"Nosworthy on ACW: Linear + Jomini + rifle muskets...and Lee?" Topic
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McLaddie | 05 Jun 2016 9:18 p.m. PST |
Well, it's hard to believe superior staff work was part of the answer. He purposely had a ridiculously small command staff for the size army he led. Their inadequacies created problems any number of times during the war, including the 3 cigar fiasco. Certainly Napoleon and Jomini were models for ACW commanders. They stated as much. They continually tried to outflank each other strategically and operationally, sometimes successfully, 2nd Mannassas and Vicksburg Campaign and sometime unsuccessfully, the Union Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville campaigns as well as the second day at Gettysburg. |
Oh Bugger | 06 Jun 2016 1:56 a.m. PST |
I read both those books sometime ago and iirc Nosworthy makes a big point, correctly as far as I can see, that later writers conflated the influence of the two Napoleons on ACW thinking. French victories under the second Napoleon, Zouaves etc seem to have made a deep impression in the USA. Also it seems to me that Nosworthy sees the roots of 'Napoleonic' tactics as pre dating Napoleon by some time. He demonstrates that the use of linear tactics as part of the normal repertoire of Napoleonic French field commanders. |
KTravlos | 06 Jun 2016 2:18 a.m. PST |
Also at least Halleck (I think) may had been influenced by Archduke Charles, for what it is worth. But yes I can see the 18th century logic in the Union conduct of the war. I mean one can see the grand strategy of the Union as one of denying supply depots to the enemy, which is kinda conservative. The Confeds as we have discussed elsewhere did not really have a grand strategy, and I would agree that Lee was more Napoleonic (trying to get the battle of annihilation) |
ChrisBBB2 | 06 Jun 2016 3:12 a.m. PST |
On Lee outperforming his opponents, specifically McLellan (at Antietam and the Seven Days) and Grant, or rather his subordinates (in The Wilderness and Spotsylvania): I think it comes down to the confidence and aggression of Lee and his troops and generals, as against Union uncertainty and apprehension. Essentially, "If in doubt, attack!" versus "If in doubt, retreat!". I've expanded on this point, and how it plays out in The Wilderness, here: link It's a generalization, of course, and there are plenty of cases where it doesn't apply. But I think it does help to explain these particular actions. Chris Bloody Big BATTLES! link |
basileus66 | 06 Jun 2016 6:05 a.m. PST |
as against Union uncertainty and apprehension. Well, after Grant took command that wouldn't apply anymore, would it? |
FatherOfAllLogic | 06 Jun 2016 6:19 a.m. PST |
But doesn't Nosworthy make the point that the Napoleon extolled by mid 19th century generals is number 2? Napoleon the second was an early exponent of new technologies such as rifled guns and machine guns(?) but who then switched back to infantry assault 'en masse' with the bayonet based on his experiences in Italy. As to strategy and operations, Napoleon number one demonstrated that destruction of the enemy army is the aim for a combatant, not the capture of positions or lines or even cities. The ACW clearly showed both sides trying to destroy each other in battle, not out-maneuver each other a la 18th century warfare. Besides the American road net was pitiful and marching was a chore (think Wilderness). |
Oh Bugger | 06 Jun 2016 6:27 a.m. PST |
Yes that is Nosworthy's point and it is an important one. |
ColCampbell | 06 Jun 2016 6:51 a.m. PST |
That is also what I am gleaning from Nosworthy although I've just started his book. I would also recommend Decision in the West: The Atlanta Campaign of 1864 by Albert Castel which provides information about how the Napoleon III and Jomini derived tactics, operational art, and weapons improvements affected the progress of Sherman's "drive" from Chattanooga to Atlanta. Jim |
wminsing | 06 Jun 2016 6:54 a.m. PST |
2) the intellectual framework for the generals was Jomini, whom Nosworthy says was not a proponent of Napoleonic [grand] tactics but rather a conservative reactionary against them back to a more Frederickian approach. I can't speak to the rest of the book (have not read it) but this is definitely true. Mahan (not the later naval writer but his father!) taught military theory at West Point when many of the later ACW commanders were students. Mahan the elder relied heavily on Jomini and primarily drew on Jomini's writings on Napoleon* when teaching. Interesting discussion, sounds like a book I should pick up! *While in retrospect it seems like Jomini was anti-Napoleonic strategy, at the time Jomini claimed he was explaining what Napoleon had 'really' done and why he was so successful. -Will |
KimRYoung | 06 Jun 2016 7:55 a.m. PST |
