"French maneuver column to line to close w\ the enemy" Topic

My understanding is the French would maneuver in column moving up to roughly 200 yards of the enemy then change into a line formation,move up to effective musket range, let loose a volley then close with the enemy. Is this accurate? If it is did other nations do something similar?
If not accurate how did the French & others close with an enemy?

I'm working on some home brew rules & what I have now is French column advances, has to spend 1/2 it movement allowance to change to line, then take defensive fire, then fire a volley then advance to melee.

Any thoughts?

Andy

Sometimes they chose to not go in with lines but stayed in column attempting to force the other side to break out of fear of contact, which was very effective against less steady opponents or one that has been primed for the assault with skirmishers and artillery. This tactic often got into problems when encountering a steady line and stalled. How often the line got used vs column has been subject to much debate, some generals preferred one or the other and there is a political/psychological dimension to their choice as much as military science. Deployment range might be on the outside of 200 meters.

Cran beats firepower, or firepower beats cran. They sure had varied opinions that are sure to be echoed among gamers today.

Andy, this thread will go on forever. I've been at it 40+ years myself, and someone will have a well-researched rebuttal to everything I'm about to say. My best guess is
1. Doctrinally, they were supposed to maneuver in column and fight in line.
2. If they did it right--adequate artillery prep, and skirmishers picking away enemy command--often the enemy broke before the French deployed out of column.
3. It's not easy to get troops under fire to deploy into line. Someone has to increase his chances of getting shot at. And once troops stop and shoot, it's harder to get them to advance.
4. This is more of a problem if the troops are poorly trained--all those provisional units which went to the Spanish Peninsula, and pretty much the whole French army in 1813 & 1814. Napoleon himself gave orders that conscripts called up in 1813 and 1814 only be taught column and square.
5. Attacks on villages or fortifications were a matter of bayonet work in anyone's army.
I'd say there are a lot of ways to represent these things in rules. The important things are that the French maneuver well, have a large percentage of skirmishers and seldom have the inclination--sometimes not even the training--to indulge in 18th Century style firefights. In fact, a detailed description of the Plains of Abraham sounds uncommonly like an unsuccessful charge by Napoleonic French, right down to shouting and firing in the air--and not impressing well-trained British troops very much. As for what you propose, I'd give them an option of charging without firing--and the possibility that if they did start firing, they might not be willing to advance to melee.

Now watch everyone disagree with me.

I think Robert's got it pretty much right – I'd also add emphasis to his suggestion that this sort of tactical activity does change over the period on a campaign by campaign basis. Each army evolved differently and at different times.

I like rules that reflect these changes over the quarter century of this period.

In fact I hate rules sets that start with designer's notes suggesting there is no "National" differences between the rank and file of each nation. Here is a prime example of the differences that did indeed exist.

I think Robert has some good insights as well.

If things went right, you didn't need to deploy into line and the enemy had already become demoralized from skirmisher fire or artillery and simply backed out of the fight. A column gave you a flexible formation that you COULD deploy into line or square from if things went not-good.

No one wanted extended firefights. They were notoriously indecisive and simply tied up your infantry and depleted it without achieving results. A long firing exchange in line was not how any competent general wanted his attack developing.

I would respectfully suggest that Mr P has summed up this potential controversy well.

The original revolutionary conscripts and later raw recruits needed to stay in column as training and discipline would realistically not allow complicated manoeuvres without chaotic results.

However trained infantry used the column to get to where they needed to deploy to commence the action. If the enemy was unsteady then a charge might encourage them to run otherwise a firefight would ensue.

The problem was when to deploy for maximum effect. If you could not see the enemy you had a problem as the British proved so often with their reverse slope tactic.

Happy modelling,

Chris

I too endorse Robert's summary.

Although I am used to seeing rules that deem French conscripts of 1813-14 incapable of deploying into line in the attack, can anyone point me to Napoleon's instructions (referred to above) that their training leave this bit out?

I usually see this issue brought up in gaming when it is applied to the distance required between French columns. A player may often attempt as much as a 3 on 1 column v.s. line attack. Some rules mandate a certain distance between columns to allow for deployment to line as called for in training doctrine.

