"Soviet forward artillery observer transportation" Topic
19 Posts
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Muerto | 26 May 2016 8:49 a.m. PST |
Hi folks, I might tap into the knowledge base here. When a Red FAO got about, how did he do it? T-70? White car? ZiS-5? Horse?? I want to use the optional command-units-as-proper-units rule in Blitzkrieg Commander, and running about on foot might not cut it. Thanks. |
Barin1 | 26 May 2016 9:01 a.m. PST |
there's a WWII text on artillery scouting/fire correction, in Russian of course. link Not sure what Google translate will make out of it, but in short it lists two option: - radio equipped tank - on feet, accompanied by a designated team |
Extra Crispy | 26 May 2016 9:24 a.m. PST |
Mine drives one of these: link |
Muerto | 26 May 2016 10:23 a.m. PST |
Many thanks, Barin. I shall name my FAO Евгений, put him in my best-painted tank, and he shall cause many krauts to be blasted in your honour. Extra Crispy, your FAO is one baaaaad mofo. |
Barin1 | 26 May 2016 11:50 a.m. PST |
Thanks Muerto, hope I'm not going to die more often than absolutely required by Soviet Motherland ;) One of my grandfathers finished the war as a captain in ZIS-3 76mm guns battery, and during my army service I also was in artillery, and even in recon /FAO team ;) |
Extra Crispy | 26 May 2016 1:09 p.m. PST |
@Muerto: His ride is. Unfortunately with that sound system, NATO hears him two miles off…. |
Mark 1 | 26 May 2016 5:07 p.m. PST |
Barin1's link is quite interesting… (THANK YOU BARIN1!) However I fear that the conclusion he has posted here:
Not sure what Google translate will make out of it, but in short it lists two option: - radio equipped tank - on feet, accompanied by a designated team
… may not be an answer to the OP, is it first appears. The link posted was to the first chapter of a 1947 compendium of Soviet artillery experiences in WW2. That first chapter was specific to the artillery intelligence service. The reference to the tank, or to the team on foot, were not "observers" in the sense that we would understand with a British, German or American artillery observer. These were examples of a Soviet intelligence team from an artillery division, not a forward observer from an infantry or tank unit's dedicated artillery. Better choices might be Chapter 3, which includes case histories on observation posts, or Chapter 4 with addresses Artillery in Offensive Operations, including battery operations in combat in the depth of the enemy defenses. These are found by backing up one level from Barin1's link: link … and then going down to Chapter 3 (Глава III. Боевые порядки) or Chapter 4 (Глава IV. Артиллерия в наступлении), and following those links. The core issue to understand, something which is difficult to replicate in many rulesets, is that the Red Army of WW2 did not, as a general rule, HAVE forward observers. At least not in the sense of the FOs/FAOs of the British/Commonwealth, German or US armies. It is my understanding that in the Red Army the origination of fire missions, and the correction of fire, was generally done by the battery or regiment commander. There was no junior officer trained in observation serving as a designated Forward Observer. The battery itself was generally left in the hands of the battery 2iC, and the battery CO went forward to a forward observation post, from which he observed the battle and issued his fire orders. This observation post was often co-located with the attacking unit's commander's observation post, so that close coordination could be achieved with the commander of the attack. If that observation post was well sited, the fire was effective. If it was not well sited, there was little in the way of effective fire support. Once the advance had moved beyond that OP's range of vision, everything had to be re-located and re-established before effective control of the artillery was possible. In the case described in the Barin1's link, an officer from the Artillery Division's intelligence service went forward in a tank. He even had a map! (The book makes a point of highlighting that!) On the map he had all of the pre-designated, pre-sited, pre-registered missions for his artillery batteries. As he traveled forward with the advancing troops, he called in which of the pre-registered fire-missions should actually be fired, and even provided some corrections to the fire on those pre-designated targets. He did not originate any fire missions, he only selected which of the fire missions would actually be fired, and when. In the case of the team on foot, it was a deep reconnaissance team from the Artillery Division intelligence service, which infiltrated the enemy defensive zone, identified and mapped out enemy artillery positions. Again not at all what we mean when we generally refer to a forward observer. Again all just from my reading. Never served in a Red Army artillery unit personally, nor even spoke directly with anyone who did (before this!). -Mark (aka: Mk 1) |