1) the ACW was fought with linear, Seven Years War tactics and grand tactics, NOT with napoleonic grand tactics or tactical use of the column [rare]. Suggest reading "Civil War Infantry Tactics" by Earl Hess who has a different take on this, both in regards to Napoleonic tactics and as well as the use of columns. The use of columns was not rare and was used often for maneuver and did in fact get used for attack more than most believe. Hess has an entire chapter on this matter. The ability of any commander to coordinate his attacks had more to do with the fact that most of the battles were fought with a large percentage of the battlefield consisting of wooded terrain and limited visibility. Coordinating large formations in such terrain was a challenge for even the best of generals. Intelligence of the tactical situation that was ever changing was not clear often reducing opportunities to brigade level actions directed by division and corps commanders. In the eastern theater, corps commander like Sumner, Heintzelman, Franklin, Keyes, Porter and Burnside were nowhere as competent as Lee's lieutenants Jackson and Longstreet. After the Seven Days, Lee also cleaned house of the likes of Huger, Magruder, Holmes and Whiting. By 1863, the Union had replaced their corps commanders with much more competent men such as Reynolds, Hancock, Sedgwick, and Sykes. With Jackson's death, Lee's edge in competent corps commanders was gone, if not surpassed by those in the Army of the Potomac. Too much credit (or blame) is often given to the army commander who could not succeed unless he had the right men executing his vision on the battlefield. No one knew this more than Grant. Kim |
vtsaogames | 06 Jun 2016 8:04 a.m. PST |
Essentially, "If in doubt, attack!" versus "If in doubt, retreat!". I think this is a case of the Army of Northern Virginia vs. the Army of the Potomac. More accurate would be "If in doubt, attack" vs. "If in doubt, stay put!". The AoP was made in McClellan's image, slow and cumbersome, even after Grant was in charge, to his intense annoyance. Grant's western army was much more aggressive and mobile, while the slogan for Bragg's army would be, "If in doubt, argue!". The army was in Bragg's image, even after he finally stepped down. The war-ending event is the march by the army of the west to the eastern seaboard, almost making it to the Virginia border before the lights went out. |
ChrisBBB2 | 06 Jun 2016 8:35 a.m. PST |
@basileus66: "Well, after Grant took command that wouldn't apply anymore, would it?" Except that, at The Wilderness, it did. Not in the case of Grant himself, nor in the overall result, but in many of the smaller encounters and actions (or inactions) that the battle consisted of. Or if not "if in doubt, retreat", then as Vincent rephrased it, "if in doubt, stay put". I don't want to overstate the case, but from my reading of The Wilderness in particular I was very struck by this contrast between the two sides. Chris |
donlowry | 06 Jun 2016 9:13 a.m. PST |
I agree that the Army of the Potomac in the Wilderness was still the AotP of McClellan, or, at least, Meade -- not yet much influenced by Grant below the strategic/operational levels. At one point during that battle he lost his temper with one of the corps commanders (not named, but probably Warren) and told him to stop worrying about what Lee was going to do and start thinking about what WE were going to do! I too have been reading Nosworthy, and I think he has a point about which Napoleon was most influential on American thinking of the time. Much of the problem was that Napoleon I was being studied as interpreted by Jomini, not Clauswitz. Lee was a big fan of Napoleon I and started a Napoleon club at West Point for faculty and students alike to study his campaigns. But, again, probably filtered thru Jomini and Halleck. I agree, too, that the personalities and capabilities of the corps commanders (and to a lesser extent, division commanders) had much to do with ACW armies' successes and failures. McClellan did not get to choose his first 4 corps commanders, who were elevated by Lincoln based on seniority. But his own choices of Porter and Franklin were no great shakes either. Lee did his best work when Jackson was in command of half of his army. Ewell and A. P. Hill were disappointments. Grant in the West had Sherman and McPherson but was saddled at first with McClernand. The Army of the James in 1864 not only had Butler in top command but had Baldy Smith and Gillmore as corps commanders -- not incompetent, but sadly lacking in experience at that level. |
138SquadronRAF | 06 Jun 2016 9:13 a.m. PST |
This may help too: YouTube link Shows the dangers of too much Jomini. I don't want to overstate the case, but from my reading of The Wilderness in particular I was very struck by this contrast between the two sides. And once the their free of the Wilderness (not a sensible place to fight) look at the difference. You don't bundle anyone back the distance Lee retreats by staying put. I broke down and got Paddy Griffith's two books since they were so cheap on Amazon despite the fact that the reviews are very mixed and there's no doubt – he has an agenda to prove his insight is contrary to everyone else's and it's enlightened. Still, even if a mixed bag I may get some use out of it. And yet the essence of Griffith's argument is that the Civil War was, in essence a Napoleonic War with the influence of Jomini in evidence rather than a modern war. One only has to compare the operations of the Civil War to the Wars of German Unification and the Franco-Prussian War to realise that Griffith was right. Well, it's hard to believe superior staff work was part of the answer. He purposely had a ridiculously small command staff for the size army he led. Their inadequacies created problems any number of times during the war, including the 3 cigar fiasco. Agreed. It's hard to imagine that happening on von Moltke the Elder's watch. |