One solution to your rules might involve having three different column designations.
1) Column of maneuver. This would represent trained units that are using the formation to close quickly with the enemy before deploying in line. Pro's would be a faster formation. Maybe allow for some limited fire from this formation. Con's would be that it might only be available to veteran or well trained troops and the distance that must be maintained between columns.

2) Assault column. This would be a tightly packed formation with the intent of closing with the enemy in column formation. Pros. Maybe a better morale modifier for closing with the enemy. Closer distance between formations. Cons. A juicier target due to tightly packed ranks. Slower, somewhere between line and column or maneuver so under fire longer. Only available to raw or conscript troops.

3)Column of route or road column. Not a combat formation. Fastest formation for use on roads or traveling to a battle sight. Troops might arrive in this formation.

I could note that tactical doctrine had not changed much even as late as the American Civil War. Maneuver in column, fight in line was still the way it was supposed to be done. Attacks in column, while not exactly encouraged, were not discouraged, either. Of course, in reality, in the ACW attacks in column were quite rare and most fighting was done in line.

laretenue, I remember something even stronger, but see Bowden's Napoleon's Grande Armee of 1813,especially Chapter IV starting about page 62: "Above all, maneuvers of change of formation from attack column to square and back…" (8 Feb 1813) "practicing moving into and out from columns of attack with division frontage, and battalion squares…"(13 March 1813) "these formations to be most important: that is, the attack column and the battalion square." (17 April 1813. Bowden footnotes all these and more to the Correspondence, but I haven't verified.

Mostly, Napoleon talks about the first division--i.e., the two lead companies--firing. There's one (27 March to Bertrand) which talks about the battalion then forming line, but frankly I wouldn't put a lot of money on it. They certainly weren't being drilled hard at it, and being shot at rarely improves drill performance. Note also this is Spring 1813. Picture the post-Armistice battalions, or the levies of 1814. Now, a good 1805 corps would be a very different story. "Napoleonic French line infantry" covers a good deal of ground.

Hope this helps.

I would agree mostly with Robert. The British theory was similar, though they used narrower and deeper columns. Often the French would rely on prolonged skirmishing to break the enemy down, rather than linear volley fire though. This rendered the linear phase irrelevant. This is quite hard to represent accurately on the tabletop, because it is quite slow – especially since the enemy usually responded in kind resulting in a long skirmish battle, which is dead boring, unless you have some form of telescoping time mechanism.
Sometimes the French would rely on shock from a direct column attack before the enemy was fully broken down (Talavera for example)… but this is not typical. They needed some kind of tactical advantage to exploit, such as enemy disorder.
The British had fewer troops to spare so would usually avoid prolonged skirmishing, and so preferred to go with in volley and bayonet. Much more tabletop-friendly.

Some excellent points to consider here. Appreciate the assistance. I'm concentrating on the 1813/14 time frame, French vs. Russians.

Andy

Great Discussion, I wonder if the absence of certain posters has any bearing on that?

John

'The action would be opened by a cloud of sharpshooters, some mounted, some on foot, who were sent forward to carry out a general rather than a minutely-regulated mission; they proceeded to harass the enemy, escaping from his superior numbers by their mobility, from the effect of his artillery by their dispersal. They were constantly relieved to ensure that the fire did not slacked, and they also received considerable reinforcements to increase their overall effect. It was rare for any army to have placed its flanks in impregnable positions; in any case every position presents natural loopholes which favor an attacker. Against such points the sharpshooters would concentrate their efforts, and elan and inspiration were not often lacking at such times amongst such troops. Once the chink in the foe's armor had been revealed, it became the focal point for the main effort. The horse artillery would gallop up and open fire from close range with canister. Meanwhile, the attacking force would be moved up in the indicated direction, the infantry advancing in column (for it had little fire to offer), the cavalry in regiments and squadrons, ready to make its presence felt anywhere or everywhere as required…'-Maximilian Foy

