not created during the war to sit at extreme range and just pretend to be real. Ha. Imagine. They set up the fake guns and run away so the enemy starts firing at the fake guns. Low and behold what happens if the crew returns to start firing the real guns. hehe!

Counter battery fire was typically frowned upon unless it was the requirement for the situation, you had superior fire power, and was directed by the Art CO, DIV or Corp CO.
Yes the Allied artillery on the East side of La Haye Saint took a pounding at waterloo, but much of that was because they were in the line of fire from a grand battery and may have been the only solid targets to fire at, at that range ( most troops being behind the reverse slope).
It consumed a lot of ammunition for little gain. The rules ( if well written) should make it difficult to damage artillery by artillery fire. It was better to send skirmishers up and snipe (and reason it was difficult to send guns up close).
There are others, whom know much more, who can give a better perspective.

Sorry,…. from this….. is a good reason "fake guns" would be laughed at once the CO of the other side noticed that fact that the group of guns didn't fire and then from after looking into his "Eye piece" he tells his staff…. hey take a look at what Boney's boys have done…. HAhAh!

My 2 cents worth…
MG

Institute ammunition and/or fatigue rules and enemy batteries are a lot less tempting as targets, unless the situation truly requires them to be withdrawn.

EDIt: IIRC Featherstone at one point allowed each gun 10 shots for a game. Perhaps resupply was possible by withdrawing the battery.
Not sure about that.

In my "Muskets and Shakos" each time a battery fires there is a small chance, based on crew quality, that a gun goes out of action for the rest of the game. As those batteries dwindle from 8 to 7 and so on, you really start prioritizing your targets.

I play "Carnage & Glory II" and the computer tracks ammo usage and fatigue. Trust me it is very frustrating to find yourself low on ammo and exhausted when a French assault column comes into close range. The computer also improves accuracy for each successive shot so switching targets every turn is counter productive as the first shot at a target is the least accurate.

p.s. A limbered battery in column still makes for a juicy target.

Counterbattery fire was the norm. Having been setup in postion did not seem to carry a huge advantage against the attackers artillery who deployed and comenced a suppressive bombardment as a matter of standard procedure – these facts should be evident to anyone who studies the actual battle accounts instead of regulations.

Piquet: Field of Battle makes counter-battery fire vs. unlimbered artillery difficult……

Whether or not counterbattery fire 'was the norm' is debatable. In the French, British, and Austrian armies counterbattery fire was not encouraged as it took too long to disable an enemy battery or group of batteries and it took a lot of ammunition.

With the exception of the Russian army, the enemy's infantry was the major target.

Counterbattery fire would be used if there were no other viable targets or if the enemy artillery was hurting your infantry more than you were hurting theirs.

The French doctrinal artillery publication, du Teil's Usage, spells this out quite clearly.

Once you have chosen a range for your models, if you still have some gaps to fill you might check Shapeways (they are a bit expensive for run-of-the-mill aircraft). Even if the models are not available in your chosen scale, some of the designers will resize their models on request. Kampfflieger resized his Boulton Paul Defiant for me to 1/350.

Dennis

I have been "bugged…. sorry Dennis. My post disappeared.

I like this post very much, it has got me thinking.
As for "fake" guns? What about Quaker guns in the ACW ?
I believe they were just logs painted black to make a fake show of force in emplacements.

Useful info here:
TMP link

Something I like in Revolution & Empire are the fatigue, ammo, and reapply rules. They've definite eliminated the "blast away at all targets" mode we've often experienced for artillery in other Nappy games.

Yes, counterbattery fire was against doctrine. Yes, it was the subject of frequent orders discouraging or forbidding it. That alone should indicate that it was fairly common. You don't waste effort issuing frequent orders forbidding something that isn't happening.

Counterbattery fire wasn't forbidden, it was discouraged in three armies and definite exceptions were noted.

In the Russian service it wasn't discouraged until after 1807 and the disaster at Friedland, and much time and ammunition was wasted employing that tactic instead of concentrating on the most important target on the battlefield-the enemy's infantry.