d effinger | 06 Jun 2016 10:53 a.m. PST |
If you look at many campaign/battles when Lee was in command his staff work was terrible. Chancellorsville was the worst. He had many missteps and his failure to keep a tighter rein on his officers hurt in critical times. Still, he was successful in spite of the failings. Don |
vtsaogames | 06 Jun 2016 11:17 a.m. PST |
One more thing: columns. Nosworthy notes battalion columns used in the attack several times early on. Later, deep formations of multiple lines are used. Longstreet used a deep formation, either a column or waves of lines to breach the Union line at Chickamauga. He used a similar formation to stop Hancock's Corps at the Wilderness. Emory Upton used an ad-hoc divisional column/wave attack at Spotsylvania, which inspired the much larger (and cruder) attack on the Mule Shoe by Hancock's corps, to mixed success. Similar massed formations were used and decimated at Cold Harbor. So it wasn't as strictly linear as the Seven Years War, although some maps make it look like that. |
doug redshirt | 06 Jun 2016 11:20 a.m. PST |
Well when you consider West Point was turning out civil engineers and not army commanders, is it any wonder the ACW turned out like it did. |
Trajanus | 06 Jun 2016 12:28 p.m. PST |
Given Mahan was teaching them that's no real surprise is it? |
Brechtel198 | 06 Jun 2016 4:09 p.m. PST |
West Point turned out army officers and it was both an engineering and artillery school on the model of the French military academies. The engineers it turned out were military engineers who could also function competently in civilian life as civil engineers. And the engineers that West Point produced were, quite literally, more than just an engineer. Lee is a perfect example of that education and developed skill, as he proved as an engineer officer on Scott's staff in Mexico. Mahan, after graduating from West Point, was sent by Sylvanus Thayer, then the Superintendent at West Point, to France to study at the famous French School of Application for Engineers and Artillery at Metz. Included in that curriculum was the construction of field and permanent fortifications, the attack and defense of fortified places, as well as the theory and practice of artillery employment. He was more than qualified to teach civil and military engineering as well as military history which he did. In 1832 Mahan was appointed a full Professor and head of the Department of Civil and Military Engineering, which later added 'and the Art of War' to its title. At West Point, he separated the study of the military art from the engineering course and produced his own textbook. He used examples from military history to illustrate the lessons he taught in military engineering. If you haven't read Mahan's work(s), they are interesting and full of good information as well as common sense. He also began the study of what would later become the Principles of War. |
Brechtel198 | 06 Jun 2016 4:26 p.m. PST |
Nosworthy correctly states that Jomini's study of the art of war was more 18th century than Napoleonic. However, I would submit that Nosworthy's book on the Civil War, as well as his previous two on the Napoleonic period and warfare in the 18th century should be used with care. This volume is like the Powder River-an inch deep and a mile wide. While the author has evidently done a large amount of research from a very impressive bibliography, the text, and many of the conclusions, don't match the effort that was quite obviously put into this book. There is a lot of good information in this volume, but it appears to this reviewer that the author was attempting to be all things to all readers and enthusiasts. That, coupled with some glaring errors and critical information left out leaves the book crippled. The artillery section, for example, is very poorly done. Information in the section(s), such as ammunition, the reference to French artillery practices in the Napoleonic period, tactics, and the problem with identifying Henry Jackson Hunt (who would become the artillery chief of the Army of the Potomac) giving him three separate entries in the Index, all contribute to the impression that the research done here was superficial at best. Further, while the excellent Artillerist's Manual by John Gibbon is referenced, the equally excellent, and necessary, Ordnance and Gunnery by Benton and Field Artillery Tactics 1864 have not. Other excellent artillery references, such as The Guns at Gettysburg and Sound of the Guns by Fairfax Downey