'French tactics of this [Revolutionary] period grew out of the problem of how a few experienced officers and brave men could carry a mass of raw Volunteers and conscripts forward and keep them under some sort of control. The solution can be very roughly described as a combination of masses of skirmishers and small, handy columns. It took some time to develop: Contrary to common opinion, raw troops seldom make good skirmishers, being too hard to control and too prone to unreasoned panic. Competent French commanders toughened their men in small-scale raids and outpost squabbles-termed affaires des postes-until they could learn to shoot straight and obey orders under fire. They also drilled them thoroughly, using barns and other shelters during bad weather. Movement into action was normally in column. Companies were formed in three ranks: A 'column of companies' consisted of the eight fusilier companies of the battalion lined up one behind the other; in a 'column of divisions' they formed two companies abreast, giving a depth of four companies. If the battalion's grenadier company were present, half of it might take position on each flank of the leading company or division. either type, but usually the column of divisions, was used for attacks, once the skirmishers and (later) the artillery had sufficiently weakened the enemy line. Whole battalions frequently were deployed as skirmishers, a tactic dubbed 'tirailleurs en grandes bandes.' A battalion column was handy, because it could move rapidly across all but the roughest terrain and still keep its formation, but it had less fire power than a battalion formed with its companies abreast in line. Therefore a line formation was favored for defensive fighting but was risky to use in an attack, because only the best-trained troops could advance in line across even open ground without falling into disorder.'-John Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 49-50.

'During the first Revolutionary campaigns skirmishers were the French generals' main implement for softening the enemy lines. Coming on in their swarms, 'sharp-sighted as ferrets and active as squirrels,' ducking and dodging from one bit of cover to the next, they shot the enemy's lines to tatters while offering only fleeting targets themselves. Artillery seconded their work. The battalion columns meanwhile moved up rapidly toward the points selected for their attack, usually getting little attention form an enemy already fixed by the skirmishers and battered by artillery…Once within striking distance, the columns closed up, then went for the enemy line at the double with the bayonet; the skirmishers rallied between the columns and kept shooting. That was important: Columns were bit targets and had little fire power; therefore the enemy must be kept busy until the last instant. If all went well, the columns caught enemy fire only during the last few minutes of their rush, and that fire was from tired, smoke-blinded men with fouled muskets, the shaken remnants of shot-up regiments. Striking like human battering rams, the columns smashed through by sheer shock action…'

'The skirmishers did indeed resemble a swarm of bees. If charged by enemy infantry, they drifted away, shooting as they retired; when the charge recoiled, they followed it back, still sniping. In open country sudden cavalry charges might cut them up, but veterans learned to rally in buildings, clumps of trees, or tight little bayonet-bristling knots until their supports could rescue them. Besides preparing the way for French attacks, they could be used to keep up pressure on other parts of the enemy's front, enabling French commanders to mass their troops at more critical points. Whole demi-brigades, especially of light infantry, might be used thus as tirailleurs en grandes bandes.'-John Elting, Swords, 532-533.

Of course, missing in all the discussion above is that a "column" could be a division wide (~ 80 yards & 2 company wide), a company wide, a section/zug wide or a column of 4's or so threading through some narrow opening.

The mental image that most of us have in our heads is of a section-wide column blundering into a long line of muskets, all of which bear on the poor, long column. This is completely ignorant of a very important geometric fact, (accessible to high school geometry) and two real and knowable features of the napoleonic era.

First of all, consider even a company-wide column (4 company deep) which is directly approaching the end company of 4 companies in line. (for easy math, lets say each company is 40 yards wide and do the math for the centerpoint of each company.

..A….B….C…D
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
,
,
zzzz……"a"
zzzz……"b"
zzzz……"c"
zzzz……"d"

The center of defending company "D" to "A" is then 120 yards. The distance from the center of "D" to the center of "a" is much longer than the distance from "A" to "a".

"A" to "a"……"D" to "a"
---------------------------
150 yards……..192 yards
125 yards……..173 yards
100 yards……..156 yards
75 yards……..142 yards
50 yards……..130 yards
25 yards……..122 yards

Okay, you call look up any one of various contemporary studies of the accuracy of the smoothbore. Much beyond 100 yards, they hit little. So company "D" may as well have been on the moon in terms of helping its friend company "A". It's even MUCH worse than that !! The soldiers were in three ranks with ~ 21" spacing. They were literally touching each other's shoulders and could NOT pivot their guys in a wide angle deflection. I've seen arguments here at TMP that this angle was very small, as little as 15 degrees. Lets do the math, to see at what "A" to "a" distance, that company "D" gets "shadowed out" from being able to fire at an approaching "a".