"Yes, counterbattery fire was against doctrine."

I even don't know if it was against doctrine, it is usually claimed, but it was more a rule than an exception.

It depended on the situation. Perhaps you should take a look at Duteil?

You should also take a look at the Zhmodikovs' work on the Russian tactics of the period, which also included artillery.

most likley in case it was ever doctrine it was seemingly doctrine of battery commanders to ignore that and acting as professionals and or mere humans, just when under artillery fire, shot back, there are numerous accounts of successfull counter battery fire for all armies, just reading Waterloo archives by Glover will provide plenty of ocassions

Have you read Duteil or the Zhmodikovs?

Just in case you have not read Duteil or don't have a copy to hand:

‘When scouting for a position for the battery, one must have as a primary target the infantry of the enemy, and not his artillery. It is not necessary to have regard for their artillery unless you cannot fulfill this main objective, or in cases where the enemy's fire greatly disrupts the infantry that one protects. It follows from this principle that one should never engage in counterbattery fire, except when it is indispensable for the support and protection of the infantry. On the contrary, one must have for a principal goal, as we have said, to fire on the infantry of the enemy, whenever they can be destroyed, or to reduce any obstacles which cover them. By engaging to eliminate the fire of their artillery is to consume powder uselessly and to seek, in vain, he destruction of their batteries. By supposing even that one could succeed in this, it would not really have accomplished anything, or very little, since there is still the infantry to overcome.'-Jean Duteil,

While I would agree that counter-battery fire at unlimbered enemy artillery tended to be unproductive, and generally not encouraged by higher authority, that was because unlimbered artillery was analogous to skirmishers as a target--too dispersed to render many hits likely. However, I think the original post, though not very clearly stated, was actually getting at the vulnerability of limbered artillery when moving into position. That was a concentrated target which offered the chance of virtually destroying an enemy battery and its draft animals before it could do any damage. I think any battery commander who ignored such an opportunity would be something of a dolt, unless his own guns were under immediate threat by enemy infantry or cavalry.

From the Zhmodikovs' two-volume study, Tactics of the Russian Army in the Napoleonic Wars:

Volume I, page 71:

Russian Major General Sievers wrote after the 1806-1807 campaign 'that Russian artillerymen often fired at enemy batteries, and that senior commanders were partly responsible for that, because some of them liked to give orders to 'silence the enemy battery.' In order to perform this counterbattery fire, the Russian artillery expended too much ammunition and time.'

Volume II, page 59:

'Khatov held the opinion that artillery should not fire at enemy artillery, in spite of a well-known fact that it was inclined to do that, but it should fire at enemy troops whenever possible. Artillery might fire at enemy artillery only if there was a no more important target, or when enemy artillery caused too much harm to friendly troops. Sievers wrote that Russian artillerists often fired at enemy batteries in 1806-1807 and he believed that counterbattery fire was appropriate only in the following cases:

1-wehn an enemy battery prevented friendly infantry or cavalry from occupying a desired position;

2-when an enemy battery prevented passage through a defile;

3-when one intended to attack an enemy battery, then artillery had to fire on the enemy battery to divert its attention from attacking enemy troops;

4-when making a breach in an enemy fortification.

In all other cases, artillery was to fire at enemy lines and columns, trying to enfilage them or to fire obliquely. Both Stolypin and Gogel wrote, that in general, artillery was to avoid counterbattery fire, and that, when friendly troops were on the devensive, artillery should concentrate its fire on enemy infantry and cavalry, but when friendly troops were on the defensive, artillery should engage in counterbattery fire. (Gogel added that, when artillery advanced with the troops to within canister range of the enemy, it should redirect its fire to enemy infantry and cavalry).

"Doctrine" tends to imply attitudes and certitude in military thinking during the Napoleonic period that simply didn't exist as defined currently by the world's armies. The word 'doctrine' certainly wasn't used outside the church.

General orders, common conventions, long-standing practices, and popular military opinion was more like it. The Napoleonic Wars were the incubation period of such notions as modern-day doctrine… not really born until the late 19th Century.