have not been referenced which would have enabled the author to develop his artillery sections in the book to an acceptable and accurate level of scholarship. Emory Upton has only been mentioned in passing, and his comrade in arms, David Russell, not at all. Upton was arguably the best tactician produced by either side in the conflict and his absence is striking. He and Russell were responsible for the superb night attack at Rappahannock Station in November 1863, the first successful night attack of the war. Further, Upton's famous assault at Spotsylvania in 1864 is barely mentioned in passing. Seems to me that these innovative and successful tactics should have been presented for discussion and review along with some of the other examples the author focuses on. Further, James Wilson, the famous Union cavalry commander whose horsemen rampaged in the South late in the war and defeated Bedford Forrest gets no mention in this text. The excellent Time-Life Civil War Series doesn't appear to have been used as source material, while such dubious works as Attack and Die have been. While the Time-Life Series is a secondary source, it is an immense study, full of primary source material contributed by an excellent team of Civil War historians. While a noble effort, this work falls short of its intended objective and contains too many errors to be used as a standard reference. This is the same situation with the authors two other works, The Anatomy of Victory and With Musket, Cannon, and Sword, which is unfortunate. This volume is like the Powder River-an inch deep and a mile wide. While the author has evidently done a large amount of research from a very impressive bibliography, the text, and many of the conclusions, don't match the effort that was quite obviously put into this book. There is a lot of good information in this volume, but it appears to this reviewer that the author was attempting to be all things to all readers and enthusiasts. That, coupled with some glaring errors and critical information left out leaves the book crippled. The artillery section, for example, is very poorly done. Information in the section(s), such as ammunition, the reference to French artillery practices in the Napoleonic period, tactics, and the problem with identifying Henry Jackson Hunt (who would become the artillery chief of the Army of the Potomac) giving him three separate entries in the Index, all contribute to the impression that the research done here was superficial at best. Further, while the excellent Artillerist's Manual by John Gibbon is referenced, the equally excellent, and necessary, Ordnance and Gunnery by Benton and Field Artillery Tactics 1864 have not. Other excellent artillery references, such as The Guns at Gettysburg and Sound of the Guns by Fairfax Downey have not been referenced which would have enabled the author to develop his artillery sections in the book to an acceptable and accurate level of scholarship. Emory Upton has only been mentioned in passing, and his comrade in arms, David Russell, not at all. Upton was arguably the best tactician produced by either side in the conflict and his absence is striking. He and Russell were responsible for the superb night attack at Rappahannock Station in November 1863, the first successful night attack of the war. Further, Upton's famous assault at Spotsylvania in 1864 is barely mentioned in passing. Seems to me that these innovative and successful tactics should have been presented for discussion and review along with some of the other examples the author focuses on. Further, James Wilson, the famous Union cavalry commander whose horsemen rampaged in the South late in the war and defeated Bedford Forrest gets no mention in this text. The excellent Time-Life Civil War Series doesn't appear to have been used as source material, while such dubious works as Attack and Die have been. While the Time-Life Series is a secondary source, it is an immense study, full of primary source material contributed by an excellent team of Civil War historians. While a noble effort, this work falls short of its intended objective and contains too many errors to be used as a standard reference. This is the same situation with the authors two other works, The Anatomy of Victory and With Musket, Cannon, and Sword, which is unfortunate. This volume is like the Powder River-an inch deep and a mile wide. While the author has evidently done a large amount of research from a very impressive bibliography, the text, and many of the conclusions, don't match the effort that was quite obviously put into this book. There is a lot of good information in this volume, but it appears to this reviewer that the author was attempting to be all things to all readers and enthusiasts. That, coupled with some glaring errors and critical information left out leaves the book crippled. The artillery section, for example, is very poorly done. Information in the section(s), such as ammunition, the reference to French artillery practices in the Napoleonic period, tactics, and the problem with identifying Henry Jackson Hunt (who would