Angle of deflection…."A" to "a" distance for shadowing
-------------------------------------------------------
15 degrees……………448 yards
30 degrees…………..207 yards
45 degrees ………….120 yards

Opps !!! Twice now, company "D" might as well be on the moon.

I am expecting a counterargument that "well, the defender would obviously would pivot the "C" & "D" companies to get the enemy in the arc of fire…" Sometimes. But how often do you read of this? In the smoke of battle? Extend your naked flank to enemy artillery, cavalry or a second column attack? Risk disordering your troops by doing parade ground activities while being attacked? Weakening your formation with other enemy units waiting to take advantage? Most troops were NOT elite or even veteran. I think it would be uncommon enough that it would be recorded as a proud and special event.

I am also expecting the counterargument that " well that defending battalion would have ANOTHER battalion lined up next to the "A" company and they would be able to fire. Not always. Lines have salients and re-entry angles in them. Bunches of trees get in the way (units often establish their flanks on these). Hills have slopes that hide approaches from certain directions and have bends in them that have adjacent defending units pointing away from each other.

So, the "line" versus "column" story for the Napoleonic era has a very strong tactical component to it, that most modern wargamers (who are used to 500 yard machine gun beaten zones) don't see. Key features are the short range of the smoothbore, compared to the width of a battalion, the narrow arc of fire of packed troops, the tactical effects of terrain and smoke and the ability of veteran attacking officers to exploit these factors.

@1968billsfan
You are or course completely correct and there is no arguing with your math. If I were playing a game where we measured and fired by stand, I would definitely exploit your proposed tactic and aim my column at the end of an isolated line.

@1968billsfan,

Well, the alternative logical deduction from your case is that a defending battalion didn't actually need the firepower of a full battalion to stop a column, so when columns were stopped, it was by the 1-2 opposing companies (or equivalents).

The fact that the defending battalion delivers any kind of fire, and doesn't merely turn tail and run, is probably what stopped the attacker, not the numbers who fall. The more noise, the more the intimidation.

I'm with Ligniere on this one. I think it is all about morale not firepower. If that long line in front of you doesn't start to waver when you approach then the chances are your column is going to grind to a halt.

However, I must admit 1968billsfan has raised a lot of points I had never considered before. I always assumed that the British, by employing a two-deep line, had an advantage in terms of muskets that could be brought to bear. It never occurred to me that the very length of the line might mean that those extra muskets could actually be out of effective range.

I'm with Ligniere on this one. I think it is all about morale not firepower. If that long line in front of you doesn't start to waver when you approach then the chances are your column is going to grind to a halt.

Well, I agree but up to a point: I think the idea of musket as firework is often over-stated . What we may see is that there are significant numbers of casualties in the engaged sub-unit, but increasing the numbers of sub-units engaged only increases the number of casualties, not the chance of success for the attacker – which are in fact reduced by exposing more sub-units.

This also explains why a unit in square or column could sometimes drive off a unit by fire: the effective fire on the actual engaged enemy sub-units isn't reduced by that much.

While there were common approaches to tactics, whether column or line, to suggest there was "The Way" it was done is like saying that pro tennis players always serve to the far corner as close as possible to the line. To do it all the time is bad tactics. Doing the unexpected and surprise were important tactics too.

Circumstances, command preferences, the year and opponents we are talking about all have a bearing. John Lynn's The Bayonets Of The Republic: Motivation And Tactics In The Army Of Revolutionary France, 1791-94is a good example. He studies 100 accounts of combat by the Armee du Nord. The accounts of the tactical use of line and column was about 50-50.

At Austerlitz, Soult's two divisions advanced, and the one on the left continued to fight in columns while St. Hilaire's fought in line.

What I haven't read about are columns targeting the end of a defending unit's line. I am sure it happened, particularly if the entire brigade attacked en echelon, but it considering the methods for moving troops, such pin-point targeting would be difficult.

The debate about the single battalion against the line (or part of the line) is valuable however what is often not discussed is the notion of the Brigade or even Division advancing in column. That gives the attacking column depth to follow up any success or repulse of the leading battalions and continue the attack, or deploy as a line of battle.