Muerto | 26 May 2016 9:07 p.m. PST |
Thanks Mark. I guess in game terms not much changes: what the book calls an FAO we know to be an intelligence officer. I model a map on Barin's tank's turret for him to read, and where the book says he's calling attacks on newly-found targets we know he's confirming what's on the map before his grandfather blasts it. For a second of what the book calls an FAO I put an element next to the overall commander and call it a battery CO. All that's left now is whether Barin would prefer a T-34/85 or an IS-2 for his glorious but never unnecessary battlefield sacrifices? |
Mark 1 | 26 May 2016 10:13 p.m. PST |
I guess in game terms not much changes: what the book calls an FAO we know to be an intelligence officer. I model a map on Barin's tank's turret for him to read, and where the book says he's calling attacks on newly-found targets we know he's confirming what's on the map before his grandfather blasts it. If you believe that an intelligence officer from a Soviet Artillery Division is essentially the same thing as a British or US forward observer, except that we call him Barin1 and give him a map, then I have clearly failed to communicate the essentials of what I thought we were discussing. If I were gaming it (and I have, often enough, though never with Barin1 before…), it would be more like: In 1 out of 10 of my games, IF I am leading a deliberate (ie: prepared) attack I have a tank with Barin1 in it (an intelligence officer from a supporting artillery division). Before the game I draw up a map of the battlefield and put 5 pre-identified target locations on it. These target locations are geographical targets, with no more than 1 target per square Kilometer. If my game board is less than 5 sq. Km I get fewer identified targets. During the game, if Barin1 has visibility on enemy activity at any of those pre-identified target points, he calls the fire of an artillery regiment on it. This decision to fire is automatic depending on whether the Barin1 figure has visibility on a target. As the attacking force commander I was able to consult with Barin1 on the targets on the map, but while he is in his tank I am not in communications with him. He calls the fire, I have no say in the matter. When his fire missions take place they consist of a medium battalion with 3 x 6-gun batteries of 122mm howitzers, a heavy battalion with 2 x 6-gun batteries of 152mm and and a super-heavy battalion of 2 x 2-gun batteries of 203mm howitzers. If it is the target area I pre-identified on the map as my #1 priority target (1 of the 5) he also adds a battalion of 3 x 4-launcher batteries of 132mm Katyusha rocket launchers. Barin1 would be a monster on my game board. The firepower he controls would typically be several times greater than the firepower of the entire force I have on the game board. Many gamers would learn to hate Barin1, if they are unfortunate enough to park their uber-panzers in any of the areas I expect them to park in. Often, if a Barin1 fire mission does in fact find the enemy, the forces in his target area will be effectively removed from play. Sometimes there may be enough survivors for partial-strength units to remain in the game … sometimes. Barin1 can not call for fire on any targets of opportunity. Well, actually he can, but it requires a number of turns equivalent to 6D10 minutes of time for the fire mission to be plotted and coordinated between the various batteries before the fire arrives. (My games are not usually long enough for this to happen.) In all of my games, if I am launching a deliberate attack or conducting a deliberate (ie: prepared) defense, I have a battery commander in an OP in a fixed location that can call for fire from 1 dedicated support battery (6 x 76mm guns or 8 x 120mm mortars) on any visible target of opportunity. If the target is outside of the spotting range and/or line-of-site of the pre-located OP, it can not be engaged. This OP can not call for any of the resources of the Artillery Division unless Barin1 is actually at the OP. If the Barin1 figure is in the OP he still calls for fire only on the pre-plotted targets on his map, but hey at least I can ask him to fire on those where he can not see enemies directly, or ask him NOT to fire on those where he CAN see the enemy, if I choose. Oh he can also call for opportunity fire, paying the same 6D10 minutes of delay. If the game involves a meeting engagement, a movement-to-contact, a reconnaissance-in-force, a hasty attack, or a hasty defense, I get no artillery support beyond direct fire units on the gameboard. I know this takes us somewhat afield of the original question, which was just what vehicle to put the forward observer in. But my point is that there is no question of what vehicle the forward observer should be in, as there should be no forward observer in the sense of what most rulesets describe as the forward observer. I don't have any rulesets that run Soviet arty in a way that really gives me the dominant characteristics of LOW command/control flexibility and OVERWHELMING concentrations of firepower that characterized Soviet artillery in WW2. So in my experience, running Soviet artillery with any effort of recreating some of the historical flavor always changes the terms of the game. But your results may vary. -Mark (aka: Mk 1) |