become the artillery chief of the Army of the Potomac) giving him three separate entries in the Index, all contribute to the impression that the research done here was superficial at best. Further, while the excellent Artillerist's Manual by John Gibbon is referenced, the equally excellent, and necessary, Ordnance and Gunnery by Benton and Field Artillery Tactics 1864 have not. Other excellent artillery references, such as The Guns at Gettysburg and Sound of the Guns by Fairfax Downey have not been referenced which would have enabled the author to develop his artillery sections in the book to an acceptable and accurate level of scholarship. Emory Upton has only been mentioned in passing, and his comrade in arms, David Russell, not at all. Upton was arguably the best tactician produced by either side in the conflict and his absence is striking. He and Russell were responsible for the superb night attack at Rappahannock Station in November 1863, the first successful night attack of the war. Further, Upton's famous assault at Spotsylvania in 1864 is barely mentioned in passing. Seems to me that these innovative and successful tactics should have been presented for discussion and review along with some of the other examples the author focuses on. Further, James Wilson, the famous Union cavalry commander whose horsemen rampaged in the South late in the war and defeated Bedford Forrest gets no mention in this text. The excellent Time-Life Civil War Series doesn't appear to have been used as source material, while such dubious works as Attack and Die have been. While the Time-Life Series is a secondary source, it is an immense study, full of primary source material contributed by an excellent team of Civil War historians. While a noble effort, this work falls short of its intended objective and contains too many errors to be used as a standard reference. This is the same situation with the authors two other works, The Anatomy of Victory and With Musket, Cannon, and Sword, which is unfortunate. The artillery section is poor, and he leaves out discussion on Upton, Russell, and Wilson, all three of whom had impact on tactics, Upton arguably being the best tactician of the war. And Henry Jackson Hunt, the Army of the Potomac's artillery chief, gets very short-shrift in the book. He was one of the best artillerymen the United States had ever produced and should have been given his just due. |
Oh Bugger | 06 Jun 2016 5:46 p.m. PST |
I think you have cut and pasted twice so its a bit confusing. Any how "while such dubious works as Attack and Die have been" I did not form the impression that Nosworthy was endorsing McWhiney's take on the ACW. Rather the opposite – have I missed something? Also I had not thought he set out to write a comprehensive volume on the battles of the ACW. I took him as offering and developing some interesting ideas on how the war was fought and the ideas behind the methods used. Locating the right Napoleon was certainly a solid contribution. |
Brechtel198 | 06 Jun 2016 8:38 p.m. PST |
Yep, I really messed up that posting. The following is what I intended to write, more or less, so perhaps we can continue from there and ignore my previous posting: Nosworthy correctly states that Jomini's study of the art of war was more 18th century than Napoleonic. However, I would submit that Nosworthy's book on the Civil War, as well as his previous two on the Napoleonic period and warfare in the 18th century should be used with care. The artillery section is poor, and he leaves out discussion on Upton, Russell, and Wilson, all three of whom had impact on tactics, Upton arguably being the best tactician of the war. And Henry Jackson Hunt, the Army of the Potomac's artillery chief, gets very short-shrift in the book. He was one of the best artillerymen the United States had ever produced and should have been given his just due. |
Trajanus | 07 Jun 2016 2:39 a.m. PST |
Actually, I liked that post. A classic example of history repeating itself! |
Brechtel198 | 07 Jun 2016 3:08 a.m. PST |
Wiseguy! ;-) Excellent answer, though. |
KimRYoung | 07 Jun 2016 5:22 a.m. PST |
@Brechtel198, Have to agree with your analysis of Nosworthy. Too much generalization and questionable research from source material. His claim at the beginning of the book that a Brown Bess musket has a muzzle velocity of 1,500 feet per second alone puts his credibility in question for me. I certainly agree with your point about the Time Life series. I still use it on a regular basis as a great reference for study. A very overlooked and excellent source of compiled information. There is way too much missing from Nosworthy's book to draw any hard conclusions. It is more like an appetizer that should inspire the serious student to delve into much greater research on the subject matters to draw their own conclusions. Kim |
138SquadronRAF | 07 Jun 2016 6:32 a.m. PST |