At Austerlitz, Soult's two divisions advanced, and the one on the left continued to fight in columns while St. Hilaire's fought in line.

What is your source for this?

"Cran"? Qu'est que c'est?

Sigler gives a good account of the action of St Hilaire's division. Use of both line and column as necessary.

See pp 120-137

link

What is your source for this?

Goetz and Bowden for starters Of course, both started in column formations and later St. H returned to columns to move south. As Mike said, 'as necessary.'

Could you give a citation and page number from Scott Bowden's volume.

I would also like to see the same from Goetz's book, though, again, the aspects of the book on the Grande Armee are not the best available.

Thank you all for your civil comments. On the battalion/company tactical level, I think that the experienced lower level officer (colonel or lower) had a big influence on the success of an attack. The French, where the officers at this level often came from deserved promotion of veterans or by transfer and promotion from the guards, rather than purchasing in rich brats, had a significant advantage relative to the monarch-lead countries.

If the attacking officer could find and line his troops up for an approach that was more poorly defended by fire, there would be more success. I think the French did it, the others (mainly English who did most of the writing that we read) did not and therefore could not replicate the success and found reasons why "it couldn't work" (despite much evidence to the contrary).

Realize also that attackers could not only exploit "defenders pointing the wrong way" that was illustrated in my 02 June post, but also differences in elevation & slope between the defender and attacker. The private soldier was taught to "level" his musket before firing and did not have sights to correctly elevate the muzzle for the range, did not correct for the trajectory of his round and did not correct for differences in elevation of the firer and target. A LOT of things could go wrong and entire volleys often missed, even at short range.

There were at least two major factors involved. The first can be said to be shear geometry again. Just one example (I may expand on this in a later post): A defender is standing at the top of a 15 degree slope (30 degrees is about as steep as you can walk up) link and is firing at an advancing column who are 150 yards away at the bottom of the slope. (That 150 yards is the distance that would be paced out, walking on the ground). An enemy soldier is now SEVEN (6') man heights the line-of-sight of that "leveled" musket. The leveled musket is not going to hit him.

The second factor is the poor trajectory of the smoothbore musket. A "roundball" has a terrible ballistic co-efficient- It has the minimum weight (think compared to a long cylindrical bullet) for its cross-sectional area, which means maximum air resistance and causes it to quickly slow down and sink greatly at larger range. The drop at 150 yards is on the order of 50", which is nearly the height of the average man of the time (68"). At longer range (300yards) the drop would be about 20 feet- 3-4 X the height of a man. They didn't have the ability to compensate.

So, a canny French actin-colonel, might approach the end of a knoll through a ravine, climb up a steep slope out of effective range and then do his divisional battalion attack (half the frontage of the battalion in line) at the apex of the angle of the enemy's line which followed the hilltop contour. We should take all these factors into consideration, when debating the "line versus column" question.

I don't know how much influence a colonel had, but certainly the généraux de brigades – who usually commanded one section of a line of battle of a division, they would have a word to say what tactical formation to be used in accordance to the divisional commanders.
A typical example is the tactical formations for the attack at Pratzen, the original tactical order of Napoleon, the change Soult made and again the change the brigade generals made, three different approaches.
The classic colonne d'attaque could be used in multiple ways – line – square – and column.
In 1813 Napoleon issued orders that the battalions should be trained to deploy from an attack column into line, there the leading division could already start to commence firing while the rest deployed, in case this as a classic colonne d'attaque or a column formed on the center, or a divisional column is difficult to access.
A colonne d'attaque could split in two when braking through the enemy line and roll up the line.
At Jemappes – some colonnes d'attaque deployed into line during an attack, but in my view this was a rare case.
In their prime – the French infantry used a combination of columns and lines.

if the attacking officer could find and line his troops up for an approach that was more poorly defended by fire, there would be more success. I think the French did it, the others (mainly English who did most of the writing that we read) did not and therefore could not replicate the success and found reasons why "it couldn't work" (despite much evidence to the contrary)

The dynamic here is wrong, on both sides. British writers, at the time and since, were confused as to why the French persisted in such clumsy attacks, rather than such skilful ones. Furthermore, sometimes the French were critical too.