Artillery did fire on other artillery for a variety of reasons and there are lots of examples. Certainly when artillery moved into range of defending artillery, without other, closer targets, the defending artillery would happily bang away at the advancing enemy guns. For instance, at Eylau there are several instances of artillery on both sides purposely firing on enemy guns to drive them away or destroy them.

In other words, the cases that Kevin lists above, particularly #1-3 occurred quite often and #1 would be when friendly troops were moving into range of enemy guns, particularly friendly guns.

If doctrine didn't exist during the Napoleonic period, what would you call Duteil's publication?

When reading the book it certainly sounds and looks like doctrine to me and quite modern in layout and appearance, along with the common sense practices it outlines.

I don't agree that 'modern-day doctrine' began in the late 19th century. Like everything else, it had its beginnings much earlier.

some examples brech ignores

Yermolov, Alexey : Memoires of the Napoleonic Wars

(Eylau) I opened fire and set this village on fire, driving out the enemy infantry that harassed my guns. Then I directed my fire against the enemy batteries and held my ground for two hours.
P. 88

Our artillery was under fire the entire day, and if our hussars had not captured some French horses to replace our killed animals, I would have lost a few guns.
p. 80 (Wolfsdorf, 1807)

Moving by forced marches, the vanguard arrived on that battlefield only to find Yurkovskii hard pressed by the enemy and falling back to a small village, the main street of which was bombarded by enemy artillery. I immediately brought my horse artillery company up and, taking advantage of my elevated position and numbers, I drove the enemy guns back and covered our cavalry's retreat.
p. 74 (around Mohrungen 1807)

Memoires of Radozshitskii
My two guns were deployed against three enemy cannon. I aimed both my guns at one enemy cannon and damaged it on the very first shot.
p:40
Noticing that the French maintained reather precise fire at my guns and had already killed another cannonier, I moved 10 paces forward.
p. 40
But alas I was astounded by the condition of our artillery at the right side of the road! Several guns were scattered around, damaged or overturned, and dead gunners and horses lay among them (according to brech most likley lighting had struck, but wait a minute). Forming a central battery, our company was ravaged by enemy cannon balls from three sides.
p. 41

I've ignored nothing. Finding examples of counterbattery fire, especially from the Russian side, explains what has already been posted and definitely ignores the improvements in Russian artillery doctrine and practice that has already been posted.

read the previous umteens of thread about the topic were you failed again to learn anything

All I can assume from your postings is that you prefer to personally attack anyone who disagrees with you.

And the failure to understand or learn about period artillery is on your part.

You just don't get it and that is unfortunate.

I see that Amazon has "Tactics of the Russian Army in the Napoleonic Wars" available for a mere $771 USD (+3.99 Shipping)…you'd think they'd throw in the shipping…

Without getting into the middle of all this, Chapter 10 in Volume 2 not only directly addresses the points being discussed here, but also post-1807 Russian theory on how to handle the original poster's question.

Now about everyone else…that's up to you.

You don't issue rules forbidding something that is not being done.
And if you keep issuing these rules, it usually means that someone keeps doing it.
Sometimes, it's the commander (or wargamer) trying to look busy.
"Fire those guns! The men need encouragement!"

Heck, once you have used up your +1 for first fire….

What punishment would an artillery commander face for firing at the enemy?

Or more to the point, the general who ordered the battery to fire at annoying enemy artillery?

Seems like we have gotten way off from the original question of how dangerous was it for artillery to deploy within range of an enemy battery. Sounds like it must not have been that big of a deal.
1) The amount of time it took for an opposing battery to sight in a new target probably equaled the amount of time to deploy and send equipment and horses to the rear reducing potential damage.
2) Enemy artillery was not the preferred target which made it somewhat safer.
3) The many instances of counter battery fire cited means it (meaning deploying within range, not counter battery fire itself) happened fairly often.

When reading the book it certainly sounds and looks like doctrine to me and quite modern in layout and appearance, along with the common sense practices it outlines.