And I find myself in agreement with Kevin again. Especially his comments on the Artillerist's Manual by John Gibbon, the Ordnance and Gunnery by Benton and Field Artillery Tactics 1864. Three books that are essential to understanding Civil War Artillery. Nosworthy is still starting point for research and no the end point. Of the three I still think his 18thC work is the best, probably because I came across it first. In the light of the subsequent volumes I need to reread and think about his conclusions. |
donlowry | 07 Jun 2016 8:42 a.m. PST |
I pretty-much agree with your take on Nosworthy. Also, his ACW book is full of minor errors -- words left out, words repeated, etc. -- it needed a good copy-editor (proof-reader). And while most of it is analysis, when he gets to ironclads, he suddenly bursts into a narrative of the battle of the Monitor and the Merrimack (Virginia). What's up with that? |
Ryan T | 07 Jun 2016 9:00 a.m. PST |
It has been a number of years since I looked at the issue of Confederate strategic thinking, but if anyone wants to explore the topic further here is a short starting bibliography. Books Connelly, Thomas L. and Archer Jones, The Politics of Command: Factions and Ideas in Confederate Strategy, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1973. Hagerman, Edward, The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988. Hattaway, Herman and Archer Jones, How the North Won, A Military History of the Civil War, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983. Articles Connelly, Thomas L., "Robert E. Lee and the Western Confederacy: A Criticism of Lee's Strategic Ability", Civil War History, Vol. XV, No. 2 (1969), pp. 116-132. Connelly, Thomas L., "Vicksburg: Strategic Point or Propaganda Device?", Military Affairs, Vol. XXXIV, No. 2 (1970), pp. 49-53. Harsh, Joseph L., "Battlesword and Rapier: Clausewitz, Jomini, and the American Civil War", Military Affairs, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 4 (1974), pp. 133-138. Jones, Archer, "Jomini and the Strategy of the American Civil War, A Reinterpretation", Military Affairs, Vol. XXXIV, No. 4 (1970), pp. 127-131. Jones, Archer, "Tennessee and Mississippi, Joe Johnston's Strategic Problem", Tennessee Historical Quarterly, Vol. XVIII, No. 2 (1959), pp. 134-147. Turner, L. C. F., "The Grand Strategy of the Civil War", The Australia Journal of Politics and History, Vol. XXVI, No. 1 (1980), pp. 57-70. |
Blutarski | 07 Jun 2016 9:23 a.m. PST |
Random thoughts - Re Nosworthy: I bought and read his first two books and ultimately gave them away to make room on my bookshelves for other titles. It is interesting that Nosworthy and "cut and paste" have been raised in the same thread. That was my impression of his research methodology – basically cut and paste. It was not so much his raw research (he clearly appears to have exerted considerable effort in that regard) that I disputed as it was certain of the interpretations and conclusions he derived from it. This is not to say that his writing should be disregarded. There is value in his raw research. But, IMO, he must be read with a careful and critical eye (as some others here have already suggested). Re ACW tactics: Both Casey's and Hardee's infantry tactics were directly derived from mid-19th century French infantry tactics. Apart from added emphasis upon skirmisher and open order, those mid-19th French tactics were direct lineal descendants of the 1791 French manual, perhaps supplemented to a degree by ad-hoc tactics developed on the battlefield by French Revolutionary generals to accommodate relatively untrained troops. So, at least in the early period ACW tactics IMO owed far more to those of the two Napoleons than to those of Frederick. In the latter part of the ACW, both North and South were IMO writing their own rule-books. Re ACW Strategy: I don't think that the South had a strategy other than to resist and endure in the hope that future developments (a northern election or foreign intervention, for example) might convince the North to give up the fight. On the other hand, I see the North's strategy as evolving over time, from a initial goal of simply targeting Richmond to a much more sophisticated and multi-faceted plan that combined economic warfare (the blockade), dismemberment of the Confederacy (seizure of the Mississippi River followed by Sherman's March to the Sea) and finally destruction of the South's fighting strength (Grant's ruthless 24/7/365 campaign of attrition against Lee in the East. Taken together, this suggests to me a strategy far more akin to the warfare of conquest and subjugation practiced by Napoleon I than to the more "gentlemanly" style of pre-Napoleonic warfare where a province or two might be conceded and a future date to renew the festivities placed on the calendar. Strictly my opinion, of course. Byron |
John Miller | 07 Jun 2016 4:04 p.m. PST |
In about 1987 I purchased and read the book "Attack & Die", mentioned above by Queen Catherine. Would anyone care to express any opinions on this book? Mine were very negative and I am curious about the thoughts of others who are much better versed on the subject than I am. Thanks, John Miller |
Blutarski | 07 Jun 2016 5:03 p.m. PST |
Hi John, I too found the author's argument unconvincing. The book lingers in my bookcase, but I have not touched it in years. B |