This contrasts with the British high opinion of French (battlefield) discipline and courage upto 1813 and the prowess of French light troops, artillery and cavalry which also seem to have been highly respected, in general. We can thus conclude that British writers weren't shy of praising French skill where they saw it.

As I mentioned previously, your thought-provoking post has convinced me that the full firepower of lines were rarely brought into action on an individual column. However, I think this allows us to draw very different conclusions from the ones you appear to draw:

1. The "firepower advantage" of a line over a column could never exceed 2.5:1 or so, without moving the flanking companies, which as you point out, could not be done on many (the majority?) of occasions. I would suggest that where it could be done, the outcome was pre-ordained.

2. Casualties were lower but concentrated in the leading companies. This disruption would halt the attack of the battalion.

3. The fire from the leading companies of a column, or square, could halt an attack for the same reason: the casualties inflicted, although small in the context of the whole battalion, would inflict enough shock on that sub-unit to stop it. And this would in turn stop the attack of the parent unit, regardless of what its formation was.

4. Here we can see why attacks in line were often discouraged: they simply increased the numbers of dead without increasing your chances of success.

5. We see that the advantage of a line is to cover more ground with the same amount of troops, but is solid enough to discourage frontal cavalry attacks (which the various forms of skirmish and open order aren't).

6. From a wargames point of view, once we adopt this principle, we should use a mechanism that a line can fire with almost equal effect on all units which attack in its frontal arc. The old "four columns abreast and divide the casualties between them" tactic ceases to work, happily. The attacker will have to use skirmishers and artillery to do that prepatory work.

columns facialiate the passage of lines as well, the second battle line can even draw into the first one, or some battalions can be detached to the flanks of the first ones.

Two lines in column are far more manoueverable than two lines in lines.

The fact that the defending battalion delivers any kind of fire, and doesn't merely turn tail and run, is probably what stopped the attacker, not the numbers who fall. The more noise, the more the intimidation.

SJDonovan 02 Jun 2016 10:21 a.m. PST

I'm with Ligniere on this one. I think it is all about morale not firepower. If that long line in front of you doesn't start to waver when you approach then the chances are your column is going to grind to a halt.

That certainly seems to have happened on occasion in the winter of 1794-95 during the French breaching of the allied position on the Waal.

People seem to forget all those recorded incidents where a unit fired without inflicting any damage. Differences in elevation caused misses. Firing through a cloud of your own smoke made misses. Bent lines-of-battle that reduced firepower caused misses. Hitting the junction of two defending units caused misses. Having poorly understood or stated orders caused misses. There is a long list of "what can go wrong, goes wrong" that causes misses. ….

@1968billsfan
Clausewitz called in 'friction'

Yes it is "friction" but I think that it often favored the "canny French veteran" tactical commanders, rather than the "green noble young men" often commanding the corresponding allies. I see it playing out this way. The allied battalion/brigade commander would be given orders to set his line up along a feature or defending between two points by a division/corp commander who may not have even seen (nor explored) that area. The battalion/brigade commander would follow his orders as well as he could but might be more concerned with following the letter of the order without tactical considerations. Then the French attacker, would be like the fox stalking the henhouse. He could take time to investigate all avenues of approach, find the weakness in the position and exploit it in his attack. Going to a division column allowed him to attack by any one of various approaches, move quickly before the defender could react, maybe catch the defender moving and strike a more concentrated blow.

Better co-ordination between artillery and cavalry might be used to distract the enemy, freeze part of the enemy line or soften up the target area.

You might consider the division column to be a re-enforced line attack on a two company front.

ANYWAY, these are areas where French methods and better small level tactics would give them advantages, that are not seen on our wargaming table. In our wargames

• the game scale, (for most rulesets),
• 
  
• plain-ness of setup & terrain for the game, and
• 
  
• the even-ness of the maneavure speed & marching abilities

don't allow these advantages, which help the divisional column attack, to have its full effect.

I can only re-iterate: the French carried out hundreds of well-recorded attacks on the British and other Allied forces. They simply don't report what you are suggesting. For that matter, neither do the French sources.