Muerto | 26 May 2016 11:45 p.m. PST |
If you believe that an intelligence officer from a Soviet Artillery Division is essentially the same thing as a British or US forward observer, except that we call him Barin1 and give him a map, then I have clearly failed to communicate the essentials of what I thought we were discussing. I understood, but I'm working within the framework of an existing rule set. These, contrary to the evidence we have, prescribe a FAO to late-war Soviet armies that doesn't differ in function from any other army. I don't aim to change the abstractions of the game to give a more accurate portrayal of Red Army command and control, but rather to model that FAO element in a way that looks like the nearest historical equivalent. So, bloke in a tank with a map. Cheers for the help – I'd like to name the second FAO element next to the HQ element Марк in your honour. |
Barin1 | 27 May 2016 3:16 a.m. PST |
Thanks Mark, once again there's a case of difficulties of translation. When I started looking for the link, i had to translate forward observer into Russian, so I went for – корректировщик артиллерийского огня, and the manual came up in the first 5 links. As far as I recall from grandfther's stories (it was like 30 years ago..) his unit rarely had fire coordinators when they were attacking. If there was a time to prepare defensive position, there might be an observation post to correct the fire till the enemy was too close. Battery commanders were operating their guns "on sight" , their ZIS-3 in most of the cases were shooting at smth they could see. In defence they might be called from unit HQ to relocate the fire – by wire phone or by a messenger. Radios were rare, especially before 1943. In attack they were together with infantry – he was at Dniepr operation, where light artillery was crossing the river with infantry, and fighting hand in hand to establish a foothold on enemy side. In this case after initial barrage against enemy MG/artillery spoptted on the way, infantry commander was calling shots. Long range artillery was operated differently, we, in 1985-1987 when drilling for offensive, had a moving forward post – ca 10 people – communications, laser measuring device, deputy polk commander, etc. who was calling shots in visible distance. When the enemy was forced into retreat, both d-30 and our post were moving forward, to the places previously scouted or determined to be suitable for operation. In defence we even had cable lines between the batteries, HQ and coordination posts…. |
Kelly Armstrong | 27 May 2016 5:23 a.m. PST |
Soviets fired a lot of artillery over "open sights" through all of WWII also to compensate for their lack of observed fire flexibility. "Open Sights" involves the battery crew sighting and correcting their own fire as well as firing from defilade positions and correcting their own fire from a nearby observation post. All very limited stuff. Even in '44-'45 the Soviets were routinely outpacing their artillery fire after a breakthrough or during battles with daily advances. Mobile rocket launchers and mortar battalions were best able to keep up with an advance. A "bloke in a tank with a map" would be rare thing and likely only found in the centerpiece assault of a primary offensive. Usually you just have artillery commander in a jeep with a crude map based on quick survey. |
Kelly Armstrong | 27 May 2016 5:53 a.m. PST |
Command Decision is one set of rules that let you model various artillery indirect fire regimes. Simplified, artillery is organic or not to a commander, artillery is either in general support or direct support, and observers can be dedicated or not. In the game (15-30 minute turns) any command stand can call any artillery but with varying degrees of success based on the above factors. Fire will either arrive that turn (~15 minutes) or the next (~30-60 minutes later). Western Allies can bring down battalion fire easily, Germans can usually bring in battery fire easily, Soviets have a tougher time getting fire (less direct support, no dedicated), but when they get it, there is a lot of it depending on if the spotting commander is the artillery battalion, regiment, or brigade commander. |
Marc33594 | 27 May 2016 6:24 a.m. PST |
Outstanding discussion and quite illuminating. Thank you. |
Starfury Rider | 27 May 2016 7:24 a.m. PST |