vtsaogames | 07 Jun 2016 6:19 p.m. PST |
I think Davis' strategy was a cordon defense, probably for political reasons as much as military. Beauregard always pushed for a concentration against the enemy army followed by an attack but he blinked when it was done at Shiloh. Aside from that, no real strategy, certainly not like what the Union evolved. Lee's strategy was restricted to defending Virginia. He seems not to have had a wider focus. |
Brechtel198 | 07 Jun 2016 6:55 p.m. PST |
John, Attack and Die is not a book that is helpful at all. I read it years ago, in the late 1980s and found its premise all wrong. You don't win by defending. |
KimRYoung | 07 Jun 2016 7:07 p.m. PST |
One of the co-authors of Attack and Die has even repudiated the premise of the book. It has been widely rejected be most scholars now. The only support is from ill informed game designers who still want to give Confederates a bonus for charging, or some sort of nonsensical "Rebel Yell" rule when there is no basis for it. Kim |
Blutarski | 07 Jun 2016 7:45 p.m. PST |
Interesting, Kim. Was unaware of that development. B |
vtsaogames | 08 Jun 2016 6:21 a.m. PST |
I don't know how nonsensical a "rebel yell" rule is. Union veterans said it made their blood run cold. It seemed effective enough that some western Union regiments went with Indian war cries rather than the standard "Huzzah". A war cry wards off fear in the crier and a good one can also inspire fear in those cried at. One Union veteran said of charges, yelling was half of it. That said, aggressive tactics having their origin in Celtic barbarians seems a stretch. |
Trajanus | 08 Jun 2016 8:57 a.m. PST |
You don't win by defending. Worked out pretty well at Gettysburg and Fredericksburg to name but two. That said I've never read Attack and Die but if it's premise is that R.E.Lee spent a lot of time getting troops under his command shot – win, lose, or draw, I'm inclined to agree! |
Brechtel198 | 08 Jun 2016 9:44 a.m. PST |
I should have made myself clear. You don't win wars by defending and not attacking. And both Fredericksburg and Gettysburg could be noted as being incomplete by the winners not going over to the offensive or pursuing aggressively. Defensive victories are more complete by counterattacking generally speaking. |
Oh Bugger | 08 Jun 2016 9:46 a.m. PST |
"That said, aggressive tactics having their origin in Celtic barbarians seems a stretch." Yeah just so, especially when you note all those Celts on the Union side who far outnumbered those Celts on the Confederate side. I was interested in his use of Census data the military conclusions not so much. Was it Gradey or McWhiney who changed their mind? |
KimRYoung | 08 Jun 2016 11:43 a.m. PST |
An interesting viewpoint: link Kim |
138SquadronRAF | 08 Jun 2016 2:10 p.m. PST |
I should have made myself clear. You don't win wars by defending and not attacking. And both Fredericksburg and Gettysburg could be noted as being incomplete by the winners not going over to the offensive or pursuing aggressively. Agreed. Although in fairness to Meade his losses at Gettysburg did leave his with few options in the AoP. Lee at Fredericksburg has no such excuse. |
donlowry | 08 Jun 2016 2:50 p.m. PST |
On the contrary, Lee had a good excuse at Fredericksburg, namely the Union artillery lining the hills north of the Rappahannock, which could blast any Confederate effort to counterattack. And while Meade had taken heavy losses at Gettysburg, (about 1/4 of his infantry) Lee had lost more (about 1/3 of his infantry), used up most of his ammo, and was a long way from home. Meade wasted at least a day in wondering what Lee would do next when he should have been marching for the Potomac, threatening to cut Lee off from Virginia. Once he found that Lee was unable to cross the swollen Potomac, Meade should have put a sizable force south of it himself (he could cross at Harper's Ferry and had functioning pontoons) to keep Lee from crossing whenever the river ran down. Imagine Lee having to make a assault crossing in the face of Federal artillery and infantry. Falling Waters might have been the Appomattox of 1863. |
John Miller | 08 Jun 2016 5:22 p.m. PST |
All Hands: Thanks to everyone who rendered an opinion on the "Attack & Die" book!!! I found it odd that one of the authors repudiated his own book but I know from nothin about the historian business. John Miller |
KTravlos | 09 Jun 2016 4:42 a.m. PST |
Ryan T Thanks for that list. It sounds very interesting |
67thtigers | 09 Jun 2016 5:59 a.m. PST |
"Was it Gradey or McWhiney who changed their mind?" Grady McWhiney was Perry Jamieson's PhD supervisor. Jamieson wanted to write a codification of the "Attack and Die" thesis that the rifle made attacks impossible. McWhiney made him add all the "celtic blood" BS which Jamieson later repudiated. |
Panfilov | 09 Jun 2016 7:12 a.m. PST |