I am sure it does read that way. So does Ney's Instructions, Brunswick's Instructions, Marmont's Instructions, Wellingtons General Orders, Davout's Instructions, Etc. etc. etc. Kutuzov's instructions for Jaegers and light infantry reads like doctrine, but it wasn't used uniformly throughout the Russian army at any point in time. The same is true of Ayde's artillery book or Ney's Instructions… In fact, why should any of those have been written if there were uniform doctrines in place???

From what I understand from the current use of the word in military circles, doctrines are those practices and methods trained and used uniformly throughout the army. DeTeil certainly wrote respected works about artillery practices, but so did several respected authors, not all of whom DeTeil agreed with.

Now, if we saw that the French army identified DeTeil's works as the ones to be followed, his precepts trained, organized around and his tactical methodologies carried out on the battlefield, then I would say that his work was French doctrine.

We don't see that. Infantry regulations were written, but then rewritten by corps and army commanders throughout the wars. It was seen as their prerogative. The same was true of artillery and cavalry.

Most regulations were 'schools' for the soldier, company and battalion. At the beginning of the Revolution and Napoleonic wars, there was no regularity in military practices…across the entire European landscape. You see great efforts to make even the regulations uniform, with only partial success.

So that got me thinking…in actual Napoleonic set piece battles, would the attacking force have to deploy their artillery and receive counter-battery fire in the process? Or was there skirmishing in the middle of the field, giving the guns time to deploy?

And the answer would be yes to both, depending on the tactical situation.

Seems like we have gotten way off from the original question of how dangerous was it for artillery to deploy within range of an enemy battery. Sounds like it must not have been that big of a deal.

davbenbak:
I agree. How many times did Wellington order his artillery not to fire on enemy artillery, only to complain that it was done and order it again the next battle. Often, artillery were ordered to a position, but then left to chose targets as they wished.

I see that Amazon has "Tactics of the Russian Army in the Napoleonic Wars" available for a mere $771 USD USD (+3.99 Shipping)…you'd think they'd throw in the shipping…

Ugh! I got them from Nafgizer for $12. USD

Without getting into the middle of all this, Chapter 10 in Volume 2 not only directly addresses the points being discussed here, but also post-1807 Russian theory on how to handle the original poster's question.

jeffreyw3:

I think you mean Chapter 11, 'Theory, Instructions and Training.' Chapter 10 only deals with Ammo and equipment. But considering possible uniform practices and doctrine and what artillery would do, the chapter is a good example.

In Chapter 11, the authors, the brothers Zhmodikov, relate the ideas and "opinions" and "advice" of several officers, Khatov, Gogel, Sievers. They quote extensively from Kutaisov's General Rules for Artillery in a Field Battle written in 1812 for the 1st Western Army. They end the chapter by noting:

As in the previous period [1795-1809], artillerists were mainly trained by their companies. N.E. Mitarevskii, a junior officer in the 12th Light Artillery Company in 1812…describes, in his memoirs, how, in the beginning of the 1812 campaign, General V.G. Kosteneskii, commander of the artillery of the 6th Infantry Corps, taught artillerists how to fire cannister at an advancing enemy, especially cavalry, at a close range. He wrote,"In this case, one does not need to aim using a dioptre, and for rapid fire, one need only look from behind [the barrel] and to aim along it.

So, doctrine was whatever your commander[s] wanted or trained you to do in a particular year. The instructions issued by Kutuzov "For the Day of Battle" in 1812 was then modified or negated by the commanders of the first and second army with their own instructions, which in turn were….

Lots of practical information was passed around, instructed and/or ordered to be followed, but it wasn't doctrine.

Thank you for correcting my typo.

I bet brech did not even read DuTeil De l'Usage d'Artillerie, a slim book and certainly not a doctrine maker – or anything near to modern – nor to any use for a Napoleonic battle field, not without any reaons a lot of newer works had to be published but in the end – the French artillery found out itself – how to act on the battle feild.

