Redlancer38 | 11 Aug 2016 5:59 a.m. PST |
For years I've always been led to believe that, as an integral part of Blitzkrieg, say 1940 France, German ground forces could "call in" Stuka air support onto a target, in a "cab rank" type system. To do this they would have needed some sort of Forward Air Controller operating alongside the ground forces. However,recently I've read that no such FAC actually existed in the manner described; that there was no such direct FAC to pilot radio link for instance. Is there any evidence out there, to the contrary, or that might resolve the issue one way or the other? Thanks in advance for your contributions. |
steamingdave47 | 11 Aug 2016 6:25 a.m. PST |
Good job my opponent in a recent Battlegroup game had not read that- my two Stuka strikes really disrupted his French forces. Found this ( Wikipedia, so caution needed) "The Luftwaffe benefited from excellent ground-to-air communications throughout the campaign. Radio equipped forward liaison officers could call upon the Stukas and direct them to attack enemy positions along the axis of advance. In some cases the Stukas responded in 10–20 minutes. Oberstleutnant Hans Seidemann (Richthofen's Chief of Staff) said that "never again was such a smoothly functioning system for discussing and planning joint operations achieved". [Hooton, E.R. Luftwaffe at War; Blitzkrieg in the West: Vol. 2. London: Chervron/Ian Allen, 2007. ISBN 978-1-85780-272-6.] Not familiar with the author or the book, but obviously he has some source that suggests tight control between ground forces and the Stukas. I read somewhere that, because the Stukas could operate from improvised strips near to the front line, they could carry out up to 10 sorties a day in support of the ground troops. |
PiersBrand | 11 Aug 2016 6:42 a.m. PST |
Each German Division was supposed to have a Luftwaffe Air Liaison Officer who worked with the three-man Air Guidance Units who essentially acted as FACs. On request for assistance, the Liaison Officer would arrange support and co-ordinate battlefield support with the Air Guidance team who would guide aircraft to its targets to avoid friendly fire. Average response time during the campaign could be as low as 15-20 minutes from the time of the request. The system also worked well enough to act on spontaneous reports of the enemy from passing Luftwaffe aircraft. On the 14th May, Kirchner with 1st Panzer received a report at 6:50am that Luftwaffe aircraft had spotted French forces preparing a counter-attack. By 7am the first German tanks had begun moving to meet the threat. |
BlackJoke | 11 Aug 2016 6:48 a.m. PST |
Interesting report, provides greater detail: link |
Kelly Armstrong | 11 Aug 2016 7:19 a.m. PST |
Still, the support required planning at the corps and army level to make sure army priorities are supported and safe zones (delineated by geography and times or combinations) are established. Normally the planning took place the day or evening before. This would place the aircraft overhead in the area to be supported at known time periods. Then the liaison officers could do the simple work of directing overhead a/c to visible targets via smoke or pre-arranged signals through command chain to air force. Army is not talking to the pilot. The Luftwaffe Liaison teams are not talking to the pilot. The Liaison teams are generally talking to the air commanders who then coordinate (or act within prior coordination) with ground commanders to put bombs on targets. Air commanders typically had authority to escalate or redirect daily missions without going up through higher command channels. |
Tarleton | 11 Aug 2016 7:48 a.m. PST |
In the Blitzkrieg book on armour colours (an old book now, that I can't remember the author of!)there is a double page photo of a Luftwaffe Sdkfz 222 radio variant with two Luftwaffe crewmen in uniform standing in front. Can't imagine that they're there on a jolly………… |
robert piepenbrink | 11 Aug 2016 9:37 a.m. PST |
I've been working heavy on the Sedan breakthrough lately and I think the good Mr. Armstrong has it right. German army-air force coordination is state of the art--but it's state of the 1940 art, not the "cab ranks" of late north Africa or fall 1944 France. The Luftwaffe can and will nail French artillery positions in front of an advancing division, but if your battalion is held up by a French bunker, the Stukas are not going to take care of it for you. That would take a direct radio link between someone so far forward as to be under fire and the pilot--often tricky even today, and not what they were even trying for. I think maybe the best game option--given I never want to push more than a kampfgruppe of about regimental size--is to let the French or British defenders set up, then count the air support as pre-game off table artillery: certain units might be eliminated or more likely suppressed before Turn 1. But if on Turn 3 some walled farmstead proves troublesome=--well, that's what I have Panzer IV's for. I hope. |
marcus arilius | 11 Aug 2016 11:44 a.m. PST |
even in Rudels book (1941 Russia) he mentions shooting up a column of vehicles then realizing they where German, then he noticed the brown uniforms on the troops and found out later the Russians had over run the column. |
Redlancer38 | 11 Aug 2016 1:46 p.m. PST |
Thanks for the replies. All appreciated and all food for thought. |
Blutarski | 11 Aug 2016 2:13 p.m. PST |
German armored division relied heavily upon close tactical air support for their offensive successes through perhaps 1943, particularly with respect to their deep penetration thrusts on the Eastern Front. From late 1943/early 1944, a steadily increasing number of bomber units were being disbanded and their pilots re-trained as replacement fighter and interceptor pilots to counter the heavy losses being suffered in defense of German homeland against the strategic bombing offensive. In turn, the decline in tactical bombing assets was very sensibly felt by German ground forces on the Eastern Front. "Strategy for Defeat" by Williamson Murray provides a good statistical breakdown of this dynamic. B |
deephorse | 11 Aug 2016 3:26 p.m. PST |
I spent a while researching this and Kelly Armstrong's post summarises well the information that I found. |
Marc33594 | 12 Aug 2016 6:46 a.m. PST |
Good memoryTarleton! The book is "Blitzkrieg: Armor Camouflage & Markings, 1939-1940" by Steven J Zaloga. Squadron/Signal Publications 1980. The picture is on page 30. It is actually a 223 not a 222. |
Tarleton | 12 Aug 2016 8:39 a.m. PST |
That's the one, Marc. I knew it was one of the family of 222's but not sure offhand which one. |
lou passejaire | 16 Aug 2016 2:51 a.m. PST |
some partial answers in : "Die deutschen Funknachrichtenanlagen bis 1945" Hans-Johachim Ellissen and in the work of colonel Thierry Moné on la Horgne … each Panzer-division was issued a Luftwaffe detachement of Sd.Kfz. 222/223 funk Luftwaffe and a Hs126 recce squadron
and they are indeed 223 :p |
Andy P | 16 Aug 2016 3:11 a.m. PST |
Each Panzer Div had an allocated air Recce squadron in HS-126 which passed target locations to both air liaison staff and Artillery. There is a document by james S Corum on Luftwaffe support doctrine 1918 -1941 if you can find it.Ait liasion officers were known as FLIVO's and the system was set up in the 30's.They were a Corps level asset. Dont forget both the JU-87 "Heavy"and the HS-123 "light" were STUKA's, and people tend not to field the HS-123. Prevalent in area of Gembloux in 40 and Russia in 41. |