I don't know of much evidence to support better French company and regimental leadership anyway. In so far as people have previously made this argument, it has been applied to the divisional/corps/wing/army level (where the nobility or otherwise of a commander might have been an issue in his appointment). It is a very shaky foundation to place the idea that the French suffered less battlefield friction upon. One might just as well argue that the increased complexity you are proposing for the French would lead to them being the more likely sufferers.

It is reasonably moot whether the French had a significant advantage in unit-level line infantry tactics at all, but one reasonable assumption is to see which of their opponents changed their regimental tactics. That would leave us with early Prussians and Austrians at a disdvantage, but not with British or Russians.

Your picture of infantry combat looks more relevant to the smokeless powder-era than the musket-era.

did anyone mention order of mixture in this thread yet, battalion in line with a battalion on each flank in column

I don't think so. I do believe that St Hilaire attacked in l'ordre mixte at Austerlitz.

Looking at period tactics one battalion at a time doesn't really explain how armies fought. Looking at brigades and divisions, as well as corps organization, especially in the Grande Armee is a good way to figure out how the French fought, and it was different from how the allies fought, especially in the numbers and missions of troops in open order/skirmishers.

It is also noteworthy that sometimes defensively the French would form their first line, depending on the commander, in a heavy skirmish line instead of in three ranks.

G'Day Bill

Napoleon himself stated that more often than naught…a close column cannot beat a fresh enemy battalion in line…also you should have taken notice of Hans-Karls postings…

Best Regards
Art

G'Day Bill

"I've seen arguments here at TMP that this angle was very small, as little as 15 degrees…."

If I recall correctly it was you who advocated 15 degrees for musketry…whilst Hans-Karl…myself…and the French military do not see it your way…

Andy et al…

"My understanding is the French would maneuver in column moving up to roughly 200 yards of the enemy then change into a line formation,move up to effective musket range…"

For the French it was never "une conduite à tenir" ou "principe général" to deploy a close column with the intentions of immediately deploying in the proximity of the enemy unless staggered.

Nevertheless as Hans-Karl pointed out…in accordance to the French ordre tactique or "l'ordre perpendiculaire" of 1803…and the instructions that Napoleon issued in 1813…the colonne d'attaque par bataillon would deploy on the flanks of the enemy on colonne d'attaque and could then deploy in line.

It was also une conduite à tenir ou principe général that if a close column formed as une colonne d'attaque and breached the enemy…it would deploy en colonne double…

A good example is the colonne par peloton serree breaching the enemy battle line, when the enemy started to stagger…as at the Battle of Valls in 1809.

Best Regards
Art

I do believe that St Hilaire attacked in l'ordre mixte at Austerlitz.

I think the problem with the thread question is the assumption that troops, French or Allied stayed in the same formation throughout a fight…

According to Soult's reports and other accounts, both Vandamme's and St. Hilaire's divisions advanced in three lines, Schiner and Morand's light infantry brigades leading, with the line brigades in the second and third lines. All in battalion columns. However, once near the enemy, both divisions had battalions and brigades deploy into line and in several places beat the Allied troops with volley fire. Colin provides a detailed analysis of the orders issued by Napoleon and Soult. The entire engagement is described from pages 146 to 160 in Goetz's book 1805: Austerlitz as does Bowden's book on the campaign.

Art,

No you are wrong. I did not advocate 15% as the angle of wiggle for firing. I said that a lot of rules used 45% or 30% and some other posters demanded that 15% was the maximum angle of deflection. By the way- take some of your figures that are in 'firing at the shoulder" poise and line them up at the actual scale spacing. The 15% argument looks pretty good when you do that. I really don't have a strong opinion one way or another, but do recall some arguments from the period that the third rank was a bad idea because it killed more front rank troops of your own battalion than enemy troops.

Art,

If I recall correctly it was you who advocated 15 degrees for musketry…whilst Hans-Karl…myself…and the French military do not see it your way…

I have not studied your previous posts here or in other threads. Who is "Hans-Karl" and could you give the reference to the ultimate opinion of the "French military", who "do not see it your way"?

I wish to remind people that a "divisional COLUMN" is just a doubled "LINE of BATTLE". It is half the length. It is not one quarter the length. It is not one tenth the length. It is not 8 files wide.

Perhaps we should think of it as an "doubled assault line", where the entire array is from the same unit and comfortable with their comrades and officers.

