"Historicon 2016 - Presentation on U.S. Cavalry 1850s-1870s" Topic

"Challenged Competency: U.S. Cavalry before, during, and after the U.S. Civil War"

Provides a case study in the Army's use, and misuse, of horse cavalry in the 19th Century. Rather than being viewed as an arm of decision, pre–Civil War cavalry was both expensive and logistically difficult to maintain. U.S. Army leaders believed in the utility of cavalry as an auxiliary arm only in the West, covering the vast territories and matching the speed of mounted Indian tribes. Even after the prewar belief in a "short war" proved unfounded, Army leaders chose not to invest in cavalry because they believed technological advancements had supplanted it.
Initially, senior U.S. Army commanders, such as McClellan, used cavalry in ways that failed to develop or take full advantage of its potential. The Confederate Army, however, did take full advantage of cavalry's potential, and therefore gained cavalry superiority over federal cavalry for the first two years of the war. Eventually, U.S. cavalry became an arm of decision once it could be properly organized in large units, equipped with repeating carbines, and led by dynamic officers such as Sheridan, James H. Wilson, and Custer. Civil War Union Cavalry also contributed to post-war reconstruction and to the removal of the French from Mexico.

Doctor John A. Bonin is the Professor, Concepts and Doctrine for the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, and a retired Army Colonel with over thirty years of service. Doctor Bonin received his doctorate in American military history in May 2006 from Temple University where he studied under the late Prof. Russell Weigley, and has served as the college's military doctrine advisor since April 2003 and an Academic Full Professor since 2011. In addition, he has been a wargamer for over fifty years.