I agree that a battery when deloying or unlimbering is a juicy target not only for guns but also limbers and ammunition carriages.

I bet brech did not even read DuTeil De l'Usage d'Artillerie…

Then you would lose your bet. I have the volume in both French and English and have used it extensively since 2003.

Where do you think I found the quotation from Duteil that I posted?

Perhaps you should stop posting trumpery and nonsense?

To provide further evidence of the lack of a specific doctrine for artillery, here is a very incomplete list of works on artillery by French writers during DuTeil's period…and only A through D. A complete list can be found in Encyclopedie Methodique Dictionnaire de L'Artillerie by Colonel H. Cotty 1822

link

Albrahamfohn, Histoire & organization du corps royal de l'artillerie de Copenhague, 1789

Antoni Du service de l'artillerie a la guerre, Paris, 1780

G. Saint-Aubuan. Memoires ur less nonveaux flstemes d'artillerie, 1774

Bigot [chef de bataillon d'artillerie] Essai fur less manoeuvres de force, 1 vol 1800

____. Traite d'artistices de guerre, tant pour l'attaque & defense des places, que pour le service de campagne, 1 vol. 1809

Bricard. Manoeuvre d/une piece de 4 de campagne, 1792

Bunaus. Instruction complete fur l'artillerie & fur less artifices. 1779

Clement [chef de bat. D'art.] Essai fur l'artillery a cheval, & observations furn armes a feu portatives, 1808

Cotty. [Colonel d'artillerie] Instruction fur les armes a feu & blanches, 1806

Dulac [colonel au service du roi de Sardaigne] Nouveau systeme d'artillerie fur mer & fur terre, 1760 & 1763

Dupuget. Essai fur l'usage de l'artillerie dans las guerre de fiege & celle de campagne, vols. 1-8 1771

Durosel. Introduction a la maniere de manoeuvrer le canon nautique, 1793

Durtubie. Manuel de l'artillerie vol 1 1792

____. Memoire furn l'artillerie a cheval. 1796

DuTeil. De L'usage de lartillerie nouvelle, 1778

Now, all these French works have one thing in common: They were all first privately published in France.

artillery despite the claim of artillery officers never was a branch of arms which could hold their own, they were usually supported and protected by infantry or cavalry, also maybe forgotten in wargaming, where units should be tied down for protection of artillery, otherwise they could be taken, like Drouot's guns at Hanau – which were saved by French cuirassiers.

Lysser commanding the Saxon Garde du Corps in 1812 writes in his memoires at the battle of Borodino:

Leysser :

„Wir erreichten eine sanfte Anhöhe und schwenkten hier ein, um eine 12 pfündige Batterie von 18 Piecen, welche stark beschossen wurde, zu decken

Kindle – Location 206 of 1335
Leysser, August Friedrich Wilhelm von : Die Erinnerungen des Kommandeurs der Garde du Corps 1812

Wir arrived at a slight height und wheeled in to cover a 12 pounder battery of 18 guns which was under heavy fire

(so a French 18 gun battery needed protection and was under heavy fire of Russian guns.

and the effect:

Leysser :
Unsere Batterie war hart mitgenommen worden, 4 Piecen derselben war demontiert, und die Bedienung lag, ich darf es ohne Übertreibung sagen, schichtenweise aufeinander. Der Batterie – Kommandant ein ernster Mann, wie man deren unter den neuen Franzosen so viele findet, versicherte mir, dass die Mannschaft bereits zum dritten Mal ersetzt worden sei.
Leysser August Friedrich Wilhelm von : Die Erinnerungen des Kommandanten der Garde du Corps 1812
Kindel : Location 217 of 1335

"Our battery suffered severly, 4 guns were dismounted, and the gunners, I may say this without exageration were lying in layers on top of each other – the commander – s sober man, such like could be found a lot under the new French, assured me that they were re placed for a third time."

Now, all these French works have one thing in common: They were all first privately published in France.

Duteil's work was used as an artillery text at Auxonne. How the works were published initially is irrelevant. What they say and how they were used is what was important.