One more comment, I agree that a column attack at the center of a straight, unshaken, un-bombarded battalion, in line, on clear level terrain with NO distractions was unlikely to succeed. It stands to reason, for anyone with a bit of common sense and not trying to be a troll, that IF THIS were NOT the case… when then the 3 rank deep line of battle would have been abandoned for some other formation. Geeesh !!

G'Day Bill

You can start here…

TMP link

TMP link

TMP link

Hmmm…I do not recall saying ultimate…but OK…Meunier…Rocquancourt…Loverdo…epagogique colonnes in the French ordinance…then I suggest you look into the treatise on l'Ordre Perpendiculaire…the faults in the princples de l'ordre separee…

Afterwards read Gerome…Givet…and in English read Fonseca on how the French…Prussians…and British had sub factions on the flanks of the parent battalions executing a wheel to put oblique fire on the enemy…for validation read Bressonnet and Foucart

As for a divisional column just a doubled line…this is totallly incorrect and is in violation of article 7, du décret impérial du 18 février 1808…

Article 7, du décret impérial du 18 février 1808; pertains to the general principles of mass and profounder, it has absolutely nothing to do with the need of forming a square, for a French column with 5 pelotons is capable of forming square.

But you are correct…six ranks was a ligne double…and was never considered a colonne. When the French executed a ligne double it was a counter measure for cavalry.

As for why the French kept three ranks…because it was thought that each sub-faction required three ranks…and a colonne needed 9 ranks for mass and shock…FACT.

Those countries that formed their bodies of troops in two ranks preferred a military system that was defensive in nature. Those that preferred three ranks had a military system that based their military system upon an offensive/tirailleur role.

Here is an example of Napoleon cheat the general principles…

1555: Duben (20 miles from Leipzig), 13 Octobre 1813

Napoleon orders that the entire army is to form 2 ranks, whether it be en ligne ou meme colonne par division. He states that the third rank is irrelative (since they are now fighting mainly defensive battles -not totally useless as some suggest), and it shall give "the greatest advantage" for a battalion of 500 men, with the impression of a battalion of 750 men. This effect shall have a great impact, because the enemy will not know of this nouvelle ordonnance. One hour after the receipt of this order, everything must be arranged.

Napoleon then goes on to say that a colonne par division (not colonne d'attaque formed on the center) gave a colonne a depth of six ranks and three more for the serre-files. -remember that the colonne par division and colonne d'attaque formed on the center are not derivative in all roles.

Napoleon by means of including the serre-files into the equation of depth, he now meets the requirements for mass in any particular circumstance that require shock.

There are some modern researchers that there is no evidence that the orders issued on 13 Octobre 1813 actually transpired. Just remember that "the lack of evidence does not mean there is no evidence"…and secondly, which commander in their right mind would fail to execute such an order, knowing that Napoleon may venture by?

At Lindenthal just north of Leipzig he issued another order to the 6e corps which occupied the woods for the three divisions to form in two ranks in lieu of three. Your fire will be better, your strength will be a third stronger; the enemy has become accustomed to us and knows we are in three ranks, they shall think our battalions are a third stronger. Give the most precise orders for the execution of the present disposition.

Best Regards
Art

I have been interested in these questions for meany years,
Translating it all to the table top and still have a workable set of rules.

From the Early Revolution to the heights in 1805 and 1809 to the mass use of conscripts of 1813 and 1814, the quality of the French infantry must very greatly, and with that the tactics they can employ.

According to Soult's reports and other accounts, both Vandamme's and St. Hilaire's divisions advanced in three lines, Schiner and Morand's light infantry brigades leading, with the line brigades in the second and third lines. All in battalion columns. However, once near the enemy, both divisions had battalions and brigades deploy into line and in several places beat the Allied troops with volley fire. Colin provides a detailed analysis of the orders issued by Napoleon and Soult. The entire engagement is described from pages 146 to 160 in Goetz's book 1805: Austerlitz as does Bowden's book on the campaign.

What 'other accounts?'

And how were the three lines composed? Were the battalions in each line in line, column, or open order?

The term 'line' when used indifferently can ignore the fact that the line mentioned could be, for example, a line of battalions columns. It does not necessarily mean the units composing those lines were deployed in line.