A lot of the "Good Stuff" in Nosworthy is derived from Paddy Griffith; Have not read the latest from Earl J Hess, but he took at least some of the data in his earlier book "The Rifle Musket in Civil War Combat" (2008) from Griffith. "Operationally" commanders were definitely following "Napoleonic" Concepts; "Manouvere sur derriere" was very popular, look at the Confederate "Campaign Plan" for my local battle of Pea Ridge. Also notable for LOUSY confederate staff work, the Confederate army was force marched without rations throung a Freezing Rain, leaving it's supply train behind. It did not end well for the Confederacy. Things that would cause howls of outrage among gamers happened. |
Oh Bugger | 09 Jun 2016 7:17 a.m. PST |
Thanks 67thtigers its been so long since I read the stuff I deleted Jamieson and doubled McWhiney. |
donlowry | 10 Jun 2016 8:24 a.m. PST |
WERE Southern troops more aggressive than Northern? I doubt it; but LEE was more aggressive than most of his opponents (except Grant). But there were other Confederate forces besides Lee's! Lee was so aggressive, and so successful at it, that the Army of the Potomac became paranoid as soon as it got close enough to the Army of Northern Virginia for Lee to attack/counter-attack. To that extent, his reputation for pugnaciousness worked to his benefit, even though his attacks often did not succeed tactically. The only enemy commander he faced who wasn't intimidated by Lee's aggressiveness was Grant. He soon forced Lee onto the tactical defensive and kept him there, dependent on entrenchments for his survival. Jackson was much of the same style as Lee, which is one reason he and Lee worked so well together. In the West, Bragg wanted to be aggressive but had such poor rapport with his corps commanders that his attacks didn't always come off. When they did, they were violent, but not well orchestrated (Stones River, Chickamauga). Joe Johnston was passive/defensive, so was Pemberton (and too tied to fixed defenses). Beauregard seems to have been somewhere in between, but certainly not as counter-attack oriented as Lee. Richard Taylor, having been schooled under Stonewall Jackson, was offensive-minded. Hood claimed to be of the "Lee and Jackson school," an interesting comment considering that when in Lee's army he had been under Longstreet, not Jackson. Either he lacked the competence or the good subordinates to make it work or he was up against a better opponent -- probably both. Sherman was no great shakes at grand tactics, but by '64 he was not easily intimidated, as he had complete confidence in his army (both men and army/corps commanders). |
KimRYoung | 10 Jun 2016 11:23 a.m. PST |
Here are 25 major battles fought in the Civil War. Listed is the side that attacked. In some cases, both sides were the attacker (usually the defender going on the counter attack after initially defending.) Battle/ Attacker 1st Manassas/ USA Seven Pines/ CSA Seven Days/ CSA Manassas/Chantilly/ Both South Mountain/ USA Antietam/ USA Fredericksburg/ USA Chancellorsville/ CSA Gettysburg/ CSA Wilderness/ Both Spotsylvania/ USA Cold Harbor/ USA Cedar Creek/ Both Shiloh/ Both Corinth/ CSA Perryville/ CSA Stones River/ CSA Champion Hill/ USA Chickamauga/ CSA Chattanooga/ USA Kennesaw Mountain/ USA Peachtree Creek/ CSA Atlanta/ CSA Jonesboro/ Both Nashville/ USA The Union attacked in 10 of these battles, the Confederates 10, and in 5 both sides attacked. 12 of the battles were won by the defender (USA 7, CSA 5). 13 of the battles were won by the attacker or counter attacker (Union 8, CSA 5). The split on the victory's being 15 Union, 10 Confederate (using Fox's criteria for who was the winner/loser) The Union won 60% of all these battles, the Confederates 40%, the split on attacker vs defender winning about the same. As you can see, both sides were pretty much equally aggressive and went on the attack about the same. If you actually research each of these battles using Livermore's criteria you will find that the attacker often inflicted more casualties then the defenders in relationship to the size of their forces. Finally, way too much credit is given to the defensive firepower of the rifle musket. Under scrutiny of the battles, what is really ignored too often by proponents of rifle musket theory is the killing power of massed artillery on the defensive! Just one example (there are many) At Stones River, the Confederates, on the attack, inflicted 12,900 casualties with fewer men, while suffering 11,700 in return. Over 1,500 of these suffered by the CSA were on the final assault on the 3rd day which were inflicted by Union massed artillery (firing in support over the heads of their infantry) which broke up the attack before the Confederates could do any real damage to the infantry that the guns were supporting. At Gettysburg, after two days of attacking, the Confederates where actually ahead in casualties inflicted, but threw it away with Pickett's charge. The majority of the casualties suffered by the CSA in this attack was from the Union artillery. Your thesis is not supported by the facts QC, sorry. Kim |
John Miller | 10 Jun 2016 3:53 p.m. PST |
KimRYoung: Concerning your above posting, great information there. Thank you very much. John Miller |
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