"The recruitment of the British Army 1807-1815 " Topic

"The French Revolution created the first era of mass warfare, and all the major European powers were forced to address the needs of this unprecedented level of mobilisation. Such demands have been recognised by historians and reflected in the work that exists on war and society between 1793 and 1815. Yet Britain has remained aloof from these trends, as it is generally assumed that Britain did not adopt mass warfare, and instead relied on a small, highly trained, professional army, in keeping with the warfare of the eighteenth century. Britain is seen as distinct and insulated from the experiences on the continent. It is undeniable that Britain had peculiar strategic, structural, and political restraints that impacted on its military policy. Within the context of these, Britain was committed to fighting Napoleon, and so came under the same pressures to expand the army and address the means of supplying such a force, although compared to the continent to a more limited extent. However, Britain's army peaked at 250,000 men in 1813, compared to just over 100,000 in the American War of Independence, and a paltry 30,000 during peacetime in the 1780s. Such a significant increase in numbers is likely to have challenged the government, and forced changes in military policy. This thesis explores the demands on Britain during its most intense years of warfare (1807 to 1815), and explores the choices made by the government. It then follows the implementation of its policy, and finally assesses the impact on the army. In doing so, it brings historical understanding of the British army during this period into alignment with studies of continental European states, and examines the response of an eighteenth century political system to the biggest military threat it had faced to its existence…"
See here
etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/281

Amicalement
Armand

Well As the Duke of Wellington said:

"A French army is composed very differently from ours. The conscription calls out a share of every class — no matter whether your son or my son — all must march; but our friends — I may say it in this room — are the very scum of the earth. People talk of their enlisting from their fine military feeling — all stuff — no such thing. Some of our men enlist from having got bastard children — some for minor offences — many more for drink; but you can hardly conceive such a set brought together, and it really is wonderful that we should have made them the fine fellows they are. "

The officers of course (for the most part) having bought their commissions.

(smile)

Amicalement
Armand

The officers of course (for the most part) having bought their commissions.

Sorry, but completely wrong outside of the Foot Guards and the Cavalry – and not even half true for them. During the Peninsula War, fewer than 1 in 5 first commissions were by purchase such was the demand for young officers – and this figure is skewed badly by the Foot Guards (44%), and the Household Cavalry/Hussars (47%).

- Almost 1 in 5 officers came from the Militia; an officer could obtain a regular commission simply by persuading 40 of his men to come with him
- There was no purchase in the RA, the RE, or the Colonial, Garrison and Veteran regiments
- One in ten commissions were from the ranks (NCOs or Volunteers, for bravery and/or long and meritorious service) with no purchase
- Around 5 in 6 (83%) of first commissions in the line infantry involved no purchase

To enter the Army with a commission required the candidate to be (a) fully literate, (b) at least 16 years of age, and (c) to be sponsored by a current serving officer of the rank of Major or above. The only reason for buying an ensigncy or cornetcy was to guarantee you went to a regiment of your choice – however most candidates achieved this anyway. Otherwise, you agreed to serve in whichever regiment/arm of service to which you might be assigned. It became so hard to sell commissions that a cavalry officer had to wait 7 years (1804-1811) to sell his cornetcy after being promoted to lieutenant.

[Source: "Wellington's Army in the Peninsula" by Michael Glover, David & Charles 1977 – so 40 years old, which makes the widespread and persisting ignorance about purchased commissions, even on these pages, all the harder to understand.]

"Only commissions in cavalry and infantry regiments (and therefore only those up to the rank of colonel) could be purchased. Commissions in the Royal Engineers and the Royal Artillery were awarded to those who graduated from a course at the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich, and subsequent promotion was by seniority. Such officers (and those of the Army of the British East India Company), were often looked down upon as being "not quite gentlemen" by officers who had purchased their commissions. Nor did the Royal Navy ever practise the sale of commissions, with advancement in officer ranks being solely by merit or seniority (at least in theory)."

"Social exclusiveness was preserved not only by money, but regimental colonels were permitted to, and often did, refuse to allow the purchase of a commission in their regiment by anyone who had the necessary money but was not from a social background to their liking. This was especially the case in the Household and Guards regiments, which were dominated by aristocrats. Elsewhere however, it was not unknown for Colonels to lend deserving senior non-commissioned officers or warrant officers the funds necessary to purchase commissions."