The 1942 Rifle Div Arty Regt only had a few vehicles allocated, 2 trucks, 1 staff car and 15 tractors, adding 2 trucks by the 'final' Dec42 table. The Regt had a small Recce Pl under RHQ, all on horses, plus a Topographical Recce Pl. Each Bn then had an Intel Sec with observer-scouts, no officer. There was then a Pl(word won't paste the Cyrillic into here), which I can't get a decent translation for, I'm guessing ranging/fire control? There was then the Sigs Pl, which included an Inf Liaison Det. Each Firing Bty then had a HQ, an HQ Pl, the latter with scout/observers plus Sigs, and two Firing Pls. There were a fair few officers at various levels, but nothing really identified as a made to measure forward observation unit. There was also a HQ Pl that could be attached, with scout-observer, telegraph and radio sections. That's for Inf Div Arty only, based on the full tables of organisation. Gary |
Muerto | 27 May 2016 8:22 a.m. PST |
Given these last comments, it may be better to have all my artillery on-table with no observer. Thanks again folks! |
Andy ONeill | 27 May 2016 9:15 a.m. PST |
If you wanted to keep it simple then you could say. All sov artillery fire is pre arranged or direct. Unless you design a specific scenario. |
Mark 1 | 27 May 2016 2:09 p.m. PST |
Barin1: Thank you SO much for recounting your grandfather's stories! I always appreciate the first-hand accounts, even if they are related 2nd hand. The information you have recalled is for the most part entirely consistent with what I have read in my studies over the years. Drawing the key lessons from your retelling of your grandfather's experiences:
1. … his unit rarely had fire coordinators when they were attacking. 2. [In a] defensive position, there might be an observation post to correct the fire … 3. Radios were rare, especially before 1943. 4. In attack they were [advancing] together with infantry … after initial barrage against enemy MG/artillery… 5. Battery commanders were operating their guns "on sight" , their ZIS-3 in most of the cases were shooting at [something] they could see.
Most of my posting above focused on indirect fire. But the dominant method for light artillery (mortars from 50mm to 120mm, often rocket artillery ["guards mortars"], and 76mm guns) was direct fire at targets visible to the battery or the battery's command post. Too few rule sets manage to provide for direct area fire by artillery. Direct fire at a point target? Sure. But direct fire and an area? Too many presume area fire is always indirect. While it places the battery in greater danger of return fire, it is also a very effective way to shoot … no delays in communicating and correcting the fall of shot when the gunners can see their fire directly. And few rule sets give any mechanisms for gamers to experience the limitations on command and control that Soviet artillery operated under. By the way, French, Italian and Romanian artillery should also have limited capabilities compared to British/Commonwealth, U.S. or German artillery. The Italians were perhaps a bit better on command/control than the other lesser combatants. But they, and the Romanians, would not be be anywhere near as able to achieve overwhelming concentrations of fire as the Soviets were. The French were indeed able to mount impressive concentrations of fire, but were almost as hampered as the Soviets in command/control. Too many rules give clear differences between a 1942 German Landsehr squad and a 1943 German Panzergrenedier squad, but make no distinctions between German and American and Soviet artillery. Yet throughout the war it was artillery that caused the majority of casualties. It is too often a disappointing afterthought. -Mark (aka: Mk 1) |
number4 | 01 Jun 2016 8:46 p.m. PST |
It is my understanding that in the Red Army the origination of fire missions, and the correction of fire, was generally done by the battery or regiment commander. There was no junior officer trained in observation serving as a designated Forward Observer. The battery itself was generally left in the hands of the battery 2iC, and the battery CO went forward to a forward observation post, from which he observed the battle and issued his fire orders. This observation post was often co-located with the attacking unit's commander's observation post, so that close coordination could be achieved with the commander of the attack. What you have described there Mark is also the system operated by the US artillery. The only difference being that they would train line officers and even enlisted men from the battery to act as OP's on rotation. They could request fire missions, but all the decisions were made by the battery or regimental FDC. Quite different from the British practice. In actual fact, almost all artillery fire is pre-plotted: a unit in defense should have all likely avenues of approach registered so that fire can be brought down immediately a prearranged signal is sent. And very few attacks are set up without an artillery fire plan that is worked up hours or even days ahead of time. These fire plans are the logical extension or the timed barrages of the First World War. In both case, fresh targets can be engaged quickly by referencing a previously recorded shoot EG: "Target Baker 23, left 100, 3 rounds gunfire" |
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