I think what is being suggested is that to talk of the concept of 'doctrine,' as opposed to drills and tactics proposed in loosely interpreted regulations and privately published handbooks, is something of an anchronism.

1-wehn an enemy battery prevented friendly infantry or cavalry from occupying a desired position;

2-when an enemy battery prevented passage through a defile;

3-when one intended to attack an enemy battery, then artillery had to fire on the enemy battery to divert its attention from attacking enemy troops;

Would the above concept not be relevant in any situation where you want to attack an enemy position which was supported by artillery?????

I would suggest reading the artillery manual itself. It is easy to read and excellent-full of common sense material for the use of field artillery, as well as in other situations besides use with the field army.

The bottom line with artillery employment is that the main target is the enemy infantry, a concept realized by the French, British, and Austrians before the wars and finally by the Russians learned by hard experience.

Duteil's work was used as an artillery text at Auxonne. How the works were published initially is irrelevant. What they say and how they were used is what was important.

DuTeil's work wasn't the only text to be used at Auxonne. And the point behind the text being privately published is relevant to the question at hand.

Many officers published works/essays/texts/manuals/advice. In france, England, Prussia, Austria and Russia, regimental officers, colonels, generals and captains printed up manuals for their commands just as Ney, Marmont, Davout and others did for their corps. They were used like general orders. The privately published texts were used like texts in universities today… Instructors used the texts they liked.

At times, such as Dundas' work, the military would pick up a published 'manual' as a set of regulations, but usually all these privately published works were simply available. Paget, commanding the hussar brigade in 1795, had his staff put together a set of regulations for his brigade combining French, British, and Spanish texts even when there was a set of official British cavalry regulations published. At times the authors such as deVerner and Tousard would be commissioned to write a text, but usually in this period, there were few 'official' publications, let alone doctrine. They all, including most official publications, ran more to 'best practices' advice and treated as such.

This tradition and common practice is one reason Dundas had so much trouble making his regulations universal in the British army…many years, lots of inspections, and lots of further texts [18 maneuvers etc.] to see any uniformity in even such low level [battalion] practices. That uniformity, such as it was, was a step towards the notion of army doctrine. [Read Grattan's description of how Wallace 'interpreted' the regulations for his 88th regt.]

No doubt that this effort towards uniformity paid off, but it wasn't doctrine.

How many French artillery manuals do you have or have you read and studied? There are quite a few, but listing them from an encyclopedia does not demonstrate understanding or how they were used.

If you read Duteil, you can see the outline of French artillery employment for the period 1791-1815. It is not a technical manual, but a doctrinal publication that addresses artillery employment above the artillery company level.

It was written to complement the introduction of the Gribeauval field artillery system and how it should be employed in a war of maneuver.

Doctrine being 'the accepted body of ideas concerning war [in this case artillery employment in war]. The acceptance of ideas can be the result of either long usage or official sanction by the appropriate military authorities of a particular service, nation, or political group…After examination and acceptance by highly experienced professionals, theory becomes doctrine…Doctrine does not, however, alleviate the requirement for sound judgment, for the best solutions to every critical problem are not always found in doctrine…'

-Definitions and Doctrine for the Military Art, The West Point Military History Series, edited by Thomas E Griess.

Duteil's Usage certainly fits this definition, which is a 'modern' one.

What special does DuTeil say, any quotes in decent French?
Moreover the deployment of French artillery was for a long time very conservative and nothing more to support infantry – see Austerlitz for example.
The commanding offcier would shape the "doctrines" of how his units would fight, not a book like DuTeil's.

And what evidence do you have to support your 'theory'?

Why don't you read Duteil yourself? It is easy to read and understand.

You can find it here:

link

Cease fire.

As for shots at limbered guns: in the rules I use limbered guns are a better target. It costs half a move to limber or deploy. So it makes sense to advance to your desired position with half a move left to deploy. Rush it and the enemy gets a better chance of silencing your guns and sending them to the rear. Seems good enough without a raft of special rules.